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such sentences as Achilles oulneravit, Lysippus fecit. But though this be evident and clearly understood, the mind is still in suspence, and finds its conception incomplete. Action, it well knows, not only requires some agent, but it must have a subject also to work on, and it must produce some effect. It is, then, to denote one of these (that is, the subject or the effect) that the authors of language have destined the accusative. Achilles vulneravit Hectorem; here the accusative denotes the subject. Lysippus fecit statuas ; here the accusative denotes the effect. By these additional explanations the mind becomes satisfied, and the sentences acquire a perfection which before they wanted. In whatever other manner, whether figuratively, or with prepositions, this case may have been used, its first destination seems to have been that here mentioned, and hence therefore we shall form its character and description: the accusative is that case which to an efficient nominative and verb of action subjoins either the effect or the passive subject. We have still left the genitive and the dative, which we investigate as follows.
It has been said in the preceding chapter, that when the places of the nominative and the accusative are filled by proper substantives, other substantives are annexed by the help of prepositions. Now though this be so far true in the modern languages, that (a very few instances excepted) they know no other method; yet is not the rule of equal latitude with respect to the Latin or Greek, and that from reasons which we are about to offer.
Among the various relations of substantives denoted by prepositions, there appear to be two principal ones; and these are, the term or point which something commences from, and the term or point which something tends to. These relations the Greeks and Latins thought of so great importance, as to distinguish them, when they occurred, by peculiar terminations of their own, which expressed their force without the help of a preposition. Now it is here we behold the rise of the ancient genitive and dative: the genitive being formed to express all relations commencing from itself; the dative all relations tending to itself. Of this there can be no stronger proof than the analysis of these cases in the modern languages which we have mentioned already.'
It is on these principles that they say in Greek, deouai oou, δίδωμι σου, ,
“of thee I ask,” “to thee I give.” The reason is, in requests, the person requested is one whom something is expected from ; in donations, the person presented is one whom something passes to. So again, tenointai ribov,' “it is made of stone." Stone was the passive subject, and thus it appears in u See before, p. 194.
“made of gold and ivory.” So says PauSee before, p. 196, 7.
sanias of the Olympian Jupiter, l. v. p. 400, * Χρυσού πεποιημένος και ελέφαντος, See also Ηom. iliad. Σ. 574.
the genitive as being the term from, or out of which. Even in Latin, where the syntax is more formal and strict, we read, Implentur veteris Bacchi, pinguisque ferinæ.
Virg. The old wine and venison were the funds or stores of or from which they were filled. Upon the same principles, Ilivw toû Üdatos, is a phrase in Greek; and Je bois de l'eau, a phrase in French; as much as to say, “ I take some or a certain part, from or out of a certain whole."
When we meet in language such genitives as “the son of a father;" “ the father of a son;" “the picture of a painter;" "the painter of a picture,” &c., these are all relatives, and therefore each of them reciprocally a term or point to the other, from or out of which it derives its essence, or at least its intellection.
The dative, as it implies tendency to, is employed among its other uses to denote the final cause, that being the cause to which all events, not fortuitous, may be said to tend. It is thus used in the following instances among innumerable others.
Tibi suaveis dædala tellus
Virg. Georg. i.
Ibid. And so much for cases, their origin and use; a sort of forms or terminations which we could not well pass over, from their great importance both in the Greek and Latin tongues ;? but which, however, not being among the essentials of language, and therefore not to be found in many particular languages, can be hardly said to fall within the limits of our inquiry.
Besides the parts of speech before mentioned, there remains the interjection. Of this kind among the Greeks are 'N, Dell, Ai, &c.; among the Latins, Ah! Heu! Hei! &c.; among the English, Ah! Alas! Fie! &c. These the Greeks have ranged among their adverbs; improperly, if we consider the adverbial nature, which always coincides with some verb as its principal, and to which it always serves in the character of an attributive. Now interjections coincide with no part of speech, but are either uttered alone, or else thrown into a sentence, without altering its form, either in syntax or signification. The Latins seem therefore to have done better in separating them by themselves," and giving them a name by way of distinction from the rest.
y All relatives are said to reciprocate, or dium, dupli dimidium. Categor, C. vii. mutually infer each other, and therefore ? Annon et illud observatione dignum they are often expressed by this case, that (licet nobis modernis spiritus nonnihil reis to say, the genitive. Thus Aristotle: dundat) antiquas linguas plenas declinaNávra dè tà após Tl após årtiotpéporta tionum, casuum, conjugationum, et similium λέγεται, οίον ο δούλος δεσπότου δούλος, fuisse; modernas, his fere destitutas, plaκαι ο δεσπότης δούλου δεσπότης λέγεται rima per prepositiones et verba auxiliaria είναι, και το διπλάσιον ημίσεος διπλάσιον, segniter expedire ? Sane facile quis conKal id fuiov diamarlov guiou: Omnia jiciat (utcunque nobis ipsi placeamus) invero, quæ sunt ad aliquid, referuntur ad ea, genia priorum seculorum nostris fuisse multo quæ reciprocantur. Ut servus dicitur do acutiora et subtiliora, Bacon. de Augm. mini servus ; et dominus, servi dominus; Scient. vi. 1. necnon duplum, dimidü duplum ; et dimi
Should it be asked, if not adverbs, what then are they? It may be answered, not so properly parts of speech, as adventitious sounds; certain voices of nature, rather than voices of art, expressing those passions and natural emotions which
spontaneously arise in the human soul, upon the view or narrative of interesting events.
“And thus we have found that all words are either significant by themselves, or only significant when associated; that those significant by themselves, denote either substances or attributes, and are called for that reason substantives and attributives; that the substantives are either nouns or pronouns ; that the attributives are either primary or secondary; that the primary attributives are either verbs, participles, or adjectives ; the secondary, adverbs. Again, that the parts of speech, only significant when associated, are either definitives or connectives; that the definitives are either articular or pronominal ; and that the connectives are either prepositions or conjunctions.
And thus have we resolved language as a whole into its constituent parts, which was the first thing that we proposed in the course of this inquiry.
& Vid. Servium in Æneid. xii. 486. signa lætitiæ idem sunt apud omnes: sunt
b Interjectiones a Græcis ad adverbia re- igitur naturales. Si vero naturales, non feruntur, atque eos sequitur etiam Boethius. sunt partes orationis. Nam eæ partes, seEt recte quidem de iis, quando casum regunt. cundum Aristotelem, ex instituto, non naSed quando orationi solum inseruntur, ut tura, debent constare. Interjectionem Græci nota affectus, velut suspirii aut metus, vix adverbiis adnumerant; sed falso. Nam videntur ad classem aliquam pertinere, ut neque, &c. Sanct. Miner. I. i. c. 2. Interquæ naturales sint notæ ; non, aliarum jectionem Græci inter adverbia ponunt, quovocum instar, ex instituto significant. Voss. niam hæc quoque vel adjungitur verbis, vel de Anal. 1. i. c. 1. Interjectio est vox af- verba ei subaudiuntur. Ut si dicam-papa! fectum mentis significans, ac citra verbi quid video-vel per se-papæ !etiamsi opem sententiam complens. Ibid. c. 3. non addatur, miror; habet in se ipsius verbi Restat classium extrema, interjectio. Hujus significationem. Quæ res maxime fecit appellatio non similiter se habet ac con- Romanorum artium scriptores separatim junctionis. Nam cum hæc dicatur con- hanc partem ab adverbiis accipere ; quia junctio, quia conjungat ; interjectio tamen, videtur affectum habere in sese verbi, et non quia interjacet, sed quia interjicitur, plenam motus animi significationem, etiamsi nomen accepit. Nec tamen de ovcią ejus non addatur verbum, demonstrare. Interjecest, ut interjiciatur ; cum per se compleat tio tamen non solum illa, quæ dicunt Græci sententiam, nec raro ab ea incipiat oratio. Oxet Alaoudy, significat; sed etiam voces, quæ Ibid. I. iv. c. 28. Interjectionem non esse cujuscunque passionis animi pulsu per expartem orationis sic ostendo: quod naturale clamationem interjiciuntur. Prisc. 1. xv. est, idem est apud omnes: scd gemitus et Sec before, p. 119.
But now, as we conclude, methinks I hear some objector demanding, with an air of pleasantry and ridicule, “Is there no speaking, then, without all this trouble? Do we not talk every one of us, as well unlearned as learned, as well poor peasants as profound philosophers?" We may answer, by interrogating on our part, Do not those same poor peasants use the lever and the wedge, and many other instruments, with much habitual readiness? And yet have they any conception of those geometrical principles from which those machines derive their efficacy and force? And is the ignorance of these peasants a reason for others to remain ignorant, or to render the subject a less becoming inquiry? Think of animals and vegetables that occur every day; of time, of place, and of motion ; of light, of colours, and of gravitation ; of our very senses and intellect, by which we perceive every thing else: that they are we all know, and are perfectly satisfied; what they are is a subject of much obscurity and doubt. Were we to reject this last question, because we are certain of the first, we should banish all philosophy at once out of the world.d
But a graver objector now accosts us. “What (says he) is the utility? Whence the profit, where the gain?” Every science whatever (we may answer) has its use. Arithmetic is excellent for the gauging of liquors; geometry, for the measuring of estates; astronomy, for the making of almanacks; and grammar, perhaps, for the drawing of bonds and conveyances.
Thus much to the sordid. If the liberal ask for something better than this, we may answer and assure them, from the best authorities, that every exercise of the mind upon theorems of science, like generous and manly exercise of the body, tends to call forth and strengthen nature's original vigour. Be the subject itself immediately lucrative or not, the nerves of reason are braced by the mere employ, and we become abler actors in the drama of life, whether our part be of the busier or of the sedater kind.
Perhaps, too, there is a pleasure even in science itself, distinct from any end to which it may be further conducive. Are not health and strength of body desirable for their own sakes, though we happen not to be fated either for porters or draymen? and have not health and strength of mind their intrinsic worth also, though not condemned to the low drudgery of sordid emolument? Why should there not be a good (could we have the grace to recognise it) in the mere energy of our intellect, as much as in energies of lower degree? The sportsman believes there is good in his chase, the man of gaiety in his intrigue, even the glutton in his meal. We may justly ask of these, Why they pursue such things? but if they answer, “they pursue them because they are good,” it would be folly to ask them further, Why they pursue what is good? It might well, in such case, be replied on their behalf, Chow strange soever it may at first appear,) " that if there was not something good, which was in no respect useful, even things useful themselves could not possibly have existence.” For this is in fact no more than to assert, that some things are ends, some things are means; and that if there were no ends, there could be, of course, no means.
1 'Αλλ' έστι πολλά τών όντων, και την number of things, many which have a most μεν ύπαρξιν έχει γνωριμωτάτην, άγνωστο- known existence, but a most unknown esτάτην δε την ουσίαν ώσπερ ήτε κίνησις, sence ; such for example as motion, place, και ο τόπος, έτι δε μάλλον ο χρόνος. and, more than either of them, time. The 'Εκάστου γάρ τούτων το μέν είναι γνώριμον existence of each of these is known and inκαι αναμφίλεκτον τις δέ ποτέ έστιν αυ- disputable, but what their essence is, or naτων η ουσία, των χαλεπωτάτων δραθήναι. ture, is among the most difficult things to "Eoti dè 81) TI TÔV TOLOÚTWv kalÝ yuxh discern. The soul also is in the same class : το μεν γαρ είναι τι την ψυχήν, γνωριμώτα- that it is something, is most evident; but TOV Kal pavepáratov Tide Troté dotiv, où what it is, is a matter not so easy to learn." ράδιον καταμαθείν : : “ There are in the Alex. Aphrod. de Anima, p. 142.
It should seem, then, the grand question was, What is good ? that is to say, what is that which is desirable, not for something else, but for itself? for whether it be the chase, or the intrigue, or the meal, may be fairly questioned, since men in each instance are far from being agreed.
In the mean time, it is plain, from daily experience, there are infinite pleasures, amusements, and diversions; some for summer, others for winter; some for country, others for town; some easy, indolent, and soft; others boisterous, active, and rough ; a multitude diversified to every taste, and which for the time are enjoyed as perfect good, without a thought of any end that may be further obtained. Some objects of this kind are at times sought by all men, excepting alone that contemptible tribe, who, from a love to the means of life, wholly forgetting its end, are truly, for that reason, called misers, or miserable.
If there be supposed, then, a pleasure, a satisfaction, a good, a something valuable for itself without view to any thing further, in so many objects of the subordinate kind; shall we not allow the same praise to the sublimest of all objects? Shall the intellect alone feel no pleasures in its energy, when we allow them to the grossest energies of appetite and sense? Or if the reality of all pleasures and goods were to be controverted, may not the intellectual sort be defended, as rationally as any of them? Whatever may be urged in behalf of the rest (for we are not now arraigning them) we may safely affirm of intellectual good, that it is "the good of that part which is most excellent within us; that it is a good accommodated to all places and times; which neither depends on the will of others, nor on the affluence of external fortune ; that it is a good which decays not with decaying appetites, but often rises in vigour when those are no
There is a difference, we must own, between this intellectual
e See before, p. 48.