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happiness is the subject; pleasure, the predicate. If we change their order, and say, “ pleasure is happiness;" then pleasure becomes the subject, and happiness the predicate. In Greek, these are distinguished not by any order or position, but by help of the article, which the subject always assumes, and the predicate in most instances (some few excepted) rejects. “Happiness is pleasure,noový ý cúdaypovía : “ pleasure is happiness, η ηδονή ευδαιμονία: “ fine things are difficult,” χαλεπά τα καλά: « difficult things are fine,” τα χαλεπά καλά.

In Greek, it is worth attending, how in the same sentence, the same article, by being prefixed to a different word, quite changes the whole meaning. For example: Iltodepalos yupνασιαρχήσας ετιμήθη, , Ptolemy, having presided over the games, was publicly honoured.” The participle youvaolapyjoas has here no other force, than to denote to us the time when Ptolemy was honoured, viz. after having presided over the games. But if, instead of the substantive, we join the participle to the article, and say, ο γυμνασιαρχήσας Πτολεμαίος ετιμήθη, our meaning is then, “the Ptolemy, who presided over the games, was honoured.” The participle in this case, being joined to the article, tends tacitly to indicate not one Ptolemy but many, of which number a particular one participated of honour."

In English likewise it deserves remarking, how the sense is changed by changing of the articles, though we leave every other word of the sentence untouched. 6 And Nathan said unto David, Thou art the man."

In that single the, that dimunitive particle, all the force and efficacy of the reason is contained. By that alone are the premises applied, and so firmly fixed, as never to be shaken. It is possible this assertion may appear at first somewhat strange; but let him who doubts it only change the article, and then see what will become of the prophet and his reasoning “And Nathan said unto David, Thou art a

Might not the king well have demanded, upon so impertinent a position,

Non dices hodie, quorsum hæc tam putida tendant ? But enough of such speculations. The only remark which we shall make on them is this; that “minute change in principles leads to mighty change in effects; so that well are principles entitled to our regard, however in appearance they may be trivial and low."

The articles already mentioned are those strictly so called; but besides these there are the pronominal articles, such as this, that, any, other, some, all, no, or none, &c. Of these we have spoken already in our chapter of pronouns, P where we have

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man.

* Apollon. 1. i. c. 33, 34.

here given, which induced Quintilian to say ο Συ εί ο ανηρ. Βασιλ. β'. κεφ. ιβ'. of the Latin tongue, Noster sermo arti

p See b. i. c. 5. p. 137, 8. It seems to culos non desiderat ; ideoque in alias partes have been some view of words, like that orationis sparguntur. Inst. Orat. 1. i. c. 4.

shewn, when they may be taken as pronouns, and when as articles. Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the essence of an article be to define and ascertain, they are much more properly articles than any thing else, and as such should be considered in universal grammar. Thus when we say, this picture I approve, but that I dislike,” what do we perform by the help of these definitives, but bring down the common appellative to denote two individuals, the one as the more near, the other as the more distant? So when we say, “ some men are virtuous, but all men are mortal,” what is the natural effect of this all and some, but to define that universality and particularity which would remain indefinite, were we to take them away? The same is evident in such sentences as, some substances have sensation, others want it;" “ choose any way of acting, and some men will find fault,” &c. For here, some, other, and any, serve all of them to define different parts of a given whole; some, to denote a definite part; any, to denote an indefinite; and other, to denote the remaining part, when a part has been assumed already. Sometimes this last word denotes a large indefinite portion, set in opposition to some single, definite, and remaining part, which receives from such opposition no small degree of heightening. Thus Virgil,

Excudent alii spirantia mollius æra ;
(Credo equidem) vivos ducent de marmore vultus ;
Orabunt causas melius, cælique meatus
Describent radio, et surgentia sidera dicent:

Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento, &c. Nothing can be stronger or more sublime than this antithesis ; one act set as equal to many other acts taken together, and the Roman singly (for it is Tu Romane, not Vos Romani) to all other men; and yet this performed by so trivial a cause, as the just opposition of alii to tu.

But here we conclude, and proceed to treat of connectives.

Æn. vi.

CHAPTER II.

CONCERNING CONNECTIVES, AND FIRST THOSE CALLED CONJUNCTIONS. CONNECTIVES are the subject of what follows; which, according as they connect either sentences or words, are called by the

So Scaliger: His declaratis, satis constat ditur enim articulus ad rei memoriam reGræcorum articulos non neglectos a nobis, novandam, cujus antea non nescii sumus, sed eorum usum superfluum. Nam ubi aut ad præscribendam intellectionem, quæ aliquid præscribendum est, quod Græci per latius patere queat ; veluti cum dicimus articulum efficiunt (έλεξεν ο δούλος) ex- C. Cæsar, is qui postea dictator fuit. Nam pletur a Latinis per is aut ille ; is, aut, ille alii fuere c. Cæsares. Sic Græce Kaioap servus dixit, de quo servo antea facta mentio : aútokpáTwp. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 131. sit, aut qui alio quo pacto notus sit. Ad

different names of conjunctions or prepositions. Of these names, that of the preposition is taken from a mere accident, as it commonly stands in connection before the part which it connects. The name of the conjunction, as is evident, has reference to its essential character.

Of these two we shall consider the conjunction first, because it connects not words but sentences. This is conformable to the analysis with which we began this inquiry,' and which led us, by parity of reason, to consider sentences themselves before words. Now the definition of a conjunction is as follows: a part of speech, void of signification itself, but so formed as to help signification, by making two or more significant sentences to be one significant sentence." 9 Sup. p. 120.

in one simple word, nor even of two or more r Grammarians have usually considered words in one simple sentence; but of two or the conjunction as connecting rather single more simple sentences in one complex senparts of speech than whole sentences, and tence, which is considered as one, from that that, too, with the addition of like with concatenation of meaning effected by the like, tense with tense, number with num- conjunctions. For example, let us take the ber, case with case, &c. This Sanctius sentence which follows: “If men are by justly explodes : Conjunctio neque casus, nature social, it is their interest to be just, neque alias partes orationis (ut imperiti though it were not so ordained by the laws docent) conjungit, ipsæ enim partes inter of their country.” Here are three sentences. se conjunguntur-sed conjunctio orationes 1. “Men are by nature social.” 2. “ It is inter se conjungit. Miner. I. iii. c. 14. He man's interest to be just.” 3. “ It is not then establishes his doctrine by a variety ordained by the laws of every country that of examples. He had already said as much, man should be just." The first two of these 1. i. c. 18; and in this he appears to have sentences are made one by the conjunction followed Scaliger, who had asserted the if; these, one with the third sentence, by same before him. Conjunctionis autem no- the conjunction though; and the three, thus tionem veteres paullo inconsultius prodi- united, make that own uía onuavtin, dere ; neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias “that one significant articulate sound," of conjungit, (ipsæ enim partes per se inter se which Aristotle speaks, and which is the conjunguntur,) —- sed conjunctio est, quæ result of the conjunctive power. conjungit orationes plures. De Caus. Ling. This explains a passage in his Rhetoric, Lat. c. 165.

where he mentions the same subject: 'O This doctrine of theirs is confirmed by γάρ σύνδεσμος έν ποιεί το πολλά ώστε Apollonius, who, in the several places, dàv egaipeoņi, dînov ŐTL Touvavtlov čotal TD where he mentions the conjunction, always êv tomid: “ The conjunction makes many considers it in syntax as connecting sen- one; so that if it be taken away, it is then tences, and not words, though in his works evident on the contrary that one will be now extant he has not given us its defini- many.” Rhet, iii. c. 12. His instance of a tion. See 1. i. c. 2. p. 14; l. ii. c. 12. p sentence, divested of its conjunctions, and 124 ; l. iii. c. 15. p. 234.

thus made many out of one, is, fadov, But we have stronger authority than this århutnoa, edebuny, veni, occurri

, rogavi, to support Scaliger and Sanctius, and that where, by the way, the three sentences, is Aristotle's definition, as the passage has resulting from this dissolution, (for Padov, been corrected by the best critics and århuonoa, and ideóunv, are each of them, manuscripts. A conjunction, according to when unconnected, so many perfect senhim, is φωνή άσημος, εκ πλειόνων μέν tences,) prove that these are the proper φωνών μιας, σημαντικών δε, ποιείν πεφυ- subjects of the conjunction 's connective kvia ulay pwrivonuavtikhu: "an articulate faculty. sound, devoid of signification, which is so Ammonius's account of the use of this formed as to make one significant articulate part of speech is elegant: Aid Kal Twy sound out of several articulate sounds, which λόγων και μέν ύπαρξιν μίαν σημαίνων, και are each of them significant.” Poet. c. 20. Kupíws els, åvároyos av ein Tớ underw In this view of things, the one significant τετμημένο ξύλο, και διά τούτο ενι λεarticulate sound, formed by the conjunction, γομένω· ο δε πλείονας υπάρξεις δηλών, is not the union of two or more syllables ένα (lege διά) τινά δε σύνδεσμον ηνώσθαι As to continuatives, they are either suppositive, such as if; πως δοκών, αναλογεί τη νηί τη εκ πολλών Ling. Lat. c. 167. συγκειμένη ξύλων, υπό δε των γόμφων Copulativa est, quæ copulat tam verba, φαινομένην εχούση την ένωσιν: “ Of sen- quam sensum. Thus Priscian, p. 1026. But tences that, which denotes one existence Scaliger is more explicit : Si sensum consimply, and which is strictly one, may be jungunt (conjunctiones sc.) aut necessario, considered as analogous to a piece of timber aut non necessario: et si non necessario, not yet severed, and called on this account tum fiunt copulativæ, &c. De Caus. Ling. one. That, which denotes several exist. Lat. c. 167. Priscian's own account of ences, and which appears to be made one continuatives is as follows. Continuativa by some conjunctive particle, is analogous sunt, quæ continuationem et consequentiam to a ship made up of many pieces of timber, rerum significant. Ibid. Scaliger's account and which, by means of the nails, has an is, Causam aut præstituunt, aut subdunt. apparent unity.” Am. in Lib. de Interpret. Ibid. c. 168. The Greek name for the

This, therefore, being the general idea of conjunctions, we deduce their species in the following manner. Conjunctions, while they connect sentences, either connect also their meanings, or not. For example: let us take these two sentences, “ Rome was enslaved, Cæsar was ambitious," and connect them together by the conjunction because. “Rome was enslaved because Cæsar was ambitious.” Here the meanings, as well as the sentences, appear to be connected. But if I

say, manners must be reformed, or liberty will be lost,” here the conjunction or, though it join the sentences, yet, as to their respective meanings, is a perfect disjunctive. And thus it appears, that though all conjunctions conjoin sentences, yet with respect to the sense, some are conjunctive, and some disjunctive; and hence it is that we derive their different species."

The conjunctions, which conjoin both sentences and their meanings, are either copulatives, or continuatives. The principal copulative in English is and. The continuatives are if, because, therefore, that, &c. The difference between these is this: the copulative does no more than barely couple sentences, and is therefore applicable to all subjects whose natures are not incompatible. Continuatives, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate sentences into one continuous whole, and are therefore applicable only to subjects which have an essential coincidence.

To explain by examples: It is no way improper to say, “ Lysippus was a statuary, and Priscian was a grammarian,” “the sun shineth, and the sky is clear,” because these are things that may coexist, and yet imply no absurdity. But it would be absurd to say, “ Lysippus was a statuary, because Priscian was a grammarian;" though not to say, “ the sun shineth, because the sky is clear.” The reason is, with respect to the first, the coincidence is merely accidental; with respect to the last, it is essential, and founded in nature. And so much for the distinction between copulatives and continuatives.

copulative was σύνδεσμος συμπλεκτικός: $ Thus Scaliger: Aut ergo sensum con- for the continuative, ouvantıkós : the etyjungunt, ac verba ; aut verba tantum con- mologies of which words justly distinguish jungunt, sensum vero disjungunt. De Caus. their respective characters.

p. 54, 6,

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or positive, such as because, therefore, as, &c. Take examples of each: “You will live happily, if you live honestly ;' happily, because you live honestly." The difference between these continuatives is this: the suppositives denote connection, but assert not actual existence; the positives imply both the one and the other."

Further than this, the positives above mentioned are either causal, such as because, since, as, &c. or collective, such as therefore, wherefore, then, &c. The difference between these is this: the causals subjoin causes to effects; “ The sun is in eclipse, because the moon intervenes :" the collectives subjoin effects to causes, " The moon intervenes, therefore the sun is in eclipse. Now we use causals in those instances where, the effect being conspicuous, we seek its cause; and collectives, in demonstrations, and science properly so called, where the cause being known first, by its help we discern consequences.*

All these continuatives are resolvable into copulatives. Instead of Because it is day, it is light,” we may say, “ It is day, and it is light.” Instead of,“ If it be day, it is light," we may say, "It is at the same time necessary to be day and to be light;" and so in other instances. The reason is, that the power of the copulative extends to all connections, as well to the essential, as to the casual or fortuitous. Hence, therefore, the continuative may be resolved into a copulative, and something more; that is to say, into a copulative implying an essential coincidence in the subjects conjoined.

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u The old Greek grammarians confined pears to have been the fact. Is it, that the the name ovvantikol, and the Latins that positive are confined to what actually is; of continuativa, to those conjunctions which the suppositive extend to possibles, nay, we have called suppositive or conditional, even as far as to impossibles ? Thus it is while the positive they called Tapasuv- false to affirm, “ As it is day, it is light," Anthol, or subcontinuatire. They agree, unless it actually be day. But we may at however, in describing their proper cha- midnight affir,“ If it be day, it is light," racters. The first, according to Gaza, are, because the if extends to possibles also. oi étaptiv uèv oŮ, ako ovdíay de Tiva kal Nay, we may affirm, by its help, (if we Tátov onaourtes. 1. iv. Priscian says, please,) even impossibles. We may say, they signify to us, Qualis est ordinatio “ If the sun be cubical, then is the sun anet natura rerum, cum dubitatione aliqua gular ; if the sky fall, then shall we catch essentiæ rerum. p. 1027. And Scaliger larks.” Thus, too, Scaliger, upon the same says, they conjoin sine subsistentia ne occasion: Amplitudinem continuativæ percessaria ; potest enim subsistere ; et non cipi ex eo, quod etiam impossibile aliquando subsistere utrumque enim admittunt. Ibid. præsupponit. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 168. c. 168. On the contrary of the posi- In this sense, then, the continuative, suptive, or tapaouvanTIKO, (to use his own positive, or conditional conjunction, is (as it name,) Gaza tells us, 8ti kal Ümaptiv metà were) superior to the positive, as being of τάξεως σημαίνουσιν ούτοιγε. And Priscian greater latitude in its application. says, Causam continuationis ostendunt con- * The Latins called the causals, causales sequentem cum essentia rerum. And Sca- or causativæ ; the collectives, collectivæ or liger, Non ex hypothesi, sed ex eo, quod illative; the Greeks called the former subsistit, conjungunt. Ibid.

αιτιολογικοί, and the latter συλλογιστικοί. It may seem at first somewhat strange, y Resolvuntur autem in copulativas omwhy the positive conjunctions should have nes hæ, propterea quod cansa cum effectu been considered as subordinate to the sup- suapte natura conjuncta est. Scal. de Caus. positive, which by their ancient names ap- Ling. Lat. c. 169.

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