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virtue, and moral virtue. Moral virtue, from its employment, may be called more human, as it tempers our appetites to the purposes of human life. But intellectual virtue may be surely called more divine, if we consider the nature and sublimity of its end.
Indeed, for moral virtue, as it is almost wholly conversant about appetites and affections, either to reduce the natural ones to a proper mean, or totally to expel the unnatural and vicious, it would be impious to suppose the Deity to have occasion for such an habit, or that any work of this kind should call for his attention. Yet God is, and lives. So we are assured from scripture itself. What then may we suppose the divine life to be? Not a life of sleep, as the fables tell us of Endymion. If we may be allowed, then, to conjecture, with a becoming reverence, what more likely than a perpetual energy of the purest intellect about the first, all-comprehensive objects of intellection, which objects are no other than that intellect itself? For in pure intellection it holds the reverse of all sensation, that the perceiver and thing perceived are always one and the same.
It was speculation of this kind concerning the Divine Nature which induced one of the wisest among the ancients to believe, “that the man who could live in the pure enjoyment of his mind, and who properly cultivated that divine principle, was happiest in himself, and most beloved by the gods. For if the gods had any regard to what passed among men, (as it appeared they had,) it was probable they should rejoice in that which was most excellent, and by nature the most nearly allied to themselves; and as this was mind, that they should requite the man who most loved and honoured this, both from his regard to that which was dear to themselves, and from his acting a part which was laudable and right." &
And thus in all science there is something valuable for itself, because it contains within it something which is divine.
Γ Ει ούν ούτως εύ έχει, ως ημείς TOTÈ, & imaginary deities, of whom some had Θεός αεί, θαυμαστόν ει δε μάλλον, έτι pretensions to life at all ; others to none θαυμασιώτερον έχει δε ώδε, και ζωή δέ γε higher than to vegetables or brutes ; and υπάρχει η γαρ Νου ενέργεια, ζωή: εκείνος the best were nothing better than illustrious δε, η ενέργεια ενέργεια δε η καθ' αυτήν, men, whose existence was circumscribed by εκείνου ζωή αρίστη και αίδιος. Φαμέν δε the short period of humanity. τον Θεόν είναι ζωον αΐδιον, άριστον" ώστε To the passage above quoted, may be ζωή και αιών συνεχής και αΐδιος υπάρχει added another, which immediately precedes τω Θεώ, τούτο γάρ ο Θεός. Τών μετά τα it. Αυτόν δε νοει ο νους κατά μετάληψιν φυσ' Λ'. '. It is remarkable in scripture, του νοητού νοητός γαρ γίνεται, θιγγάνων that God is peculiarly characterized as a και νοών ώστε ταυτον νους και νόητον, living God, in opposition to all false and 8 'HOL• Nikomax. od K'. Kep. '.
DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT INTO ITS PRINCIPAL PARTS.
Some things the mind performs through the body; as, for example, the various works and energies of art. Others it performs without such medium; as, for example, when it thinks, and reasons, and concludes. Now though the mind, in either case, may be called the principle or source, yet are these last more properly its own peculiar acts, as being immediately referable to its own innate powers. And thus is mind ultimately the cause of all; of every thing at least that is fair and good.
Among those acts of mind more immediately its own, that of mental separation may be well reckoned one. Corporeal separations, however accurate otherwise, are in one respect incomplete, as they may be repeated without end. The smallest limb, severed from the smallest animalcule, (if we could suppose any instrument equal to such dissection,) has still a triple exten-. sion of length, breadth, and thickness; has a figure, a colour, with perhaps many other qualities, and so will continue to have though thus divided to infinity. But the mind surmounts all power of concretion, and can place in the simplest manner every attribute by itself: convex without concave; colour without superficies; superficies without body; and body without its accidents; as distinctly each one as though they had never been united.
And thus it is that it penetrates into the recesses of all things, not only dividing them, as wholes, into their more conspicuous parts, but persisting till it even separate those elementary principles, which, being blended together after a more mysterious manner, are united in the minutest part as much as in the mightiest whole.b
Now if matter and form are among these elements, and deserve perhaps to be esteemed as the principal among them, it may not be foreign to the design of this treatise, to seek whether these, or any things analogous to them, may be found in speech or language. This, therefore, we shall attempt after the following method.
a Itaque naturæ facienda est prorsus so- terms of great import in the days of ancient latio et separatio ; non per ignem certe, sed philosophy, when things were scrutinized per mentem, tanquam ignem divinum. rather at their beginning than at their end. Bacon. Organ. 1. ii. 16.
They have been but little regarded by See below, p. 207, note c.
modern philosophy, which almost wholly c See before, p. 117, 119. “ Matter” employs itself about the last order of suband "form" (in Greek óan and eldos) were stance, that is to say, the tangible, corporeal,
Every thing in a manner, whether natural or artificial, is in its constitution compounded of something common and some
or concrete, and which acknowledges no city," and consider them as only denoting separations even in this, but those made by that original and native power of intellecmathematical instruments or chemical pro- tion, which being previous to all human
knowledge, is yet necessary to its reception; The original meaning of the word 6an, there seems nothing then to remain that was sylva, "a wood.” Thus Homer: can give us offence. And so much for the
Τρέμε δ' ούρεα μακρά και ύλη, idea of 6xn, or “matter.” See Alex. Aphrod. Noooivům abavátoloi Mooerddwvos ibvtos. de Anim. p. 144. b. 145. Arist. Metaph. As Neptune past, the mountains and the wood p. 121, 122, 141. edit. Sylb. Procl. in Trembled beneath the god's immortal feet. Euclid. p. 22, 23.
Hence as wood was perhaps the first and As to eldos, its original meaning was most useful kind of materials, the word ún, that of "form” or “figure," considered as which denoted it, came to be by degrees denoting visible symmetry and proportion; extended, and at length to denote matter and hence it had its name from elow, "to or materials in general. In this sense brass see;" beauty of person being one of the was called the ýan or “matter” of a statue; noblest and most excellent objects of sight. stone, the űan or “ matter" of a pillar; and Thus Euripides, so in other instances. The Platonic Chal- slp@tov uèr el dos čiov tupavvidos. cidius, and other authors of the latter Fair form to empire gave the first pretence. Latinity, use sylva under the same extended Now as the form or figure of visible beings and comprehensive signification.
tended principally to distinguish them, and Now as the species of matter here men- to give to each its name and essence ; hence tioned (stone, metal, wood, &c.) occur most in a more general sense, whatever of any frequently in common life, and are all kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal) was nothing more than natural substances or peculiar, essential, and distinctive, so as by bodies, hence by the vulgar, matter and body its accession to any beings, as to its űan or have been taken to denote the same thing; “ matter,” to mark them with a character material to mean corporeal ; immaterial, in- which they had not before, was called by corporeal, &c. But this was not the sentiment the ancients eldos, or “form.” Thus not of philosophers of old, by whom the term only the shape given the brass was matter was seldom used under so narrow an called the eldos, or “form" of the statue ; acceptation. By these, everything was but the proportion assigned to the drugs called xn, or“matter," whether corporeal or was the eldos or “form” of the medicine ; incorporeal, which was capable of becoming the orderly motion of the human body was something else, or of being moulded into the eldos or "form" of the dance; the just something else, whether from the operation arrangement of the propositions, the eldos of art, of nature, or a higher cause.
or “ form” of the syllogism. In like manner, In this sense, they not only called brass the rational and accurate conduct of a wise the can of a statue, and timber of a boat, and good man, in all the various relations but letters and syllables they called the and occurrences of life, made that eldos or údai of words ; words, or simple terms, the “ form” described by Cicero to his son: Gal of propositions ; and propositions them- Formam quidam ipsam, Marce fili, et tanselves the órai of syllogisms. The Stoics quam faciem honesti vides: quæ, si oculis held all things out of our own power, (rà cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) oủk éqñuiv, such as wealth and poverty, excitaret sapientiæ, &c. De Offic. i. honour and dishonour, health and sickness, We may go further still: the Supreme life and death, to be the oxal, or materials Intelligence which passes through all things, of virtue or moral goodness, which had its and which is the same to our capacities as essence in a proper conduct with respect to light is to our eyes, this Supreme Intelliall these. (Vid. Arr. Epict. 1. i. c. 29. Also gence has been called eloos elowv, " the the Dialogue concerning Happiness, p. form of forms,” as being the fountain of all 75, and note t. M. Ant. xii. 29 ; vii. symmetry, of all good, and of all truth ; 29; x. 18, 19; where the 'Aikdy and and as imparting to every being those esaiti@des are opposed to each other.) The sential and distinctive attributes which Peripatetics, though they expressly held the make it to be itself, and not any thing else. Soul to be ασώματος, or incorporeal," yet And so much concerning form, as before still talked of a voûs únikos, “a material concerning matter. We shall only add, mind” or “intellect." This to modern cars that it is in the uniting of these that every may possibly sound somewhat barshly. Yet thing generable begins to exist; in their if we translate the words, "natural capa- separating, to perish, and be at an end;
thing peculiar; of something common, and belonging to many other things; and of something peculiar, by which it is distinguished, and made to be its true and proper self.
Hence language, if compared according to this notion to the murmurs of a fountain, or the dashings of a cataract, has in common this, that, like them, it is a sound. But then, on the contrary, it has in peculiar this, that whereas those sounds have no meaning or signification, to language a meaning or signification is essential. Again, language, if compared to the voice of irrational animals, has in common this, that, like them, it has a meaning. But then it has this in peculiar to distinguish it from them, that whereas the meaning of those animal sounds is derived from nature, that of language is derived, not from nature, but from compact.
From hence it becomes evident, that language, taken in the most comprehensive view, implies certain sounds, having certain meanings; and that of these two principles, the sound is as the matter, common (like other matter) to many different things; the meaning as that peculiar and characteristic form, by which the nature or essence of language becomes complete.
that while the two co-exist, they co-exist
FORM. not by juxta-position, like the stones in a Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo wall, but by a more intimate coincidence, genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id complete in the minutest part ; that hence, sit, unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quasi if we were to persist in dividing any sub- imago, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque stance (for example marble) to infinity, auribus, neque ullo sensu percipi potest: there would still remain after every section cogitatione tantum et mente complectimur. both matter and form, and these as per Has rerum formas appellat ideas ille non fectly united as before the division began: intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi gravislastly, that they are both pre-existent to simus auctor et magister, Plato: easque the beings which they constitute ; the gigni negat, et ait semper esse, ac ratione matter being to be found in the world at et intelligentia contineri : cætera nasci occilarge; the form, if artificial, pre-existing dere, fluere, labi ; nec diutius esse uno et within the artificer, or if natural, within eodem statu. Quidquid est igitur, de quo the Supreme Cause, the sovereign artist of ratione et via disputetur, id est ad ultimam the universe.
sui generis formam speciemque redigendum. Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse Cic. ad M. Brut. Orat. Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine d The Peripatetics (and with just reason) formans.
in all their definitions, as well of words as Even without speculating so high as this, of sentences, made it a part of their chawe may see among all animal and vegetable racter to be significant catà ouvohnny,“ by substances, the form pre-existing in their compact." See Aristot. de Interp. c. 2. 4. immediate generating cause ; oak being the Boethius translates the words katà ouvparent of oak, lion of lion, man of man, &c. dňanı, “ ad placitum,” or “ secundum placi
Cicero's account of these principles is as tum," and thus explains them in his comfollows:
ment: Secundum placitum vero est, quod MATTER.
secundum quandam positionem, placitumSed subjectam putant omnibus sine ulla que ponentis aptatur ; nullum enim nomen specie, atque carentem omni illa qualitate naturaliter constitutum est, neque unquam, (faciamus enim tractando usitatius hoc sicut subjecta res a natura est, ita quoque verbum et tritius) materiam quandam, ex a natura veniente vocabulo nuncupatur. qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint: (quæ Sed hominum genus, quod et ratione, et tota omnia accipere possit, omnibusque oratione vigeret, nomina posuit, eaque quimodis mutari atque ex omni parte) eoque bus libuit literis syllabisque conjungens, etiam interire, non in nihilum, &c. Acad. singulis subjectarum rerum substantiis dedit. i. 8.
Boeth. in lib. de Interpret. p. 308.
UPON THE MATTER, OR COMMON SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE.
The üln, or “matter of language," comes first to be considered; a subject which order will not suffer us to omit, but in which we shall endeavour to be as concise as we can. Now this ύλη, , or "matter," is sound; and sound is that sensation peculiar to the sense of hearing, when the air hath felt a percussion adequate to the producing such effect.
As the causes of this percussion are various, so from hence sound derives the variety of its species.
Further, as all these causes are either animal or inanimate, so the two grand species of sounds are likewise animal or inanimate.
There is no peculiar name for sound inanimate; nor even for that of animals, when made by the trampling of their feet, the fluttering of their wings, or any other cause, which is merely accidental. But that which they make by proper organs, in consequence of some sensation or inward impulse, such animal sound is called a voice.
As language therefore implies that sound called human voice, we may perceive that to know the nature and powers of the human voice, is in fact to know the matter or common subject of language.
Now the voice of man, and it should seem of all other animals, is formed by certain organs between the mouth and the lungs, and which organs maintain the intercourse between these two. The lungs furnish air, out of which the voice is formed; and the mouth, when the voice is formed, serves to publish it abroad.
What these vocal organs precisely are, is not in all respects agreed by philosophers and anatomists. Be this as it will, it is certain that the mere primary and simple voice is completely formed, before ever it reach the mouth, and can therefore (as well as breathing) find a passage through the nose, when the mouth is so far stopped, as to prevent the least utterance.
Now pure and simple voice, being thus produced, is (as before
• This appears to be Priscian's meaning 'Ακούειν δε, του μεταξύ του τε φωνούντος when he says of a voice, what is more και του ακούοντος αέρος πληττομένου σφαιproperly true of sound in general, that it is, ροειδώς, είτα κυματουμένου, και ταις ακοαίς suum sensibile aurium, id est, quod proprie προσπίπτοντος, ως κυματούται το εν τη auribus accidit. Lib. i. p. 537.
δεξαμενή ύδωρ κατά κύκλους υπό του The following account of the Stoics, duBand évtos aídov: “Porro audire, cum is, which refers the cause of sound to an un- qui medius inter loquentem, et audientem dulation in the air propagated circularly, est, aer verberatur orbiculariter, deinde as when we drop a stone into a cistern of agitatus auribus influit, quemadmodum et water, seems to accord with the modern cisternæ aqua per orbes injecto agitatur hypothesis, and to be as plausible as any: lapide.” Diog. Laert. vii.