of themselves unknowable, become objects of knowledge, as far as their nature will permit: for then, only, may any particular be said to be known, when by asserting it to be a man, or an animal, or the like, we refer it to some such comprehensive or general idea. Now it is of these comprehensive and permanent ideas, the genuine perceptions of pure mind, that words of all languages, however different, are the symbols. And hence it is, that as the perceptions include, so do these their symbols express, not this or that set of particulars only, but all indifferently, as they happen to occur. Were, therefore, the inhabitants of Salisbury to be transferred to York, though new particular objects would appear on every side, they would still no more want a new language to explain themselves, than they would want new minds to comprehend what they beheld. All, indeed, that they would want, would be the local proper names; which names, as we have said already, are hardly a part of language, but must equally be learnt, both by learned and unlearned, as often as they change the place of their abode. It is upon the same principles we may perceive the reason why the dead languages (as we call them) are now intelligible; and why the language of modern England is able to describe ancient Rome; and that of ancient Rome to describe modern England. But of these matters we have spoken before. II. And now, having viewed the process by which we acquire general ideas, let us begin anew from other principles, and try to discover (if we can prove so fortunate) whence it is that these ideas originally come. If we can succeed here, we may discern, perhaps, what kind of beings they are, for this at present appears somewhat obscure. Let us suppose any man to look for the first time upon some work of art, as, for example, upon a clock, and having sufficiently viewed it, at length to depart. Would he not retain, when absent, an idea of what he had seen? And what is it to retain such idea? It is to have a form internal correspondent to the external; only with this difference, that the internal form is devoid of the matter; the external is united with it, being seen in the metal, the wood, and the like. Now if we suppose this spectator to view many such machines, and not simply to view, but to consider every part of them, so as to comprehend how these parts all operate to one end, he might be then said to possess a kind of intelligible form, by which he would not only understand and know the clocks which he had seen already, but every work also, of like sort, which he might see hereafter. Should it be asked, "which of these forms is prior, the external and sensible, or the internal and intelligible" the answer is obvious, that the prior is the sensible. Thus, then, we see, there are intelligible forms, which to the sensible are subsequent. But further still: if these machines be allowed the work, not of chance, but of an artist, they must be the work of one who knew what he was about. And what is it to work, and know what one is about? It is to have an idea of what one is doing; to possess a form internal, corresponding to the external, to which external it serves for an exemplar, or archetype. Here then we have an intelligible form, which is prior to the sensible form; which, being truly prior, as well in dignity as in time, can no more become subsequent, than cause can to effect. Thus, then, with respect to works of art, we may perceive, if we attend, a triple order of forms: one order, intelligible and previous to these works; a second order, sensible and concomitant; and a third, again, intelligible and subsequent. After the first of these orders, the maker may be said to work; through the second, the works themselves exist, and are what they are; and in the third they become recognised as mere objects of contemplation. To make these forms by different names more easy to be understood, the first may be called the maker's form; the second, that of the subject; and the third, that of the contemplator. Let us pass from hence to works of nature. Let us imagine ourselves viewing some diversified prospect, "a plain, for example, spacious and fertile; a river winding through it; by the banks of that river, men walking, and cattle grazing; the view terminated with distant hills, some craggy, and some covered with wood." Here, it is plain, we have plenty of forms natural. And could any one quit so fair a sight, and retain no traces of what he had beheld? And what is it to retain traces of what one has beheld? It is to have certain forms internal correspondent to the external, and resembling them in every thing, except the being merged in matter: and thus, through the same retentive and collective powers, the mind becomes fraught with forms natural, as before with forms artificial. Should it be asked, "which of these natural forms are prior, the external ones viewed by the senses, or the internal existing in the mind?" the answer is obvious, that the prior are the external. Thus, therefore, in nature, as well as in art, there are intelligible forms, which to the sensible are subsequent. Hence then we see the meaning of that noted school axiom, Nil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu; an axiom which we must own to be so far allowable, as it respects the ideas of a mere contemplator. But to proceed somewhat further. Are natural productions made by chance or by design? Let us admit by design, not to lengthen our inquiry. They are certainly more exquisite than any works of art," and yet these we cannot bring ourselves to suppose made by chance. Admit it, and what follows? We must of necessity admit a mind also, because design implies mind, wherever it is to be found. Allowing therefore this, Η Μᾶλλον δ ̓ ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ και λὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις, ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τεχνῆς: “The principles of design and beauty are more in the works of nature, than they are in those of art.” Arist. de Part. Animal. 1. i. c. 1. The following quotation, taken from the third book of a manuscript comment of Proclus, on the Parmenides of Plato, is here given for the sake of those who have curiosity with regard to the doctrine of ideas, as held by ancient philosophers. Εἰ δὲ δεῖ συντόμως εἰπεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν ἰδεῶν ὑποθέσεως, δι ̓ ἣν ἐκείνοις ἤρεσε, ῥητέον ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα ὅσα ὁρατὰ, οὐράνια καὶ ὑπὸ σελήνην, ἢ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου ἐστὶν, ἢ κατ' αἰτίαν· ἀλλ ̓ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου ἀδύνατον· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις τὰ κρείττονα, νοῦς, καὶ λόγος, καὶ αἰτία, καὶ τὰ αἰ τίας, καὶ οὕτω τὰ ἀποτελέσματα κρείττω τῶν ἀρχῶν, πρὸς τῷ καὶ ὅ φησιν ὁ ̓Αριστοτέλης· δεῖ πρὸ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτίων εἶναι τὰ καθ ̓ αὑτὰ, τούτων γὰρ ἔκβασις τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὥστε τοῦ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου πρεσβύτερον ἂν ἦν τὸ κατ ̓ αἰτίαν, εἰ καὶ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου τὰ Θειότατα ἦν τῶν φανερῶν : “ If, therefore, we are to relate concisely the cause, why the hypothesis of ideas pleased them, (namely Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, &c.) we must begin by observing, that all the various visible objects around us, the heavenly as well as the sublunary, are either from chance, or according to a cause. From chance is impossible; for then the more excellent things (such as mind, and reason, and cause, and the effects of cause) will be among those things that come last, and so the endings of things will be more excellent than their beginnings. To which too may be added what Aristotle says; that essential causes ought to be prior to accidental, inasmuch as every accidental cause is a deviation from them; so that whatever is the effect of such essential cause [as is indeed every work of art and human ingenuity] must needs be prior to that which is the effect of chance, even though we were to refer to chance the most divine of visible objects, [the heavens themselves.] The philosopher, having thus proved a definite cause of the world in opposition to chance, proceeds to shew, that from the unity and concurrent order of things this cause must be one. After which he goes on as follows: Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἄλογον τοῦτο, ἄτοπον. ἔσται γάρ τι πάλιν τῶν ὑστέρων τῆς τούτων αἰτίας κρεῖττον, τὸ κατὰ λόγον καὶ γνῶσιν ποιοῦν, εἴσω τοῦ παντὸς ὄν, καὶ τοῦ ὅλου μέρος, ὅ ἐστιν ἀπ' αἰτίας ἀλόγου τοιοῦτο. Εἰ δὲ λόγον ἔχον, καὶ αὐτὸ γινῶσκον, οἶδεν ἑαυτὸ δήπου τῶν πάντων αἴτιον ὄν, ἢ τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦν, ἀγνοήσει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν. Εἰ δὲ οἶδεν, ὅτι κατ ̓ οὐσίαν ἐστὶ τοῦ παντὸς αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ ὡρισμένως εἰδὼς θάτερον, καὶ θάτερον οἶδεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οἶδεν ἄρα καὶ οὗ ἔστιν αἴτιον ὡρισμένως· οἶδεν οὖν καὶ τὸ πᾶν, καὶ πάντα ἐξ ὧν τὸ πᾶν, ὧν ἐστι καὶ αἴτιον. Καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, ἤτοι εἰς ἑαυτὸ ἄρα βλέπον, ἑαυτὸ γινώσκον, οἶδε τὰ μετ ̓ αὐτό. Λόγοις ἄρα καὶ εἴδεσιν ἀΰλοις οἶδε τοὺς κοσμικοὺς λόγους, καὶ τὰ εἴδη, ἐξ ὧν τὸ πᾶν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν, ὡς ἐν αἰτίῳ, χωρὶς τῆς ὕλης: “Now if this cause be void of reason, that indeed would be absurd; for then again there would be something among those things which came last in order, more excellent than their principle or cause. I mean, by more excellent, something operating according to reason and knowledge, and yet within that universe, and a part of that whole, which is what it is from a cause devoid of reason. “ But if, on the contrary, the cause of the universe be a cause, having reason and knowing itself, it of course knows itself to be the cause of all things; else, being ignorant of this, it would be ignorant of its own nature. But if it know, that from its very essence it is the cause of the universe, and if that, which knows one part of a relation definitely, knows also of necessity the other, it knows for this reason definitely the thing of which it is the cause. It knows therefore the universe, and all things out of what do we mean by the term mind? We mean something, which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned.* which the universe is composed, of all which also it is the cause. But if this be true, it is evident that by looking into itself, and by knowing itself, it knows what conies after itself, and is subsequent. It is, therefore, through certain reasons and forms devoid of matter that it knows those mundane reasons and forms out of which the universe is composed, and that the universe is in it, as in a cause, distinct from and without the matter.” * It is upon these principles that Nicomachus, in his Arithmetic, p. 7, calls the Supreme Being an artist: ἐν τῇ τοῦ τεχνίτου Θεοῦ διανοίᾳ, in Dei artificis mente. Where Philoponus, in his manuscript Comment, observes as follows: τεχνίτην φησὶ τὸν Θεόν, ὡς πάντων τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν ἔχοντα : “ He calls God an artist, as possessing within himself the first causes of all things, and their reasons or proportions." Soon after, speaking of those sketches, after which painters work and finish their pictures, he subjoins: Boep οὖν ἡμεῖς, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα σκιαγραφήματα βλέποντες, ποιοῦμεν τόδέ τι, οὕτω καὶ ὁ δημιουργός, πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἀποβλέπων, τὰ τῇδε πάντα κεκόσμηκεν· ἀλλ ̓ ἰστέον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν τῇδε σκιαγραφήματα ἀτελῆ εἰσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ οἱ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ λόγοι ἀρχέτυποι καὶ παντέλειοί εἰσιν: “ As therefore we, looking upon such sketches as these, make such and such particular things; so also the Creator, looking at those sketches of his, hath formed and adorned with beauty all things here below. We must remember, however, that the sketches here are imperfect; but that the others, those reasons or proportions which exist in God, are archetypal and all-perfect," It is according to this philosophy that Milton represents God, after he had created this visible world, contemplating How it show'd 66 πάντων ἴδοις ἂν ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον, ὅσα αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιεῖ. καὶ τὸ αἴτιον οὖν τοῦ παντὸς αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιοῦν τοῦτό ἐστι πρώτως, ὅπερ ὁ κόσμος δευτέρως. εἰ δὴ δ κόσμος πλήρωμα εἰδῶν ἐστὶ παντοίων, εἴη ἂν καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰτίῳ τοῦ κόσμου ταῦτα πρώ τως τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ αἴτιον καὶ ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ ἄνθρωπον ὑπέστησε, καὶ ἵππον, καὶ ὅλως τὰ εἴδη, τὰ ἐν τῷ παντί. ταῦτα ἄρα πρώτως ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ αἰτίᾳ τοῦ παντὸς, ἄλλος ἥλιος παρὰ τὸν ἐμφανῆ, καὶ ἄλλος ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ὁμοίως ἕκαστον. ἔστιν ἄρα τὰ εἴδη πρὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ αἴτια αὐτῶν τὰ δημιουργικὰ κατὰ τὸν εἰρη μένον λόγον, ἐν τῇ μιᾷ τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς αἰτίᾳ προϋπάρχοντα: “ If, therefore, the cause of the universe be a cause which operates merely by existing, and if that which operates merely by existing, operate from its own proper essence, such cause is primarily what its effect is secondarily, and that which it is primarily, it giveth to its effect secondarily. It is thus that fire both giveth warmth to something else, and is itself warm ; that the soul giveth life and possesseth life ; and this reasoning you may perceive to be true in all things whatever, which operate merely by existing. It follows, therefore, that the cause of the universe, operating after this manner, is that primarily which the world is secondarily. If therefore the world be the plenitude of forms of all sorts, these forms must also be primarily in the cause of the world, for it was the same cause which constituted the sun, and the moon, and man, and horse, and in general all the forms existing in the universe. These, therefore, exist primarily in the cause of the universe; another sun besides the apparent, another man, and so with respect to every form else. The forms, therefore, previous to the sensible and external forms, and which according to this reasoning are their active and efficient In prospect from his throne, how good, how causes, are to be found pre-existing in that fair, Answering his great idea, Par. Lost, vii. 556. Proclus proves the existence of these general ideas, or universal forms, by the following arguments: εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῦ παντὸς αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιοῦσα, τὸ δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖ οὐσίας τοῦτό ἐστι πρώτως, ὅπερ τὸ ποιούμενον δευτέρως καὶ ὅ ἐστι πρώτως, δίδωσι τῷ ποιουμένω δευτέρως· οἷον τὸ πῦρ καὶ δίδωσι θερμότητα ἄλλῳ, καὶ ἔστι θερμὸν, ἡ ψυχὴ δίδωσι ζωὴν, καὶ ἔχει ζωὴν, καὶ ἐπὶ one and common cause of all the universe." Procli Com. MS. in Plat. Parmenid. l. iii. We have quoted the above passages for the same reason as the former; for the sake of those who may have a curiosity to see a sample of this ancient philosophy, which (as some have held may be traced up from Plato and Socrates to Parmenides, Pythagoras, and Orpheus himself. 66 If the phrase, to operate merely by existing,” should appear questionable, it must be explained upon a supposition, that in the Supreme Being no attributes are That such exemplars, patterns, forms, ideas, (call them as you please,) must of necessity be, requires no proving, but follows of course, if we admit the cause of nature to be a mind, as above mentioned. For take away these, and what a mind do we leave without them? Chance, surely, is as knowing as mind without ideas; or rather mind without ideas is no less blind than chance. The nature of these ideas is not difficult to explain, if we once come to allow a possibility of their existence. That they are exquisitely beautiful, various, and orderly, is evident from the exquisite beauty, variety, and order seen in natural substances, which are but their copies or pictures. That they are mental is plain, as they are of the essence of mind, and consequently no objects to any of the senses, nor therefore circumscribed either by time or place. Here, then, on this system, we have plenty of forms intelligible, which are truly previous to all forms sensible. Here, too, we see that nature is not defective in her triple order, having (like art) her forms previous, her concomitant, and her subsequent.' secondary, intermittent, or adventitious, but all original, ever perfect and essential. See p. 164, note a, and p. 220. That we should not therefore think of a blind unconscious operation, like that of fire here alluded to, the author had long before prepared us, by uniting knowledge with natural efficacy, where he forms the character of these divine and creative ideas. But let us hear him in his own language: ἀλλ ̓ εἴπερ ἐθέλοιμεν τὴν ἰδιότητα αὐτῶν (sc. ἰδεῶν) ἀφορίσασθαι διὰ τῶν γνωριμω τέρων, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν φυσικῶν λόγων λάβωμεν τὸ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιητικὸν, ὧν δὴ καὶ ποιούσι· ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνικῶν, τὸ γνωστικὸν, ὧν ποιοῦσιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιοῦσι, καὶ ταύτα ἑνώσαντες φῶμεν αἰτίας εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας δημιουργικὰς ἅμα καὶ νοεράς πάντων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀποτελουμένων: But if we should choose to define the peculiar character of ideas by things more known to us than themselves, let us assume from natural principles the power of effect ing, merely by existing, all the things that they effect; and from artificial principles the power of comprehending all that they effect, although they did not effect them merely by existing ; and then uniting those two, let us say that ideas are at once the eficient and intelligent causes of all things produced according to nature.” From book the second of the same Comment. The schoolman, Thomas Aquinas, a subtle and acute writer, has the following sentence, perfectly corresponding with this philosophy: Res omnes comparantur ad Divinum Intellectum, sicut artificiata ad artem. 1 66 The verses of Orpheus on this subject may be found in the tract De Mundo, ascribed to Aristotle, p. 23. edit. Sylburg. Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζευς, κ. τ. λ. Simplicius, in his commentary upon the Predicaments, calls the first order of these intelligible forms, τà πрò Tñs μebéžews, "those previous to participation;" and at other times, ¿¿npnuévn kowóτns, “the transcendent universality," or sameness." the second order he calls τὰ ἐν μεθέξει, "those which exist in participation," that is, those merged in matter, and at other times he calls them ἡ κατατεταγμένη κοι νότης, “the subordinate universality" or sameness:" lastly, of the third order he says, that they have no independent existence of their own, but that ἡμεῖς ἀφελόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἐννοίαις, καθ ̓ ἑαυτὰ ὑπεστήσαμεν, 66 66 we ourselves abstracting them in our own imaginations, have given them by such abstraction an existence as of themselves." Simp. in Prædic. p. 17. In another place he says, in a language somewhat mysterions, yet still conformable to the same doctrine, Μήποτε οὖν τριττὸν ληπ, τέον τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ μὲν ἐξηρημένον τῶν καθ ̓ ἕκαστα, καὶ αἴτιον τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς κοινότητος, κατὰ τὴν μίαν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ της διαφορότητος κατὰ τὴν πολυειδή πρό ληψιν—δεύτερον δέ ἐστι τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ αἰτίου τοῖς διαφόροις εἴδεσιν ἐνδιδό μενον, καὶ ἐνυπάρχον αὐτοῖς—τρίτον δὲ, τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις διανοίαις ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ὑφιστάμενον, ὑστερογενὲς ἄν: “Perhaps therefore, we must admit a triple order of what is universal and the same; that of the |