was observed) transmitted to the mouth. Here, then, by means of certain different organs, which do not change its primary qualities, but only superadd others, it receives the form or character of articulation. For articulation is in fact nothing else, than that form or character, acquired to simple voice, by means of the mouth and its several organs, the teeth, the tongue, the lips, &c. The voice is not by articulation made more grave or acute, more loud or soft, (which are its primary qualities,) but it acquires to these characters certain others additional, which are perfectly adapted to exist along with them.f

The simplest of these new characters are those acquired through the mere openings of the mouth, as these openings differ in giving the voice a passage. It is the variety of configurations in these openings only, which gives birth and origin to the several vowels; and hence it is they derive their name, by being thus eminently vocal, and easy to be sounded of themselves alone.

There are other articulate forms, which the mouth makes not by mere openings, but by different contacts of its different parts;

f The several organs above mentioned not only serve the purposes of speech, but those very different ones likewise of mastication and respiration ; so frugal is nature in thus assigning them double duty, and so careful to maintain her character of doing nothing in vain.

He that would be informed how much better the parts here mentioned are framed for discourse in man, who is a discursive animal, than they are in other animals, who are not so, may consult Aristotle in his treatise de Animal, Part. lib. ii. c. 17; lib. iii. c. 1. 3. De Anima, lib. ii. c. 8. s. 23, &c.

And here, by the way, if such inquirer be of a genius truly modern, he may possibly wonder how the philosopher, considering (as it is modestly phrased) the age in which he lived, should know so much, and reason so well. But if he have any taste or value for ancient literature, he may with much juster cause wonder at the vanity of his contemporaries, who dream all philosophy to be the invention of their own age, knowing nothing of those ancients still remaining for their perusal, though they are so ready on every occasion to give the preference to themselves.

The following account from Ammonius will shew whence the notions in this chapter are taken, and what authority we have to distinguish voice from mere sound; and articulate voice from simple voice.

Καὶ ψόφος μέν ἐστι πληγὴ ἀέρος αἰσθητὴ ἀκοῇ· φωνὴ δὲ, ψόφος ἐξ ἐμψύχου γινόμενος, ὅταν διὰ τῆς συστολῆς τοῦ θώρακος ἐκθλιβόμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύμονος ὁ εἰσπνευθεὶς ἀὴρ προσπίπτῃ ἀθρόως τῇ καλουμένῃ

τραχείᾳ ἀρτηρίᾳ, καὶ τῇ ὑπερώα, ἤτοι τῷ γαργαρεώνι, καὶ διὰ τῆς πληγῆς ἀποτελῇ τινα ἦχον αἰσθητὸν, κατά τινα ὁρμὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμπνευστῶν παρὰ τοῖς μουσικοῖς καλουμένων ὀργάνων συμβαίνει, οἷον αὐλῶν καὶ συρίγγων τῆς γλώττης, καὶ τῶν ὀδόντων, καὶ χειλέων πρὸς μὲν τὴν διάλεκτον ἀναγκαίων ὄντων, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἁπλῶς φωνὴν οὐ πάντως συμBaλλouévwv: "Estque sonus, ictus aeris qui auditu sentitur: vox autem est sonus, quem animans edit, cum per thoracis compressionem aer attractus a pulmone, elisus simul totus in arteriam, quam asperam vocant, et palatum, aut gurgulionem impingit, et ex ietu sonum quendam sensibilem pro animi quodam impetu perficit. Id quod in instrumentis quæ quia inflant, ideo μ

veurà a musicis dicuntur, usu venit, ut in tibiis, ac fistulis contingit, cum lingua, dentes, labiaque ad loquelam necessaria sint, ad vocem vero simplicem non omnino conferant." Ammon. in lib. De Interpr. p. 25. B. Vid. etiam Boerhaave Institut. Medic. sect. 626. 630.

It appears that the Stoics (contrary to the notion of the Peripatetics) used the word own, to denote sound in general. They defined it therefore to be, τὸ ἴδιον àσordν άкons, which justifies the definition given by Priscian, in the note preceding. Animal sound they defined to be, amp, ind ópμñs teñλnyuévos. "air struck (and so made audible) by some animal impulse ;” and human or rational sound, they defined, ἔναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη, “ sound articulate and derived from the discursive faculty.” Diog. Laert. vii. 55, 8 Φωνήεντα.

P

such, for instance, as it makes by the junction of the two lips, of the tongue with the teeth, of the tongue with the palate, and the like.

Now as all these several contacts, unless some opening of the mouth either immediately precede, or immediately follow, would rather occasion silence, than to produce a voice; hence it is, that with some such opening, either previous or subsequent, they are always connected. Hence also it is, that the articulations so produced are called consonant, because they sound not of themselves, and from their own powers, but at all times in company with some auxiliary vowel.

There are other subordinate distinctions of these primary articulations, which to enumerate would be foreign to the design of this treatise.

It is enough to observe, that they are all denoted by the common name of element, inasmuch as every articulation of every other kind is from them derived, and into them resolved. Under their smallest combination they produce a syllable; syllables properly combined produce a word; words properly combined produce a sentence; and sentences properly combined produce an oration or discourse.

And thus it is, that to

Η Σύμφωνα.

principles apparently so trivial, as

The Stoic definition of an element is as follows: ἔστι δὲ στοιχεῖον, ἐξ οὗ πρώτου γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον ἀναλύεται: “ an element is that out of which, as their first principle, things generated are made, and into which, as their last remains, they are resolved." Diog. Laert. vii. 176. What Aristotle says upon elements, with respect to the subject here treated, is worth attending to : φωνής στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ἡ φωνὴ, καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ἔσχατα· ἐκεῖνα δὲ μηκέτ ̓ εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἑτέρας τῷ εἴδει AUTŵv: "the elements of articulate voice are those things out of which the voice is compounded, and into which, as its last remains, it is divided: the elements themselves being no further divisible into other articulate voices, differing in species from them." Metaph. v. c. 3.

The Egyptians paid divine honours to the inventor of letters, and regulator of language, whom they called Theuth. By the Greeks he was worshipped under the name of Hermes, and represented commonly by a head alone without other limbs, standing upon a quadrilateral basis. The head itself was that of a beautiful youth, having on it a petasus, or bonnet, adorned with two wings.

There was a peculiar reference in this figure to the 'Epuns λóyos, “the Hermes of language or discourse." He possessed no other part of the human figure but the head,

because no other was deemed requisite to rational communication. Words, at the same time, the medium of this communication, being (as Homer well describes them) Ĕτεα πтEроÉνтα, “winged words,” were represented in their velocity by the wings of his bonnet.

Let us suppose such a Hermes, having the front of his basis (the usual place for inscriptions) adorned with some old alphabet, and having a veil fung across, by which that alphabet is partly covered. Let a youth be seen drawing off this veil; and a nymph, near the youth, transcribing what she there discovers.

Such a design would easily indicate its meaning. The youth we might imagine to be the genius of man, (naturæ Deus humanæ, as Horace styles him ;) the nymph to be μvnμoovn, or "memory;" as much as to insinuate that "man, for the preservation of his deeds and inventions, was necessarily obliged to have recourse to letters; and that memory, being conscious of her own insufficiency, was glad to avail herself of so valuable an acquisition."

As to Hermes, his history, genealogy, mythology, figure, &c. vid. Platon. Phileb. vol. ii. p. 18. edit. Serran. Diod. Sic. l. i. Horat. od. x. 1. 1. Hesiod. Theog. v. 937. cum Comment. Joan. Diaconi. Thucyd. vi. 27. et Scholiast. in loc. Pighium apud Gronov. Thesaur, vol. ix. P. 1164.

For the value and importance of princi

about twenty plain elementary sounds, we owe that variety of articulate voices, which have been sufficient to explain the sentiments of so innumerable a multitude, as all the present and past generations of men.

It appears, from what has been said, that the matter or common subject of language is that species of sounds called voices articulate.

What remains to be examined in the following chapter, is language under its characteristic and peculiar form, that is to say, language considered, not with respect to sound, but to meaning.

CHAPTER III.

UPON THE FORM, OR PECULIAR CHARACTER, OF LANGUAGE.

WHEN to any articulate voice there accedes by compact a meaning or signification, such voice by such accession is then called a word; and many words, possessing their significations (as it were) under the same compact,' unite in constituting a particular language.

It appears from hence, that a word may be defined, "a voice articulate and significant by compact ;" and that language may be defined, "a system of such voices, so significant."

It is from notions like these concerning language and words, that one may be tempted to call language a kind of picture of the universe, where the words are as the figures or images of all particulars.

And yet it may be doubted how far this is true. For if pictures and images are all of them imitations, it will follow, that whoever has natural faculties to know the original, will, by help of the same faculties, know also its imitations. But it by no means follows, that he who knows any being, should know, for that reason, its Greek or Latin name.

The truth is, that every medium through which we exhibit any thing to another's contemplation, is either derived from natural attributes, and then it is an imitation; or else from accidents quite arbitrary, and then it is a symbol.m

Now if it be allowed, that in far the greater part of things, not any of their natural attributes are to be found in articulate voices, and that yet through such voices things of every kind are exhibited, it will follow, that words must of necessity be symbols, because it appears that they cannot be imitations.

But here occurs a question, which deserves attention: "Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, have imitations been neglected, and symbols preferred, although symbols are only known by habit or institution, while imitations are re

Ammonius here speaks, and which he considers as a distinctive mark peculiar to the human soul, means something very different from the mere producing works of elegance and design; else it could never be a mark of distinction between man and many other species of animals, such as the bee, the beaver, the swallow, &c. See before, p. 3, 4, and 62.

m Alapépei de rò dμolwμa тov σvμßóλov, καθόσον τὸ μὲν ὁμοίωμα τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ πράγματος κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀπεικονίζεσθαι βούλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτὸ μεταπλάσαι· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι γεγραμμένου τοῦ Σωκράτους, ὁμοίωμα, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ φαλακρὸν, καὶ τὸ σιμὸν, καὶ τὸ ἐξώφθαλμον ἔχει τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὐκέτ' ἂν αὐτοῦ λέγοιτο εἶναι ὁμοίωμα· τὸ δέ γε σύμβολον, ἤτοι σημεῖον, (ἀμφότερα γὰρ ὁ φιλόσοφος αὐτὸ ὀνομάζει) τὸ ὅλον ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔχει, ἅτε καὶ ἐκ μόνης ὑφιστάμενον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπινοίας· οἷον, τοῦ πότε δεῖ συμβάλλειν ἀλλήλοις τοὺς πολεμοῦντας, δύναται σύμβολον εἶναι καὶ σάλπιγγος ἀπή χησις, καὶ λαμπάδος ῥίψις, καθάπερ φησὶν Εὐριπίδης,

Επεὶ δ ̓ ἀφείθη πυρσὸς, ὡς τυρσηνικῆς
Σάλπιγγος ἦχος, σῆμα φοινίου μάχης.

Δύναται δέ τις ὑποθέσθαι καὶ δόρατος ἀνάτασιν, καὶ βέλους ἄφεσιν, καὶ ἀλλὰ με pía: "A representation, or resemblance, differs from a symbol, inasmuch as the resemblance aims, as far as possible, to represent the very nature of the thing, nor is it in our power to shift or vary it. Thus, a representation intended for Socrates, in a picture, if it have not those circumstances peculiar to Socrates, the bald, the flat-nosed, aud the eyes projecting, cannot properly be called a representation of him. But a symbol, or sign, (for the philosopher Aristotle uses both names,) is wholly in our own power, as depending singly for its existence on our imagination. Thus, for example, as to the time when two armies should engage, the symbol or sign may be the sounding of a trumpet, the throwing of a torch, (according to what Euripides says, But when the flaming torch was hurled,

cognised by a kind of natural intuition?" To this it may be answered, that if the sentiments of the mind, like the features of the face, were immediately visible to every beholder, the art of speech or discourse would have been perfectly superfluous. But now, while our minds lie enveloped and hid, and the body (like a veil) conceals every thing but itself, we are necessarily compelled, when we communicate our thoughts, to convey them to each other through a medium which is corporeal." And hence it is that all signs, marks, imitations, and symbols must needs be sensible, and addressed as such to the senses. Now the senses, we know, never exceed their natural limits; the eye perceives no sounds; the ear perceives no figures nor colours. If, therefore, we were to converse, not by symbols but by imitations, as far as things are characterized by figure and colour, our imitation would be necessarily through figure and colour also. Again, as far as they are characterized by sounds, it would, for the same reason, be through the medium of sounds. The like may be said of all the other senses, the imitation still shifting along with the objects imitated. We see, then, how complicated such imitation would prove.

If we set language, therefore, as a symbol, in opposition to such imitation; if we reflect on the simplicity of the one, and the multiplicity of the other; if we consider the ease and speed with which words are formed, (an ease which knows no trouble or fatigue, and a speedP which equals the progress of our very thoughts,) if we oppose to this the difficulty and length of imitations; if we remember that some objects are capable of no imitations at all, but that all objects universally may be typified by symbols; we may plainly perceive an answer to the question here proposed, "Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, imitations have been rejected, and symbols preferred."

Hence, too, we may perceive a reason, why there never was a language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to express the properties and real essences of things, as a mirror exhibits their figures and their colours. For if language of itself imply nothing more than certain species of sounds, with certain motions concomitant; if to some beings sound and motion are no attributes at all; if to many others, where attributes, they are no way essential, (such as the murmurs and wavings of a tree