The Peripatetic definition of art is is petà λóyov åλndoûs #ointikh: "an efficient habit, joined with sound and true reason." Arist. Ethic. 1. vi. c. 4.

The Stoic definition, as we find it in Sext. Empir. adversus Logicos, p. 392, is, Σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων ἐγγεγυμνασμένων πρὸς τὶ τέλος εὔχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βιῷ. Thus translated by Cicero in Diodemes de Grammat. 1. ii. Ars est perceptionum exercitatarum collectio, ad unum exitum vitæ utilem pertinentium. And again by Quintilian, Inst. Orat. 1. ii. c. 18. Artem constare ex perceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad finem utilem vitæ. The same definition is also alluded to in the Academics of Cicero, l. ii. c. 7, where it is said, Ars vero quæ potest esse, nisi quæ non ex una, aut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat ?

There is a third definition of art cited by Quintilian in the same place, and ascribed by him to Cleanthes: Ars est potestas via (id est, ordine) efficiens. The Greek, from which this Latin definition is taken, is fuller and more philosophieal: the words are, Εξις ὁδῷ βαδίζουσα μετὰ φαντασίας: which may be rendered, "an habit, which proceeds in a road or method, having a sense, withal, of what it is about." The last character distinguishes art from the natural energies of all things insensitive, which, though they proceed methodically, yet want a sense of what they are doing. Vid. Niceph. Blemmid. Epit. Logic. p. 20.

Now if we compare these definitions with that in the Dialogue, we shall find them all to correspond. “The habitual power in man of becoming the cause of some effect," is the same as "Eğis TonTin in the Peripatetic definition. According to a system of various and well-approved precepts," is the same as μετὰ λόγου aAndous. For sound and true reason must needs be the basis of all such precepts.

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Again, as to the second definition; the words Zornua kaтaλń↓ewv [a system of comprehensions, or of certain and evident truths] correspond to the latter part of the definition in the Dialogue, "according to a system of various and well-approved precepts." The word éyyeyvμvaoμévwv [that

a

is to say, worked in by habit and exercise] corresponds to the first part, that "art is a cause founded in habit." And the rest [Tpòs TI TÉλOS, &c. that is to say, system which has respect to some useful and serviceable end or purpose in human life,"] shews the system here mentioned to regard practice and action, not theory and speculation. And thus does it correspond with the definition of the Dialogue, where it is said that art is an habitual power, not of merely contemplating and knowing, but of becoming the cause of some effect. It is not, indeed, expressed in the Dialogue, that this effect has respect to the utility of human life, because this latter circumstance is reserved to the definition of the final cause of art, given page 16.

As to the third definition of art, potestas via efficiens, "a power operating methodically," it may be observed, that by being called an operating power, it is distinguished from powers purely speculative; and as it is said to operate methodically, or in a road and regular process, it is distinguished from chance as well as blind necessity. And thus far it corresponds with what is offered in the Dialogue. But it does not appear from this definition, whether the power therein mentioned be original and natural, or secondary and habitual, because powers of either sort may operate methodically. And perhaps Cleanthes intended not to distinguish so far, but took art in that larger and more general sense, adopted sometimes by the Stoics; as when they describe Nature herself to be a Tup τεχνικὸν ὅδῳ βαδίζον πρὸς γένεσιν, artificial fire, proceeding methodically to production or creation." For it is not to be imagined, they intended by this to insinuate that nature was a fire, which had learnt by habit so to operate. On the contrary, by "artificial," it is probable they intended no more than some active efficient principle, working with reason, order, and method; of which principle they considered fire to be the properest vehicle, as being of all bodies the most subtle, and that into which the rest are all ultimately resolvable. Vide Diog. Laert. 1. vii. s. 156. Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1. ii. c. 22.

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an

The cause here treated is the material, the Ὕλη, or Υποκείμενον, οι τὸ ἐξ οὗ γινεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος.

Of a contingent we have the following definition : Λέγω δ' ἐνδέχεσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, οὗ μὴ ὄντος ἀναγκαίου, τεθέντος δ ̓ ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲν ἔσται διὰ τοῦτ ̓ ἀδύνατον. "I call that a contingent, which not being necessary, but being supposed to be, there will follow nothing impossible from such supposition." Arist. Anal. prior. 1. i. c. 13. Diog. Laert. 1. iii. s. 10.

That this is true in works of art, is evident. It is not necessary, that a given fragment of such a rock should assume the figure of Hercules: but there follows nothing impossible, if we suppose it so figured. It is for this reason that the subject of art is in the Dialogue called "a contingent."

But, however, to explain the whole of what is said in this place, it is necessary to go backward, and deduce what we would say from some remoter considerations.

The Peripatetics held the end or aim of their philosophy to be the discovering and knowing the apxǹ, the "primary and creative principle of all things." They pursued this inquiry, when they reasoned analytically, that is to say, upwards, by beginning their contemplation from those things which are to us first in the order of our comprehension, and so ascending gradually to that which is truly first in the real order of beings. Ammon. eis E. pwv. p. 36.

The first and original objects of our comprehension are those nearer and more immediate, viz. the objects of sense, with which we are surrounded on every side. These objects we perceive to be all in motion; and the motions are multiform, various, and often opposite to each other. The consequences of this we perpetually behold. By such motions we see, that not only the mere local site of these beings is

changed, but their very bulk, and figure, and qualities ; nay, more than this, even the beings themselves are made to separate and perish, while new beings arise from the re-assemblage of the scattered parts, which parts different motions can as well bring together, as disunite. The beings or objects of the character here described, the Peripatetics denoted under the common appellation of the τὰ κινούμενα καὶ φθαρτὰ, "the beings moving and corruptible."

From these moving and perishable objects they passed to those sublimer and more transcendent objects of sense, which they saw adorn the heavens. Here, likewise, they discovered motion; but then this motion was uniform and constant; affecting not the beings moved, save in the relation of local site. As, therefore, they beheld no change in the form and essence of these beings, they deemed them (upon their hypothesis) incorruptible, and out of them established another class of beings, that is to say, the τὰ κινούμενα καὶ ἄφθαρτα, "the beings moving and incorruptible."

From these sublimer objects of sense they passed to objects of pure intellect; to bodies devoid of all motion, and of all quality, save that inseparable one of figure; such bodies, for instance, as the cube, the sphere, and the rest of bodies mathematical. From mathematical bodies, and the truths resulting from them, they passed to the contemplation of truth in general; to the soul, and its powers both of intuition and syllogization; to being universal, and above both time and place; and thus, at last, to that supreme cause, the great principle of the whole, which is ever the same, immutable and eternal. The several objects of this intellectual comprehension they styled, not merely ἄφθαρτα, but ἄφθαρτα καὶ ἀκί νητα, beings incorruptible and immoveable." Vid. inf. note r.

success.

In this manner did the Peripatetics speculate. And hence was it they established to themselves three species of philosophical employment-one about beings motionless and eternal ; another, about beings moveable and eternal; and a third, about beings moveable and perishable. The first they held the proper employment of the metaphysician; the two last of the astronomer and the naturalist.

Διὸ τρεῖς αἱ πραγματεῖαι ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀκίνητον· ἡ δὲ, περὶ κινούμενον μὲν, ἄφθαρτον δέ· ἡ δὲ, περὶ τὰ φθαρτά. Idcirco tres sunt tractationes ; una, de immobili; altera de eo, quod movetur quidem, sed est interitus expers; tertia de rebus, interitui obnoxiis. Arist. Natural. Ausc. l. ii. c. 7. Διὸ καὶ τρεῖς αἱ πραγματείαι· ἡ μὲν, περὶ κινούμενα καὶ φθαρτά· ἡ δὲ περὶ κινούμενα, ἄφθαρτα δέ· ἡ δὲ, περὶ ἀκίνητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα. Themistii Paraphrasis in loc.

This threefold subject of philosophic inquiry is elegantly explained in the following passage: Τὶ δὲ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς Αριστοτελικής φιλοσοφίας; φαμὲν ὅτι γνῶναι τὴν πάντων ἀρχὴν, τὴν τῶν πάντων δημιουργὸν αἰτίαν, τὴν ἀεὶ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν· ἀποδείκνυσι γὰρ πάντων ἀρχὴν, καὶ ἀσώματον· ἐξ ἐκείνης δὲ τὰ πάντα παράγεσθαι. Τίνα δὲ τὰ ἄγοντα ἡμᾶς εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τέλος; φαμὲν ὅτι ἡ διδασκαλία τῶν ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ μεταβολῇ ὑπαρχόντων τοιαῦτα δέ ἐστι τὰ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτων, διὰ μεσῶν μαθηματικών, ἀνάγομεν ἑαυτοῦς ἐπὶ τὰ ἀεὶ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα τοιαῦτα δὲ ἔστι τὰ οὐράνια· καὶ οὕτω, μετὰ τὰς ἀσωμάτους οὐσίας, ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάντων ἀρχήν. Πάσης γὰρ κινήσεως ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν οὔσης, ἢ κατὰ ποιὸν, ἢ κατὰ τόπον, τὰ μὲν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ κατὰ πάσαν κίνησιν κινοῦνται τὰ δὲ οὐράνια κατὰ μόνην τὴν κατὰ τόπον. Διὸ χρὴ εὐ τάκτως ὁδεύειν ἀπὸ τῶν πολυτρόπως κινουμένων ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ μίαν, καὶ μόνην κίνησιν κινούμενα, καὶ οὕτως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαυτῶς ἔχουσαν ἄρχην. Αμμονίου εἰς τὰς κατηγορίας, p. 12. edit. Venet. 8vo. 1545.

The author of the Dialogue has had refer ence to this threefold division of subjects, as may be seen in that part of his Dialogue which gives occasion to the present comment. He has chosen, however, to style the τὰ οὐράνια, or “ heavenly bodies,” rather contingents of higher order, than beings necessary, as imagining the former to be their truer character.

It may be here added, that the Peripatetics confined Φύσις, or "Nature,” for the most part, to this earth of ours, where they

considered her as the active principle of life in plants and animals. Hence, therefore, they distinguished not her effects from those of art, by their necessity, (for the effects of both they treated as contingent,) but from the cause in natural subjects operating within, artificial without, as has been already observed, note c. See Diog. Laert. p. 459.

It may be further added, that they placed these effects of art and nature, and, indeed, all other contingents whatever, in a middle rank between things necessary and things impossible. The reason was evident. Things necessary could not but be; things impossible could not be; but contingents were τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, that is, “ were equally susceptible both of being and non-being.”

But still, though all contingents admitted, on their hypothesis, both of being and non-being, yet they supposed some to have a greater tendency to existence, and others to have a less. The first species of these they styled τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, “ the things which happen for the most part ;" the last, τὰ ἐπ ̓ ἔλαττον, “ the things which happen less frequently.”

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Now as it is evident that both nature and art oftener obtain their end, than miss it, (for complete animals are more frequently born than monsters ; and the musician, if an artist, strikes oftener the right string than the wrong, hence it was, that they ranged the effects of nature and art among those contingents which were τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, “ contingents of greater frequency.” But yet, as these effects were not from the hypothesis necessary, and contrary to these upon occasion happened, hence it was, that whenever either nature or art became causes of the τὰ ἐπ' ἔλαττον, “ those rarer events, in such case they (nature and art) were considered by these philosophers as αἰτίαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, “ causes by way of accident,” and not according to their own essence and distinguishing character. In such instances it was, that they assumed the names of Τύχη and Αὐτόματον, Fortune and Chance; Túxn having mostly reference to works of men, Αὐτόματον to works of nature. The instances given by Themistius, in cases of chance and fortune, are as follow. A tile falls from a house. end of its falling is to arrive at that lower place, whither nature would carry it by the common law of gravity. In falling, it strikes and wounds a passenger. This last event is from chance. Again, a man digs in his garden, to plant. In digging, he

The

discovers a hidden treasure. This last event is from fortune. And thus, adds Themistius, ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις καὶ μία, ἄλλου μὲν καθ' αὐτὴν αἰτία, ἄλλου δὲ κατὰ συμBeẞnkos: "the same individual action is the cause of one thing from its own peculiar character, and of another thing, by way of accident." And again, čσri uèv ov καὶ τῶν οὕτως συμβαινόντων ἢ τὴν φύσιν ἢ τὴν προαίρεσιν αἰτίαν πῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ ̓ οὐ καθ ̓ αὐτήν. οὐ γὰρ τούτων χάριν οὔτε προήλθεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε ἡ κέραμις κατη νέχθη, ἀλλ ̓ εἰ ἄρα, κατὰ συμβεβηκός : "of these events we may call nature, or human will, in a manner the cause, but yet not so from themselves, and according to their own peculiar essence; for it was not for the sake of what happened, that either the passenger went forth, or the tile fell downward, but, if any thing, it was by accident." Themist. in lib. ii. Natur. Auscult. p. 26. edit. Ald. See also Arist. Natur. Auscult. 1. ii. c. 4, 5, 6. Ammon. in Prædicam. p. 113. b. This doctrine came originally from Plato, whose definition of fortune was σύμπτωμα φύσεως ή προαιρέrews, "a symptom, or thing co-incident either with nature or human will." Vid. Suidam in voc. Ειμαρμένη.

It must be here observed, that Karà σvμßeßnds, "by accident," means, in no part of these quotations, accidental, as standing for casual; for this would be mere tautology, as to what is here said concerning chance. It means, rather, something by way of appendage; something adventitious; in other words, it means accident, as adhering to substance, without which it can have no being, though suppose it absent or taken away, the nature of substance is no way affected. It was in this sense the Peripatetics supposed chance and fortune to be accidents or appendages to nature and mind. According, therefore, to them, the supposition of chance and fortune was so far from excluding nature and mind from

the universe, that they demonstrably proved their existence in it. For admitting their account of chance and fortune to be just; if we grant the accidents to exist, much more must we grant the subjects, and this, too, with that superior dignity and priority of existence, which is evidently due to all subjects above their accidents. Well, therefore, did the philosopher conclude, ὕστερον ἄρα τὸ Αὐτόματον, καὶ ἡ Τύχη τοῦ Νού, καὶ τῆς φύσεως. Subsequent in existence, are chance and fortune to mind and nature.” Arist. Natur. Ausc. l. ii. c. 6.

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From what has been said, we see the reason of that enumeration of causes mentioned in the beginning of the first note, where they are described to be necessity, nature, man, and fortune.

To necessity they referred all those things and events, which they supposed of necessary existence; such as the universe, the heavenly bodies, together with their uniformly regular motions.

To nature, man, and chance, they referred all contingents; to nature and man, obtaining their end, all contingents of greater frequency; to the same causes, either falling short of their end, or going beyond it, and thus becoming chance or fortune, those opposite contingents of existence less usual.

And hence, as art and fortune were both conversant about the same subjects, (viz. such contingents as respected human life,) we find the meaning of that verse of Agatho's, cited by Aristotle, in his Ethics, 1. vi. c. 5.

Τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε, καὶ τύχη τέχνην. "Art loveth fortune; fortune loveth art.'

The whole chapter, indeed, is well worth perusal. But we shall not venture to lengthen this note, which may be probably deemed too long already, and which can be only excused, as giving some sample of a philosophy, which, from its rarity, perhaps, may possibly furnish some amusement.