As to causal conjunctions, (of which we have spoken already,) there is no one of the four species of causes which they are not capable of denoting; for example: the material cause, "the trumpet sounds, because it is made of metal;" the formal, "the trumpet sounds, because it is long and hollow;" the efficient, "the trumpet sounds, because an artist blows it ;" the final, "the trumpet sounds, that it may raise our courage." Where it is worth observing, that the three first causes are expressed by the strong affirmation of the indicative mode; because, if the effect actually be, these must of necessity be also. But the last cause has a different mode, namely, the contingent, or potential: the reason is, that the final cause, though it may be first in speculation, is always last in event; that is to say, however it may be the end, which set the artist first to work, it may still be an end beyond his power to obtain, and which, like other contingents, may either happen, or not. Hence, also, it is connected by conjunctions of a peculiar kind, such as that, iva, ut, &c.

The sum is, that all conjunctions, which connect both sentences and their meanings, are either copulative or continuative: the continuatives are either conditional or positive; and the positives are either causal or collective.

And now we come to the disjunctive conjunctions, a species of words which bear this contradictory name, because, while they disjoin the sense, they conjoin the sentences.a

With respect to these, we may observe, that as there is a principle of union diffused throughout all things, by which this whole is kept together, and preserved from dissipation; so there is a principle of diversity diffused in like manner, the source of distinction, of number, and of order.b

* Οἱ δὲ διαζευκτικοὶ τὰ διαζευγμένα συντιθέασι, καὶ ἢ πρᾶγμα ἀπὸ πράγματος, прóσwnоv and mpoσánov diaČevyvÛvтes, Thν páσi éπLOvvooûow. Gaza Gram. 1. iv. Disjunctivæ sunt, quæ, quamvis dictiones conjungant, sensum tamen disjunctum habent. Prisc. 1. xvi. p. 1029. And hence it is that a sentence connected by disjunctives has a near resemblance to a simple negative truth: for though this, as to its intellection, be disjunctive, (its end being to disjoin the subject from the predicate,) yet, as it combines terms together into one proposition, it is as truly synthetical as any truth that is affirmative. See chap. i. note b, p. 117.

The diversity which adorns nature may be said to heighten by degrees, and as it passes to different subjects to become more and more intense. Some things only differ when considered as individuals, but if we recur to their species, immediately lose all distinction: such, for instance, are Socrates

and Plato. Others differ as to species, but as to genus are the same: such are man and lion. There are others, again, which differ as to genus, and coincide only in those transcendental comprehensions of ens, being, existence, and the like: such are quantities and qualities; as, for example, an ounce, and the colour white. Lastly, all being whatever differs, as being, from non-being.

Further in all things different, however moderate their diversity, there is an appearance of opposition with respect to each other, inasmuch as each thing is itself, and not any of the rest. But yet in all subjects this opposition is not the same. In relatives, such as greater and less, double and half, father and son, cause and effect; in these it is more striking than in ordinary subjects, because these always shew it, by necessarily inferring each other. In contraries, such as black and white, even and odd, good and bad, virtuous and vicious; in these the opposition goes still further, because these not only differ, but are even destructive of each other. But the most potent opposition is

Now it is to express, in some degree, the modifications of this diversity, that disjunctive conjunctions seem first to have been invented.

Of these disjunctives, some are simple, some adversative: simple, as when we say, "Either it is day, or it is night;" adversative, as when we say, "It is not day, but it is night." The difference between these is, that the simple do no more than merely disjoin; the adversative disjoin, with an opposition concomitant. Add to this, that the adversative are definite; the simple, indefinite. Thus, when we say, "The number of three is not an even number, but an odd," we not only disjoin two opposite attributes, but we definitely affirm one, and deny the other; but when we say, "The number of the stars is either even or odd,” though we assert one attribute to be, and the other not to be, yet the alternative, notwithstanding, is left indefinite. And so much for simple disjunctives.

As to adversative disjunctives, it has been said already that they imply opposition. Now there can be no opposition of the same attribute in the same subject, as when we say, "Nireus was beautiful;" but the opposition must be either of the same attribute in different subjects, as when we say, "Brutus was a patriot, but Cæsar was not;" or of different attributes in the same subject, as when we say, "Gorgias was a sophist, but not a philosopher;" or of different attributes in different subjects, as when we say, "Plato was a philosopher, but Hippias was a sophist."

The conjunctions used for all these purposes may be called absolute adversatives.

But there are other adversatives, besides these; as when we say, "Nireus was more beautiful than Achilles; Virgil was as great a poet, as Cicero was an orator." The character of these latter is, that they go further than the former, by marking, not only opposition, but that equality, or excess, which arises among

that of avripaois, or "contradiction," when we oppose proposition to proposition, truth to falsehood, asserting of any subject, either it is, or it is not. This, indeed, is an opposition which extends itself to all things; for every thing conceivable must needs have its negative, though multitudes by nature have neither relatives nor contraries.

Besides these modes of diversity, there are others that deserve notice: such, for instance, as the diversity between the name of a thing and its definition; between the various names which belong to the same thing, and the various things which are denoted by the same name; all which diversities, upon occasion, become a part of our discourse. And so much, in short, for the subject of diversity.

The simple disjunctive, or vel, is mostly used indefinitely, so as to leave an alternative; but when it is used definitely, so as to leave no alternative, it is then a perfect disjunctive of the subsequent from the previous, and has the same force with kal où, or et non. It is thus Gaza explains that verse of Homer, Βούλομ ̓ ἐγὼ λαὸν σόον ἔμμεναι, ἢ ἀπο λέσθαι. Iliad. A. That is to say, "I desire the people should be saved, and not be destroyed;" the conjunction being avaipetikòs, or “sublative." It must, however, be confessed, that this verse is otherwise explained by an ellipsis, either οἱ μᾶλλον, οι αὐτὶς, concerning which, see the commentators.

subjects from their being compared; and hence it is they may be called adversatives of comparison.

Besides the adversatives here mentioned, there are two other species, of which the most eminent are unless and although. For example: "Troy will be taken, unless the Palladium be preserved; Troy will be taken, although Hector defend it." The nature of these adversatives may be thus explained: as every event is naturally allied to its cause, so by parity of reason it is opposed to its preventive; and as every cause is either adequated or inadequate, (inadequate, when it endeavours without being effectual,) so in like manner is every preventive. Now adequate preventives are expressed by such adversatives as unless; "Troy will be taken, unless the Palladium be preserved;" that is, this alone is sufficient to prevent it. The inadequate are expressed by such adversatives as although; "Troy will be taken, although Hector defend it;" that is, Hector's defence will prove ineffectual.

The names given by the old grammarians to denote these last adversatives, appear not sufficiently to express their natures. They may be better, perhaps, called adversatives adequate, and inadequate.

And thus it is that all disjunctives, that is, conjunctions, which conjoin sentences, but not their meanings, are either simple or adversative; and that all adversatives are either absolute or comparative, or else adequate or inadequate.

We shall finish this chapter with a few miscellany observa

tions.

In the first place it may be observed, through all the species of disjunctives, that the same disjunctive appears to have greater or less force, according as the subjects, which it disjoins, are more or less disjoined by nature. For example: if we say, "Every number is even or odd, every proposition is true or false," nothing seems to disjoin more strongly than the disjunctive, because no things are in nature more incompatible than the subjects. But if we say, "That object is a triangle, or figure contained under three right lines;" the or, in this case, hardly seems to disjoin, or, indeed, to do more than distinctly to express the thing; first by its name, and then by its definition. So if we say, "That figure is a sphere, or a globe, or a ball," the disjunctive, in this case, tends no further to disjoin, than as it distinguishes the several names which belong to the same thing.

d This distinction has reference to common opinion, and the form of language consonant thereto. In strict metaphysical truth, no cause that is not adequate is any cause at all.

They called them for the most part, without sufficient distinction of their species, adversativa, or ἐναντιωματικοί.

The Latins had a peculiar particle for

this occasion, which they called subdisjunctiva, "a subdisjunctive," and that was sive. Alexander sive Paris; Mars sive Mavors. The Greek er' ouv seems to answer the same end. Of these particles, Scaliger thus speaks: Et sane nomen subdisjunctivarum recte acceptum est, neque enim tam plane disjungit, quam disjunctiva. Nam disjunctivæ sunt in eontrariis-subdisjunctivæ

Again the words when and where, and all others of the same nature, such as whence, whither, whenever, wherever, &c. may be properly called adverbial conjunctions, because they participate the nature both of adverbs and conjunctions: of conjunctions, as they conjoin sentences; of adverbs, as they denote the attributes either of time or of place.

Again these adverbial conjunctions, and perhaps most of the prepositions, (contrary to the character of accessory words, which have strictly no signification, but when associated with other words,) have a kind of obscure signification, when taken alone, by denoting those attributes of time and place. And hence it is, that they appear in grammar like Zoophytes in nature; a kind of middle beings," of amphibious character, which, by sharing the attributes of the higher, and the lower, conduce to link the whole together."

And so much for conjunctions, their genus, and their species.

CHAPTER III.

CONCERNING THOSE CONNECTIVES CALLED PREPOSITIONS.

PREPOSITIONS by their name express their place, but not their character. Their definition will distinguish them from the former connectives. A preposition is a part of speech, devoid itself of signification, but so formed as to unite two words that are significant, and that refuse to coalesce or unite of themselves. This connective power (which relates to words only, autem etiam in non contrariis, sed diversis tantum; ut, Alexander sive Paris. Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 170.

De

h It is somewhat surprising that the politest and most elegant of the Attic writers, and Plato above all the rest, should have their works filled with particles of all kinds, and with conjunctions in particular; while in the modern polite works, as well of ourselves as of our neighbours, scarce such a word as a particle or conjunction is to be found. Is it, that where there is connexion in the meaning, there must be words had to connect; but that where the connexion is little or none, such connectives are of little use? That houses of cards,

without cement, may well answer their end, but not those houses where one would choose to dwell? Is this the cause? or have we attained an elegance to the ancients unknown ?

Venimus ad summam fortunæ, &c. i The Stoic name for a preposition was προθετικός σύνδεσμος, prepositiva con junctio, "a prepositive conjunction." Ως μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας παραθέσεις αἱ προθέσεις συνδεσμικῆς συντάξεως γίνονται παρεμφατικαί, λέλεκται ἡμῖν· ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἀφορμὴ εὔρηται παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς τοῦ καλεῖσθαι αὐτὰς προθετικοὺς συνδέσμους : "Now in what manner, even in other applications, (besides the present,) prepositions give proof of their conjunctive syntax, we have mentioned already; whence, too, the Stoics took occasion to call them prepositive conjunctions." Apollon. 1. iv. c. 5. p. 313. Yet is this, in fact, rather a descriptive sketch, than a complete definition, since there are other conjunctions which are prepositive as well as these. See Gaz. 1. iv. de Præposit. Prisc. 1. xiv. p. 983.

and not sentences) will be better understood from the following speculations.

Some things coalesce and unite of themselves; others refuse to do so without help and, as it were, compulsion. Thus, in works of art, the mortar and the stone coalesce of themselves, but the wainscot and the wall not without nails and pins. In nature this is more conspicuous. For example; all quantities and qualities coalesce immediately with their substances. Thus it is we say, "a fierce lion," "a vast mountain ;" and from this natural concord of subject and accident, arises the grammatical concord of substantive and adjective. In like manner, actions coalesce with their agents, and passions with their patients. Thus it is we say, "Alexander conquers," "Darius is conquered." Nay, as every energy is a kind of medium between its agent and patient, the whole three, agent, energy, and patient, coalesce with the same facility; as when we say, "Alexander conquers Darius." And hence, that is, from these modes of natural coalescence, arises the grammatical regimen of the verb by its nominative, and of the accusative by its verb. Further than this, attributives themselves may be most of them characterized; as when we say of such attributives as ran, beautiful, learned, he ran swiftly, she was very beautiful, he was moderately learned, &c. And hence the coalescence of the adverb with verbs, participles, and adjectives.

The general conclusion appears to be this. "Those parts of speech unite of themselves in grammar, whose original archetypes unite of themselves in nature." To which we may add, as following from what has been said, that the great objects of natural union are substance and attribute. Now though substances naturally coincide with their attributes, yet they absolutely refuse doing so one with another. And hence those known maxims in physics, that body is impenetrable; that two bodies cannot possess the same place; that the same attribute cannot belong to different substances, &c.

From these principles it follows, that when we form a sentence, the substantive without difficulty coincides with the verb, from the natural coincidence of substance and 66 energythe sun warmeth." So likewise the energy with the subject, on which it operates "warmeth the earth." So likewise both substance and energy with their proper attributes "the splendid sun,— genially warmeth-the fertile earth." But suppose we were desirous to add other substantives, as, for instance, air, or beams. How would these coincide, or under what character could they be introduced? Not as nominatives or accusatives, for both

* Causa, propter quam duo substantiva accidens; itaque non dicas, Cæsar, Cato non ponuntur sine copula, e philosophia pugnat. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. petenda est: neque enim duo substantiali- 177. ter unum esse potest, sicut substantia et