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the others could not be used. It is, moreover, by means of these, and of articles, which are nearly allied to them, that "language, though in itself only significant of general ideas, is brought down to denote that infinitude of particulars which are for ever arising, and ceasing to be." But more of this hereafter, in a proper place.

As to the three orders of pronouns already mentioned, they may be called prepositive, as may, indeed, all substantives, because they are capable of introducing or leading a sentence, without having reference to any thing previous. But besides those there is another pronoun, (in Greek ôs, oσTIs in Latin, Qui; in English, Who, Which, That,) a pronoun having a character peculiar to itself, the nature of which may be explained as follows.

Suppose I was to say, "Light is a body, Light moves with great celerity." These would apparently be two distinct sentences. Suppose, instead of the second light, I were to place the prepositive pronoun it, and say, Light is a body; it moves with great celerity; the sentences would still be distinct and two. But if I add a connective, (as for example an and,) saying, Light is a body, and it moves with great celerity; I then by connexion make the two into one, as by cementing many stones I make one wall.

Now it is in the united powers of a connective and another pronoun, that we may see the force and character of the pronoun here treated. Thus, therefore, if in the place of and it, we substitute that, or which, saying Light is a body, which moves with great celerity; the sentence still retains its unity and perfection, and becomes if possible more compact than before. We may, with just reason, therefore, call this pronoun the subjunctive, because it cannot (like the prepositive) introduce an original sen

duced together, and made to cooperate to the same end.

Sometimes, by virtue of deîis, the pronoun of the third person stands for the first.

Quod si militibus parces, erit hic quoque
Miles.

That is, "I also will be a soldier."

Tibul. 1. ii. el. 6. v. 7. See Vulpius. It may be observed, too, that even in epistolary correspondence, and indeed in all kinds of writing, where the pronouns I and you make their appearance, there is a sort of implied presence, which they are supposed to indicate, though the parties are, in fact, at ever so great a distance. And hence the rise of that distinction in Apollonius, Tàs μèv Tŵv ŏyewv elva deifeis, τὰς δὲ τοῦ νοῦ, “ that some indications are ocular, and some are mental." De Syntaxi, 1. ii. c. 3. p. 104.

The Greeks, it must be confessed, call this pronoun ὑποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον, “the subjunctive article." Yet, as it should seem, this is but an improper appellation. Apollonius, when he compares it to the πротакTikov, or true "prepositive article," not only confesses it to differ, as being expressed by a different word, and having a different place in every sentence; but in syntax, he adds, it is wholly different. De Syntax, l. i. c. 43. p. 91. Theodore Gaza acknowledges the same, and therefore adds, 80ev dǹ кal οὗ κυρίως ἂν εἴη ἄρθρον ταυτί: “ for these reasons this (meaning the subjunctive) cannot properly be an article." And just before he says, kuρiws ye μǹv åрlроν тò πротакTuóv: "however, properly speaking, it is the prepositive is the article." Gram. Introd. 1. iv. The Latins, therefore, have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with the pronouns.

tence, but only serves to subjoin one to some other which is previous.d

The application of this subjunctive, like the other pronouns, is universal. It may be the substitute of all kinds of substantives, natural, artificial, or abstract; as well as general, special, or particular. We may say, the animal, which, &c.; the man, whom, &c.; the ship, which, &c.; Alexander, who, &c.; Bu cephalus, that, &c.; virtue, which, &c. &c.

Nay, it may even be the substitute of all the other pronouns, and is of course, therefore, expressive of all three persons. Thus we say, I, who now read, have near finished this chapter; thou, who now readest; he, who now readeth, &c. &c.

And thus is this subjunctive truly a pronoun from its substitution, there being no substantive existing, in whose place it may not stand. At the same time, it is essentially distinguished from the other pronouns by this peculiar, that it is not only a substitute, but withal a connective.

d Hence we see why the pronoun here mentioned is always necessarily the part of some complex sentence, which sentence contains, either expressed or understood, two verbs and two nominatives.

Thus in that verse of Horace,
Qui metuens vivit, liber mihi non erit

unquam.
Ille non erit liber is one sentence, qui me-
tuens vivit is another. Ille and qui are
the two nominatives, erit and vivit the two
verbs, and so in all other instances.

The following passage from Apollonius (though somewhat corrupt in more places than one) will serve to shew whence the above speculations are taken. Tò úжоTakтIκὸν ἄρθρον ἐπὶ ῥῆμα ἴδιον φέρεται, συνδεdeμévov did Tĥs ȧvapoрâs тý πрokeiμév ὀνόματι καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἁπλοῦν λόγον οὐ παριστάνει κατὰ τὴν τῶν δύο ῥημάτων σύνταξιν (λέγω τὴν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἄρθρῳ) ὅπερ πάλιν παρείπετο τῷ ΚΑΙ συνδέσμῳ. Κοινὸν μὲν (lege ΤΟ ΚΑΙ γὰρ κοινὸν μὲν) παρελάμβανε το ὄνομα τὸ προκείμενον, σύμπλεκον δὲ ἕτερον λόγον πάντως καὶ ἕτερον ῥῆμα παρελάμβανε, καὶ οὕτω τὸ, παρεγένετο ὁ γραμματικὸς, ὃς διελεξάτο, δυνάμει τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποτελεῖ τοῦ (fors. τῷ ὁ γραμματικὸς παρεγένετο, καὶ διελεξάτο. "The subjunctive article (that is, the pronoun here mentioned) is applied to a verb of its own, and yet is connected withal to the antecedent Hence it can never serve to constitute a simple sentence, by reason of the syntax of the two verbs; I mean, that which respects the noun or antecedent, and that which respects the article or relative. The same, too, follows as to the conjunction and. This copulative assumes the ante

noun.

cedent noun, which is capable of being applied to many subjects, and by connecting to it a new sentence, of necessity assumes a new verb also. And hence it is that the words, the grammarian came, who discoursed,' form in power nearly the same sentence, as if we were to say, 'the grammarian came, and discoursed."" Apoll. de Syntaxi, l. i. c. 43. p. 92. See also an ingenious French treatise, called Grammaire Generale et Raisonnée, c. 9.

The Latins, in their structure of this subjunctive, seem to have well represented its compound nature of part pronoun and part connective, in forming their qui and quis from que and is, or (if we go with Scaliger to the Greek) from καὶ and os, Kal and 8. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 127.

Homer also expresses the force of this subjunctive, pronoun or article, by help of the prepositive and a connective, exactly consonant to the theory here established. See Iliad, Λ. ver. 270, 553. Ν. 571. Π. 54, 157, 158.

e Before we quit this subject, it may not be improper to remark, that in the Greek and Latin tongues the two principal pronouns, that is to say, the first and second person, the ego and the tu, are implied in the very form of the verb itself, ypápw, ypάpeis, scribo, scribis,) and are for that reason never expressed, unless it be to mark a contradistinction; such as in Virgil,

Nos patriam fugimus; tu, Tityre, lentus

in umbra

Formosam resonare doces, &c. This, however, is true with respect only to the casus rectus, or nominitive of these pronouns, but not with respect to their oblique cases, which must always be added, because

And now to conclude what we have said concerning substantives. All substantives are either primary or secondary; that is to say, according to a language more familiar and known, are either nouns or pronouns. The nouns denote substances, and those either natural, artificial, or abstract. They moreover denote things either general, or special, or particular. The pronouns, their substitutes, are either prepositive or subjunctive. The prepositive is distinguished into three orders, called the first, the second, and the third person. The subjunctive includes the powers of all those three, having superadded, as of its own, the peculiar force of a connective.

Having done with substantives, we now proceed to attributives.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCERNING ATTRIBUTIVES.

ATTRIBUTIVES are all those principal words, that denote attributes, considered as attributes. Such, for example, are the words black, white, great, little, wise, eloquent, writeth, wrote, writing, &c.

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quired the name of KλTıkaì, that is, “leaning or inclining pronouns." The Greeks, too, had in the first person, ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ, ἐμὲ, for contradistinctives, and μoû, μol, μè, for enclitics. And hence it was that Apollonius contended, that in the passage above quoted from the first Iliad, we should read παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ, for παῖδα δὲ μοι, on account of the contradistinction which there occurs between the Grecians and Chryses. See Apoll. de Syntaxi, l. i. c. 3. p. 20; 1. ii. c,

Quid memorem Alciden? Et mi genus ab 2. p. 102, 103.
Jove summo.

Thus Homer:

ὑμῖν μὲν θεοὶ δοῖεν .

Παῖδα δὲ ΜΟΙ λύσατε φίλην. Ιλ. Α. Where the buîv and the poì stand, as contradistinguished, and both have precedence of their respective verbs, the uîv even leading the whole sentence. In other instances, these pronouns commonly take their place behind the verb, as may be seen in examples everywhere obvious. The Greek language went further still. When the oblique case of these pronouns happened to contradistinguish, they assumed a peculiar accent of their own, which gave them the name of ὀρθοτονουμέναι, οι pronouns uprightly accented." When they marked no such opposition, they not only took their place behind the verb, but even gave it their accent, and (as it were) inclined themselves upon it. And hence they ac

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This diversity between the contradis tinctive pronouns and the enclitic, is not unknown even to the English tongue. When we say, Give me content, the me in this case is a perfect enclitic. But when we say, Give me content, Give him his thousands, the me and him are no enclitics, but as they stand in opposition, assume an accent of their own, and so become the true ὀρθοτονουμέναι.

See before, p. 128.

In the above list of words are included what grammarians called adjectives, verbs, and participles, inasmuch as all of them equally denote the attributes of substance. Hence it is, that as they are all from their very nature the predicates in a proposition, (being all predicated of some subject or substance, Snow is white, Cicero writeth, &c.) hence I say the appellation pua or verb is employed by logicians in an extended sense

However, previously to these, and to every other possible attribute, whatever a thing may be, whether black or white, square or round, wise or eloquent, writing or thinking, it must first of necessity exist, before it can possibly be any thing else. For existence may be considered as an universal genus, to which all things of all kinds are at all times to be referred. The verbs, therefore, which denote it, claim precedence of all others, as being essential to the very being of every proposition, in which they may still be found, either expressed, or by implication; expressed, as when we say, The sun is bright; by implication, as when we say, The sun rises, which means, when resolved, The sun is rising.h

The verbs, is, groweth, becometh, est, fit, væάρXEι ẻσтì, πέλει, γίγνεται, are all of them used to express this general genus. The Latins have called them verba substantiva, "verbs substantive,” but the Greeks ῥήματα ὑπαρκτικὰ, "verbs of existence;" a name more apt, as being of greater latitude, and comprehending equally as well attribute, as substance. The principal of those verbs, and which we shall particularly here consider, is the verb eorì, est, is.

Now all existence is either absolute or qualified: absolute, as when we say, B is; qualified, as when we say, B is an animal; B is black, is round, &c.

With respect to this difference, the verb is can by itself express absolute existence, but never the qualified, without subjoining the particular form, because the forms of existence being in number infinite, if the particular form be not expressed, we cannot know which is intended. And hence it follows, that when is only serves to subjoin some such form, it has little more force than that of a mere assertion. It is under the same character, that it becomes a latent part in every other verb, by expressing that assertion which is one of their essentials. Thus, as was observed just before, riseth means, is rising; writeth, is writing.

Again as to existence in general, it is either mutable, or immutable mutable, as in the objects of sensation; immutable, as in the objects of intellection and science. Now mutable objects exist all in time, and admit the several distinctions of present, past, and future. But immutable objects know no such distinctions, but rather stand opposed to all things temporary.

to denote them all. Thus Ammonius, explaining the reason why Aristotle in his tract De Interpretatione calls evкòs a verb, tells us, πᾶσαν φωνὴν, κατηγορούμενον ὅρον ἐν προτασει ποιοῦσαν, ῥῆμα Kaλeîobaι, "that every sound articulate, that forms the predicate in a proposition, is called a verb," p. 24. edit. Ven. Priscian's observation, though made on another oc

casion, is very pertinent to the present. Non declinatio, sed proprietas excutienda est significationis. Lib. ii. p. 576. And in another place he says, Non similitudo de clinationis omnimodo conjungit vel discernit partes orationis inter se, sed vis ipsius significationis. Lib. xiii. p. 970.

See Metaphys. Aristot. l. v. c. 7. edit. Du-Vall.

And hence two different significations of the substantive verb is, according as it denotes mutable, or immutable being.

For example, if we say, This orange is ripe, is meaneth, that it existeth so now at this present, in opposition to past time, when it was green, and to future time, when it will be rotten.

But if we say, The diameter of the square is incommensurable with its side, we do not intend by is, that it is incommensurable now, having been formerly commensurable, or being to become so hereafter; on the contrary, we intend that perfection of existence to which time and its distinctions are utterly unknown. It is under the same meaning we employ this verb, when we say, Truth is, or, God is. The opposition is not of time present to other times, but of necessary existence to all temporary existence whatever. And so much for verbs of existence, com

monly called verbs substantive.

We are now to descend to the common herd of attributives, such as black and white, to write, to speak, to walk, &c.; among which, when compared and opposed to each other, one of the most eminent distinctions appears to be this. Some, by being joined to a proper substantive, make, without further help, a perfect assertive sentence; while the rest, though otherwise perfect, are in this respect deficient.

To explain by an example. When we say, Cicero eloquent, Cicero wise, these are imperfect sentences, though they denote a substance and an attribute. The reason is, that they want an assertion, to shew that such attribute appertains to such substance. We must therefore call in the help of an assertion elsewhere, an is, or a was, to complete the sentence, saying, Cicero is wise, Cicero was eloquent. On the contrary, when we say, Cicero writeth, Cicero walketh, in instances like these there is no such occasion, because the words writeth and walketh imply in their own form not an attribute only, but an assertion likewise. Hence it is they may be resolved, the one into is and writing, the other into is and walking.

Now all those attributives which have this complex power of denoting both an attribute and an assertion, make that species of words which grammarians call verbs. If we resolve this complex power into its distinct parts, and take the attribute alone without the assertion, then have we participles. All other attributives, besides the two species before, are included together in the general name of adjectives.

i Cum enim dicimus, Deus est, non eum dicimus nunc esse, sed tantum in substantia esse, ut hoc ad immutabilitatem potius substantiæ, quam ad tempus aliquod referatur. Si autem dicimus, dies est, ad nullam diei substantiam pertinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constitutionem; hoc enim, quod

significat, tale est, tanquam si dicamus, nunc est. Quare cum dicimus esse, ut substantiam designemus, simpliciter est addimus; cum vero ita ut aliquid præsens significetur, secundum tempus. Boeth. in lib. de Interpr. p. 307. See also Plat. Tim. p. 37, 38. edit. Serrani,

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