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Among the attributes of substance are reckoned quantities and qualities. Thus we say, "a white garment," "a high mountain." Now some of these quantities and qualities are capable of intension and remission. Thus we say, "a garment exceedingly white;" 99 66 a mountain tolerably high, or moderately high." It is plain, therefore, that intension and remission are among the attributes of such attributes. Hence then one copious source of secondary attributives, or adverbs, to denote these two; that is, intension and remission. The Greeks have their favμaoτôs, μάλιστα, πάνυ, ἥκιστα: the Lating their valde, vehementer, maxime, satis, mediocriter: the English, their greatly, vastly, extremely, sufficiently, moderately, tolerably, indifferently, &c.
Further than this, where there are different intensions of the same attribute, they may be compared together. Thus, if the garment A be exceeedingly white, and the garment B be moderately white, we may say," the garment A is more white than the garment B."
In these instances, the adverb more not only denotes intension, but relative intension. Nay, we stop not here. We not only denote intension merely relative, but relative intension, than which there is none greater. Thus we not only say, "the mountain A is more high than the mountain B," but "that it is the most high of all mountains." Even verbs, properly so called, as they admit simple intensions, so they admit also these comparative ones. Thus in the following example: "fame he loveth more than riches, but virtue of all things he loveth most ;" the words more and most denote the different comparative intensions of the verbal attributive loveth.
And hence the rise of comparison, and of its different degrees; which cannot well be more than the two species above mentioned, one to denote simple excess, and one to denote superlative. Were we indeed to introduce more degrees than these, we ought perhaps to introduce infinite, which is absurd. For why stop at a limited number, when in all subjects, susceptible of intension, the intermediate excesses are in a manner infinite? There are infinite degrees of more white, between the first simple white, and the superlative, whitest; the same may be said of more great, more strong, more minute, &c. The doctrine of grammarians about three such degrees, which they call the positive, the comparative, and the superlative, must needs be absurd; both because in their positive there is no comparison at all, and
times has cases, as in valde sapiens; sometimes has none, as in valde amat.) Priscian's definition of an adverb is as follows: Adverbium est pars orationis indeclinabilis, cujus significatio verbis adjicitur. Hoc enim perficit adverbium verbis additum, quod adjectiva nomina appellativis nominibus adjuncta; ut prudens homo; prudenter egit; felix vir; feliciter vivit. I. xv. p. 1003.
And before, speaking of the Stoics, he
Qui (scil. gradus positivus) quoniam
because their superlative is a comparative, as much as their comparative itself. Examples to evince this may be found everywhere. "Socrates was the most wise of all the Athenians; Homer was the most sublime of all poets."
Cadit et Ripheus, justissimus unus
It must be confessed, these comparatives, as well the simple as the superlative, seem sometimes to part with their relative nature, and only retain their intensive. Thus in the degree, denoting simple excess,
Tristior, et lacrymis oculos suffusa nitentes.
In the superlative this is more usual. Vir doctissimus, vir fortissimus, “a most learned man, a most brave man ;" that is to say, not the bravest and most learned man that ever existed, but a man possessing those qualities in an eminent degree.
The authors of language have contrived a method to retrench these comparative adverbs, by expressing their force in the primary attributive. Thus, instead of more fair, they say fairer; instead of most fair, fairest; and the same holds true both in the Greek and Latin. This practice however has reached no further than to adjectives, or at least to participles, sharing the nature of adjectives. Verbs perhaps were thought too much diversified already, to admit more variations without perplexity.
As there are some attributives which admit of comparison, so there are others which admit of none. Such for example are those, which denote that quality of bodies arising from their figure; as when we say, "a circular table, a quadrangular court, a conical piece of metal," &c. The reason is, that a million of things, participating the same figure, participate it equally, if they participate it at all. To say, therefore, that while A and B are both quadrangular, A is more or less quadrangular than B, is absurd. The same holds true in all attributives, denoting definite quantities, whether continuous or discrete, whether absolute or relative. Thus the two-foot rule A, cannot be more a two-foot rule than any other of the same length. Twenty lions cannot be more twenty than twenty flies. If A and B be both triple or quadruple to C, they cannot be more triple, or more quadruple, one than the other. The reason of all this is, there can be no comparison without intension and remission; there can be no intension and remission in things always definite; and such are the attributives which we have last mentioned.
In the same reasoning we see the cause, why no substantive is susceptible of these comparative degrees. A mountain cannot be said more to be, or to exist, than a mole-hill, but the more and less must be sought for in their quantities. In like manner, when we refer many individuals to one species, the lion A cannot be called more a lion than the lion B; but if more any thing,
he is more fierce, more speedy, or exceeding in some such attribute. So again, in referring many species to one genus, a crocodile is not more an animal than a lizard, nor a tiger more than a cat; but if any thing, they are more bulky, more strong, &c. the excess, as before, being derived from their attributes. So true is that saying of the acute Stagirite, "that substance is not susceptible of more and less." But this by way of digression; to return to the subject of adverbs.
Of the adverbs, or secondary attributives already mentioned, these denoting intension or remission may be called adverbs of quantity continuous: once, twice, thrice, are adverbs of quantity discrete; more and most, less and least, to which may be added equally, proportionally, &c. are adverbs of relation. There are others of quality, as when we say, honestly industrious, prudently brave, they fought bravely, he painted finely, a portico formed circularly, a plain cut triangularly, &c.
And here it is worth while to observe, how the same thing, participating the same essence, assumes different grammatical forms from its different relations. For example, suppose it should be asked, how differ honest, honestly, and honesty. The answer is, they are in essence the same, but they differ, inasmuch as honest is the attributive of a substantive; honestly, of a verb; and honesty, being divested of these its attributive relations, assumes the power of a substantive, so as to stand by itself.
The adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are common to verbs of every species; but there are some which are peculiar to verbs, properly so called; that is to say, to such as denote motion or energy, with their privations. All motion and rest imply time and place, as a kind of necessary coincidents. Hence, then, if we would express the place or time of either, we must needs have recourse to the proper adverbs; of place, as when we say, he stood there, he went hence, he travelled far, &c.: of time, as when we say, he stood then, he went afterward, he travelled formerly, &c. Should it be asked, Why adverbs of time, when verbs have tenses? The answer is, though tenses may be sufficient to denote the greater distinctions of time, yet to denote them all by tenses would be a perplexity without end. What a variety of forms to denote yesterday, to-day, to-morrow, formerly, lately, just now, now, immediately, presently, soon, hereafter, &c.? It was this, then, that made the temporal adverbs necessary, over and above the tenses.
To the adverbs just mentioned, may be added those which denote the intensions and remissions peculiar to motion, such as
ι Οὐκ ἂν ἐπιδέχοιτο ἡ οὐσία τὸ μᾶλλον Kal TO HTTOV. Categor. c. 5. See also Sanctius, l. i. c. 11; 1. ii. c. 10, 11. where the subject of comparatives is treated in a very
masterly and philosophical manner. See also Priscian, p. 598. Derivantur igitur comparativa a nominibus adjectivis, &c.
speedily, hastily, swiftly, slowly, &c.; as also adverbs of place, made out of prepositions, such as avw and κáτw, from ȧvå and KaTà, in English upward and downward, from up and down. In some instances the preposition suffers no change, but becomes an adverb by nothing more than its application; as when we say, circa equitat, "he rides about;" prope cecidit, "he was near falling; verum ne post conferas culpam in me, "but do not after lay the blame on me." "
There are likewise adverbs of interrogation, such as where, whence, whither, how; of which there is this remarkable, that when they lose their interrogative power, they assume that of a relative, so as even to represent the relative or subjunctive pronoun. Thus Ovid,
Et seges est, ubi Troja fuit: translated in our old English ballad,
"And corn doth grow, where Troy town stood."
That is to say, seges est in eo loco, in quo, &c. "corn groweth in that place, in which," &c.; the power of the relative being implied in the adverb. Thus Terence,
Hujusmodi mihi res semper comminiscere,
Heaut. iv. 6.
where ubi relates to res, and stands for quibus rebus.
It is in like manner that the relative pronoun, upon occasion, becomes an interrogative, at least in Latin and English. Thus Horace,
Quem virum aut heroa lyra, vel acri
Who first seduc'd them to that foul revolt?
The reason of all this is as follows. The pronoun and adverbs here mentioned are all alike, in their original character, relatives. Even when they become interrogatives, they lose not this character, but are still relatives, as much as ever. The difference is, that without an interrogation, they have reference to a subject, which is antecedent, definite, and known; with an interrogation, to a subject which is subsequent, indefinite, and unknown, and which it is expected that the answer should express and ascertain.
Who first seduc'd them?
The very question itself supposes a seducer, to which, though unknown, the pronoun who, has a reference.
Th' infernal serpent.
Here, in the answer, we have the subject, which was indefinite, ascertained; so that the who in the interrogation is (we see) as much a relative, as if it had been said originally, without any interrogation at all, "it was the infernal serpent who first seduced them."
"Sosip. Charisii Inst. Gram. p. 170. Terent. Eun. act. ii. sc. 3.
And thus is it that interrogatives and relatives mutually pass into each other.
And so much for adverbs, peculiar to verbs properly so called. We have already spoken of those which are common to all attributives. We have likewise attempted to explain their general nature, which we have found to consist in being the attributes of attributes. There remains only to add, that adverbs may be derived from almost every part of speech: from prepositions, as when from after we derive afterwards; from participles, and through these from verbs, as when from know we derive knowing, and thence knowingly; from scio, sciens, and thence scienter: from adjectives, as when from virtuous and vicious, we derive virtuously and viciously; from substantives, as when from πίθηκος, “an ape,” we derive πιθήκειον βλέπειν, “to look apishly;" from λéwv, "a lion," λeovTwdws, "leoninely:" nay, even from proper names, as when from Socrates and Demosthenes, we derive Socratically and Demosthenically. "It was Socratically reasoned," we say; "it was Demosthenically spoken." Of the same sort are many others, cited by the old grammarians, such as Catiliniter from Catilina, Sisenniter from Sisenna, Tulliane from Tullius, &c.
Nor are they thus extensive only in derivation, but in signification also. Theodore Gaza in his Grammar informs us, that adverbs may be found in every one of the predicaments, and that the readiest way to reduce their infinitude, was to refer them by classes to those ten universal genera. The Stoics, too, called the adverb by the name of πaνdéктηs, and that from a view to the same multiform nature. Omnia in se capit quasi collata per satiram, concessa sibi rerum varia potestate. It is thus that Sosipater explains the word," from whose authority we know it to be Stoical. But of this enough.
And now having finished these principal parts of speech, the substantive and the attributive, which are significant when alone, we proceed to those auxiliary parts, which are only significant, when associated. But as these make the subject of a book by themselves, we here conclude the first book of this treatise.
* Aristotle has KUKλоTIKS, "Cyclopically,” from Κύκλωψ, “a Cyclops.” Εth.
Nic. x. 9.
y See Prisc. 1. xv. p. 1022. Sos. Charis. 161. edit. Putschii.
· Διὸ δὴ καὶ ἄμεινον ἴσως δέκα καὶ τῶν ἐπιῤῥημάτων γένη θέσθαι ἐκεῖνα, οὐσίαν, ποιόν, ποσὸν, πρός τι, κ. τ. λ. trod. I. ii.
a Sosip. Char. p. 175. edit. Putschii.