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happiness is the subject; pleasure, the predicate. If we change their order, and say, "pleasure is happiness;" then pleasure becomes the subject, and happiness the predicate. In Greek, these are distinguished not by any order or position, but by help of the article, which the subject always assumes, and the predicate in most instances (some few excepted) rejects. "Happiness is pleasure," ýdovǹ ý evdaιμovía: "pleasure is happiness, ἡ ἡδονὴ εὐδαιμονία: “fine things are difficult,” χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά: “difficult things are fine,” τὰ χαλεπὰ καλά.

In Greek, it is worth attending, how in the same sentence, the same article, by being prefixed to a different word, quite changes the whole meaning. For example: & IIтоλeμaîos yμὁ vaσiaρxnoas eτiunon, "Ptolemy, having presided over the νασιαρχήσας ἐτιμήθη, games, was publicly honoured." The participle yvuvaoiapxnoas has here no other force, than to denote to us the time when Ptolemy was honoured, viz. after having presided over the games. But if, instead of the substantive, we join the participle to the article, and say, ὁ γυμνασιαρχήσας Πτολεμαῖος ἐτιμήθη, ὁ our meaning is then, "the Ptolemy, who presided over the games, was honoured." The participle in this case, being joined to the article, tends tacitly to indicate not one Ptolemy but many, of which number a particular one participated of honour."

In English likewise it deserves remarking, how the sense is changed by changing of the articles, though we leave every other word of the sentence untouched. "And Nathan said unto David, Thou art the man." In that single the, that dimunitive particle, all the force and efficacy of the reason is contained. By that alone are the premises applied, and so firmly fixed, as never to be shaken. It is possible this assertion may appear at first somewhat strange; but let him who doubts it only change the article, and then see what will become of the prophet and his reasoning. "And Nathan said unto David, Thou art a man." Might not the king well have demanded, upon so impertinent a position,

Non dices hodie, quorsum hæc tam putida tendant?

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But enough of such speculations. The only remark which we shall make on them is this; that "minute change in principles leads to mighty change in effects; so that well are principles entitled to our regard, however in appearance they may be trivial

and low."

The articles already mentioned are those strictly so called; but besides these there are the pronominal articles, such as this, that, any, other, some, all, no, or none, &c. Of these we have spoken already in our chapter of pronouns, where we have


Apollon. 1. i. c. 33, 34.

ο Σὺ εἰ δ ̓ ἀνηρ. Βασιλ. β'. κεφ. ιβ'. P See b. i. c. 5. p. 137, 8. It seems to have been some view of words, like that

here given, which induced Quintilian to say of the Latin tongue, Noster sermo articulos non desiderat; ideoque in alias partes orationis sparguntur. Inst. Orat. l. i. c. 4.


shewn, when they may be taken as pronouns, and when as articles. Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the essence of an article be to define and ascertain, they are much more properly articles than any thing else, and as such should be considered in universal grammar. Thus when we say, "this picture I approve, but that I dislike," what do we perform by the help of these definitives, but bring down the common appellative to denote two individuals, the one as the more near, the other as the more distant? So when we say, some men are virtuous, but all men are mortal," what is the natural effect of this all and some, but to define that universality and particularity which would remain indefinite, were we to take them away? The same is evident in such sentences as, some substances have sensation, others want it;""choose any way of acting, and some men will find fault," &c. For here, some, other, and any, serve all of them to define different parts of a given whole; some, to denote a definite part; any, to denote an indefinite; and other, to denote the remaining part, when a part has been assumed already. Sometimes this last word denotes a large indefinite portion, set in opposition to some single, definite, and remaining part, which receives from such opposition no small degree of heightening. Thus Virgil,


Excudent alii spirantia mollius æra;

(Credo equidem) vivos ducent de marmore vultus;
Orabunt causas melius, cœlique meatus

Describent radio, et surgentia sidera dicent:
Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento, &c.

Æn. vi.

Nothing can be stronger or more sublime than this antithesis; one act set as equal to many other acts taken together, and the Roman singly (for it is Tu Romane, not Vos Romani) to all other men; and yet this performed by so trivial a cause, as the just opposition of alii to tu.

But here we conclude, and proceed to treat of connectives.



CONNECTIVES are the subject of what follows; which, according as they connect either sentences or words, are called by the

So Scaliger: His declaratis, satis constat Græcorum articulos non neglectos a nobis, sed eorum usum superfluum. Nam ubi aliquid præscribendum est, quod Græci per articulum efficiunt (ἔλεξεν ὁ δοῦλος) expletur a Latinis per is aut ille; is, aut, ille servus dixit, de quo servo antea facta mentio sit, aut qui alio quo pacto notus sit. Ad

ditur enim articulus ad rei memoriam renovandam, cujus antea non nescii sumus, aut ad præscribendam intellectionem, quæ latius patere queat; veluti cum dicimus C. Cæsar, is qui postea dictator fuit. Nam alii fuere C. Cæsares. Sic Græce Kaîoap à avтokрάтwp. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 131.

different names of conjunctions or prepositions. Of these names, that of the preposition is taken from a mere accident, as it commonly stands in connection before the part which it connects. The name of the conjunction, as is evident, has reference to its essential character.

Of these two we shall consider the conjunction first, because it connects not words but sentences. This is conformable to the analysis with which we began this inquiry, and which led us, by parity of reason, to consider sentences themselves before words. Now the definition of a conjunction is as follows: a part of speech, void of signification itself, but so formed as to help signification, by making two or more significant sentences to be one significant sentence."

9 Sup. p. 120.

Grammarians have usually considered the conjunction as connecting rather single parts of speech than whole sentences, and that, too, with the addition of like with like, tense with tense, number with number, case with case, &c. This Sanctius justly explodes: Conjunctio neque casus, neque alias partes orationis (ut imperiti docent) conjungit, ipsæ enim partes inter se conjunguntur-sed conjunctio orationes inter se conjungit. Miner. 1. iii. c. 14. He then establishes his doctrine by a variety of examples. He had already said as much, 1. i. c. 18; and in this he appears to have followed Scaliger, who had asserted the same before him. Conjunctionis autem notionem veteres paullo inconsultius prodidere; neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias conjungit, (ipsæ enim partes per se inter se conjunguntur,)-sed conjunctio est, quæ conjungit orationes plures. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 165.

This doctrine of theirs is confirmed by Apollonius, who, in the several places, where he mentions the conjunction, always considers it in syntax as connecting sentences, and not words, though in his works now extant he has not given us its definition. See l. i. c. 2. p. 14; l. ii. c. 12. p 124; 1. iii. c. 15. p. 234.

But we have stronger authority than this to support Scaliger and Sanctius, and that is Aristotle's definition, as the passage has been corrected by the best critics and manuscripts. A conjunction, according to him, is φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς, σημαντικῶν δὲ, ποιεῖν πεφυκυῖα μίαν φωνὴν σημαντικήν: “an articulate sound, devoid of signification, which is so formed as to make one significant articulate sound out of several articulate sounds, which are each of them significant.” Poet. c. 20. In this view of things, the one significant articulate sound, formed by the conjunction, is not the union of two or more syllables

in one simple word, nor even of two or more words in one simple sentence; but of two or more simple sentences in one complex sentence, which is considered as one, from that concatenation of meaning effected by the conjunctions. For example, let us take the sentence which follows: "If men are by nature social, it is their interest to be just, though it were not so ordained by the laws of their country." Here are three sentences. 1. "Men are by nature social." 2. "It is man's interest to be just." 3. "It is not ordained by the laws of every country that man should be just." The first two of these sentences are made one by the conjunction if; these, one with the third sentence, by the conjunction though; and the three, thus united, make that own) μía onμartIKÝ, "that one significant articulate sound," of which Aristotle speaks, and which is the result of the conjunctive power.

This explains a passage in his Rhetoric, where he mentions the same subject: 'O γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἓν ποιεῖ τὸ πολλά· ὥστε ἐὰν ἐξαιρεθῇ, δῆλον ὅτι τουναντίον ἔσται τὸ ev ToλAά: "The conjunction makes many one; so that if it be taken away, it is then evident on the contrary that one will be many." Rhet. iii. c. 12. His instance of a sentence, divested of its conjunctions, and thus made many out of one, is, λbov, ἀπήντησα, ἐδεόμην, veni, occurri, romani, where, by the way, the three sentences, resulting from this dissolution, (for Bor, ἀπήντησα, and ἐδεόμην, are each of them, when unconnected, so many perfect sentences,) prove that these are the proper subjects of the conjunction's connective faculty.

Ammonius's account of the use of this part of speech is elegant: Aid Kal Tür λόγων δ μὲν ὕπαρξιν μίαν σημαίνων, ὁ κυρίως εἷς, ἀνάλογος ἂν εἴη τῷ μηδέπω τετμημένῳ ξύλῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἑνὶ λεγομένῳ· ὁ δὲ πλείονας ὑπάρξεις δηλῶν, ἕνα (lege διὰ) τινὰ δὲ σύνδεσμον ἡνῶσθαί

This, therefore, being the general idea of conjunctions, we deduce their species in the following manner. Conjunctions, while they connect sentences, either connect also their meanings, or not. For example: let us take these two sentences, "Rome was enslaved, Cæsar was ambitious," and connect them together by the conjunction because. "Rome was enslaved because Cæsar was ambitious." Here the meanings, as well as the sentences, appear to be connected. But if I say, manners must be reformed, or liberty will be lost," here the conjunction or, though it join the sentences, yet, as to their respective meanings, is a perfect disjunctive. And thus it appears, that though all conjunctions conjoin sentences, yet with respect to the sense, some are conjunctive, and some disjunctive; and hence it is that we derive their different species."


The conjunctions, which conjoin both sentences and their meanings, are either copulatives, or continuatives. The principal copulative in English is and. The continuatives are if, because, therefore, that, &c. The difference between these is this: the copulative does no more than barely couple sentences, and is therefore applicable to all subjects whose natures are not incompatible. Continuatives, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, consolidate sentences into one continuous whole, and are therefore applicable only to subjects which have an essential coincidence.

To explain by examples: It is no way improper to say, "Lysippus was a statuary, and Priscian was a grammarian," "the sun shineth, and the sky is clear," because these are things that may coexist, and yet imply no absurdity. But it would be absurd to say, "Lysippus was a statuary, because Priscian was a grammarian;" though not to say, "the sun shineth, because the sky is clear." The reason is, with respect to the first, the coincidence is merely accidental; with respect to the last, it is essential, and founded in nature. And so much for the distinction between copulatives and continuatives.t

As to continuatives, they are πως δοκῶν, ἀναλογεῖ τῇ νηὶ τῇ ἐκ πολλῶν συγκειμένῃ ξύλων, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν γόμφων φαινομένην ἐχούσῃ τὴν ἕνωσιν : “ Of sentences that, which denotes one existence simply, and which is strictly one, may be considered as analogous to a piece of timber not yet severed, and called on this account one. That, which denotes several existences, and which appears to be made one by some conjunctive particle, is analogous to a ship made up of many pieces of timber, and which, by means of the nails, has an apparent unity." Am. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 54, 6. Thus Scaliger: Aut ergo sensum conjungunt, ac verba; aut verba tantum conjungunt, sensum vero disjungunt. De Caus.

either suppositive, such as if; Ling. Lat. c. 167.

Copulativa est, quæ copulat tam verba, quam sensum. Thus Priscian, p. 1026. But Scaliger is more explicit : Si sensum conjungunt (conjunctiones sc.) aut necessario, aut non necessario: et si non necessario, tum fiunt copulativæ, &c. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 167. Priscian's own account of continuatives is as follows. Continuativæ sunt, quæ continuationem et consequentiam rerum significant. Ibid. Scaliger's account is, Causam aut præstituunt, aut subdunt. Ibid. c. 168. The Greek name for the copulative was σύνδεσμος συμπλεκτικός : for the continuative, σvvaжTIKós: the etymologies of which words justly distinguish their respective characters.

or positive, such as because, therefore, as, &c. Take examples of each: "You will live happily, if you live honestly;" "you live happily, because you live honestly." The difference between these continuatives is this: the suppositives denote_connection, but assert not actual existence; the positives imply both the one and the other."

Further than this, the positives above mentioned are either causal, such as because, since, as, &c. or collective, such as therefore, wherefore, then, &c. The difference between these is this: the causals subjoin causes to effects; "The sun is in eclipse, because the moon intervenes:" the collectives subjoin effects to causes, "The moon intervenes, therefore the sun is in eclipse." Now we use causals in those instances where, the effect being conspicuous, we seek its cause; and collectives, in demonstrations, and science properly so called, where the cause being known first, by its help we discern consequences.*

All these continuatives are resolvable into copulatives. Instead of "Because it is day, it is light," we may say, "It is day, and it is light." Instead of, "If it be day, it is light," we may say, "It is at the same time necessary to be day and to be light;" and so in other instances. The reason is, that the power of the copulative extends to all connections, as well to the essential, as to the casual or fortuitous. Hence, therefore, the continuative may be resolved into a copulative, and something more; that is to say, into a copulative implying an essential coincidence in the subjects conjoined.

"The old Greek grammarians confined the name σvvaлTIKоl, and the Latins that of continuativa, to those conjunctions which we have called suppositive or conditional, while the positive they called TaparvATTIKоl, or subcontinuative. They agree, however, in describing their proper characters. The first, according to Gaza, are, οἱ ὕπαρξιν μὲν οὖ, ἀκολουθίαν δέ τινα καὶ τάξιν δηλοῦντες. 1. iv. Priscian says, they signify to us, Qualis est ordinatio et natura rerum, cum dubitatione aliqua essentiæ rerum. p. 1027. And Scaliger says, they conjoin sine subsistentia necessaria; potest enim subsistere; et non subsistere utrumque enim admittunt. Ibid. c. 168. On the contrary of the positive, or TapaσvvaTTiKol, (to use his own name,) Gaza tells us, oтi kai raptiv μerà τάξεως σημαίνουσιν οὗτοιγε. And Priscian says, Causam continuationis ostendunt consequentem cum essentia rerum. And Scaliger, Non ex hypothesi, sed ex eo, quod subsistit, conjungunt. Ibid.

It may seem at first somewhat strange, why the positive conjunctions should have been considered as subordinate to the suppositive, which by their ancient names ap

pears to have been the fact. Is it, that the positive are confined to what actually is; the suppositive extend to possibles, nay, even as far as to impossibles? Thus it is false to affirm, "As it is day, it is light,” unless it actually be day. But we may at midnight affirm, "If it be day, it is light," because the if extends to possibles also. Nay, we may affirm, by its help, (if we please,) even impossibles. We may say, "If the sun be cubical, then is the sun angular; if the sky fall, then shall we catch larks." Thus, too, Scaliger, upon the same occasion: Amplitudinem continuativæ percipi ex eo, quod etiam impossibile aliquando præsupponit. De Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 168. In this sense, then, the continuative, suppositive, or conditional conjunction, is (as it were) superior to the positive, as being of greater latitude in its application.

The Latins called the causals, causales or causativa; the collectives, collective or illative; the Greeks called the former αἰτιολογικοὶ, and the latter συλλογιστικοί.

y Resolvuntur autem in copulativas omnes hæ, propterea quod causa cum effectu suapte natura conjuncta est. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 169.

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