position of the United States, they have been at least unimpaired in their efficiency and significance. Relatively speaking, the first of the three, that dealing with the recognition of only such states or governments as are founded upon the will of the people, has undergone the greatest change, and has been, of the three, the most disputed. Whereas at the close of the eighteenth century it stood foremost in the minds of American statesmen, and in the opinion of the public, especially especially in connection with the struggles for freedom waged by the various SpanishAmerican colonies on both continents, - and to a considerable extent formed the substance of political agitation, it now occupies only the modest place to which diplomacy and the political thought of a mighty and firmly established nation have relegated it. Quite recently, however, it has come vigorously to life, and, during President Wilson's administration, it has made a deep moral impression. General Huerta can testify most eloquently to that! In sharp contrast we find the second principle-relatively the least changed of the three-thrusting its granite foundations in the path of all invitations to enter into alliances. It forms a protecting bulwark against the real and imaginary dangers which menace the Union from abroad, and especially against the threat 'to entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice.' In the interest of the American people, one can only hope that the veil which just now seems to cloud the historical memory of its leading statesmen will soon be lifted. One can only hope that before it be too late the American people will again grasp the full significance of, and will place the correct interpretation upon, this warn1 Washington's Farewell Address of September 17, 1796.

ing, which Washington wrote in conspicuous and impressive letters above the gateway of American diplomacy.

Because it has remained untouched by the evolutions and changes wrought by time, and because of its rigid conservatism, this principle of avoidingalliances distinguishes itself preeminently from the Monroe Doctrine. Of the three guiding principles, the latter has had the most eventful existence, and has exercised the strongest positive effect effect upon the development of the foreign policy of the United States. Were it not that one would, in some aspects, be doing the Monroe Doctrine an injustice in so characterizing it, superficially at least, one could most strikingly compare it to a will-o'-the-wisp. It is not a will-o'-the-wisp in so far as it affects American diplomats, since it is at their behest that the Monroe Doctrine flits hither and thither; and yet, to the rest of the world of nations, it remains none the less a will-o'-the-wisp. This similarity to a will-o'-the-wisp is in fact its most salient characteristic, and is unquestionably the secret of its practical efficiency and beneficial effect upon the policies of the United States. It will retain this characteristic until it has discovered the true boundaries of the territory it embraces. Champions of the idea of defining the Monroe Doctrine are constantly springing up, and attempts are constantly being made to bring Congress to take action to this end. So far, there is not the slightest indication that the thing will ever be accomplished. The general conviction exists that when the Monroe Doctrine has been defined, its value will be extinguished; this fact, combined with the impossibility of framing a correct and comprehensive formula, and yet one which will not be too uncertain, forms the greatest stumbling-block to the accomplishment of this aim.

On the other hand, the lack of an au

thentic and correct interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine lies at the root of the preponderance of false statements as to its scope, object, and contents which one constantly hears and reads, - misrepresentations often far-reaching, of which the American press and American public opinion are quite as much the victims as are those of European countries. One result of these errors may be seen in the bitter arguments which have arisen as to whether, in the event of an invasion of Canada by Germany, in the course of the present war, the United States, in pursuance of the Monroe Doctrine, would be obliged to oppose such a movement. In the solution of this problem, the question was raised whether sending Canadian troops to the European theatre of war did not militate against the Monroe Doctrine. Technically, the Monroe Doctrine does not have the remotest bearing on either point. This should be evident after the outcome of the wellknown complication as to the Venezuelan debts. Ex-President Taft decided quite rightly, as to the former question, that the Monroe Doctrine would be in no way involved by a German attack upon Canada.

When one comes to discuss the correct scope of the Monroe Doctrine, one cannot pass by without observing that more mistakes occur in this respect in the United States than in Europe. The tendency to stretch this principle, so generally popular in the United States; to use it as a shield against actual and imaginary dangers threatening from abroad, even if it neither applies nor assists, is but the too natural outcome of the sharply defined American patriotism. There is a great measure of truth in the words of one of the ablest and most discriminating American antagonists of the Monroe Doctrine, Hiram Bingham, who recently wrote, 'I believe that... these two words,

"Monroe Doctrine," have come to be used by us in place of two other words that are less interesting and less significant, namely, "foreign policy." Our foreign policy is the Monroe Doctrine. Whatever our foreign policy happens to be for the moment is called the Monroe Doctrine.' 1

Quite the opposite construction is applied by the rest of the world. At the present time they accept it in a spirit of cold aloofness. The result is that, abroad, efforts are made to restrict its scope as far as possible; and since its scope is actually but a very limited one, Europe, on the whole, comes closer to a true interpretation than does the United States.

I should be loath to have the foregoing statement so understood as to convey the idea that to my mind the whole world is, without exception, hostile to the Monroe Doctrine. In so far as it affects Europe, naturally one will find but few true enthusiasts to champion it, although in England, during recent times, persons in high office have repeatedly spoken in the friendliest terms of the Monroe Doctrine. Their utterances have been eagerly transmitted to America and there believed. None the less, one should mistrust them; no Englishman can favor the Monroe Doctrine. Any such affection would be unnatural, and analogous to a child's love of the rod, or to the pseudofraternal enthusiasm of democratic France for Russia the absolute. More fully to grasp this fact, it is only necessary to remember that, with the exception of the intervention of Napoleon III in Mexico, and the episode of Magdalena Bay, every blow that the United States has struck with the aid of the Monroe Doctrine has been dealt to

1 For an able statement of the case against the Monroe Doctrine, see Professor Bingham's "The Monroe Doctrine: An Obsolete Shibboleth," in the Atlantic for June, 1913.- THE EDITORS.

England, and put up with by her. One can hardly fail to make the interesting observation that this doctrine, in the origin of which England took such an active part, is the strongest weapon of which the United States disposes in the long-protracted, and by no means concluded contest which she and England are waging for supremacy in America. A certain reticence and aloofness in the attitude of official Europe toward the Monroe Doctrine, 'a watchful waiting, mixed with a certain amount of mistrust,' should in no way surprise an unbiased observer when applied to a doctrine which in itself is a challenge to European statesmanship. In connection with this point, it should be noted that the feeling of general hostility to the Monroe Doctrine throughout Europe gathered force but very slowly until the outbreak of the present war. Even now, the sentiment of Europe is far more favorable to it than is that of the states of Central and South America, for whose protection it was originated.

-

In so far as Germany is particularly affected, it should be stated that recently, under the influence of the everincreasing relations between the two countries, at the moment, alas, so wantonly threatened, and because of a growing mutual comprehension, there has been a daily increasing number of persons who recognize the tre mendous value which the Monroe Doctrine possesses for the purposes of the United States. In it they see the master-key to the political power of that country; they envy her the theory, and they have formed their ideas as to its significance in connection with the minimizing of possible bones of contention between the members of the family of nations.

To be sure, now and again in Germany, as in all countries, even in the

United States, one reads and hears attacks upon the Monroe Doctrine. To draw conclusions from them as to the public opinion of Europe as a whole, and more especially of Germany, would be an anticipatory and unpardonable generalization of the sort for which the American press has such a deplorable weakness. This has been very clearly demonstrated over and over again by the present war; and no better example can be found if this slight digression be permissible than the continued tearing to pieces of Bernhardi's book as an instance of the 'German spirit.' Figures will show that this work is almost unknown in Germany, and is much less widely read there than in America. The theories set forth are energetically denied by the German spirit, to which they stand in absolute opposition. In no way do they coincide with the teachings which are promulgated and supported by, and under the auspices of, Kaiser William II.

As a result of my personal and very minute observations as to German sentiment in regard to the Monroe Doctrine, I can emphasize most strongly the fact that there is not the slightest indication of any actual hostility. Even at the present time the impression produced by sundry reports in connection with the anti-German inclination of certain parties in the United States has in no way altered the general feeling.

Should one wish to generalize superficially concerning public opinion, it would be necessary to give a certain predominance to fear and to surprise. One must point out 'the dread of the will-o'-the-wisp'; and even this dread of the Monroe Doctrine is traceable to its course and historical development. It is easily accounted for, since, until now, almost every expansion of this doctrine has found its inception in a concrete example, - quasi post factum.

It is not as if this newly applicable aspect of the Monroe Doctrine were unexpected, or had sprung into prominence while the world was unprepared, like the outgrowth of some political phase. One can, by looking back, point out quite clearly each new incident of its inception and development; one can note how the new thought originated and grew to maturity, until, at last, it stood out as a definite attitude, finding its expression in a concrete example. Even the Monroe message of 1823 did not, like Pallas Athene, spring suddenly, full grown and fully armed, from the head of Zeus; it was rather the outcome of a long series of separate, and yet consecutive, historical theories. It is, however, characteristic, that it was not primarily enunciated, and subsequently applied to isolated incidents, but—and thereby it can be distinguished from a legal axiom had its origin in its application to incidents. One must admit that, as its origin was justifiable, so is its continuation. The normal result is that, even for him who has devoted much careful study to the Doctrine, it is impossible, at any given time, to state its future scope concisely, clearly, and comprehensively. Any one attempting this must produce his representation in the garb of the present, yet with the superscription, 'Future Tendencies.' This holds particularly true in the immediate present. Beyond question, the Monroe Doctrine is now passing through a period of transition, and passing through it so entirely and comprehensively that no equivalent precedent can be found.

Denmark. The intervention of the United States in Cuban affairs has certainly cleared the road for the realization of this conception of AmericanEuropean relations. In those hundred days of war, the United States transgressed the law imposed upon her by her own Monroe Doctrine not to interfere with such foreign colonies as still existed in America. Without question, the American political conscience has fully conceived that there is no room for non-American colonies in the American hemisphere. Furthermore, all powers are warned, not only that they may, in the future, acquire no new territory, but that they must relinquish any possessions they have previously held, and still control, in America. Even so, this theory has never been logically and simply formulated; it still sleeps the untroubled sleep of the embryo. And yet from time to time there are indications of incipient life. Instinctively, we call to mind Champ Clark's memorable utterance of February 14, 1911, in which he expressed the wish that he might live to see the day when the American flag should float over the American continent from the North Pole to the Equator.

Be that as it may, this question is not one for our solution; the future will vouchsafe an answer; and the date of that future is unascertained.

On the other hand, one may unhesitatingly state that the Monroe Doctrine, at this moment, is passing through a stage of acute transition and evolution.

I. The Monroe Doctrine in the immediate present is engrossed by the idea of absorbing, controlling, and commercially restricting non-American states. The inception of this theory dates back to the administration of President Grant. The episode of Magdalena Bay, when Japan for the first

time came in contact with the Monroe Doctrine, demonstrated the fact that, under certain conditions, this doctrine could be made to apply to, and to restrict, private business relations with America. The well-known Lodge Resolution clearly formulated this theory; and under President Wilson's administration it has been widely extended. Judging from first appearances, President Wilson, in his departure from the Taft-Knox dollar-diplomacy, which incorporated this standard, was disposed to oppose the natural development of the Monroe Doctrine. In his speech delivered in Mobile on October 28, 1913, and in his first Annual Message, in which he spoke of his oil-concession policy, he has proved the contrary. President Wilson contended that the grant of oil concessions to foreign promoters, through the agency of the weaker American states, was a menace to the Monroe Doctrine and upheld a principle antagonistic thereto. He thereby added weight and scope to various still questionable conceptions dealing with restrictions of foreign trade in America.

It becomes self-evident, without further discussion, that the 'Wilson Doctrine' contains the power and the initiative to restrict without discrimination all trade between foreign nations and America. Basing her arguments on the same assumption of right - namely, the Monroe Doctrine-by which she opposes and denies the grants of oil concessions through Mexico, Columbia, Nicaragua, or Ecuador, the United States can raise the same objections to beneficial contracts entered into between Americans and citizens of foreign countries. She can — to use another example - veto any or all Asiatic or European immigration into Central or South America. And here we are brought face to face with another contingency, the only one,

indeed, which might eventually cause the Monroe Doctrine to militate against German interests. Germany has never yet made a serious attempt to establish colonies in America. The agitation of 1870, when it was claimed that she intended to acquire Porto Rico from Spain, was newspaper talk pure and simple; and the representations against such action which Mr. Cushing made in Madrid at that time were as unnecessary as they were groundless. Sticklers might call attention to the only other exception: in the year 1901, Germany made overtures for the purchase from Venezuela of the island of Marguerita in market-overt, — if the term is applicable, but abandoned the plan immediately upon the expressed opposition of the United States. On closer examination it will be found that this was hardly a colonization project. It was an enterprise actuated solely by the desire not to see a naval supremacy established without, to a moderate degree, following in the course arbitrarily imposed upon us. By her policy of naval supremacy, England continued to establish a cordon of naval bases around the whole world. The heroic fate of the German cruisers on the high seas in the present war has demonstrated to every unprejudiced observer the justice of Germany's attempt.

In view of what has been said, the expectation should by no means be expressed that the commercial element of the Monroe Doctrine will cause friction between the United States and Germany. Such a contingency can arise only in the course of relations with England, whose every transaction has been actuated by underlying motives, and who, up to the present, has always

1 It seems appropriate here to point out that the following islands, and groups of islands, are at the present moment in English possession: the Bay Islands, Galapagos Islands, Falkland Islands, Corn Islands, Tortuga, Trinidad, and Tiger Island.—THE AUTHOR.