to the evidence of consciousness,'-if Descartes had simply said, that we can have no knowledge of any kind except by means of those feelings and ideas of which we are conscious; he would not indeed have made a very original and profound remark; but, however, he would have made a just one. But the peculiarity of Descartes's opinions on the subject of consciousness consists in supposing, that truth is not merely made known to us by means of consciousness, which would be a self-evident observation; but that it essentially and by definition depends upon this last, in such a manner as that whatever ideas we perceive with clearness and precision are necessarily true. This doctrine approaches, we are aware, very nearly to what may be called the leading article in the Philosophy of Dr. Reid: Mr. Stewart, however, is hasty in taking it for granted, that it is on this account admitted into the prevailing and accredited doctrines of the present day; and perhaps still more precipitate' in concluding that it is, for the same

reason, true.

6

Our author is also hardly correct in stating that the merit of having first noted the error of attempting to define words too simple to admit of analysis belongs unquestionably to Descartes rather than to Locke.' We can easily conceive, that both the one and the other may deserve the praise of having made this useful observation, but the praise of having made it first belongs in reality to neither. Andrew Cisalpine, a writer whose fame was by no means extinguished in the time of Descartes, in his book Peripateticorum questionum libri quinque,' on the subject of the Philosophia primi, lays down the canon here alluded to, in a very philosophical manner; and refers it, if we remember rightly, to Aristotle, who in the seventh book of his Metaphysics, more than once observes, that the nature of simple ideas is not to be discovered by reasoning and definition.*

in Mr. Stewart is also, we conceive, incorrect in stating that the We may n which Descartes pointed out between the primary and 'a doubting, knowing, affirming, though known to some of the affirms that he might have learned threce, was afterwards rejected rience of the laws and qualities of matterle's works Mr. Stewart it difficult, we apprehend, to make good his ass the following quothe hypothesis of innate ideas. It is true, a km the error which minds is not to be acquired by studying matte pen; for we author agrees with Descartes in thinking that we migh reality of covered the attributes of our minds, independently of, an physics ous to, the exercise of our external senses, he must have cartes. eye, we suspect, some theory of his own upon the subject. which we are not acquainted.

· ἕτερος We think it unnecessary to say more in excuse for not fe

That the immediate objects of our perceptions, as well as our perceptions themselves, do not really exist, is perhaps true; for these are affections and actions of the percipient; but that the substances which cause sensation in us, should not really exist, is impossible. For sensation does not come of itself into the mind, but there is something besides sensation which must necessarily exist previously to it. For that which causes motion must necessarily precede the motion that it communicates; nor is this the less true because these two are relative to each other.2* We can hardly believe that a writer who appears to have understood thus accurately the reasons upon which the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter is founded, should nevertheless have rejected the distinction itself in the unrestricted sense which the words of Mr. Stewart would lead us to suppose. One word more upon the subject of this famed distinction, and we have done.

Those who are familiar with the writings of Mr. Stewart will probably have observed that he entertains no very profound respect for the character of our English seats of learning; immoveably moored to the same station, to use his own ingenious illustration, by the strength of their cables and the weight of their anchors,' he seems to think them of no other use than to enable the historian of the human mind to measure the rapidity of the current by which the rest of the world are borne along. We certainly do not feel flattered by the opinion here expressed of the seminaries in which we received our education; but, however, we have no quarrel with Mr. Stewart on this score. Considering universities in the light in which he views them, as mere societies of learned men incorporated for the purpose of facilitating the progress of science and rearing a succession of professors and philosophers, we can easily conceive that he should see much to disapprove of, in institutions that are manifestly projected with a view to many other objects. But although Mr. Stewart is at liberty to think lowly of the usefulness of our universities, he ought still to speak of them with fairness; and not show a disposition to find fault upon imperfect evidence. On this account, we were sorry to observe that his prejudices should have made him so far forget the liberality which he displays upon most subjects, as the following passage seems to imply :—

'So slow,' says he, speaking of the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities, is the progress of good sense, when it has to struggle

*

το μεν ουν μητε τα αισθητα είναι, μητα τα αισθήματα, ίς ως αληθές του γερ αισθανούμενο πάθος τουτο εστι το δὲ τα υποκειμενα μη είναι ἡ ποιει την αισθησια, αδυνατον ου γαρ δη ή αισθησις αυτη εαυτης εστιν, αλλα εστι τι έτερον παρα την αισθησιν, ὁ αναγκη πρότερον είναι της αισθησεως το γαρ κινούν του κινουμένου, φύσει πρότερον εστι κανει λεγεται προς άλληλα ταυτα αυτα, ουδεν ήττον Met. lib.iv. c. v.

against the prejudices of the learned, that as lately as 1718, the paradox so clearly explained and refuted by Descartes, appears to have kept some footing in that University from which, about thirty years before, Mr. Locke had been expelled. In a paper of the Guardian, giving an account of a visit paid by Jack Lizard to his mother and sisters, after a year and a half's residence at Oxford, the following precis is given of his logical attainment. "For the first week (it is said) Jack dealt wholly in paradoxes. It was a common jest with him to pinch one of his sister's lap-dogs and afterwards prove he could not feel it. When the girls were sorting a set of knots, he would demonstrate to them that all the ribands were of the same colour; or rather, says Jack, of no colour at all. My Lady Lizard herself, though she was not a little pleased with her son's improvement, was one day almost angry with him; for having accidentally burnt her finger as she was lighting the lamp of her tea-pot, in the midst of her anguish, Jack laid hold of the opportunity to instruct her that there was no such thing as heat in the fire."-p. 97.

What the state of logical science may have been at the university of Oxford in the year 1718, we do not pretend to know, nor are we solicitous to inquire; but that a writer so much above the influence of vulgar feelings as the author before us generally is, should nevertheless, in a grave dissertation upon the progress of philosophy, venture to deduce any conclusion whatever upon the subject on such slight grounds as are here stated, has, we confess, made us also moralize upon the slow progress of good sense when it has to struggle with the prejudices of the learned.'

In the first place, the metaphysical opinions with which Jack Lizard amused his mother and sisters, are surely not given by Mr. Addison as a precis of the attainments to be made by those who were educated at the University of Oxford at the time when he was writing; and supposing them to be the only acquisitions which, after a year and a half's residence, Jack had obtained, this would only prove how little proficiency he must have made in the philosophy which he had been taught. For we think we may take upon ourselves to say, that neither Aristotle nor the schoolmen, nor any sect of philosophers as yet heard of, ever maintained that lap-dogs when pinched feel no pain. As to the young philosopher's belief that the colour was not in the riband, nor the heat in the fire, we apprehend it to be sound doctrine, and obviously borrowed more immediately from that writer whom, Mr. Stewart takes an opportunity of sarcastically observing, the University of Oxford had expelled thirty years before. As if the University of Oxford had any exclusive reason to blush for having yielded in common with the rest of the nation to the violence of an arbitrary ruler! The act itself was not the act of the University, but of James the Second, by whose express command, and

under the peremptory authority of whose written warrant, as Visiter of Christ-church, the expulsion took place. Whether James could legally insist upon compliance we are not sufficiently acquainted with the subject to decide. It is however evident, from the correspondence which took place, that the college unwillingly submitted as to a measure which it could not resist without obviously compromising the peace and safety of its members; and under such circumstances to designate Oxford, not by its proper name, nor by any epithet of civility, but, periphrastically, as the University which expelled Locke, is we really think neither candid nor

courteous.

The writers who next pass in review are Gassendi, Malebranche, and the author* of the Art de Penser. The criticisms which Mr. Stewart passes upon their writings are lively and elegant, and such as will probably conduce to render his essay more acceptable to the general reader than a graver view of his subject might have done. But his subject is, a review of the progress of Philosophy in Europe; and on this account, whatever pleasure we may have received from the characteristic observations which he extracts from the writings of his authors, and the literary anecdotes with which he intersperses his strictures, still we cannot help saying, that they take up room which might have been occupied by more appropriate matter. It is the absence of this of which we complain, and not the presence of the other. Those who have read the works of Malebranche and Gassendi will learn nothing more of their philosophy than they were previously acquainted with; and those who have not read them will find it difficult, we think, even to understand the exact scope of many of our author's observations. In saying this, we speak from experience of the fact: for we have read Melabranche and have not read Gassendi; and as our knowledge of the philosophical tenets of the former was in no respect increased, so neither was our ignorance of the writings of the latter at all removed, by the view which our author has taken of them. In the praise which he bestows upon the Recherche de la Vérité, we heartily acquiesce; with the exception, perhaps, of the Art de Penser, it is, we think, the best philosophical work in the French language, and, with the exception of the Essay upon the Human Understanding, at least equal to any metaphysical production that is to be found in ours. The arguments by which Malebranche endeavours to show that our knowledge of a material world is only occasional and intermediate, is founded, we think, upon a much more philosophical view of the subject than Berkeley's

The author of this admirable treatise is commonly supposed to be Anthony Arnauld, to whom our author ascribes it; we may, however, just notice that Baillet, in his Jugemens des Savans, vol. i. p. 52, imputes it to a person of the name of le Bon.

theory, to which it very nearly approaches; and although the arguments by which he supports his opinions are not put into so logical a shape and kept so close together as in the writings of the latter, yet Malebranche reasons much the more accurately of the two, and exhibits a much more comprehensive acquaintance with the real grounds of his argument. This, however, is a subject upon which we hope to have an opportunity of speaking more at large on a future occasion: Mr. Stewart promises us a sequel to the Dissertation now before us, in which the writings of Berkeley and Hume will probably occupy a prominent situation.

With the expectation of being shortly gratified by the fulfilment of this promise, we shall now bring our remarks to a close. We owe Mr. Stewart many thanks for the amusement which he has afforded us to make any apologies for the freedom which we have taken of differing from him in opinion on so many occasions, would be paying him a compliment, which, we are persuaded, he himself would think unnecessary.

ART. III.-The History of Java. By Thomas Stamford Raffles, Esq. late Lieut. Governor of that Island and its Dependencies, F. R. S. and A. S. &c. In two Volumes, with a Map and Plates. pp. 1072. London. 1817.

FEELINGS of regret have accompanied us through the perusal

of much the greater part of these two bulky volumes-that one of the finest islands in the world should, with so little ceremony as it would seem, have been consigned over to its former oppressors. Perhaps, however, on this point neither Governor Raffles nor ourselves will be admitted as competent judges; there may have been, and doubtless were, substantial reasons on general principles of policy for forcing on the Dutch the re-possession of an island, the loss of which was no immediate or positive evil to them.'

For many years' (it is Mr. Raffles who speaks) prior to the British expedition, Holland had derived little or no advantage from the nominal sovereignty which she continued to exercise over its internal affairs. All trade and intercourse between Java and Europe was interrupted and nearly destroyed; it added nothing to the commercial wealth or the naval means of the mother country; the control of the latter over the agents she employed had proportionally diminished; she continued to send out governors, counsellors, and commissioners, but she gained from their inquiries little information on the causes of her failure, and no aid from their exertions in improving her resources, or retarding the approach of ruin. The colony became a burden on the mother country instead of assisting her, and the company which had so long