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science. There is, indeed, in this last prejudice, something peculiarly unfortunate, and that is, the more excellent the science, the more likely it will be found to produce this effect.
There are few sciences more intrinsically valuable than mathematics. It is hard, indeed, to say, to which they have more contributed, whether to the utilities of life, or to the sublimest parts of science. They are the noblest praxis of logic, or universal reasoning. It is through them we may perceive how the stated forms of syllogism are exemplified in one subject, namely, the predicament of quantity. By marking the force of these forms, as they are applied here, we may be enabled to apply them of ourselves elsewhere. Nay, further still, by viewing the mind, during its process in these syllogistic employments, we may come to know, in part, what kind of being it is; since mind, like other powers, can be only known from its operations. Whoever, therefore, will study mathematics in this view, will become not only by mathematics a more expert logician, and by logic a more rational mathematician, but a wiser philosopher, and an acuter reasoner, in all the possible subjects either of science or deliberation.
But when mathematics, instead of being applied to this excellent purpose, are used, not to exemplify logic, but to supply its place; no wonder if logic pass into contempt, and if mathematics, instead of furthering science, become in fact an obstacle. For when men, kuowing nothing of that reasoning which is universal, come to attach themselves for years to a single species, a species wholly involved in lines and numbers only, they grow insensibly to believe these last as inseparable from all reasoning, as the poor Indians thought every horseman to be inseparable from his horse.
And thus we see the use, nay, the necessity of enlarging our literary views, lest even knowledge itself should obstruct its own growth, and perform in some measure the part of ignorance and barbarity.
Such, then, is the apology made by the author of this treatise, for the multiplicity of ancient quotations with which he has filled his book. If he can excite in his readers a proper spirit of curiosity; if he can help in the least degree to enlarge the bounds of science; to revive the decaying taste of ancient literature; to lessen the bigotted contempt of every thing not
modern ; and to assert to authors of every age their just portion of esteem ; if he can in the least degree contribute to these ends, he hopes it may be allowed that he has done a service to mankind. Should this service be a reason for his work to survive, he has confessed already it would be no unpleasing event. Should the contrary happen, he must acquiesce in its fate, and let it peaceably pass to those destined regions, whither the productions of modern wit are every day passing,
In vicum vendentem thus et odores.
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY CONCERNING
INTRODUCTION.-DESIGN OF THE WHOLE.
If men by nature had been framed for solitude, they had never felt an impulse to converse one with another; and if, like lower animals, they had been by nature irrational, they could not have recognised the proper subjects of discourse. Since speech, then, is the joint energy of our best and noblest faculties,à (that is to say, of our reason, and our social affection,) being withal our peculiar ornament and distinction, as men; those inquiries may surely be deemed interesting, as well as liberal, which either search how speech may be naturally resolved, or how, when resolved, it may be again combined.
Here a large field for speculating opens before us. We may either behold speech, as divided into its constituent parts, as a statue may be divided into its several limbs; or else, as resolved into its matter and form, as the same statue may be resolved into its marble and figure.
These different analysings or resolutions constitute what we call “philosophical or universal grammar."
When we have viewed speech thus analyzed, we may then consider it as compounded. And here, in the first place, we may contemplate that synthesis, which, by combining simple
See p. 58 to 66. See also note 2, p. 61, • Aristotle says, Τών δε κατά μηδεμίαν and note d, p. 66.
συμπλοκήν λεγομένων ουδέν ούτε αληθές 6 Grammaticam etiam bipartitam pone- ούτε ψευδές εστιν οιον άνθρωπος, λεύκος, mus, ut alia sit literaria, alia philosophica, Tpéxel, Vikậ: “Of those words which are etc. Bacon, de Augm. Scient. vi. 1. And spoken without connexion, there is no one soon after he adds, Verumtamen hac ipsa re either true or false ; as, for instance, man, moniti, cogitatione complexi sumus gram- white, runneth, conquereth.” Cat. c. iv. So maticam quandam, quæ non analogiam ver- again, in the beginning of his treatise De borum ad invicem, sed analogiam inter verba Interpretatione : Iepi yèp cúvdegiv kal 86et res sive rationem sedulo inquirat. αίρεσιν ίστι το ψευδός τε και το αληθές:
terms, produces a truth; then, by combining two truths, produces a third; and thus others, and others, in continued demonstration, till we are led, as by a road, into the regions of science.
Now this is that superior and most excellent synthesis which alone applies itself to our intellect or reason; and which, to conduct according to rule, constitutes the art of logic.
After this we may turn to those inferior compositions, which are productive of the pathetic and the pleasant, in all their kinds. These latter compositions aspire not to the intellect; but being addressed to the imagination, the affections, and the sense, become, from their different heightenings, either rhetoric or poetry.
Nor need we necessarily view these arts distinctly and apart; we may observe, if we please, how perfectly they coincide. Grammar is equally requisite to every one of the rest: and though logic may, indeed, subsist without rhetoric or poetry, yet so necessary to these last is a sound and correct logic, that without it they are no better than warbling trifles.
Now all these inquiries, (as we have said already,) and such others arising from them as are of still sublimer contemplations
, (of which, in the sequel, there may be possibly not a few,) may with justice be deemed inquiries, both interesting and liberal.
" True and false are seen in composition and settled it, one to the hearers, to whom it division.” Composition makes affirmative explains something, and one to the things, truth, division makes negative ; yet both concerning which the speaker proposes to alike bring terms together, and so far, there- persuade his hearers ; with respect to the fore, may be called synthetical.
first relation, that which regards the hearers, d Ammonius, in his comment on the are employed poetry and rhetoric. Thus it treatise Nepl 'Epunvelas, p. 53, gives the becomes the business of these two, to select following extract from Theophrastus; which the most respectable words, and not those is here inserted at length, as well for the that are common, and of vulgar use, and excellence of the matter, as because it is to connect such words harmoniously one not (I believe) elsewhere extant.
with another ; so as through these things Διττής γαρ ούσης του λόγου σχέσεως, and their consequences, such as perspicnity, (xado a diápioer o pubgopos @ed pastos) delicacy, and the other forms of eloquence, της τε προς τους ακροωμένους, οίς και ση- together with copiousness and brevity, all μαίνει τι, και της προς τα πράγματα, υπέρ employed in their proper season, to lead the áy Néywv meira aporlontai tous åxpow- hearer, and strike him, and hold him vanμένους, περί μεν ούν την σχέσιν αυτού την quished by the power of persuasion. On προς τους ακροατές καταγίνονται ποιητική the contrary, as to the relation of speech to και ρητορική, διότι έργον αυταίς εκλέγεσθαι things, here the philosopher will be found τα σεμνότερα των ονομάτων, αλλά μη τα to have a principal employ, as well in Γοκοινά και δεδημευμένα, και ταυτα εναρμο- futing the false, as in demonstrating the νίως συμπλέκειν αλλήλοις, ώστε διά τού- true." των και των τούτοις επομένων, οίον σαφη- Sanctius speaks elegantly on the same νείας, γλυκύτητος, και των άλλων ιδεών, subject: Creavit Deus hominem rationis έτι τε μακρολογίας, και βραχυλογίας, κατά participem ; cui, quia sociabilem esse voluit, καιρόν πάντων παραλαμβανομένων, οίσαι magno pro munere dedit sermonem. Serimoni τε τον ακροατών, και εκπλήξαι. και προς autem perficiendo tres opifces adhibuit. την πείθω χειρωθέντα έχειν της δέ γε πρός Prima est grammatica, que ab oratione τα πράγματα του λόγου σχέσεως και φιλόσο- solecismos et barbarismos expellit; secunda φος προηγουμένως επιμελήσεται, τό τε dialectica, que in sermonis veritate verψεύδος διελέγχων, και το αληθές αποδεικ- satur; tertia rhetorica, que ornatum servús. “The relation of speech being two- monis tantum exquirit. Min. I. i. c. 2. fold, (as the philosopher Theophrastus hath