Nor are these mental productions the mere efforts of art, the ingenious inventions of human sagacity; but, under the original guidance of pure nature, even children in their early days spontaneously fashion them, and spontaneously refer them to individuals as they occur, saying of this individual, it is a horse; of another, it is a dog; of a third, it is a sparrow."

If from the nature of these objects (which we have now supposed to be either sensible or intelligible) we pass to their multitude, we shall find the genera to be fewer than the species, and that from this plain reason, because many species are included within one genus; we shall find also the species to be fewer than the individuals, and that by parity of reason, because many individuals are included within one species. But as for individuals themselves, these we shall find to be truly infinite; and not only infinite, but changing every moment, as the old are incessantly perishing, the new incessantly arising.

Yet it is these that compose that universe in which we exist; and without knowing something of these we may be considered as living like the Cimmerians in Homer,

Μέρι καὶ νεφέλῃ κεκαλυμμένοι."

"Covered with mist and cloud."

If, therefore, all science be something definite and steady, (for without this character it would not merit the name,) how can it possibly bear relation to such a multitude as this; a multitude in character so truly contrary to its own, a multitude everywhere fleeting, everywhere infinite and vague? How indeed should the fleeting be known steadily, or how should the vague and infinite be known definitely?"

As this can hardly be supposed, it is for this reason that logic, which is justly called the organ or instrument of the sciences,"

m See Hermes, b. iii. c. 4. where the doctrine of general or universal ideas is discussed more largely.

See also the Εἰσαγωγὴ, or Introduction of Porphyry, where the subject of genus and species is treated in a perspicuous and easy method. This tract is usually prefixed to Aristotle's Logic.

" Οδυσσ. Λ. 15.

• Infinitorum nulla cognitio est ; infinita namque animo comprehendi nequeunt; quod autem ratione mentis circumdari non potest, nullius scientiæ fine concluditur: quare infinitorum scientia nulla est. Boeth. in Præd. p. 113. edit. Bas.

Such was the doctrine of Boethius, who, according to the practice of the age in which he lived, united the Platonic and the Peripatetic philosophies. But Aristotle himself taught the same doctrine many centuries before.

Εἰ δὴ τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον, ᾗ ἄπειρον, ἄγνωστον, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἢ μέγεθος απει

ρον, ἄγνωστον ποσόν τι τὸ δὲ κατ ̓ εἶδος ἄπειρον, ἄγνωστον ποιόν τι· τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν ἀπείρων οὐσῶν καὶ κατὰ πλῆθος καὶ κατ' εἶδος, ἀδύνατον εἰδέναι τὰ ἐκ τούτων, οὕτω γὰρ εἰδέναι τὸ σύνθετον ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅταν εἰδῶμεν ἐκ τίνων καὶ πόσων ἐστίν. Arist. Phys. 1. i. p. 12. edit. Sylb. "If therefore infinite, considered as infinite, be unknowable, then that which is infinite in multitude or magnitude is unknowable as to quantity, and that which is infinite in form is unknowable as to quality. But the principles being infinite both in multitude and in quality, it is impossible to know the beings derived out of them. For then it is we conceive that we know any being composite, when we know out of what things and how many things it is compounded."

P The Stoics held logic to be a part of philosophy, the Peripatetics held it no more than an organ or instrument; Plato held it to be both, as well a part as an organ. His reasoning, according to Ammonius, was 28

has for its first employment to reduce infinitude; and this it does by establishing certain definitive arrangements, or classes, to some of which all particulars may be referred, however numerous, however diversified-the past, the present, the future, all alike. And thus we return to classing and arranging, the process already suggested to be the proper one.

It remains to inquire, whether there are more methods of arrangement than one; and if more, then, from among them, which method we ought to prefer.

But this will be the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER II.

AN

A METHOD OF ARRANGEMENT PROPOSED—REJECTED, AND WHY. OTHER METHOD PROPOSED ADOPTED, AND WHY. GENERAL REMARKS. PLAN OF THE WHOLE.

ONE method of arrangement is as follows:

The multitude of ideas treasured up in the human mind, and which, bearing reference to things, are expressed by words, may be arranged and circumscribed under the following characters. They all denote either substance or attribute; and substance and attribute may be each of them modified under the different characters of universal and particular, as best befits the purposes of reasoning and science. Thus man is an universal substance; Alexander, a particular one; valour, an universal attribute; the valour of Alexander, a particular one.

And hence there arises a quadruple arrangement of terms; an arrangement of them into substance universal, and substance particular; into attribute universal, and attribute particular; to some one of which four, not only our words and our ideas, but the innumerable tribe of individuals may all of them be reduced.

follows: Καθάπερ γάρ φησιν ὁ ξέστης διττὸς, ὁ μὲν μετρῶν, ὁ δὲ μετρούμενος, καὶ ὁ μὲν μετρῶν ὄργανόν ἐστι τῆς μετρήσεως, δ δὲ μετρούμενος μέρος τοῦ ὅλου ὑγροῦ, ὡσαύτως καὶ ἡ λογικὴ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων οὖσα, ὄργανόν ἐστι τῆς φιλοσοφίας, συμβι βαζομένη δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι, μέρος ἐστι τῆς piλoropías. "As the quart, says he, is twofold, one that which measures, the other that which is measured; and as that which measures is the organ of mensuration, that which is measured the part of some whole or entire fluid in like manner also, logic, when taken apart from things, is an organ of philosophy; when connected with them, is a part of philosophy."

Thus Ammonius on the Categories, p. 8. where we may find also the reasonings both

of the Stoics and the Peripatetics.

This method may be found in the beginning of Aristotle's Predicaments, before he comes to the actual enumeration of the predicaments themselves.

See Aristot. Prædic. p. 23. edit. Sylb. Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ ̓ ὑποκειμένου κ.τ.λ.

The Stagirite, in giving this quadruple arrangement, explains himself not by names, but by descriptions. Substance universal he describes as follows: Ka' TOKELμÉVOV τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δ ̓ οὐδενί ἐστι: attribute particular, év voкeévy μév čoti, καθ ̓ ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται: attribute general, xaľ ÚTOKELμÉVOV TE λéyeται, καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν: substances particular, ouтe èv útokeμévy čotiv, oute καθ ̓ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται.

A large reduction this, yet a reduction which may possibly lead us into another extreme, by rendering that multitude, which we would confine, too limited, too abridged. Suppose, therefore, we were to inquire whether this reduction might not be enlarged, and a second and more perfect method than the last be established.

The world, as we see, is filled with various substances. Each of these possesses its proper attributes, and is at the same time encompassed with certain circumstantials. Not to speak of intelligible substances, (which belong rather to metaphysics,) natural substances appear all to be extended; nor that simply, but under a certain external figure, and internal organization. A lion and an oak agree, as they are both extended; yet have they each a figure and organization peculiar. A living lion and a brazen lion may have the same external figure, but within there is a wide difference, from the possession of organization on one side, and the want of it on the other. If then we call the attribute of extension quantity, that of figure and organization quality, we may set down these two (I mean quantity and quality) as the two great essential attributes belonging to every substance, whether natural or artificial.

Again every substance, whether natural or artificial, either from will or from appetite, or, where these are wanting, from such lower causes as its figure or mere quantity has (in an enlarged use of the words) a power to act. Thus it is through will that men study, through appetite that brutes eat, through its figure that the clock goes, and through its quantity that the stone descends. Nor are they only thus capable of acting, but also of being acted upon; and that, too, each of them, according to its respective character. The mind is acted upon by truth, the appetite by pleasure, the clock by a spring, and the stone by gravitation. Thus, then, besides quantity and quality, we have found two other attributes, common to all substances, and these are action and passion.

Again: it often happens when substances are not present to us, that we are desirous to know when and where they existed: When, we ask, lived Homer? Where, we ask, stood the ancient Memphis? In the answer to these questions we learn the time and place which circumscribed the existence of these beings. Now as all sensible substances are circumscribed after these manners, hence we may consider the when and the where as two circumstantials that inseparably attend them. And thus have we added two more attributes to the number already established. Further still in contemplating where things exist, we are

Those who would see an explanation of those several descriptions, and why Aristotle prefers them to their peculiar names, may consult his Greek commentator, Ammonius,

and his Latin one, Boethius, who are both of them copious and accurate upon the subject.

often led to consider their position, and that more especially in living substances possessing the power of self-motion. There is a manifest difference between reclining and sitting, between sitting and standing; and there are other circumstances of position which extend to all substances whatever. And thus must position or situation be subjoined as another different attribute.

Add to this, when substances are superinduced upon substances, we consider them under the character of clothing, or habit. Thus, in the strict sense of the word, the glove covering our hand, the shoe our foot, the coat our body, are so many species of habit. By a more distant analogy, the corn may be said to clothe the fields, the woods to clothe the mountains; and by an analogy still more remote than that, the sciences and virtues to be habits that clothe the mind.

Last of all, in the variety of co-existing substances and attributes, there are many whose very existence infers the existence of some other. Thus, in substances, the existence of son infers that of father, of servant that of master; in quantity, the existence of greater infers that of less; in position, above infers below; and in the time when, subsequent has a necessary respect to prior. It is when we view things in these mutual dependencies, in these reciprocal inferences, that we discover another attribute, the attribute of relation.

And thus, instead of confining ourselves to the simple division of substance and attribute, we have divided attribute itself into nine distinct sorts; some of which we have considered as essential, others as circumstantial, and thus made, upon the whole, (by setting substance at their head) ten comprehensive and universal genera, called, with reference to their Greek name, categories; with reference to their Latin name, predicaments; and styled in the title of this work, "Philosophical Arrangements."

The ancients gave to these arrangements different names, and made also the number of them different. Some, as Archytas, called them κałóλov λóyo, “universal denominations;" others, as Quintilian, elementa, "elements;" others, as Aristotle, oxhuaта KAтnyopías, "figures, or forms of predication;" καTηyopía, "predicaments;" yévn yeviάrata, “the most general or comprehensive genera;" тà πрŵra yévn, "the primary genera." They differed also as to their number. Some made them two, subject and accident, or (which is the same) substance and attribute; others made them three, dividing accidents into the inherent and circumstantial; the Stoics held them to be four, vokeiμeva, пoîα, nŵs exovтa, kal mpós ti nŵs exovra, “subjects, things distinguished by qualities, distinguished by being peculiarly circumstanced within themselves, distinguished by being so with reference to something else;" Plato said they

66

were five, οὐσία, ταυτότης, ἑτερότης, κίνησις, καὶ στάσις, “ substance, identity, diversity, motion, rest;" others made seven ; lastly, the Pythagoreans and Peripatetics maintained the number usually adopted, that is to say, those ten which make the subject of this treatise.

See Aristot. Prædic. p. 24, et Metaphys. p. 79. 100. 104, &c. edit. Sylburg. Quintil. 1. iii. c. 6. Ammon. in Prædicam. p. 16, 17, &c. edit. Venet. 8vo. 1545. Simplic. in Prædicam. p. 16. V. edit. Basil. fol. 1551.

As words, by signifying things, through the medium of our ideas, are essential to logic, and are the materials of every proposition, the present work may be called logical. But as the speculations extend to physics, to ethics, and even to the first philosophy, they become for that reason something more than logical, and have been called, with a view to this their compre

When enumerated, their several names are in order, as they follow: substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, when, where, position, and habit.

As each of these ten predicaments has its subordinate distinctions, the basis of our knowledge will be now so amply widened, that we shall find space sufficient on which to build, be our plan diversified and extensive as it may.

We cannot conclude this chapter without observing, that the doctrine of these categories, these predicaments, these primary genera, or Philosophical Arrangements, is a valuable, a copious, and a sublime theory; a theory which, when well understood, leads by analogy from things sensible to things intelligible; from effect to cause; from that which is passive, unintelligent, and subordinate, to that which is active, intelligent, and supreme: a theory which prepares us not only to study every thing else with advantage, but makes us knowing withal, in one respect, where particular studies are sure to fail; knowing in the relative value of things when compared one to another; and modest, of course, in the estimate of our own accomplishments."

This is, in fact, the necessary consequence of being shewn to what portion of being every art or science belongs; and how limited that portion, when compared to what remains. The want of this general knowledge leads to an effect the very reverse; so that men who possess it not, though profoundly knowing in a single art or a single science, are too often carried by such partial knowledge to a blameable arrogance, as if the rest of mankind were busied in pursuits of no value, and themselves the monopolizers of wisdom and of truth. But this by the way.

The distinct discussion of each one of these categories, predicaments, arrangements, or genera, will become the business of the following chapters; which discussion, joined to what has been already premised, as well as to such future inquiries as shall naturally arise in consequence, will include all we have to offer upon this interesting subject."

As for propositions, which have for their materials the simple

hensive character, not logical, but Philosophical Arrangements.

• Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγο μένων, ἕκαστον ἤτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει, ἢ ποσόν, ἢ ποιὸν, ἢ πρός τι, ἤ που, ἢ ποτὲ, ἢ κεῖσθαι, ἢ ἔχειν, ἢ ποιεῖν, ἢ πάσχειν. Aristot. Præd. p. 24. edit. Sylb. The passage needs no other translation than what appears in the text.

See the last chapter of this treatise. a The Greek logicians divided their speculations on this subject into three TuhMara, or sections, calling the first section τὰ πρὸ τῶν κατηγοριών; the second, τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν κατηγοριών; the third, τὸ μετὰ Tas KaтηYoрías. Ammon. in Prædic. p. 146.

The Latins, adhering to the same division, coined new names: ante-prædicamenta, or præ-prædicamenta, prædicamenta, and post-prædicamenta. Sanderson, p. 22. 51. 55. edit. Oxon. 1672.

In the present work, the first section begins from chapter the first, the second section from chapter the third, the third section from chapter the fifteenth. Of these sections, the second (which discusses the predicaments, or philosophical arrangements) makes the real and essential part of the speculation: the first and third sections are only subservient to it; the first to prepare, the third to explain.