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No. XXIII.

Extract of a Letter from Lord William Bentinck to Lord Viscount Castlereagh; dated Madrid, 14th November, 1808.-(One Enclosure.)

AS the reports herewith transmitted are numerous, and a part of their contents not applicable to the present state of affairs, I think it may be more satisfactory to your Lordship that the whole should be brought into one point of view.

To begin with the French army: two statements, taken from LieutenantColonel Doyle's letters, exhibit the gross amount; the other a return of the number that passed each day through Irun of the reinforcements that have arrived in Spain from the 1st October to the 4th November; these statements, marked No 1, make them to amount to 48,700 infantry, 7,840 cavalry, 850 artillery men, 84 cannon, and 509 ammunition waggons. On the 4th Buonaparte passed through, and has been since heard of at Vittoria ; the report of his being at Logrono I should think unfounded; with these troops, Marshals Victor, Lefevre, Savari, Palet, and 17 general officers have arrived.

Your Lordship will have heard of the attack made upon General Blake's army, and of that officer's retreat to Valmaseda; you will also probably have heard of the defeat of a considerale part of the Estramaduran division at Burgos, with the loss of the greater part of their cannon, and I am afraid a considerable number of men; this division, consisting of 12,000 or 14,000 men, was intended for the support of General Blake, and to keep up in some manner the communication between the armies of the left and centre. The defeat of this division is the more to be regretted, as it was in a much better state of equipment and order than the generality of the Spanish troops; the remains of this division, of which 5 or 6000 men are untouched, have retreated to Oranda. The French, as it would appear, have not advanced beyond Burgos.

By the paper marked No. 2, you will perceive that all in probability ere this time, a general action has been fought between the armies of General Castanos and Palafox and the French. By a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Doyle received last night, and forming one of his enclosures in his last letter, it appears that the junction of the army of Arragon, considered uncertain in Colonel Graham's letter, will have taken place; your Lordship will hear from Mr. Frere, that the command of the army of the centre has been taken from General Castanos and given to the Marquis de la Romana.

Major-General St. Juan has been appointed to collect the remains of the Estramaduran division; to these are to be added 5000 or 6000 men that marched from Madrid yesterday, and about 8000 men coming from the South; in the course of a fortnight or three weeks he will have under his command about 20,000 men. I have been much struck with the good sense, intelligence, and reasonableness of this officer, and his reputation stands very high; I had much conversation with him upon the present situation of things. He proposes to adopt the following plan of operations for his corps; if Castanos should beat the French, he presumes, as is most probable, that the French will retreat again across the Ebro, and the danger being thus for the moment averted, time may be had for the concentration and better disposition of our force; in this case he will advance to Burgos; but should the French beat Castanos, he is of opinion that the enemy will then advance; in that case he purposes to remain as long as possible at Aranda, without committing his force, and, if obliged to retire, he will take the road of Valladolid and join the English army; the plan seems to me in all respects judicious. In case your Lordship should receive no advices from Sir John Moore by the present occasion, you will be glad to receive the latest intelligence of the exact situation of the British army; the first division of General Hope's column coming from Badajoz, according to the present arrangement, will pass through Madrid on the 22d November, the nine other divisions in which this corps marches, will pass on the nine successive days; the route has been so settled by the Spanish officers sent to meet a British officer of the Quarter-master-general's Department.

Sir John Moore is at Salamanca, he writes me word in a letter tlated the 10th, that in six or seven days he should have assembled at Salamanca 15,000 infantry, and one brigade of artillery; he proposes not to move beyond Salamanca, until the army are united; how far the union of the army, and its future operations are likely to be effected by the movements of the French, I shall offer an opinion presently.

I must not disguise from your Lordship that I think very unfavourably of the affairs of Spain. I presume nobody doubts that Buonaparte will make a great push, that he will act with his accustomed vigour, in the hope of being able, by a series of victories, to subdue the Spanish spirit. It cannot be doubted but that he has come with a very large army. I should think it would be a low calculation to estimate his force at 100,000, of which at least 12,000 are cavalry. Blake's army is for the present hors du combat. The only immediate means of resistance consists in the army of Castanos and

Palafox. Against these, I think Bonaparte can bring superior numbers, and a very superior cavalry. This army is also in want of clothing, of money, and of provisions. Its spirit, however, is represented to be excellent, and Colonel Graham, in whose opinion I have great reliance, speaks very confidently of the event of a battle. If, however, it should happen that the French are victorious, it must be expected that the army will advance, and occupying Placentia and Valladolid, may endeavour to prevent the junction of our troops from Corunna, or of the army of General Blake with our main corps. I know not the proposed plan for the co-operation of the army of the left, but it is supposed that the Marquis de la Romana will direct General Blake to leave the mountains, and to join the nearest troops to the right. If the French allow this operation to be made, and that the British army united shall be enabled to form a junction with Generals Blake and St. Juan, there will be collected together a very formidable force, and capable of making head against the enemy. But should the British army either not be able to unite, or the junction of General Blake not take place, it seems hardly possible for Sir John Moore to resist the concentrated attack that will be made upon him. This case is the most probable one, in my judgment, and it seems important that every remedy against disasters, and every means of strengthening the British force, should be immediately adopted. With this view it is my intention to write to Sir Harry Burrard, stating the critical situation of affairs, and my opinion of the urgency of forwarding to the frontier all the British and Portuguese force that can be collected. Notwithstanding I think ill of the present moment, and that the Spaniards have not the means at present to repel the danger that threatens, still I have confidence in the unconquerable spirit of the nation. They want time, which unfortunately the activity of Bonaparte's movements will not allow them. But great as the success of the French may be, the Spaniards will be able again to assemble at the south of Madrid in every province, and in their mountains they will be able to carry the same destruc tive warfare which has once cleared Spain, much more unprovided with the means of annoyance than she is at present. But the early or distant period of success must always depend upon the extent of assistance in well disciplined infantry, and in cavalry in particular, which can be given by Great Britain.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letters of the 1st and 27th of October. That of the 1st October only reached me on the 4th November. I have submitted the question respecting the supply of oats and

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hay from England for Sir John Moore's opinion. I have directed Lieute nant-Colonel Doyle to go into Catalonia.

I have the honour to be,&c.

W. BENTINCK.

MY DEAR LORD,

Tudela, Head Quarters,

Castanos' Army, 9th November, 1808.

CAPTAIN WHITTINGHAM meant to have written to Lord Castlereagh by the General's courier to-day; but he has just sent me word that he is unable to move from a violent rheumatism, owing to his having got very wet the other day while oppressed with a bad cold. He desires me to inform you of this, and to let you know that the movement across the Ebro, which was determined on in the Council of War on the 5th instant, will not take place.

From all the information received, it appears to be the design of the enemy to come down in force on this side from Logrono, &c. and the General has determined to support the troops left at Carahorra, and to take up a position from thence with his left extending across the plain towards the mountains at Amido, with the remainder of the troops in a second line of cantonments, the right at Alfaro, and the left up towards Fetero. This sccond line, however, will be very incomplete, unless the Aragonese troops come over to fill it up.

The member of the Junta, Palafox, set out early yesterday morning to Exca, in consequence of the expectation of the movement across the Ebro taking place. On receiving this intelligence concerning the plans of the enemy, (rendered still more probable by the account the General received from Blake, of his being forced to retire,) an express was sent after Palafox, who is expected back here this morning.

It is hoped that his order to General O'Neil will induce him to march from Sanguessa without a moment's delay, and without waiting for any or ders from the Captain General of Aragon.

If this corps arrives in time, the army will be altogether about 50,000 men, and in a good position, with the mountains on their left, and rear, to retire into by Agreda and Seira, in case of defeat

The troops are now moving forward from this, and head quarters will

move to-morrow. I wish I may have it in my power to send you good

news soon.

Ever most truly your's, (Signed)

THOMAS GRAHAM.

No. XXIV.

Extract of a Letter from Major-General Lord William Bentinck, to the Right IIonourable Lord Viscount Castlereagh; dated Madrid, 21st November, 1808.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your three letters, dated the 2d of November.

I have little news to communicate. The Captain-General of Castile informed me to-day, that a party of 1000 infantry and 1,500 horse had approached the Somo Sierra, where General St. Juan, with 8,000 men, are posted. General St. Juan stated, that he could not answer for their not being the advanced guard of a larger force.-The head of General Hope's column arrived at the Escurial to-day. He assembles there all his infantry, to allow the cavalry in the rear divisions to precede the column; General Stewart, with the 18th, will enter Madrid on the 24th.-The march of this column becomes rather critical, as there is nothing whatever between it and the enemy. I cannot however think that the French will push on, as long as the army of the centre and of Aragon have not been beaten. We are in hourly expectation of hearing of the result of the attack that was to have been made upon the French in Navarre by Generals Castanos and Palafox. In case of the British army being obliged to retreat, I have communicated to Sir John Moore the wish of the Spanish Government, that he should fall back upon the centre of Spain, in preference to a movement either towards Gallicia or Portugal.

I shall set out on the 24th to join the army at Salamanca.

No. XXV.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore to Lord Viscount Castlereagh.

MY LORD,

Lisbon, 9th October, 1808.

I HAD the honour to receive on the evening of the 6th inst. your Lordship's letter of the 25th September, announcing to me that his Majesty

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