It does not seem to have entered the minds of either side that a good infantry force can take care of itself and repulse anywhere an equal or greater number of cavalry, and there are everywhere positions where cavalry would be at a disadvantage. Having called on Governor and Captain-General Blanco and received his courteous call in return, I could not with propriety seek communication with insurgents. I had plenty of safe offers of safe conduct to Gomez's camp, and was told that if I would write him, an answer would be returned safely within ten days at most. I saw several who had visited the insurgent camps, and was sought out by an insurgent field officer, who gave me the best information received as to the insurgent force. His statements were moderate, and I was credibly informed that he was entirely reliable. He claimed that the Cubans had about 30,000 men now in the field, some in every province, but mostly in the two eastern provinces and eastern Santa Clara, and this statement was corroborated from other good sources. They have a force all the time in Habana Province itself, organized in four small brigades and operating in small bands. Ruiz was taken, tried, and shot within about a mile and a half of the railroad and about fifteen miles out of Habana, on the road to Matanzas, a road more traveled than any other, and which I went over four times. Arranguren was killed about three miles the other side of the road and about the same distance, fifteen or twenty miles, from Habana. They were well armed, but very poorly supplied with ammunition. They are not allowed to carry many cartridges; sometimes not more than one or two. The infantry, especially, are poorly clad. Two small squads of prisoners which I saw, however, one of half a dozen in the streets of Habana, and one of three on the cars, wore better clothes than the average Spanish soldier. Each of these prisoners, though surrounded by guards, was bound by the arm and wrists by cords, and they were all tied together by a cord running along the line, a specimen of the amenities of their warfare. About one-third of the Cuban army are colored, mostly in the infantry, as the cavalry furnished their own horses. This field officer, an American from a Southern State, spoke in the highest terms of the conduct of these colored soldiers; that they were as good fighters and had more endurance than the whites; could keep up with the cavalry on a long march and come in fresh at night. The Political Situation The dividing lines between parties are the most straight and clear cut that have ever come to my knowledge. The division in our war was by no means so clearly defined. It is Cuban against Spaniard. It is practically the entire Cuban population on one side and the Spanish army and Spanish citizens on the other. I do not count the autonomists in this division, as they are so far too inconsiderable in numbers to be worth mentioning. General Blanco filled the civil offices with men who had been autonomists and were still classed as such. But the march of events had satisfied most of them that the chance for autonomy came too late. It falls as talk of compromise would have fallen the last year or two of our war. If it succeeds, it can only be by armed force, by the triumph of the Spanish army, and the success of Spanish arms would be easier by Weyler's policy and method, for in that the Spanish army and people believe. There is no doubt that General Blanco is acting in entire good faith; that he desires to give the Cubans a fair measure of autonomy, as Campos did at the close of the ten-year war. He has, of course, a few personal followers, but the army and Spanish citizens do not want genuine autonomy, for that means government by the Cuban people. And it is not strange that the Cubans say it comes too late. I have never had any communication, direct or indirect, with the Cuban Junta in this country or any of its members, nor did I have with any of the juntas which exist in every city and large town of Cuba. None of the calls I made were upon parties of whose sympathies I had the least knowledge, except that I knew some of them were classed as autonomists. Most of my informants were business men, who had no sides and rarely expressed themselves. I had no means of guessing in advance what their answers would be, and was in most cases greatly surprised at their frankness. I inquired in regard to autonomy of men of wealth and men as prominent in business as any in the cities of Habana, Matanzas, and Sagua, bankers, merchants, lawyers, and autonomist officials, some of them Spanish born but Cuban bred, one prominent Englishman, several of them known as autonomists, and several of them telling me they were still believers in autonomy if practicable, but without exception they replied that it was "too late" for that. Some favored a United States protectorate, some annexation, some free Cuba; not one has been counted favoring the insurrection at first. They were business men and wanted peace, but said it was too late for peace under Spanish sovereignty. They characterized Weyler's order in far stronger terms than I can. I could not but conclude that you do not have to scratch an autonomist very deep to find a Cuban. There is soon to be an election, but every polling place must be inside a fortified town. Such elections ought to be safe for the "ins." I have endeavored to state in not intemperate mood what I saw and heard, and to make no argument thereon, but leave everyone to draw his own conclusions. To me the strongest appeal is not the barbarity practiced by Weyler nor the loss of the Maine, if our worst fears should prove true, terrible as are both of these incidents, but the spectacle of a million and a half of people, the entire native population of Cuba, struggling for freedom and deliverance from the worst misgovernment of which I ever had knowledge. But whether our action ought to be influenced by any one or all these things, and, if so, how far, is another question. I am not in favor of annexation; not because I would apprehend any particular trouble from it, but because it is not wise policy to take in any people of foreign tongue and training, and without any strong guiding American element. The fear that if free the people of Cuba would be revolutionary is not so well founded as has been supposed, and the conditions for good self-government are far more favorable. The large number of educated and patriotic men, the great sacrifices they have endured, the peaceable temperament of the people, whites and blacks, the wonderful prosperity that would surely come with peace and good home rule, the large influx of American and English immigration and money, would all be strong factors for stable institutions. But it is not my purpose at this time, nor do I consider it my province, to suggest any plan. I merely speak of the symptoms as I saw them, but do not undertake to prescribe. Such remedial steps as may be required may safely be left to an American President and the American people. F. H. SAWYER F. H. SAWYER was British consul in Manila and a resident there for some fourteen years. PROSPECTS IN THE PHILIPPINES The commercial prospects of the islands are great, even if we do not instantly take for gospel the fairy tales we are told about Manila becoming the centre of the trade of the Pacific. There can be no doubt that if peace and an honest administration can be secured, capital will be attracted and considerable increase in the export of hemp, tobacco, and sugar will gradually take place as fresh land can be cleared and planted. As I have elsewhere said, the Philippines in energetic and skillful hands will soon yield up the store of gold which the poor Spaniards have been so mercilessly abused for leaving behind them. But the Philippines are not and never will be a country for the poor white man. A white man cannot labour there without great danger to his health. He cannot compete with the native or Chinese mechanic, in fact he is not wanted there at all. For my part, I would never employ a white man there as a labourer or mechanic, if I could help it, more especially an Englishman or an American, for I know from experience what the result would be. As foreman or overseer a white man may be better, according to his skill and character. Now let me, as soon as possible, expose the absurdity of a mischievous letter, which I fear may already have done much harm, but I hope my warning may do something to counteract its effects. I quote from the Blue Book so often mentioned: pp. 330-1. SIR, MR. WILLIAMS to MR. DAY. U. S. S. BALTIMORE, MANILA BAY, If long occupation or possession on the part of our government be considered, I believe early and strenuous efforts should be made to bring here from the United States men and women of many occupations-mechanics, teachers, ministers, shipbuilders, merchants, electricians, plumbers, druggists, doctors, dentists, carriage and harness makers, stenographers, typewriters, photographers, tailors, blacksmiths, and agents for exporting, and to introduce American products, natural and artificial, of many classes. To all such I pledge every aid, and now is the time to start. Good government will be easier the greater the influx of Americans. My despatches have referred to our present percentage of export trade. If now our exports come here as interstate, duty free, we have practical control of Philippine trade, which now amounts to many millions, and because of ingrafting of American energy and methods upon the fabulous natural and productive wealth of these islands, can and probably will be multiplied by twenty during the coming twenty years. All this increment should come to our nation and not go to any other. I hope for an influx this year of 10,000 ambitious Americans, and all can live well, become enriched. I venture to say that the man who wrote this astonishing letter, taking upon himself the responsibility of advising "early and strenuous efforts" to send from the United States thousands of men and women of many occupations to Manila, and of assuring them that "all could live well and become enriched," knew nothing at all about the state of the Philippine Islands, and is a most unsafe guide. What on earth would all these tradespeople find to do in the islands? Where could they be housed? How could they be supported? If they came in numbers, the doctors and druggists might indeed find full employment prescribing and making up medicine for the many sufferers from tropical ailments, especially the typhoid fevers, that would attack the unacclimatised immigrants, and the ministers could earn their daily bread by reading the burial service, whilst the typewriters would be busy typing letters to friends at home announcing the deaths that occurred; and warning them against coming to starve in Manila. But |