foresight, is therefore expressed most naturally by the mode here mentioned. For example, Ut jugulent homines, surgunt de nocte latrones. Hor. "Thieves rise by night, that they may cut men's throats." Here that they rise, is positively asserted in the declarative or indicative mode; but as to their cutting men's throats, this is only delivered potentially, because how truly soever it may be the end of their rising, it is still but a contingent that may never perhaps happen. This mode, as often as it is in this manner subjoined, is called by grammarians, not the potential, but the subjunctive. But it so happens, in the constitution of human affairs, that it is not always sufficient merely to declare ourselves to others. We find it often expedient, from a consciousness of our inability, to address them after a manner more interesting to ourselves, whether to have some perception informed, or some volition gratified. Hence then new modes of speaking: if we interrogate, it is the interrogative mode; if we require, it is the requisitive. Even the requisitive itself hath its subordinate species with respect to inferiors, it is an imperative mode; with respect to equals and superiors, it is a precative or optative.° And thus have we established a variety of modes: the indicative or declarative, to assert what we think certain; the potential, for the purposes of whatever we think contingent; the interrogative, when we are doubtful, to procure us information; and the requisitive, to assist us in the gratification of our volitions. The requisitive too appears under two distinct species, either as it is imperative to inferiors, or precative to superiors. P • It was the confounding of this distine tion that gave rise to a sophism of Protagoras. Homer (says he) in beginning his Iliad with, Sing, Muse, the wrath; when he thinks to pray, in reality commands. Εὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος, ἐπιτάττει. Aristot. Poet. c. 19. The solution is evident from the division here established, the grammatical form being in both cases the same. P The species of modes in great measure depend on the species of sentences. The Stoics increased the number of sentences far beyond the Peripatetics. Besides those mentioned in chap. ii. note k, p. 122, they had many more, as may be seen in Ammonius de Interpret. p. 4. and Diogenes Laertius, 1. vii, 66. The Peripatetics (and it seems too with reason) considered all these additional sentences as included within those which they themselves acknowledged, and which they made to be five in number; the vocative, the imperative, the interrogative, the precative, and the assertive. There is no mention of a potential sentence, which may be supposed to coincide with the assertive, or indicative. The vocative (which the Peripatetics called the εἶδος κλητικὸν, *Ω μάκαρ 'Ατρείδη. Αἲ γὰρ Ζεῦ τε πάτερ. Θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα ἴσασιν. où repì Tavτds, &c. Els Tò Tepl 'Epμ. p. 4. As therefore all these several modes have their foundation in nature, so have certain marks or signs of them been introduced into languages, that we may be enabled by our discourse to signify them one to another. And hence those various modes or moods of which we find in common grammar so prolix a detail, and which are, in fact, no more than "so many literal forms, intended to express these natural distinctions." All these modes have this in common, that they exhibit some way or other the soul and its affections. Their peculiarities and distinctions are in part, as follows. The requisitive and interrogative modes are distinguished from the indicative and potential, that whereas these last seldom call for a return, to the two former it is always necessary. If we compare the requisitive mode with the interrogative, we shall find these also distinguished, and that not only in the return, but in other peculiarities. The return to the requisitive, is sometimes made in words, sometimes in deeds. To the request of Dido to Æneas, Boethius's account is as follows. Perfectarum vero orationum partes quinque sunt: deprecativa, ut, Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si flecteris ullis, sist for the most part either in multiplying or diminishing the number of syllables, or else in lengthening or shortening their respective quantities, which two methods are called by grammarians the syllabic and the temporal. The Latin, which is but a species of Greek somewhat debased, admits in Vade age, nate,voca Zephyros, et labere pennis. like manner a large portion of those varia Interrogativa, ut, Dic mihi, Damæta, cujum pecus? Vocativa, ut, O! Pater, O! hominum rerumque æterna potestas. Enuntiativa, in qua veritas vel falsitas invenitur, ut, Principio arboribus varia est natura creandis. The imperative, The tions, which are chiefly to be found at the ending of its verbs, and but rarely at their beginning. Yet in its deponents and passives it is so far defective, as to be forced to have recourse to the auxiliar, sum. modern languages, which have still fewer of those variations, have been necessitated all of them to assume two auxiliars at least, that is to say, those which express in each language the verbs have and am. As to the English tongue, it is so poor in this respect as to admit no variation for modes, and only one for time, which we apply to express an aorist of the past. Thus from write cometh Go then, thou mightiest, in thy Father's might. wrote; from give, gave; from speak, spake, The interrogative, &c. Hence, to express time and modes, we Whence, and what art thou, execrable shape? are compelled to employ no less than seven The vocative, Adam, earth's hallow'd mould, Of God inspir'd. The assertive or enunciative, The conquer'd also and enslav'd by war Shall, with their freedom lost, all virtue lose. The Greek language, which is of all the most elegant and complete, expresses these several modes, and all distinctions of time likewise, by an adequate number of variations in each particular verb. These variations may be found, some at the beginning of the verb, others at its ending, and con auxiliars, viz. do, am, have, shall, will, may, and can; which we use sometimes singly, as when we say, I am writing, I have written; sometimes two together, as, I have been writing, I should have written; sometimes no less than three, as, I might have been lost, He could have been preserved. But for these, and all other speculations relative to the genius of the English language, we refer the reader, who wishes for the most authentic information, to that excellent treatise of the learned Dr. Lowth, entitled, A short Introduction to English Grammar. ... a prima dic, hospes, origine nobis Insidias Danaum ..... the proper return was in words; that is, in an historical narrative. To the request of the unfortunate chief-date obolum Belisariothe proper return was in a deed; that is, in a charitable relief. But with respect to the interrogative, the return is necessarily made in words alone; in words, which are called a response or answer, and which are always actually or by implication some definitive assertive sentence. Take examples. Whose verses are these? the return is a sentence, These are verses of Homer. Was Brutus a worthy man? the return is a sentence, Brutus was a worthy man. And hence (if we may be permitted to digress) we may perceive the near affinity of this interrogative mode with the indicative, in which last its response or return is mostly made. So near indeed is this affinity, that in these two modes alone the verb retains the same form, nor are they otherwise distinguished, than either by the addition or absence of some small particle, or by some minute change in the collocation of the words, or sometimes only by a change in the tone, or accent. - Ηγε οὖν προκειμένη δριστικὴ ἔγκλισις, τὴν ἐγκειμένην κατάφασιν ἀποβάλλουσα, μεθίσταται τοῦ καλεῖσθαι ὁριστικὴ ἀναπληρωθεῖσα δὲ τῆς καταφάσεως, ὑποστρέφει Els Tò elvai dρIOTIKh: “The indicative mode, of which we speak, by laying aside that assertion, which by its nature it implies, quits the name of indicative-when it reassumes the assertion, it returns again to its proper character." Apoll. de Synt. iii. c. 21. Theodore Gaza says the same, Introd. Gram. 1. iv. • It may be observed of the interrogative, that as often as the interrogation is simple and definite, the response may be made in almost the same words, by converting them into a sentence affirmative or negative, according as the truth is either one or the other. For example: Are these verses of Homer? Response: These verses are of Homer. Are those verses of Virgil? Response, Those are not verses of Virgil. And here the artists of language, for the sake of brevity and despatch, have provided two particles, to represent all such responses; Yes, for all the affirmative; No, for all the negative. But when the interrogation is complex, as when we say, Are these verses of Homer, or of Virgil? much more, when it is indefinite, as when we say in general, Whose are these verses? we cannot then respond after the manner above mentioned. The reason is, that no interrogation can be answered by a simple Yes, or a simple No, except only those which are themselves so simple, as of two possible answers to admit only one. Now the least complex interrogation will admit of four answers, two affirmative, two negative, if not perhaps of more. The reason is, a complex interrogation cannot consist of less than two simple ones; each of which may be separately affirmed and separately denied. For instance: Are these verses Homer's or Virgil's? 1. They are Homer's; 2. They are not Homer's; 3. They are Virgil's; 4. They are not Virgil's; we may add, 5. They are of neither. The indefinite interrogations go still further; for these may be answered by infinite affirmatives, and infinite negatives. For instance: Whose are these verses? We may answer affirmatively, They are Virgil's, They are Horace's, They are Ovid's, &c.; or negatively, They are not Virgil's, They are not Horace's, They are not Ovid's, and so on, either way, to infinity. How then should we learn from a single Yes, or a single No, which particular is meant among infinite possibles? These therefore are interrogations which must be always answered by a sentence. Yet even here custom has consulted for brevity, by returning for answer only the single essential characteristic word, and retrenching by an ellipsis all the rest, which rest the interrogator is left to supply from himself. Thus, when we are asked, How many right angles equal the angles of a triangle? we answer in the short monosyllable, Two; whereas, without the ellipsis, the answer would have been, Two right angles equal the angles of a triangle. The ancients distinguished these two M But to return to our comparison between the interrogative mode and the requisitive. The interrogative (in the language of grammarians) has all persons of both numbers. The requisitive or imperative has no first person of the singular, and that from this plain reason, that it is equally absurd in modes for a person to request or give commands to himself, as it is in pronouns, for the speaker to become the subject of his own address. Again, we may interrogate as to all times, both present, past, and future. Who was founder of Rome? Who is king of China? Who will discover the longitude? But entreating and commanding (which are the essence of the requisitive mode) have a necessary respect to the future only." For, indeed, what have they to do with the present or the past, the natures of which are immutable and necessary ? species of interrogation by different names. u Apollonius's account of the future, implied in all imperatives, is worth observing. Ἐπὶ γὰρ μὴ γινομένοις ἢ μὴ γεγονόσιν ἡ πρόσταξις· τὰ δὲ μὴ γινόμενα ἢ μὴ γεγονότα, ἐπιτηδειότητα δὲ ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ ἔσεσθαι, μέλλοντος ἐστι: “ A command has respect to those things which either are not doing, or have not yet been done. But those things, which being not now doing, or having not yet been done, have a natural aptitude to exist hereafter, may be properly said to appertain to the future." De Syntaxi, 1. i. c. 36. Soon before this he says, "Απαντα τὰ προστακτικὰ ἐγκειμένην ἔχει τὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος διάθεσιν—χηδόν γὰρ ἐν ἴσῳ ἐστὶ τὸ, ὁ τυραννοκτόνησας τιμάσθω, τῷ τιμηθήσεται, κατὰ τὴν χρόνου ἔννοιαν· τῇ ἐκκλίσει διηλλαχὸς, καθὸ τὸ μὲν προστακτικὸν, τὸ δὲ ὁριστικόν: “ ΑΠ imperatives have a disposition within them, which respects the future: with regard therefore to time, it is the same thing to say, Let him, that kills a tyrant, be honoured; or, He, that kills one, shall be honoured, the diference being only in the mode, inasmuch as one is imperative, the other indicative or declarative." Apoll. de Syntaxi, l. i. c. 35. Priscian seems to allow imperatives a share of present time, as well as future. But if we attend, we shall find his present to be nothing else than an immediate future, as opposed to a more distant one. Imperativus vero præsens et futurum [tempus] naturali quadam necessitate videtur posse accipere. Ea etenim imperamus, quæ vel in præsenti statim volumus fieri sine aliqua dilatione, vel in futuro. Lib. viii. p. 806. It is true, the Greeks in their imperatives admit certain tenses of the past, such as those of the perfectum, and of the two aorists. But then these tenses, when so applied, either totally lose their temporary character, or else are used to insinuate such a speed of execution, that the deed should be (as it were done in the very instant when commanded. The same difference seems to subsist between our English imperative, Be gone, and those others of, Go, or Be going. The first (if we please) may be styled the imperative of the perfectum, as calling in the very instant for the completion of our commands: the others may be styled imperatives of the future, as allowing a reasonable time to begin first, and finish afterward. 66 It is thus Apollonius, in the chapter first. cited, distinguishes between σκαπτέτω τὰς ἀμπέλους, “go to digging the vines,” and σκαψάτω τὰς ἀμπέλους, “ get the vines dug.” The first is spoken (as he calls it) εἰς παράτασιν, “by way of extension, or allowance of time for the work;" the second, els σuvTeλelwow," with a view to immediate completion." And in another place, explaining the difference between the same tenses, σkάπтe and σkávov, he says of the last, οὐ μόνον τὸ μὴ γενόμενον προστάσσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν παρατάσει ἀπαγοpevel, "that it not only commands something, which has not been yet done, but forbids also that, which is now doing in an extension, that is to say, in a slow and lengthened progress." Hence, if a man has been a long while writing, and we are willing to hasten him, it would be wrong to say in Greek, ypápe, “write," (for that he is now, and has been long doing,) but It is from this connexion of futurity with commands, that the future indicative is sometimes used for the imperative, and that to say to any one, You shall do this, has often the same force with the imperative, Do this. So in the decalogue, "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not bear false witness," which denote (we know) the strictest and most authoritative commands. As to the potential mode, it is distinguished from all the rest by its subordinate or subjunctive nature. It is also further distinguished from the requisitive and interrogative, by implying a kind of feeble and weak assertion, and so becoming, in some degree, susceptible of truth and falsehood. Thus, if it be said potentially, This may be, or This might have been, we may remark without absurdity, It is true, or It is false. But if it be said, Do this, meaning, Fly to heaven; or Can this be done? meaning, to square the circle; we cannot say in either case, It is true, or false, though the command and the question are about things impossible. Yet still the potential does not aspire to the indicative, because it implies but a dubious and conjectural assertion, whereas that of the indicative is absolute, and without reserve. This, therefore, (the indicative, I mean,) is the mode, which, as in all grammars it is the first in order, so is truly first both in dignity and use. It is this which publishes our sublimest perceptions; which exhibits the soul in her purest energies, superior to the imperfection of desires and wants; which includes the whole of time, and its minutest distinctions; which, in its various past tenses, is employed by history, to preserve to us the remembrance of former events; in its futures is used by prophecy, or (in default of this) by wise foresight, to instruct and forewarn us, as to that which is coming; but above all in its present tense serves philosophy and the sciences, by just demonstrations to establish necessary truth; that truth, which from its nature only exists in the present; which knows no distinctions either of past or of future, but is everywhere and always invariably one.* ypávov, "get your writing done; make no delays." See Apoll. 1. iii. c. 24. See also Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Græc. et Lat. p. 680. edit. Varior. Latini non æstimaverunt, &c. * See the quotation, note i, chapter vi. p. 143. Cum enim dicimus, Deus est, non eum dicimus nunc esse, sed, &c. Boethius, author of the sentiment there quoted, was by birth a Roman of the first quality; by religion, a Christian; and by philosophy, a Platonic and Peripatetic; which two sects, as they sprang from the same source, were in the latter ages of antiquity commonly adopted by the same persons, such as Themistius, Porphyry, Iam blichus, Ammonius, and others. There were no sects of philosophy that lay greater stress on the distinction between things existing in time and not in time, than the two above mentioned. The doctrine of the Peripatetics on this subject (since it is these that Boethius here follows) may be partly understood from the following sketch. "The things that exist in time are those whose existence time can measure. But if their existence may be measured by time, then there may be assumed a time greater than the existence of any one of them, as there may be assumed a number greater than the greatest multitude, that is capable of being numbered. And hence it is that |