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was observed) transmitted to the mouth. Here, then, by means of certain different organs, which do not change its primary qualities, but only superadd others, it receives the form or character of articulation. For articulation is in fact nothing else, than that form or character, acquired to simple voice, by means of the mouth and its several organs, the teeth, the tongue, the lips, &c. The voice is not by articulation made more grave or acute, more loud or soft, (which are its primary qualities) but it acquires to these characters certain others additional, which are perfectly adapted to exist along with them.

The simplest of these new characters are those acquired through the mere openings of the mouth, as these openings differ in giving the voice a passage. It is the variety of configurations in these openings only, which gives birth and origin to the several vowels; and hence it is they derive their name, by being thus eminently vocal,k and easy to be sounded of themselves alone.

There are other articulate forms, which the mouth makes not by mere openings, but by different contacts of its different parts;

The several organs above mentioned τραχεία αρτηρία, και τη υπερώα, ήτοι τω not only serve the purposes of speech, but γαργαρεώνι, και διά της πληγής αποτελή those very different ones likewise of masti- τινα ηχον αισθητόν, κατά τινα ορμήν της cation and respiration ; 80 frugal is nature ψυχής όπερ επί των εμπνευστών παρά in thus assigning them double duty, and so τους μουσικούς καλουμένων οργάνων συμcareful to maintain her character of doing βαίνει, οίον αυλών και συρίγγων της nothing in vain.

γλώττης, και των οδόντων, και χειλέων He that would be informed how much πρός μέν τήν διάλεκτον αναγκαίων όντων, , better the parts here mentioned are framed προς δε την απλώς φωνήν ου πάντως συμfor discourse in man, who is a discursive Baxrouévwv: “Estque sonus, ictus aeris qui animal, than they are in other animals, auditu sentitur : vox autem est sonus, quem who are not so, may consult Aristotle in animans edit, cum per thoracis compresbis treatise de Animal, Part. lib. ii, c. 17; sionem aer attractus a pulmone, elisus simul lib. ii. c. 1. 3. De Anima, lib. ii. c. 8. totus in arteriam, quam asperam vocant, et 8. 23, &c.

palatum, aut gurgulionem impingit, et ex And here, by the way, if such inquirer ictu sonum quendam sensibilem pro animi be of a genius truly modern, he may pos- quodam impetu perficit. Id quod in insibly wonder how the philosopher, consider- strumentis quæ quia inflant, ideo é o ing (as it is modestly phrased) the age in TVEUTTà a musicis dicuntur, usu venit, ut which he lived, should know so much, and in tibiis, ac fistulis contingit, cum lingua, reason so well. But if he have any taste dentes, labiaque ad loquelam necessaria sint, or value for ancient literature, he may with ad vocem vero simplicem non omnino conmuch juster cause wonder at the vanity of ferant.” Ammon. in lib. De Interpr. p. 25, his contemporaries, who dream all philo- B. Vid. etiam Boerhaave Institut. Medic. sophy to be the invention of their own age, sect. 626. 630. knowing nothing of those ancients still re- It appears that the Stoics (contrary to maining for their perusal, though they are the notion of the Peripatetics) used the so ready on every occasion to give the pre- word own, to denote sound in general. ference to themselves.

They defined it therefore to be, To Yolov The following account from Ammonius eloðntöv åkons, which justifies the definiwill shew whence the notions in this chapter tion given by Priscian, in the note preare taken, and what authority we have to ceding. Animal sound they defined to be, distinguish voice from mere sound; and åtp, ůnd opuñs renanyuevos. “air struck articulate voice from simple voice.

(and so made audible) by some animal imΚαι ψόφος μέν έστι πληγή αέρος αισθητή pulse ;” and human or rational sound, they ακοή φωνή δε, ψόφος εξ εμψύχου γινό- defined, έναρθρος και από διανοίας εκπεμπομενος, όταν δια της συστολής του θώρακος μένη, “ sound articulate and derived from έκθλιβόμενος από του πνεύμονος και εισπνευ- the discursive faculty.” Diog. Laert. vii. 55, θείς αήρ προσπίπτη αθρόως τη καλουμένη Ο φωνήεντα.



such, for instance, as it makes by the junction of the two lips, of the tongue with the teeth, of the tongue with the palate, and the like.

Now as all these several contacts, unless some opening of the mouth either immediately precede, or immediately follow, would rather occasion silence, than to produce a voice; hence it is, that with some such opening, either previous or subsequent, they are always connected. Hence also it is, that the articulations so produced are called consonant, because they sound not of themselves, and from their own powers, but at all times in company with some auxiliary vowel.

There are other subordinate distinctions of these primary articulations, which to enumerate would be foreign to the design of this treatise,

It is enough to observe, that they are all denoted by the common name of element, inasmuch as every articulation of every other kind is from them derived, and into them resolved. Under their smallest combination they produce a syllable ; syllables properly combined produce a word; words properly combined produce a sentence; and sentences properly combined produce an oration or discourse.

And thus it is, that to principles apparently so trivial," as Σύμφωνα. .

because no other was deemed requisite to i The Stoic definition of an element is rational communication. Words, at the same as follows: ČOTI oroixelov, et oll mpúrov time, the medium of this communication, γίνεται τα γινόμενα, και εις ο έσχατον ανα- being (as Homer well describes them) λύεται: «,

an element is that out of which, črea TTepoérta, "winged words," were reas their first principle, things generated are presented in their velocity by the wings of made, and into which, as their last remains, his bonnet. they are resolved.” Diog. Laert. vii. 176. Let us suppose such a Hermes, having What Aristotle says upon elements, with re- the front of his basis (the usual place for spect to the subject here treated, is worth at- inscriptions) adorned with some old alphatending to: pwvñs otoixeia, e av oúykeltai bet, and having a veil flung across, by ή φωνή, και εις & διαιρείται έσχατα εκείνα which that alphabet is partly covered. Let δε μηκέτ' εις άλλας φωνάς ετέρας τώ είδει a youth be seen drawing of this veil; and aut@: “ the elements of articulate voice a nymph, near the youth, transcribing what are those things out of which the voice is she there discovers. compounded, and into which, as its last Such a design would easily indicate its remains, it is divided : the elements them- meaning. The youth we might imagine to selves being no further divisible into other be the genius of man, (naturæ Deus humanæ, articulate voices, differing in species from as Horace styles him ;) the nymph to be them.” Metaph. v. c. 3.

urnuosúvn, or “memory;" as much as to * The Egyptians paid divine honours to insinuate that man, for the preservation of the inventor of letters, and regulator of his deeds and inventions, was necessarily language, whom they called Theuth. By obliged to have recourse to letters; and the Greeks he was worshipped under the that memory, being conscious of her own name of Hermes, and represented commonly insufficiency, was glad to avail herself of so by a head alone without other limbs, stand- valuable an acquisition.” ing upon a quadrilateral basis. The head As to Hermes, his history, genealogy, itself was that of a beautiful youth, having mythology, figure, &c. vid. Platon. Phileb.

it a petasus, or bonnet, adorned with vol. ii. p. 18. edit. Serran. Diod. Sic. l. i. two wings.

Horat. od. x. l. 1. Hesiod. Theog. v. 937. There was a peculiar reference in this cum Comment. Joan. Diaconi. Thucyd. vi. figure to the 'Epuñs abyros, “the Hermes of 27. et Scholiast, in loc. Pighium apud language or discourse." He possessed no Gronov. Thesaur, vol. ix. p. 1164. other part of the human figure but the head, For the value and importance of princiThe following passage, taken from that είς κάλλος συντιθέμενοι λόγοι μετά μέτρων, able mathematician Tacquet, will be found h drev uétpwv: “In the same manner, peculiarly pertinent to what has been said therefore, as local motion is from nature, in thischapter concerning elementary sounds, but dancing is something positive ; and as p. 324, 325.

about twenty plain elementary sounds, we owe that variety of articulate voices, which have been sufficient to explain the sentiments of so innumerable a multitude, as all the present and past generations of men.

It appears, from what has been said, that the matter or common subject of language is that species of sounds called voices articulate.

What remains to be examined in the following chapter, is language under its characteristic and peculiar form, that is to say, language considered, not with respect to sound, but to meaning.



When to any articulate voice there accedes by compact a meaning or signification, such voice by such accession is then called a word; and many words, possessing their significations (as it were) under the same compact,' unite in constituting a particular language. ples, and the difficulty in attaining them, ίνα και εν αυτώ τω φωνείν ή τεχνική αυτής see Aristot. de Sophist. Elench. c. 34. διακρίνεται δύναμις δηλουσι δε ταύτα οι

timber exists in nature, but a door is someMille milliones scriptorum mille annorum thing positive ; so is the power of promillionibus non scribent omnes 24 litte- ducing a vocal sound founded in nature, rarum alphabeti permutationes, licet singuli but that of explaining ourselves by nouns, quotidie absolverent 40 paginas, quarum or verbs, something positive. And hence it unaquæque contineret diversos ordines lit- is, that as to the simple power of producing terarum 24. Tacquet Arithmeticæ Theor. vocal sound, (which is, as it were, the organ p. 381. edit. Antverp. 1663.

or instrument to the soul's faculties of See before, note d, p. 207. See also knowledge or volition,) as to this vocal p. 27, note c; and p. 28, note b.

power, I say, man seems to possess it from The following quotation from Ammonius nature, in like manner as irrational aniis remarkable : Kabátep oor To Mèv katé mals: but as to the employing of nouns, or τόπον κινείσθαι, φύσει, το δε όρχείσθαι, verbs, or sentences composed out of them, θέσει και κατά συνθήκην, και το μέν ξύ- in the explanation of our sentiments, (the λον, φύσει, ή δε θύρα, θέσει ούτω και το thing thus employed being founded not in per paveiv, qúoet, Td 8d 8i' óvoudtwv nature, but in position,) this he seeins to ρημάτων σημαίνειν, θέσει-και έoικε την possess by way of peculiar eminence, beμεν φωνητικήν δύναμιν, όργαναν ούσαν cause he alone, of all mortal beings, parYuxin@ ev ñuùy Ouvduewv YvWoti@v, takes of a soul, which can move itself

, and η ορεκτικών, κατά φύσιν έχειν ο άνθρωπος operate artificially; so that even in the παραπλησίως τοις άλόγοις ζώοις το δε subject of sound, his artificial power shews ονόμασιν, ή ρήμασιν, ή τοις εκ τούτων itself; as the various elegant compositions, συγκειμένοις λόγοις χρήσθαι προς την ση- both in metre and without metre, abunμασίαν (ουκέτι φύσει ουσιν, αλλά θέσει) dantly prove.” Ammon. de Interpr. p. εξαίρετον έχεις προς τα άλογα ζώα, διότι 51. Α. και μόνος των θνητών αυτοκινήτου μετέχει It must be observed, that the operating ψυχής, και τέχνικώς ενεργείν δυναμένης, artificially, (ενεργείν τεχνικώς,) of which

It appears from hence, that a word may be defined, “a voice articulate and significant by compact;” and that language may be defined, “a system of such voices, so significant.”

It is from notions like these concerning language and words, that one may be tempted to call language a kind of picture of the universe, where the words are as the figures or images of all particulars.

And yet it may be doubted how far this is true. For if pictures and images are all of them imitations, it will follow, that whoever has natural faculties to know the original, will, by help of the same faculties, know also its imitations. But it by no means follows, that he who knows any being, should know, for that reason, its Greek or Latin name.

The truth is, that every medium through which we exhibit any thing to another's contemplation, is either derived from natural attributes, and then it is an imitation; or else from accidents quite arbitrary, and then it is a symbol." Now if it be allowed, that in far the greater part of things,

of their natural attributes are to be found in articulate voices, and that yet through such voices things of every kind are exhibited, it will follow, that words must of necessity be symbols, because it appears that they cannot be imitations.

But here occurs a question, which deserves attention : "Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, bave imitations been neglected, and symbols preferred, although symbols are only known by habit or institution, while imitations are re

not any

Ammonius here speaks, and which he con- Δύναται δέ τις υποθέσθαι και δόρατος siders as a distinctive mark peculiar to the ανάτασιν, και βέλους άφεσιν, και αλλά μυhuman soul, means something very different pla : “A representation, or resemblance, from the mere producing works of elegance differs from a symbol, inasmuch as the reand design ; else it could never be a mark semblance aims, as far as possible, to repreof distinction between man and many other sent the very nature of the thing, nor is it species of animals, such as the bee, the in our power to shift or vary it. Thus, a beaver, the swallow, &c. See before, p. 3, 4, representation intended for Socrates, in a and 62.

picture, if it have not those circumstances m Alapépei de to Suolwua toll ovußbaov, peculiar to Socrates, the bald, the flat-nosed, καθόσον το μεν ομοίωμα την φύσιν αυτήν aud the eyes projecting, cannot properly be του πράγματος κατά το δυνατόν απεικονί- called a representation of him.

But a ζεσθαι βούλεται, και ουκ έστιν εφ' ημίν symbol, or sign, (for the philosopher Ariαυτό μεταπλάσαι το γαρ εν τη εικόνα γε- stotle uses both names,) is wholly in our γραμμένου του Σωκράτους, ομοίωμα, ει μή own power, as depending singly for its και το φαλακρόν, και το σιμον, και το existence on our imagination. Thus, for εξώφθαλμον έχει του Σωκράτους, ουκέτ' άν example, as to the time when two armies αυτού λέγοιτο είναι ομοίωμα το δέ γε should engage, the symbol or sign may be σύμβολον, ήτοι σημείον, (αμφότερα γάρ δ the sounding of a trumpet, the throwing of φιλόσοφος αυτό ονομάζει) το όλον εφ' ημίν a torch, (according to what Euripides says έχει, άτε και εκ μόνης υφιστάμενος της But when the flaming torch was hurlech ημετέρας επινοίας· οίον, του πότε δει συμβάλλειν αλλήλους τους πολεμούντας, δύ- Of purple fight, as when the trumpet ναται σύμβολον είναι και σάλπιγγος απή- sounds, &c.) χησις, και λαμπάδος ρίψις, καθάπερ φησίν or else one may suppose the elevating of a Ευριπίδης,

spear, the darting of a weapon, and a thou'Επει δ' αφείθη πυρσός, ώς τυρσηνικής sand ways beside." Ammon. in Lib. de Σάλπιγγος ήχος, σημα φοινίου μάχης. Interp. p. 17. B.

the sign

cognised by a kind of natural intuition?” To this it may be answered, that if the sentiments of the mind, like the features of the face, were immediately visible to every beholder, the art of speech or discourse would have been perfectly superfluous. But now, while our minds lie enveloped and bid, and the body (like a veil) conceals every thing but itself, we are necessarily compelled, when we communicate our thoughts, to convey them to each other through a medium which is corporeal." And hence it is that all signs, marks, imitations, and symbols must needs be sensible, and addressed as such to the senses. Now the senses, we know, never exceed their natural limits; the eye perceives no sounds; the ear perceives no figures nor colours. if, therefore, we were to converse, not by symbols but by imitations, as far as things are characterized by figure and colour, our imitation would be necessarily through figure and colour also. Again, as far as they are characterized by sounds, it would, for the same reason, be through the medium of sounds. The like may be said of all the other senses, the imitation still shifting along with the objects imitated. We see, then, how complicated such imitation

would prove.

If we set language, therefore, as a symbol, in opposition to such imitation ; if we reflect on the simplicity of the one, and the multiplicity of the other; if we consider the ease and speed with which words are formed, (an ease which knows no trouble or fatigue, and a speed P which equals the progress of our very thoughts,) if we oppose to this the difficulty and length of imitations; if we remember that some objects are capable of no imitations at all, but that all objects universally may be typified by symbols; we may plainly perceive an answer to the question here proposed, “Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, imitations have been rejected, and symbols preferred.”

Hence, too, we may perceive a reason, why there never was a language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to express the properties and real essences of things, as a mirror exhibits their figures and their colours. For if language of itself imply nothing more than certain species of sounds, with certain motions concomitant; if to some beings sound and motion are no attributes at all; if to many others, where attributes, they are no way essential, (such as the murmurs and wavings of a tree

η Αι ψυχαί αι ημέτεραι, γυμναι μεν ούσαι tur: quocirca opus eis fuit nominibus, quiτων σωμάτων, ηδύναντο δι' αυτών των νοη- bus res inter se significarent." Ammon. in μάτων σημαίνειν αλλήλαις τα πράγματα Predicam. p. 18. Α. 'Επειδή δε σώμασι συνδέδενται, δίκην νέ- • Quicquid scindi possit in differentias φους περικαλύπτουσιν αυτών το νοερόν, satis numerosas, ad notionum varietatem έδεήθησαν των ονομάτων, δι' ών σημαί- explicandam (modo differentiae ille sensui VOVO I århaais apáyuata : “ Animi perceptibiles sint) fieri potest vehiculum postri a corporis compage secreti res vicissim cogitationum de homine in hominem. Baanimi conceptionibus significare possent : con. de Augm. Scient. vi. 1. cum autem corporibus involuti sint, perinde D 'Enea TTEPOÉvta. See before, p. 211. ac nebula, ipsorum intelligendi vis obtegi

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