virtue, and moral virtue. Moral virtue, from its employment, may be called more human, as it tempers our appetites to the purposes of human life. But intellectual virtue may be surely called more divine, if we consider the nature and sublimity of its end. Indeed, for moral virtue, as it is almost wholly conversant about appetites and affections, either to reduce the natural ones to a proper mean, or totally to expel the unnatural and vicious, it would be impious to suppose the Deity to have occasion for such an habit, or that any work of this kind should call for his attention. Yet God is, and lives. So we are assured from scripture itself. What then may we suppose the divine life to be? Not a life of sleep, as the fables tell us of Endymion. If we may be allowed, then, to conjecture, with a becoming reverence, what more likely than a perpetual energy of the purest intellect about the first, all-comprehensive objects of intellection, which objects are no other than that intellect itself? For in pure intellection it holds the reverse of all sensation, that the perceiver and thing perceived are always one and the same." It was speculation of this kind concerning the Divine Nature which induced one of the wisest among the ancients to believe, "that the man who could live in the pure enjoyment of his mind, and who properly cultivated that divine principle, was happiest in himself, and most beloved by the gods. For if the gods had any regard to what passed among men, (as it appeared they had,) it was probable they should rejoice in that which was most excellent, and by nature the most nearly allied to themselves; and as this was mind, that they should requite the man who most loved and honoured this, both from his regard to that which was dear to themselves, and from his acting a part which was laudable and right." 8 And thus in all science there is something valuable for itself, because it contains within it something which is divine. Γ Εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτὲ, ὁ Θεὸς ἀεὶ, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον· ἔχει δὲ ὧδε, καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει ἡ γὰρ Νοῦ ἐνέργεια, ζωή· ἐκεῖνος δὲ, ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ ̓ αὑτὴν, ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αἴδιος. Φαμὲν δὲ τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον αἴδιον, ἄριστον· ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ αἴδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ Θεῷ, τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ Θεός. Τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσ' Λ'. ζ'. It is remarkable in scripture, that God is peculiarly characterized as a living God, in opposition to all false and imaginary deities, of whom some had no pretensions to life at all, others to none higher than to vegetables or brutes ; and the best were nothing better than illustrious men, whose existence was circumscribed by the short period of humanity. To the passage above quoted, may be added another, which immediately precedes it. Αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίνεται, θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν· ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νόητον. 8 Ηθικ· Νικομαχ' τὸ Κ'. κεφ. η'. INTRODUCTION. BOOK III. CHAPTER I. DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT INTO ITS PRINCIPAL PARTS. SOME things the mind performs through the body; as, for example, the various works and energies of art. Ŏthers it performs without such medium; as, for example, when it thinks, and reasons, and concludes. Now though the mind, in either case, may be called the principle or source, yet are these last more properly its own peculiar acts, as being immediately referable to its own innate powers. And thus is mind ultimately the cause of all; of every thing at least that is fair and good. Among those acts of mind more immediately its own, that of mental separation may be well reckoned one. Corporeal separations, however accurate otherwise, are in one respect incomplete, as they may be repeated without end. The smallest limb, severed from the smallest animalcule, (if we could suppose any instrument equal to such dissection,) has still a triple exten-. sion of length, breadth, and thickness; has a figure, a colour, with perhaps many other qualities, and so will continue to have though thus divided to infinity. But the mind surmounts all power of concretion, and can place in the simplest manner every attribute by itself: convex without concave; colour without superficies; superficies without body; and body without its accidents; as distinctly each one as though they had never been united. a And thus it is that it penetrates into the recesses of all things, not only dividing them, as wholes, into their more conspicuous parts, but persisting till it even separate those elementary principles, which, being blended together after a more mysterious manner, are united in the minutest part as much as in the mightiest whole." Now if matter and form are among these elements, and deserve perhaps to be esteemed as the principal among them, it may not be foreign to the design of this treatise, to seek whether these, or any things analogous to them, may be found in speech or language. This, therefore, we shall attempt after the following method. a Itaque naturæ facienda est prorsus solutio et separatio; non per ignem certe, sed per mentem, tanquam ignem divinum. Bacon. Organ. 1. ii. 16. b See below, p. 207, note c. See before, p. 117, 119. "Matter" and "form" (in Greek üλŋ and eldos) were terms of great import in the days of ancient philosophy, when things were scrutinized rather at their beginning than at their end. They have been but little regarded by modern philosophy, which almost wholly employs itself about the last order of substance, that is to say, the tangible, corporeal, Every thing in a manner, whether natural or artificial, is in its constitution compounded of something common and some or concrete, and which acknowledges no separations even in this, but those made by mathematical instruments or chemical pro cess. The original meaning of the word "An, was sylva, "a wood." Thus Homer: Τρέμε δ' οὔρεα μακρὰ καὶ ὕλη, Ποσσὶν ὑπ ̓ ἀθανάτοισι Ποσειδάωνος ἰόντος. As Neptune past, the mountains and the wood Trembled beneath the god's immortal feet. Hence as wood was perhaps the first and most useful kind of materials, the word "An, which denoted it, came to be by degrees extended, and at length to denote matter or materials in general. In this sense brass was called the "An or "matter" of a statue; stone, the "An or "matter" of a pillar; and so in other instances. The Platonic Chalcidius, and other authors of the latter Latinity, use sylva under the same extended and comprehensive signification. Now as the species of matter here mentioned (stone, metal, wood, &c.) occur most frequently in common life, and are all nothing more than natural substances or bodies, hence by the vulgar, matter and body have been taken to denote the same thing; material to mean corporeal; immaterial, incorporeal, &c. But this was not the sentiment of philosophers of old, by whom the term matter was seldom used under so narrow an acceptation. By these, every thing was called "An, or "matter," whether corporeal or incorporeal, which was capable of becoming something else, or of being moulded into something else, whether from the operation of art, of nature, or a higher cause. In this sense, they not only called brass the λn of a statue, and timber of a boat, but letters and syllables they called the λa of words; words, or simple terms, the λa of propositions; and propositions themselves the vλa of syllogisms. The Stoics held all things out of our own power, (rà oùк p'uiv,) such as wealth and poverty, honour and dishonour, health and sickness, life and death, to be the Aa, or materials of virtue or moral goodness, which had its essence in a proper conduct with respect to all these. (Vid. Arr. Epict. 1. i. c. 29. Also the Dialogue concerning Happiness, p. 75, and note t. M. Ant. xii. 29; vii. 29; x. 18, 19; where the vλikdy and airides are opposed to each other.) The Peripatetics, though they expressly held the soul to be ἀσώματος, οι incorporeal," yet still talked of a vous vλiкds, "a material mind" or "intellect." This to modern cars may possibly sound somewhat harshly. Yet if we translate the words, "natural capa city," and consider them as only denoting that original and native power of intellection, which being previous to all human knowledge, is yet necessary to its reception; there seems nothing then to remain that can give us offence. And so much for the idea of "An, or "matter." See Alex. Aphrod. de Anim. p. 144. b. 145. Arist. Metaph. p. 121, 122, 141. edit. Sylb. Procl. in Euclid. p. 22, 23. As to eldos, its original meaning was that of "form" or "figure," considered as denoting visible symmetry and proportion; and hence it had its name from elow, “to see;" beauty of person being one of the noblest and most excellent objects of sight. Thus Euripides, 66 Πρῶτον μὲν εἶδος ἄξιον τυραννίδος. Fair form to empire gave the first pretence. Now as the form or figure of visible beings tended principally to distinguish them, and to give to each its name and essence; hence in a more general sense, whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal) was peculiar, essential, and distinctive, so as by its accession to any beings, as to its "Aŋ or matter," to mark them with a character which they had not before, was called by the ancients eldos, or "form." Thus not only the shape given to the brass was called the eldos, or "form" of the statue; but the proportion assigned to the drugs was the eldos or "form" of the medicine; the orderly motion of the human body was the eldos or "form" of the dance; the just arrangement of the propositions, the eldos or "form" of the syllogism. In like manner, the rational and accurate conduct of a wise and good man, in all the various relations and occurrences of life, made that eldos or "form" described by Cicero to his son: Formam quidam ipsam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem honesti vides: quæ, si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret sapientiæ, &c. De Offic. i. We may go further still: the Supreme Intelligence which passes through all things, and which is the same to our capacities as light is to our eyes, this Supreme Intelligence has been called eldos eldwv, “the form of forms," as being the fountain of all symmetry, of all good, and of all truth; and as imparting to every being those essential and distinctive attributes which make it to be itself, and not any thing else. And so much concerning form, as before concerning matter. We shall only add, that it is in the uniting of these that every thing generable begins to exist; in their separating, to perish, and be at an end; thing peculiar; of something common, and belonging to many other things; and of something peculiar, by which it is distinguished, and made to be its true and proper self. Hence language, if compared according to this notion to the murmurs of a fountain, or the dashings of a cataract, has in common this, that, like them, it is a sound. But then, on the contrary, it has in peculiar this, that whereas those sounds have no meaning or signification, to language a meaning or signification is essential. Again, language, if compared to the voice of irrational animals, has in common this, that, like them, it has a meaning. But then it has this in peculiar to distinguish it from them, that whereas the meaning of those animal sounds is derived from nature, that of language is derived, not from nature, but from compact." d From hence it becomes evident, that language, taken in the most comprehensive view, implies certain sounds, having certain meanings; and that of these two principles, the sound is as the matter, common (like other matter) to many different things; the meaning as that peculiar and characteristic form, by which the nature or essence of language becomes complete. that while the two co-exist, they co-exist not by juxtaposition, like the stones in a wall, but by a more intimate coincidence, complete in the minutest part; that hence, if we were to persist in dividing any substance (for example marble) to infinity, there would still remain after every section both matter and form, and these as perfectly united as before the division began: lastly, that they are both pre-existent to the beings which they constitute; the matter being to be found in the world at large; the form, if artificial, pre-existing within the artificer, or if natural, within the Supreme Cause, the sovereign artist of the universe. Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans. Even without speculating so high as this, we may see among all animal and vegetable substances, the form pre-existing in their immediate generating cause; oak being the parent of oak, lion of lion, man of man, &c. Cicero's account of these principles is as follows: MATTER. Sed subjectam putant omnibus sine ulla specie, atque carentem omni illa qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usitatius hoc verbum et tritius) materiam quandam, ex qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint: (quæ tota omnia accipere possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte) eoque etiam interire, non in nihilum, &c. Acad. i. 8. FORM. Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id sit, unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quasi imago, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, neque ullo sensu percipi potest: cogitatione tantum et mente complectimur. Has rerum formas appellat ideas ille non intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister, Plato: easque gigni negat, et ait semper esse, ac ratione et intelligentia contineri: cætera nasci occidere, fluere, labi; nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu. Quidquid est igitur, de quo ratione et via disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis formam speciemque redigendum. Cic. ad M. Brut. Orat. 66 d The Peripatetics (and with just reason) in all their definitions, as well of words as of sentences, made it a part of their character to be significant kaTÀ σVVlÝKNY, “by compact." See Aristot. de Interp. c. 2. 4. Boethius translates the words karà σvvOr, “ad placitum," or " secundum placitum," and thus explains them in his comment: Secundum placitum vero est, quod secundum quandam positionem, placitumque ponentis aptatur; nullum enim nomen naturaliter constitutum est, neque unquam, sicut subjecta res a natura est, ita quoque a natura veniente vocabulo nuncupatur. Sed hominum genus, quod et ratione, et oratione vigeret, nomina posuit, eaque quibus libuit literis syllabisque conjungens, singulis subjectarum rerum substantiis dedit. Boeth. in lib. de Interpret. p. 308. CHAPTER II. UPON THE MATTER, OR COMMON SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE. THE Uλn, or "matter of language," comes first to be considered; ὕλη, a subject which order will not suffer us to omit, but in which we shall endeavour to be as concise as we can. Now this ὕλη, or "matter," is sound; and sound is that sensation peculiar to the sense of hearing, when the air hath felt a percussion adequate to the producing such effect." As the causes of this percussion are various, so from hence sound derives the variety of its species. Further, as all these causes are either animal or inanimate, so the two grand species of sounds are likewise animal or inanimate. There is no peculiar name for sound inanimate; nor even for that of animals, when made by the trampling of their feet, the fluttering of their wings, or any other cause, which is merely accidental. But that which they make by proper organs, in consequence of some sensation or inward impulse, such animal sound is called a voice. As language therefore implies that sound called human voice, we may perceive that to know the nature and powers of the human voice, is in fact to know the matter or common subject of language. Now the voice of man, and it should seem of all other animals, is formed by certain organs between the mouth and the lungs, and which organs maintain the intercourse between these two. The lungs furnish air, out of which the voice is formed; and the mouth, when the voice is formed, serves to publish it abroad. What these vocal organs precisely are, is not in all respects agreed by philosophers and anatomists. Be this as it will, it is certain that the mere primary and simple voice is completely formed, before ever it reach the mouth, and can therefore (as well as breathing) find a passage through the nose, when the mouth is so far stopped, as to prevent the least utterance. Now pure and simple voice, being thus produced, is (as before • This appears to be Priscian's meaning when he says of a voice, what is more properly true of sound in general, that it is, suum sensibile aurium, id est, quod proprie auribus accidit. Lib. i. p. 537. The following account of the Stoics, which refers the cause of sound to an undulation in the air propagated circularly, as when we drop a stone into a cistern of water, seems to accord with the modern hypothesis, and to be as plausible as any: ̓Ακούειν δὲ, τοῦ μεταξὺ τοῦ τε φωνοῦντος καὶ τοῦ ἀκούοντος αέρος πληττομένου σφαι ροειδώς, εἶτα κυματουμένου, καὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσπίπτοντος, ὡς κυματοῦται τὸ ἐν τῇ δεξαμενῇ ὕδωρ κατὰ κύκλους ὑπὸ τοῦ ußanlévros λítov: “Porro audire, cum is, qui medius inter loquentem, et audientem est, aer verberatur orbiculariter, deinde agitatus auribus influit, quemadmodum et cisternæ aqua per orbes injecto agitatur lapide." Diog. Laert. vii. |