terms here enumerated, and for syllogisms, which have for their materials the several species of propositions, both these naturally make subsequent and distinct parts of logic, and must therefore be consigned to some future speculation.

If we go back further, and recur to theorems of science, or to sciences themselves, these will be found not properly parts of logic, but works of a different and higher character; works where logic serves the philosopher for an instrument or organ, as the chisel serves the statuary, the pencil serves the painter. At present we are to proceed to the speculation concerning substance.

CHAPTER III.

CONCERNING SUBSTANCE NATURAL-HOW CONTINUED, OR CARRIED ON. PRINCIPLES OF THIS CONTINUATION, TWO-INCREASED TO THREE— REDUCED AGAIN TO TWO. THESE LAST TWO, FORM AND A SUBJECT, OR RATHER FORM AND MATTER.

To explain how natural substances originally began, is a task too arduous for unassisted philosophy. But to inquire after what manner, when once begun, they have been continued, is a work better suited to human abilities: because to a portion of this continuity we are personally present; nay, within it we ourselves are all included, as so many parts.

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Now as to the manner, in which subsists the continuity of natural substances, and as to the causes by which that continuity is maintained, there is no one, it is probable, who imagines every birth, every recent production that daily happens in the universe, to be an absolutely fresh creation; a realizing of nonentity; an evocation (if it may be so described) of something out of nothing. What then is it? It is a change or mutation out of something which was before. It appears, therefore, that to inquire how natural substances are continued, is to inquire what are the principles of mutation or change.

First, then, let us observe, what is in fact most obvious, that there can be no mutation or change, were every thing to remain

The doctrine of causes, and their different species, is treated at large through the whole Treatise upon Art, and in the notes subjoined to the same, particularly page 59.

The author desires to inform his readers, that in the subsequent disquisitions he hath not confined himself merely to logic, but has interspersed many speculations of dif ferent kinds; acting in this view differently from the model set him by the Stagirite. The Stagirite left no part of philosophy un

explored, and of course had separate and distinct treatises for logic, physics, and the many other branches of science, as well the practical as the speculative. Not so the author of this treatise: he by no means pretends to emulate the comprehensive variety of that sublime and acute genius, whose writings made him for more than two thousand years the admiration of Grecians, Romans, Arabians, Jews, and Christians. Such esteem could not have been the effect either of fashion or of chance.

precisely one and the same; hot and cold, precisely as they are, one hot, the other cold; so likewise crooked and straight, black and white, &c. On the contrary, mutation or change is from one thing into another: from hot into cold, or from cold into hot; from straight into crooked, or from crooked into straight; and so in other instances. It follows hence, that the principles of mutation or change are necessarily two; one, a principle out of which; the other, a principle into which.

Again, these two principles are not merely casual and temerarious. Hot changes not into crooked, but into cold; crooked not into cold, but into straight; white not into moist, but into black; moist not into black, but into dry. The same holds in other instances more complicated." The becoming a statue is a change from indefinite configuration into definite; the becoming a palace, a change from dispersion into combination, from disorder into order. Already the principles which we investigate have appeared to be two; and now it further appears that they must be contraries or opposites.b

Authority is not wanting to countenance this last position. The Scripture tells us, that the earth in the beginning was "without form and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep." After thus it became enlightened as well as replenished: replenished with various forms, both vegetable and animal; enlightened by the sublime command of, "Let there be light, and there was light." In the whole of this progress we may remark contrariety; formless opposed to form; void to replenished; and darkness to light.

* Thus Aristotle: Пâra μeraßox or Te vores els ra He then subjoins the etymology of the word weraßexy, to confirm δεν ειχεν: δηλοῖ γὰρ καὶ τούνομα. Μετ' Αλλο θα το καὶ τὸ μὲν πρότερον δηλοῖ τὸ Arr: "even the name," says he, "shows it: for it is something after someελεύτης εἶχε ὁ από one of these things denotes

, the other denotes swisement." Physic. lib. v. e. 1. p. 93. edit. Sylb,

Thus the same author: 'Ardra Tv derwer vidèr edre moveûr repower, obre ráotered regula and Top TuyaPros, oùdè Severadrenor & drovoir-dAAd Aeror wo acrera eg og Aeixos, kai robrou our el marele d11'de aclaros § rŵr ueralt, awar. A. “Universally with wgand to all beings whatever, no one being is formed by nature either to act upon any other minivently, or to be acted upon in di kuwaty z mar is any thing produced or gsmid pindiscriminately] out of any Dogg, Patola is generated or produced out of womething as what ; and this not chey Phong that may be so called, but We et ac black, or some of the interGAM KYNNIN The some holds as to the

production of what is musical," &c. Arist. Phys. 1. i. c. 5. p. 14. edit. Sylb.

* Καὶ τὰ μὴ ἁπλᾶ τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ σύνθετα, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον τε γὰρ οἰκία γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ συγκεῖσθαι, dà diņpñobai radi wôl xal d àvôpías Kai τῶν ἐσχηματισμένων τι ἐξ ἀσχημοσύνης, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων τὰ μὲν τάξις, τὰ δὲ ouvbeois tis èotiv: "Beings, too, which are not simple, but composite, admit the same reasoning-for the house is formed from certain materials, which are not previously so compounded [as to make a house], but which lie separate; and the statue, and every one of those things which have figure given them, are formed out of something which wants that figure; and each production has a different name; sometimes it is order, sometimes it is composition.” Arist. Phys. L. i. c. 5. p. 14, 15.

See the same author in the same treatise, p. 11, 12, &c. See also the quotation in the text from Scripture, which imme diately follows, as well as the subsequent notes.

* Genesis, chap. i.

Among the ancient philosophers, some held the principles of things to be hot and cold; others, to be moist and dry; others, to be dense and rare; others, in a more abstracted way, to be excess and defect; even and odd; friendship and strife. Among the moderns, we know the stress laid on action and reaction; attraction and repulsion; expansion and condensation; centripetal and centrifugal: to which may be added those two principles, held by many ancients as well as moderns, the principles of atoms and a void, which two stand opposed nearly as being and non-being.

We shall subjoin the following passage from a treatise of ancient date, because in it the force of contraries is exemplified with elegance.

"Some (says an ancient author) have wondered how the world, if it be composed, as it appears, out of contrary principles, (the dry, the moist, the cold, and the hot,) has not for ages ago been ruined and destroyed. As if indeed men should wonder how a city could subsist, composed (as it is) out of contrary tribes, (I mean, the poor and the opulent, the young and the aged, the weak and the strong, the good and the bad,) and be ignorant that this of all things is most admirable in political concord; I mean, that by admitting every nature and every fortune, it forms out of many dispositions one disposition; and out of dissimilar ones, a similar. Perhaps also nature herself has an affection for contraries, and chooses out of these to form the consonant, and not out of things similar; so that in the same manner as she associated the male to the female, and not each to its own sex, did she establish through contraries, and not similars, the first and original concord. Art, too, in imitation of nature, appears to do the same. Thus painting, by blending the natures of things white and black, pale and red, produces representations consonant to their originals. Thus music, by mixing together sounds that are sharp and flat, that are long and short, out of different voices produces one harmony. Thus grammar, by forming a mixture out of vowels and "Democritus," says Aristotle, "holds the solid and the void," To σTepeòv kal Kevdy," to be principles," v Tò uèv s ov, Tò d'ús oùк by elvai onσi, “of which he says the one is the same as being, the other the same as non-being.' See Arist. Phys. 1. i. c. 5. p. 13. See also c. 4. p. 11, where the other contraries are explained at large.

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* See the treatise, Пeрl кóσμov. It is given to Aristotle, and always makes a part of his works; but although it be of genuine antiquity, and truly sublime, both in language and sentiment, yet some have thought it of a later period, and not written in the close manner and style of Aristotle. A translation of it is extant, as old as by the philosopher Apuleius, besides other transla

tions more modern. The tract itself stands the fifth in the volume of Aristotle's physical pieces, according to Sylburgius's edition, and the passage here translated may be found, cap. 5. page 12, of that edition, beginning at the words, Kaí Toι Yé Tis

aúμaσe Tŵs TоTE ei èk Tŵv èvavríwv, K. T.λ. In Apuleius the words are, Et quibusdam mirum videri solet, quod, cum ex diversis, &c. p. 731. edit. in Usum Delphini. quarto.

See Fabricius's Biblioth. Græc. vol. ii. p. 127; where the learned author, with his usual labour and accuracy, has collected all the sentiments both of ancients and moderns on this valuable work.

mutes, through these hath established the whole of its art. And this is what appears to have been the meaning of that obscure philosopher Heraclitus. You are, says he, to connect the perfect and the imperfect, the agreeing and the disagreeing, the consonant and the dissonant; and out of all things, one; and out of one, all things."

Thus far this ingenious author, with regard to whose doctrine, as well as that of the many others already mentioned, we cannot but remark, that whatever may have caused such an unanimity of opinion, whether it were that men adopted it from one another by a sort of tradition, or were insensibly led to it by the latent force of truth; all philosophers, of all ages, appear to have favoured contrariety, and given their sanction to the hypothesis, that principles are contraries.

But further still: "It is impossible for contrarieties to coexist, in the same place, at the same instant." It is impossible, for example, that in the same place and instant should co-exist cold and hot, crooked and straight, dispersion and combination, disorder and order. As therefore the principles of change are contraries, and contraries cannot co-exist, it follows that one principle must necessarily depart, as the other accedes. Thus in the mutation out of disorder into order, when the principle into which, that is, order accedes, the principle out of which, that is, disorder departs. The same happens in all other in

stances.

A question then arises. If one of them necessarily depart as soon as the other accedes, how can nature possibly maintain the continuity of her productions? To depart, is to be no more, a sort of annihilation, or death; to accede, is to pass into being, a sort of production, or birth. They cannot co-exist, because they are absolutely incompatible; so that upon this hypothesis there can be no continuity at all, but every new production must be a realizing of nonentity, a fresh and genuine evocation of something out of nothing.

If this in the continuity of beings appear a difficulty, let us try whether we can remove it by any aid not yet suggested. Crooked, we are told, is changed into straight, a contrary into a

* Πάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑπ ̓ αὐτῶν καλουμένας ἀρχὰς, καίπερ ἄνευ λόγου τιθέντες, ὅμως τἀναντία λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκασθέντες: "For all philosophers hold the elements and those other causes, which they call principles, (though they suppose them, without giving a reason,) to be contraries, compelled, as it were, to do so by truth itself.” Aristot. Phys. 1. i. c. 5. p. 15.

« Τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν δύο μόνον, ἔχει τινὰ λόγον ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις, πῶς ἡ πυκνότης τὴν μανότητα ποιεῖν πέφυκεν, ἢ αὐτὴ τὴν πυκνότητα· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλη ὁποιανοῦν ἐναν

τιότης: “That we should not make two principles only, has some appearance of reason: for a man may well doubt, how density should be formed by nature to make rarity, or this last, density; and so in like manner with respect to any other contrariety whatever." Arist. Phys. 1. i. c. 6. p. 16.

Simplicius well observes-τὸ μὲν γὰρ ποιοῦν εἰς ὑπομένον τι ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον οὐχ ὑπομένει τὸ ἐναντίον: “ That which acts, acts upon something which remains ; but contrary does not remain and wait for contrary." Simpl. in Præd. p. 43. B. edit. Basil. 1551.

contrary; one of which necessarily departs, and the other accedes. We admit it. But is there not something which, during the change, neither departs nor accedes? Something which remains, and is all along still one and the same."

The stick, for example, changes from crooked into straight; and if there was not a stick, or something analogous, no such change could be effected. Yet is it less a stick for becoming straight; or was it more so when crooked? Does it not remain,i considered as a stick, precisely, in either case, one and the same? As therefore the stick is to crooked and straight, so is the bar of iron to hot and cold; the brass of the statue to figure and deformity; the stones of the palace to order and confusion; and something, analogous in other changes, to other contraries, not enumerated.

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If, therefore, we were right in what we asserted before, and are so in what we assert now, it should seem that the principles of change or mutation were three: one, that which deκαὶ τῷ ἀμούσῳ εἶναι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ ̓ οὐχ ὑπομένει· τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὑπομένει ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὑπομένει) τὸ δὲ ἄμουσον οὐχ ̓ ὑπομένει: “ It is necessary that in every production there should be a subject, [or a substratum,] and this, though one numerically, yet not one in form, (I mean, by one in form, the same as one in reason, in detail, or definition.) Thus it is not the same thing to be a man, and to be a being immusical, or void of musical art. [In the formation of a musician,] the one remains, the other remains not; the subject or substratum remains, (for man remains ;) the being immusical, or void of musical art, remains not," [for that is lost as soon as he becomes an artist.] Arist. Phys. 1. i. c. 7. p. 18. edit. Sylb.

* Καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς λέγει Διογένης, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἅπαντα, οὐκ ἂν ἦν τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οἷον τὸ θερμὸν ψύχεσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο θερμαίνεσθαι πάλιν· οὐ γὰρ ἡ θερμότης μεταβάλλει καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης εἰς ἀλλήλα, ἀλλὰ δῆλον, ὅτι τὸ ὑποκείμενον· ὥστε ἐν οἷς τὸ ποιεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀνάγκη τούτων μίαν εἶναι τὴν Væоkeшμévηv púσw: "And this is rightly said by Diogenes, that if all things were not out of one thing, it would not be possible for them to act, or be acted upon by one another: for example, that what is hot should become cold; or reciprocally, that this should become hot; for it is not the heat or the coldness which change into one another, but it is that evidently changes which is the subject of these affections: whence it follows, that in those things where there is acting, and being acted upon, it is necessary there should belong to them some one nature, their common subject." Arist. de Gener. et Cor. lib. i. c. 6. p. 20. edit. Sylb.

Aristotle, who gives this quotation, well remarks, that it was too much to affirm this of all things, but that it should be confined to such things only as reciprocally act, and are acted upon; and so in his comment we may perceive he restrains them.

See more of this one being, the common subject, or substratum, in the following chapter.

The Diogenes here mentioned was a contemporary of Anaxagoras, and lived many years before the cynic of the same name. See Diog. Laert. ix. 57.

1 Ὅτι δεῖ ἀεί τι ὑποκεῖσθαι τὸ γιγνόμενον, καὶ τοῦτο εἰ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἐστὶν ἐν, ἀλλ ̓ εἴδει γε οὐχ ἵν' (τὸ γὰρ εἴδει λέγῳ, καὶ λόγῳ ταὐτόν.) οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἀνθρώπῳ

The production, or formation here spoken of, means the becoming a musician by the acquisition of the musical art. The same reasoning may be applied to any other art or science, which man, as man, is capable of acquiring.

Again, the same philosopher: "ETI TÒ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ ̓ ἐναντίον οὐχ ὑπομένει ἔστιν ἄρα τὶ τρίτον παρὰ τὰ ἐναντία: "Add to this (says he) there is something [in productions of all kinds] which remains; but the contrary does not remain; there is therefore some third thing over and above the contraries." Metaph. A. p. 196. edit. Sylb.

If there appear a difficulty in the first quotation of this note, concerning a subject being one numerically, but not so in form, or character, see note on the word privation, in the first part of the following chapter.

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Διόπερ, εἴ τις τόν τε πρότερον ἀληθῆ νομίσειεν εἶναι λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον· ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ μέλλει διασώσειν ἀμφοτέρους αὐτοὺς,