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And thus it is, that all attributives are either verbs, participles, or adjectives.
Besides the distinctions above mentioned, there are others which deserve notice. Some attributes have their essence in motion; such are to walk, to fly, to strike, to live. Others have it in the privation of motion; such are to stop, to rest, to cease, to die. And, lastly, others have it in subjects which have nothing to do with either motion or its privation ; such are the attributes of great and little, white and black, wise and foolish, and, in a word, the several quantities and qualities of all things. Now these last are adjectives; those which denote motions, or their privation, are either verbs or participles.
And this circumstance leads to a further distinction, which may be explained as follows. That all motion is in time, and therefore, wherever it exists, implies time as its concomitant, is evident to all, and requires no proving. But, besides this, all rest or privation of motion implies time likewise. For how can a thing be said to rest or stop, by being in one place for one instant only? So, too, is that thing, which moves with the greatest velocity:To stop, therefore, or rest, is to be in one place for more than one instant; that is to say, during an extension between two instants, and this of course gives us the idea of time. As therefore motions and their privation imply time as their concomitant, so verbs, which denote them, come to denote time also.' And hence the origin and use of tenses, “which are so many different forms assigned to each verb, to shew, without altering its principal meaning, the various times in which such meaning may exist.” Thus scribit, scripsit, scripserat, and scribet, denote all equally the attribute, to write, while the difference between them is, that they denote writing in different times.
Should it be asked, whether time itself may not become, upon occasion, the verb's principal signification; it is answered, No. And this appears, because the same time may be denoted by different verbs, (as in the words writeth and speaketh,) and different times by the same verb, (as in the words writeth and wrote,) neither of which could happen, were time any thing more than a mere concomitant. Add to this, that when words denote time, not collaterally, but principally, they cease to be verbs, and become either adjectives or substantives. Of the
k Thus Proclus, in the beginning of his a verb: ρήμα δε εστι το προσσημαίνον treatise concerning motion : "Hpeuoûv dot! Xpóvov, “a verb is something, which sigτο πρότερον και ύστερον εν τω αυτό τοπώ nikes time over and above," (for such is the ον, και αυτό, και τα μέρη: “That thing is force of the preposition πρός.) If it should at rest, which for a tinie prior and subse- be asked, Over and above what? It may quent is in the same place, both itself, and be answered, Over and above its principal its parts."
signification, which is to denote some movi The ancient authors of dialectic oring and energizing attribute. See Arist. logic have well described this property. de Interpret. c. 3. together with his com. The following is part of their definition of mentators Ammonius and Boethius,
adjective kind are timely, yearly, daily, hourly, &c.; of the substantive kind are time, year, day, hour, &c.
The most obvious division of time is into present, past, and future, nor is any language complete whose verbs have not tenses to mark these distinctions. But we may go still further. Time past and future are both infinitely extended. Hence it is that in universal time past we may assume many particular times past, and in universal time future, many particular times future; some more, some less remote, and corresponding to each other under different relations. Even present time itself is not exempt from these differences, and as necessarily implies some degree of extension, as does every given line, however minute.
Here, then, we are to seek for the reason which first introduced into language that variety of tenses. It was not, it seems, enough to denote indefinitely (or by aorists) mere present, past, or future, but it was necessary, on many occasions, to define with more precision what kind of past, present, or future. And hence the multiplicity of futures, preterites, and even present tenses, with which all languages are found to abound, and without which it would be difficult to ascertain our ideas.
However, as the knowledge of tenses depends on the theory of time, and this is a subject of no mean speculation, we shall reserve it by itself for the following chapter.
CONCERNING TIME AND TENSES.
Time and space have this in common, that they are both of them by nature things continuous, and as such they both of them imply extension. Thus between London and Salisbury there is the extension of space, and between yesterday and tomorrow the extension of time. But in this they differ, that all the parts of space exist at once and together, while those of time only exist in transition or succession. Hence, then, we may gain some idea of time, by considering it under the notion of a transient continuity. Hence also, as far as the affections and properties of transition go, time is different from space; but as to those of extension and continuity they perfectly coincide.
Let us take, for example, such a part of space as a line. In every given line we may assume anywhere a point, and there
m See p. 18, note n. To which we may sist the whole at once, but only in a single add what is said by Ammonius: oudè yap now or instant ; for it hath its existence in ο χρόνος όλος άμα υφίσταται, αλλ' ή κατά becoming and in ceasing to be.” Amm. in μόνον το νύν έν γάρ τώ γίνεσθαι και φθεί- Predicam. p. 82. Β. ρεσθαι το είναι έχει. « Time doth not sub
fore in every given line there may be assumed infinite points. So in every given time we may assume anywhere a now or instant, and therefore in every given time there may be assumed infinite nows or instants.
Further still: a point is the bound of every finite line, and a now, or instant, of every finite time. But although they are bounds, they are neither of them parts, neither the point of any line, nor the now or instant of
appear strange, we may remember that the parts of any thing extended are necessarily extended also, it being essential to their character that they should measure their whole. But if a point or now were extended, each of them would contain within itself infinite other points, and infinite other nows, (for these may be assumed infinitely within the minutest extension, and this, it is evident, would be absurd and impossible.
These assertions, therefore, being admitted, and both points and nows being taken as bounds, but not as parts," it will follow, that in the same manner as the same point may be the end of one line, and the beginning of another, so the same now or instant may be the end of one time and the beginning of another. Let us suppose, for example, the lines A B, BC.
I say, that the point B is the end of the line A B, and the beginning of the line B C. In the same manner let us suppose AB, BC to represent certain times, and let B be a now or instant. In such case, I say, that the instant B is the end of the time A B, and the beginning of the time BC. I say likewise of these two times, that with respect to the now or instant, which they include, the first of them is necessarily past time, as being previous to it; the other is necessarily future, as being subsequent. As, therefore, every now or instant always exists in time, and without being time, is time's bound; the bound of completion to the past, and the bound of commencement to the future: from hence we may conceive its nature or end, which is to be the medium of continuity between the past and the future, so as to render time, through all its parts, one entire and perfect whole.
η Φανερόν ότι ουδέ μόριον το νύν του τε γάρ το μέρος, και σύγκεισθαι δεί το όλον χρόνου, ώσπερ ουδ' αι στιγμαι της γραμμής εκ των μερών και δε χρόνος ου δοκεί σύγ αι δε γραμμαι δύο της μίας μόρια: “It is κεισθαι εκ των νυν: “A now is no part of evident that a now, or instant, is no more time ; for a part is able to measure its whole, a part of time than points are of a line. and the whole is necessarily made up of its The parts, indeed, of one line are two other parts ; but time doth not appear to be made lines.” Natur. Ausc. l. iv. c. 17. And up of nows.” Ibid. c. 14. not long before: Το δε νύν ου μέρος μετρεί ο Το δε νύν εστι συνέχεια χρόνου, ώσπερ
From the above speculations there follow some conclusions, which may be perhaps called paradoxes, till they have been attentively considered. In the first place, there cannot (strictly speaking) be any such thing as time present. For if all time be transient as well as continuous, it cannot, like a line, be present all together, but part will necessarily be gone and part be coming. If, therefore, any portion of its continuity were to be present at once, it would so far quit its transient nature, and be time no longer. But if no portion of its continuity can be thus present, how can time possibly be present, to which such continuity is essential?
Further than this: if there be no such thing as time present, there can be no sensation of time by any one of the senses. For all sensation is of the present only,' the past being preserved not by sense but by memory, and the future being anticipated by prudence only and wise foresight.
But if no portion of time be the object of any sensation ; further, if the present never exist; if the past be no more; if the future be not as yet; and if these are all the parts out of which time is compounded; how strange and shadowy a being do we find it? How nearly approaching to a perfect nonentity ?! Let us try, however, since the senses fail us, if we have not faculties of higher power to seize this fleeting being.
The world has been likened to a variety of things, but it appea to resemble no one more than some moving spectacle (such as a procession or a triumph) that abounds in every part with splendid objects, some of which are still departing, as fast CAéxOn. ouvéxei gào tòy xpórov Toy Taper- therefore time exists not at all, or at least θόντα και εσόμενον, και όλως πέρας χρόνου has but a faint and obscure existence, one εστίν έστι γαρ του μεν αρχή, του δε τε- may suspect from hence. A part of it has neuth: “A now or instant is (as was said been, and is no more ; a part of it is coming, before) the continuity or holding together and is not as yet ; and out of these is made of time ; for it makes time continuous, the that infinite time which is ever to be aspast and the future, and is in general its sumed still further and further. Now that boundary, as being the beginning of one which is made up of nothing but nonentitime and the ending of another.” Natur. ties, it should seem was impossible ever to Auscult. I. iv. c. 19. Euvexela in this place participate of entity.” Natural. Ausc. l. iv. means not continuity, as standing for ex- c. 14. Πώς δε τοις μη ουσι γειτνιάζει; tension, but rather that junction, or holding Πρώτον μεν, επειδή ενταύθα το παρελθόν together, by which extension is imparted to εστι και το μέλλον, ταύτα δε μη όντα το other things.
μεν γαρ ηφάνισται και ουκ έτι έστι, το δε PTαυτή γάρ (αισθήσειsc.) ούτε το μέλλον, ουπώ έστι: συμπαραθέει δε τω χρόνω τα ούτε το γενόμενον γνωρίζομεν, αλλά το φύσικα πάντα, μάλλον δε της κινήσεως παρόν μόνον: « For by this faculty (namely, αυτών παρακολούθημά έστι ο χρόνος: “How the faculty of sense) we neither know the therefore is it that they approach nearly to future nor the past, but the present only.” nonentities ? In the first place, because 'Αριστ. περί Μνημ. Α. α.
here (where they exist) exists the past and 4“Οτι μεν ούν όλως ουκ έστιν, ή μόγις the future, and these are nonentities ; for και αμυδρώς, εκ των δέ τις αν υποπτεύσειε" the one is vanished and is no e, the το μεν γαρ αυτού γέγονε, και ουκ έστι το δέ other is not as yet. Now all natural subμέλλει, και ούπω εστίν εκ δε τούτων και ο stances pass away along with time, or rather άπειρος και ο αεί λαμβανόμενος χρόνος σύγ- it is upon their motion that time is an KEITAI TO 8° ék ÖVTW OUYkEiuevov, adúva- attendant.” Philop. MS. Com. in Nicomach. τον αν δόξειε κατέχειν ποτέ ουσίας: “ That p. 10.
as others make their appearance.
The senses look on while the sight passes, perceiving as much as is immediately present, which they report with tolerable accuracy to the soul's superior powers. Having done this, they have done their duty, being concerned with nothing save what is present and instantaneous. But to the memory, to the imagination, and above all to the intellect, the several nows or instants are not lost, as to the senses, but are preserved and made objects of steady compre hension, however in their own nature they may be transitory
“Now it is from contemplating two or more of these instants under one view, together with that interval of continuity which subsists between them, that we acquire insensibly the idea of time." For example: The sun rises; this I remember: it rises again; this too I remember. These events are not together; there is an extension between them-not, however, of space, for we may suppose the place of rising the same, or at least to exhibit no sensible difference. Yet still we recognise some extension between them. Now what is this extension but a natural day? And what is that but pure time? It is after the same manner, by recognising two new moons, and the extension between these two vernal equinoxes, and the extension between these ; that we gain ideas of other times, such as months and years, which are all so many intervals, described as above; that is to say, passing intervals of continuity between two instants viewed together.
And thus it is the mind acquires the idea of time. But this time it must be remembered is past time only, which is always the first species that occurs to the human intellect. How then do we acquire the idea of time future? The answer is, we acquire it by anticipation. Should it be demanded still further, and what is anticipation? We answer, that in this case it is a kind of reasoning by analogy from similar to similar; from successions of events, that are past already, to similar successions,
r Τότε φαμέν γεγονέναι χρόνον, όταν του c. 16. Themistius's Comment upon
pasπροτέρου και υστέρου εν τη κινήσει αίσθη- sage is to the same purpose. . Όταν γαρ ο σιν λάβωμεν. Ορίζομεν δε το άλλο και νους αναμνησθείς του νυν, και χθες είπεν, άλλο υπολαβείν αυτά, και μεταξύ τι αυτών έτερον πάλιν είπη το τήμερον, τότε και έτερον όταν γαρ τα άκρα έτερα του μέσου χρόνον ευθύς ενενόησεν, υπό των δύο νύν νοήσωμεν, και δύο είπη η ψυχή τα νύν, το οριζόμενον, οίον υπό περάτων δυοίν και μέν πρότερον, το δε ύστερον, τότε και ούτω λέγειν έχει, ότι ποσόν εστι πεντεκαίτούτο φαμέν είναι χρόνον: « It is then we δεκα ωρών, ή εκκαίδεκα, οίον εξ απείρου Bay there has been time, when we can γραμμής πηχυαίαν δύο σημείοις αποτεμνόacquire a sensation of prior and subsequent uevos: “ For when the mind, remembering in motion. But we distinguish and settle the now, which it talked of yesterday, talks these two by considering one first, then the again of another now to-day, then it is it other, together with an interval between immediately has an idea of time, terminated them different from both. For as often as by these two nows, as by two boundaries; we conceive the extremes to be different and thus it is enabled to say, that the quanfrom the mean, and the soul talks of two tity is of fifteen or sixteen hours, as if it nows, one prior and the other subsequent, were to sever a cubit's length from an infithen it is we say there is time, and this it nite line by two points." Themist. Op. edit. is we call time," Natural. Auscult. I. iv. Ald. p. 45. B.