racter, when you compare it to the weakness and imperfection of your own. On the contrary, when these dark, these melancholy thoughts assail you, immediately turn your mind to the consideration of habit. Remember how easy its energies to those who possess it; and yet how impracticable to such as possess it not.

It must be owned, said I, that this is a satisfaction, and may be some kind of assistance in a melancholy hour. And yet this very doctrine naturally leads to another objection. Does not the difficulty of attaining habit too well support a certain assertion, that, defend virtue as we will, it is but a scheme of self-denial?

By self-denial, said he, you mean, I suppose, something like what follows: appetite bids me eat; reason bids me forbear. If I obey reason, I deny appetite; and appetite being a part of myself, to deny it, is a self-denial. What is true thus in luxury, is true also in other subjects; is evident in matters of lucre, of power, of resentment, or whatever else we pursue by the dictate of any passion.-You appear, said I, to have stated the objection justly.

To return then to our instance, said he, of luxury. Appetite bids me eat; reason bids me forbear. If I obey reason, I deny appetite; and if I obey appetite, do I not deny reason? Can I act either way, without rejecting one of them? And is not reason a part of myself, as notoriously as appetite?

Or to take another example: I have a deposit in my hands. Avarice bids me retain; conscience bids me restore. Is there not a reciprocal denial, let me obey which I will? And is not conscience a part of me, as truly as avarice?

Poor self indeed must be denied, take which party we will. But why should virtue be arraigned of thwarting it, more than vice her contrary? Make the most of the argument, it can come but to this: if self-denial be an objection to virtue, so is it to vice; if self-denial be no objection to vice, no more can it be to virtue. A wonderful and important conclusion indeed!

He continued, by saying, that the soul of man appeared not as a single faculty, but as compounded of many; that as these faculties were not always in perfect peace one with another, so there were few actions which we could perform, where they would be all found to concur. What then are we to do? Suspend till they agree? That were indeed impossible. Nothing therefore can remain, but to weigh well their several pretensions; to hear all that each has to offer in its behalf; and finally to pursue the dictates of the wisest and the best. This done, as for the self-denial, which we force upon the rest with regard to our own character, it is a matter of honour and praise; with regard to the faculties denied, it is a matter of as small weight, as to contemn the noise and clamours of a mad and senseless

mob, in deference to the sober voice of the worthier, better citizens. And what man could be justified, should he reject these, and prefer a rabble?

XI. In this place he paused again, and I took occasion to acknowledge, that my objection appeared obviated. As the day advanced apace, he advised that we might return home; and walking along leisurely, thus resumed to himself the dis

course.

I dare say, continued he, you have seen many a wise head shake, in pronouncing that sad truth, How we are governed all by interest. And what do they think should govern us else? Our loss, our damage, our disinterest? Ridiculous, indeed! We should be idiots in such case, more than rational animals. The only question is, where interest truly lies? For if this once be well adjusted, no maxim can be more harmless.

“I find myself existing upon a little spot, surrounded every way by an immense unknown expansion. Where am I? What sort of place do I inhabit? Is it exactly accommodated, in every instance, to my convenience? Is there no excess of cold, none of heat, to offend me? Am I never annoyed by animals, either of my own kind, or a different? Is every thing subservient to me, as though I had ordered all myself? No, nothing like it; the furthest from it possible. The world appears not then originally made for the private convenience of me alone? It does not. But is it not possible so to accommodate it, by my own particular industry? If to accommodate man and beast, heaven and earth; if this be beyond me, it is not possible. What consequence then follows? Or can there be any other than this? If I seek an interest of my own, detached from that of others; I seek an interest which is chimerical, and can never have existence.

"How then must I determine? Have I no interest at all? If I have not, I am a fool for staying here. It is a smoky house, and the sooner out of it, the better. But why no interest? Can I be contented with none, but one separate and detached? Is a social interest joined with others such an absurdity, as not to be admitted? The bee, the beaver, and the tribes of herding

• See of the Dialogue, pages 90 and 105. See also notes s and q

» Καπνός ἐστι· ἀπέρχομαι. M. Ant. l. v. c. 29. See Arr. Epict. 1. i. c. 25. p. 129.

4 As the Stoics, above all philosophers, opposed a lazy inactive life, so they were perpetually recommending a proper regard to the public, and encouraging the practice of every social duty. And though they made the original spring of every particular man's action, to be self-love, and the prospect of private interest; yet so intimately united did they esteem this private interest with the public, that they held it impossible to promote the former, and not at the

same time promote the latter. Τοιαύτην φύσιν τοῦ λογικοῦ ζώου κατεσκεύασεν, ἵνα μηδενὸς τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθὼν δύνηται τυγ χάνειν, εἰ μή τι εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ὠφέλιμον προσφέρηται· οὕτως ουκέτι ἀκοινώνητον γίνεται, τὸ πάντα αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιεῖν. "God hath so framed the nature of the rational animal, that it should not be able to obtain any private goods, if it contribute not withal something profitable to the community. Thus is there no longer any thing unsocial, in doing all things for the sake of self." Arr. Epict. 1. i. c. 19. p. 106. The Peripatetic doctrine was much the same. Πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ

animals, are enough to convince me, that the thing is, somewhere at least, possible. How then am I assured, that it is not equally true of man? Admit it; and what follows? If so, then honour and justice are my interest; then the whole train of moral virtues are my interest; without some portion of which, not even thieves can maintain society."

"But further still; I stop not here, I pursue this social interest as far as I can trace my several relations. I pass from my own stock, my own neighbourhood, my own nation, to the whole race of mankind, as dispersed throughout the earth. Am I not related to them all by the mutual aids of commerce, by the general intercourse of arts and letters, by that common nature of which we all participate? Again, I must have food and clothing. Without a proper genial warmth, I instantly perish. Am I not related, in this view, to the very earth itself? To the distant sun, from whose beams I derive vigour? to that stupendous course and order of the infinite host of heaven, by which the times and seasons ever uniformly pass on? Were this order once confounded, I could not probably survive a moment; so absolutely do I depend on this common general welfare. "What then have I to do, but to enlarge virtue into piety?t

καλὸν, καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, κοινῇ τ ̓ ἂν παντὶ εἴη τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι· ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν, δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει: “ Were all to aim jointly at the fair principle of honour, and ever strive to act what is fairest and most laudable, there would be to every one in common whatever was wanting, and to each man in particular of all goods the greatest, if virtue deserve justly to be so esteemed. So that the good man is necessarily a friend to self: for by doing what is laudable, he will always himself be profited, as well as at the same time be beneficial to others." Ethic. Nicom. 1. ix. c. 8.

r Thus Cicero, after having supposed a social common interest to be the natural interest of man, subjoins immediately, Quod si ita est, una continemur omnes et eadem lege naturæ. Idque ipsum si ita est, certe violare alterum lege naturæ prohibemur. De Offic. 1. iii. c. 6.

ἐστιν ἡ κοινωνία. Ὅτι γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον συνέχει τὴν κοινωνίαν, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδικωτάτων εἶναι δοκούντων· οὗτοι δέ εἰσιν οἱ λησταί· οἷς ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία ὑπὸ δικαιοσύνης σώζεται τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Διά τε γὰρ τὸ μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀλλήλους, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ ψεύδεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τιμᾶν τὸ κρεῖττον δοκοῦν, καὶ τὸ τὰ συγκείμενα φυλάττειν, καὶ διὰ τὸ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀσθενεστέροις, διὰ ταῦτα ἡ πρὸς ἀλλή λους αὐτοῖς κοινωνία συμμένει· ὧν πᾶν τοὐναντίον εἰς οὓς ἀδικοῦσι ποιοῦσιν. “ It is necessary, society being natural, that justice should be natural also, by which society exists. For that justice holds society together, is evident in those who appear all the most unjust; such, I mean, as robbers or banditti, whose society with each other is preserved by their justice to each other. For by not aspiring to any unequal shares, and by never falsifying, and by submitting to what appears expedient, and by justly guarding the booty amassed together, and by assisting their weaker companions, by these things it is that their society subsists; the contrary to all which they do by those whom they injure." Alex. Aphrod. repl vx. p. 156. edit. Ald. See also Plat. de Repub. 1. i. p. 351. vol. xi. edit. Serrani.

All manner of events, which any way affect a man, arise either from within himself, or from causes independent. In the former case, he maintains an active part ; in the latter, a passive. The active part of

Not only honour and justice, and what I owe to man, is my interest; but gratitude also, acquiescence, resignation, adoration, and all I owe to this great polity, and its greater Governor, our common Parent.

"But if all these moral and divine habits be my interest, I need not surely seek for a better. I have an interest compatible with the spot on which I live: I have an interest which may exist, without altering the plan of Providence; without mending or marring the general order of events." I can bear whatever happens with manlike magnanimity; can be contented, and fully happy in the good which I possess; and can pass through this turbid, this fickle, fleeting period, without bewailings, or envyings, or murmurings, or complaints."

And thus, my friend, have you my sentiments, as it were, abridged; my sentiments on that subject which engages every one of us. For who would be unhappy? Who would not, if he

his character seens chiefly to be the care of virtue, for it is virtue which teaches us what we are to act or do; the passive part seems to belong more immediately to piety, because by this we are enabled to resign and acquiesce, and bear with a manly calmness whatever befalls us. As therefore we are framed by nature both to act and to suffer, and are placed in a universe where we are perpetually compelled to both; neither virtue nor piety is of itself sufficient, but to pass becomingly through life, we should participate of each.

Such appears to have been the sentiment of the wise and good emperor. Avkev ὅλον ἑαυτὸν, δικαιοσύνῃ μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑφ ̓ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργοῦμενα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ovußaivovoi, Tỷ tŵv öλwv púσel. Tí d' ἐρεῖ τις, ἢ ὑπολήψεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἡ πράξει κατ ̓ αὐτοῦ, οὐδ ̓ εἰς νοῦν βάλλεται, δύο τούτοις ἀρκούμενος, αὐτὸς δικαιοπραγεῖν τὸ νῦν πρασσόμενον, καὶ φιλεῖν τὸ νῦν ἀπονεμόμενον ἑαυτῷ: “He (the perfect man) commits himself wholly to justice, and the universal nature; to justice, as to those things which are done by himself; and in all other events, to the nature of the whole. What any one will say, or think about him, or act against him, he doth not so much as take into consideration; contented and abundantly satisfied with these two things, himself to do justly what is at this instant doing, and to approve and love what is at this instant allotted him. M. Anton. 1. x. s. 11. Пávтa èkeîva, p' & διὰ περιόδου εὔχῃ ἐλθεῖν, ἤδη ἐχεῖν δύνασαι, ἐὰν μὴ σαυτῷ φθονῇς· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν, ἐὰν πᾶν τὸ παρελθὸν καταλίπῃς, καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐπιτρέψῃς τῇ προνοίᾳ, καὶ τὸ παρὸν μόνον ἀπευθύνῃς πρὸς ὁσιότητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην ὁσιότητα μὲν, ἵνα φιλῇς τὸ ἀπονεμόμενον· σοὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἡ φύσις ἔφερε, καὶ σὲ τούτῳ

δικαιοσύνην δὲ, ἵνα ἐλευθέρως καὶ χωρὶς περιπλοκῆς λέγῃς τε τ ̓ ἀληθῆ, καὶ πράσσῃς τὰ κατὰ νόμον καὶ κατ ̓ ἀξίαν: “ All those things, at which thou wishest to arrive by a road round about, thou mayst instantly possess, if thou dost not grudge them to thyself; that is to say, in other words, if every thing past thou entirely quit, if the future thou trust to Providence, and the present alone thou adjust according to piety and justice; according to piety, that so thou mayst approve and love what is allotted, (for whatever it be, it was nature brought it to thee, and thee to it ;) according to justice, that so thou mayst generously and without disguise both speak the truth, and act what is consonant to the general] law, and the real value of things." M. Ant. l. xii. c. 1. See also l. vii. c. 54 ; and Plato's Gorgias, p. 507. vol. i. edit. Serr. καὶ μὴν ὅγε σώφρον, κ. τ. λ.

« Παιδεύεσθαι τουτέστι τὸ μανθάνειν ἕκαστα οὕτω θέλειν, ὡς, &c. "To be instructed; that is to say, to learn so to will all things, as in fact they happen. And how do they happen? As He, who ordains them, hath ordained. Now he hath ordained that there should be summer and winter, and plenty and famine, and virtue and vice, and all manner of contrarieties, for the harmony of the whole; and to each of us hath he given a body, and its members, and a fortune, and certain associates. Mindful therefore of this order, ought we to come for instruction; not indeed how we may alter what is already established, (for that neither is permitted us, nor would it be better so to be, but how, while things continue around us, just as they are, and as it is their nature, we may still preserve our judgment in harmony with all that hap pens.” Arr. Epict. 1. i. c. 12. p. 74.

knew how, enjoy one perpetual felicity? Who are there existing, who do not at every instant seek it? It is the wish, the employ, not of the rational man only, but of the sot, the glutton, the very lowest of our kind. For my own system, whether a just one, you may now examine, if you think proper. I can only say on its behalf, if it happen to be erroneous, it is a grateful error, which I cherish and am fond of. And yet if really such, I shall never deem it so sacred, as not willingly, upon conviction, to resign it up to truth.

Little passed after this, worth relating. We had not far to walk, and we fell into common topics. Yet one observation of his I must not omit: it was what follows. When we are once, said he, well habituated to this chief, this moral science, then logic and physics become two profitable adjuncts: logic, to secure to us the possession of our opinions; that, if an adversary attack, we may not basely give them up: physics, to explain the reason and economy of natural events, that we may know something of that universe where our dwelling has been appointed us. But let me add a saying, (and may its remembrance never escape you :) While you find this great, this master-science wanting, value logic but as sophistry, and physics but as raree-show; for both, assure yourself, will be found nothing better.

It was soon after this that our walk ended. With it ended a conversation which had long engaged us; and which, according to my promise, I have here endeavoured to transcribe.

* Ταύτης (sc. εὐδαιμονίας) γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντες πάντα πράττομεν. "It is for the sake of happiness, we all of us do all other things whatever." Ethic. Nicom. 1. i. c. 12. sub. fin. See before, of the Dialogue, pages 90 and 105; and notes s and q. Plat. Protag. p. 358. vol. i. edit. Serr.

* Εἰ δὲ ἐξαπατηθέντα τινὰ ἔδει μαθεῖν, ὅτι τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπροαιρέτων οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς huâs, ¿yw μèv hleλov tηv åtátηY TAUTηy, ἐξ ἧς ἤμελλον ευρέως καὶ ἀταράχως βιώσedbal. "Were a man to be deceived, in having learned concerning externals, that all beyond our power was to us as nothing; I, for my own part, would desire a deceit, which would enable me for the future to live

tranquil and undisturbed.” Arr. Εpict. 1. i. c. 4. p. 27.

Ad easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, dialecticam etiam adjungunt et physicam, easque ambas virtutum nomine adpellant: alteram, quod habeat rationem ne cui falso adsentiamur, neve, &c. Cic. de Fin. l. iii. c. 21. p. 265.

The threefold division of philosophy into ethics, physics, and logic, was commonly received by most sects of philosophers. See Laert. 1. vii. c. 39. See also Cicero, in his treatise de Legibus, 1. i. c. 23. and in his Accademics, 1. i. c. 5. Fuit ergo jam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex, &c. Plutarch de Placit. Philos. p. 874.