Congress and Defense Spending: The Distributive Politics of Military ProcurementUniversity of Oklahoma Press, 2002 - 200 pages Since World War II, the U.S. government has spent more than $10 trillion on defense. Although everyone in the United States must pay taxes supporting defense contracts, ten states have obtained 75 percent of all defense contracts and expenditures. In Congress and Defense Spending , Barry S. Rundquist and Thomas M. Carsey examine how the distribution of defense contracts is influenced by the interaction of state and local economies with the organization of Congress and how previous state representation on defense committees has affected current committee representation. |
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