Cape Finisterre, or to follow you to the Tagus. You will of course feel it of the most pressing importance that your armament should proceed off the Tagus, not separating yourself from it, with the least possible delay. The artillery preparation which was ordered to be in readiness for the 1st July, with a view to another service, had been embarked with six additional ten inch mortars, and will sail from the river to-morrow. It will be directed to proceed immediately off the Tagus. Two additional battalions, at present cantoned in the vicinity of Cork, viz. the 36th and 45th, consisting of about 1200 men, have been ordered to embark, and to join your force, for the reception of which, and to prevent the troops already embarked from being too much crowded, 5000 tons of transports sailed this day from the Downs with a fair wind, as did also the 20th light dragoons from Portsmouth. I consider, therefore, every part of your equipment has been forwarded from hence, and I trust you will find the whole ready to proceed upon your arrival at Cork. But if the two last regiments should not have been actually embarked, you will not delay your departure, but will order them to follow you off the Tagus. 30,000 stand of arms, and an equal number of pikes, have been sent, which you will make such use of as the public service may appear to you to require. A supply of money has also been sent for the use of your troops. Any demands for military stores which you may receive from the provinces which have declared against France, you will send home, and it will be the earnest wish of his Majesty's Government to comply with them as far as circumstances will permit. With respect to money, 200,000. has been ordered to be sent to Ferrol for the immediate use of the Spaniards, till further arrangements can be made. It would much facilitate their financial operations if they could give circulation within Spain to a paper currency secured upon their South American treasures; this, together with a moderate duty upon imports, would furnish them with immediate resources; and in proportion as a currency of the nature alluded to could be thrown into circulation, it would have the effect of attaching the holders to the national cause.

I mention this subject that, in any communication you may have with the persons in authority, you may press it upon their attention.

Copy of a Letter from Sir Charles Cotton to the Honourable

[Enclosure.]

SIR,

W. Wellesley Pole.

[Most Secret.]

Hibernia, off the Tagus, 12th June, 1808.

I request you will acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that from every account I have been able to procure, there is not more than 4000 French troops in Lisbon, from whom the Spaniards are now completely separated, and against whom the populace are highly incensed; so that I feel it a duty to state to their Lordships my opinion, that five or six thousand British troops might effect a landing, gain possession of the forts on the banks of the Tagus, and by co-operating with his Majesty's fleet, give to our possession the whole of the maritime means now collected in the Tagus.

I further beg you will please to state to their Lordships, that having some hope a reinforcement may be on its way to Gibraltar, as stated in the dispatch contained in their Lordships' secret order to me of the 25th ultimo, I have placed the Blossom sloop off the Rock of Lisbon, to look out for the same; and, in the event of falling in with any expedition having troops, directed Captain Pigott to request the commander thereof to repair off the Tagus to confer with me: a measure I am induced to take from the critical state of affairs, and presuming the intelligence correct as stated in my letter to you of yesterday's date, respecting the fleet of Rear-Admiral Purvis being already in Cadiz.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To the Hon. William Wellesley Pole, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed)

C. COTTON.

No. VI.

Copy of a Letter from Lord Viscount Castlereagh to LieutenantGeneral Sir Arthur Wellesley.

[By Lord Burgherst.]

Downing Street, 15th July, 1808.

SIR, SINCE my dispatches to you of the 30th ultimo, marked Secret, Nos. 1 and 2, the inclosed intelligence has been received from Major-General Spencer, with respect to the state of the enemy's force in Portugal.

The number of French troops, immediately in the vicinity of Lisbon (so far as this information can be relied on), appearing much more considerable than it was before reported to be by Sir Charles Cotton, his Majesty has been pleased to direct a corps of 5000 men, consisting of the regiments stated in the margin,* to be embarked, and to proceed without loss of time to join you off the Tagus.

His Majesty has been further pleased to direct, that the troops under Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, which are arrived from the Baltic, so soon as they are refreshed, and their transports can be revictualled, should to also proceed without delay off the Tagus.

The motives which have induced the sending so large a force to that quarter are

1st. To provide effectually for an attack upon the Tagus; and,

2d. To have such an additional force, disposable, beyond what may be indispensably requisite for that operation, as may admit of a detachment being made to the southward, either with a view to secure Cadiz, if it should be threatened by the French force under General Dupont, or to cooperate with the Spanish troops in reducing that corps, if circumstances should favour such an operation, or any other that may be concerted.

His Majesty is pleased to direct, that the attack upon the Tagus should be considered as the first object to be attended to. As the whole force (of which a statement is inclosed), when assembled, will amount to not less than 30,000 men, it is conceived that both services may be amply provided for: the precise distribution as between Portugal and Andalusia, both as to time and proportion of force, must depend on circumstances, to be judged of on the spot; and should it be deemed adviseable to fulfil the assurance, which Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple appears to have given to the Supreme Junta of Seville, under the authority of my dispach of that it was his Majesty's intention to employ a corps of his troops to the amount of 10,000 men, to co-operate with the Spaniards in that quarter; a corps of this magnitude may, I should hope, be detached without prejudice to the main operation against the Tagus; and may be reinforced according to circumstances, after the Tagus has been secured. But if previous to the arrival of the force, under orders from England, Cadiz should be seriously threatened, it must rest with the Senior Officer off the Tagus, at his discretion, to detach, upon receiving a requisition to that effect, such an amount of force as may place this important place out of the reach of immediate danger, even though it should, for the time, suspend operations against the Tagus.

As the force which may be called for on the side of Cadiz can only require a field equipment, the ordnance preparation, which has been sent with a view to the reduction of the Tagus, will remain at that station.

With the exception of the ordnance preparation, sent for the attack of the forts on that river, it has not been deemed necessary to encumber the army, at present, with any larger detail of artillery than what belongs to a field equipment, with a proportion of horses.

Exclusive of the period for which the transports are provided, a due proportion of victuallers will accompany the armament, which, with the sup

plies which may be expected to be derived from the disposition and resources of the country, it is conceived, will remove all difficulty on this head, so long as the army shall continue to act near the coast.

The great delay and expence that would attend embarking, and sending from hence all those means which would be requisite to render the army completely moveable immediately on its landing, has determined his Majesty's Government to trust, in a great measure, to the resources of the country for these supplies.

There is every reason to believe, from the ardour of the inhabitants, both of Spain and Portugal, that so soon as a British army can establish itself on any part of the coast, not only numbers will be anxious to be armed and arrayed in support of the common cause, but that every species of supply, which the country produces, for subsisting and equipping an army will be procurable. It, therefore, becomes the first object for consideration (if a direct and immediate attack upon the defences of the Tagus cannot in prudence be attempted), on what part of the coast, between Penichè on the north, and St. Ubes on the south of that river, a position can be taken up by the British army, in which its intercourse with the interior may be securely opened, and from whence it may afterwards move against the enemy, endeavouring, if possible, not only to expel him from Lisbon, but to cut off his retreat towards Spain.

A proportion of cavalry, as far as the means of transport exist, will accompany the troops, which can be hereafter increased, according as circumstances shall point out.

I have, &c. (Signed)

CASTLEREAGH.

To Lieut.-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, K. B.

&c. &c. &c.

Copy of a Letter from Major-General Spencer to Lord Viscount

[Enclosure.]

MY LORD,

Castlereagh.

H. M. S. Hibernia, off Lisbon, 24th June, 1808.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, that on my arrival here this morning, in the Scout brig of war, having preceded the convoy, I immediately conferred with Sir Charles Cotton, on the present state of affairs in Portugal, and on the advisability of making an attempt on Lisbon, conformably to the Vice-Admiral's suggestion to that effect.