SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. mon law jurisdiction;" and by $ 1910, with "the same jurisdiction in all cases under the Consti512 tution and laws of the United States, as is vested in the circuit and district courts of the United States," with a right of appeal to the supreme court of the territory; and by § 1871 it was provided that there should be but one clerk of each district court in the territory, appointed and designated by the presiding judge, as well as that "only such district clerk" should be entitled to a compensation from the United States. OCT. TERM, in cases to which they are not a party, in a The United States have no greater interest, court of the United States, than in a territorial court. The acts of Congress, regulating the fees to be received, the accounts to be rendered, and the compensation to be retained, by the clerks, are no more limited to cases or fees in which the United States are interested, in the district courts of the territories, than in the circuit and district courts of the United States. For these reasons, we are of opinion that the Congress then, in the exercise of its sover-parties in civil actions, and from the territory, fees received by the appellee from private eign and supreme power of legislation over the territories of the United States, had extended, in the clearest and fullest manner, to the clerks of the district courts of the territories, all the provisions of the statutes of the United States, establishing a fee bill, and restricting both the sums of the fees and emoluments to be received, and the maximum amount thereof to be retained, by the clerks of the courts of the United States held within a state; and it had expressly disapproved all laws of the territory of Utah, inconsistent with the legislation of Congress. Among the provisions of the act of 1853, and of U. S. Rev. Stat. tit. 13, chap. 16, expressly extended by Congress to the territories, is the provision that the maximum personal compensation of a clerk of a district court or of a circuit court of the United States shall be no greater if he holds both clerkships than if he holds only one. This clearly indicates the intention of Congress that the maximum compensation of the clerk of a territorial district court should not be increased even if his fees and emoluments were derived from two distinct sources of authority. But the fees and emoluments of the appellee were not derived from two offices or from two sources of authority, but from a single office and a single appointment. Each district court of the territory, vested by Congress with the jurisdiction which the circuit and district courts of the United States have over cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and also with general jurisdiction, at law and in equity, was, in the execution of either branch of its authority, whether exercising Federal or general jurisdiction, one and the same court, deriving its existence and its judicial powers from Congress; and its clerk, 513] whether dealing with Federal or territorial business, was one and the same clerk, holding a single appointment under an act of Congress and from a judge commissioned by the President of the United States. on account of territorial business, must be included in his returns, and be considered in computing the aggregate compensation to be allowed to and retained by him; and that, to this extent, the judgment of the supreme court of the territory is erroneous, and must be reversed. or his duty to account for, sums received by The question of the appellee's right to retain, him in naturalization proceedings, depends upon distinct and peculiar considerations. The only place, it is believed, in the statutes the clerk in such proceedings have ever been of the United States, in which fees received by mentioned, is in one of the earlier naturalization acts. The act of April 14, 1802, chap. 28,enacted in §1 that an alien's declaration of intention to *become a citizen might be made[514 before a court of record of one of the states or of a territory of the United States or before a cir cuit or district court of the United States; and, in § 2, that a report in behalf of an applicant for naturalization, stating his name, birthplace, age, nation, and allegiance, the country whence he migrated, and the place of his recorded by the clerk of the court; and that intended settlement, should be received and the clerk should receive 50 cents for recording such report, and 50 cents for a certificate thereof under his hand and seal of office. 2 Stat. at L. 153. The provision as to a clerk's fees has been omitted in the later naturalization acts. Conkling's U. S. Practice, 4th ed. 722; U. S. Rev. Stat. tit. 30; Act of February 1, 1876, chap. 5 (19 Stat. at L. 2). And no act of Congress, regulating the fees and accounts of clerks of courts, has fixed the sums which they might charge, or specifically required them to account to the United States for services performed for aliens presenting to the court, through the clerk, preliminary declarations of intention to become citizens, or final applications for naturalization. At the time of the passage of the naturalWhenever Congress has considered the statutes affecting the compensation of clerks ization act of 1802, above referred to, the only amount of the compensation authorized to be of the circuit and district courts of the United received and retained by the clerk of a court, States fixed their compensation at $5 a day for either of the United States or of a territory, to attending court; 10 cents a mile for travel; he insufficient, it has authorized him to charge such fees as were allowed in the supreme double fees, and to be allowed a double maxi- court of the state; and a reasonable compensamum compensation, as in the courts of the tion, to be allowed by the court, for any kind United States held in the states of California, of service for which the laws of the state made Oregon, and Nevada, by U. S. Rev. Stat. no allowance. Act of March 3, 1791, chap. § 840, above cited; or to tax double fees, with-22, § 2 (1 Stat. at L. 217); Act of May 8, 1792, out increasing his maximum compensation, as in the courts of the territories of New Mexico and Arizona, by the act of August 7, 1882, chap. 436. 22 Stat. at L. 344; McGrew v. United States. 23 Ct. Cl. 273. chap. 36, § 3 (1 Stat. at L. 277). The earliest legislation restricting the aggregate amount which clerks might retain, or requiring any returns from them, was in the appropriation act of March 3, 1841, chap. 35; and the provisions of 3 of the act of 1953. already cited, had | their origin in the appropriation act of May 18, 1842, chap. 29, No. 167, which, however, vested in the Secretary of the Treasury the supervisory power over their accounts, afterwards transferred to the Secretary of the Interior by the act of March 3, 1849, chap. 108, §4, and to the Attorney General by the act of June 22, 1870, chap. 150, § 15. 5 Stat. at L. 427, 483; 9 515] Stat. *at L. 395; 16 Stat. at L. 164. By the act of August 16, 1856, chap. 124, § 1, reenacted in U. S. Rev. Stat. 846, their accounts were to be examined and certified by the district judge, before being presented to the accounting officers of the Treasury for settle ment; and to be then subject to revision upon their merits by those officers. 11 Stat. at L. 49. The case of United States v. Hill, 120 U. S. 169 [30: 627], arose in this way: It was an action brought December 4, 1884, in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, by the United States upon the official bond of the clerk, appointed in 1879, of the district court for that district, to recover a large amount of fees of $1 and $2 each, respectively, charged and received by him for a declaration of intention to become a citizen, and for a final naturalization and certificate thereof. The judgment of the circuit court reported in 25 Fed. Rep. 375, in favor of the defendants, was affirmed by this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Blatchford, at October term, 1886, up on the following grounds: U. S. Rev. Stat. 823, re-enacting 1 of the act of 1853, ap plies prima facie to taxable costs and fees in ordinary suits between party and party prosecuted in a court. There is no specification of naturalization matters in the fees of clerks. From as early as 1839, it has been the practice of the clerks of the courts of the United States for that district to charge the fees of $1 and $2 in naturalization proceedings, in gross sums, without any division for specific services according to any items of the fee bill. The clerk of the district court had never included these fees in his returns of fees and emoluments. From 1842 and including 1884 his accounts were examined and approved by the district judge; they then went from 1842 to 1849 to the Secretary of the Treasury, from 1849 to 1870 to the Secretary of the Interior, and since 1870 to the Attorney General; and they were, during this long period, examined and adjusted by the accounting officers of the Treasury, with the naturalization fees not included. This long practice amounted to a contemporaneous and continuous construction of the statute by the concurring in terpretation of judicial and executive officers 516] *charged with the duty of carrying out its provisions. 120 U. S. 181, 182 [30: 632]. After that decision, the clerks of the courts of the United States in Massachusetts and in some other states, at least, continued to omit, in the returns of their official fees and emolu ments, sums received for their services and naturalization proceedings; and attempts made from time to time to require them to include such fees in their returns have proved unsuccessful. United States v. Hill, 123 U. S. 681, [31 275]; Attorney General's Report for 1890, xx.; 52d Congress, 1st sess. H. R. Bills 9612, 9613, and Reports No. 1966, pp. 22, 23, and Nos. 1969, 1970; 53d Congress, 1st sess. H. R. Bill 3963, and Report No. 111. In the Fifty-second Congress on July 21, 1892, the committee on the judiciary of the House of Representatives reported a bill, approved by the Attorney General and by the first comptroller of the Treasury, entitled "A Bill to Amend Section 833 of the Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to Semiannual Returns of Fees by District Attorneys. Marshals, and Clerks," and purporting to amend that section by inserting, after the words "all fees and emoluments of his office, of every name and character," the words "including all naturalization fees," and by requir ing each clerk's return to contain a true statement of all naturalization fees." On Janu ary 17, 1893, the bill was amended in the House by adding at its close these words: "That in each of the three judicial districts of the state of Alabama there shall be a district attorney and a marshal,”—and, as amended, was passed by the House and sent to the Senate. February 13, 1893, the committee on the judiciary of the Senate reported that the bill be amended by striking out all the enacting clause, except the words which had been added by amendment in the House; and the bill in this shape, with its title amended accordingly, and thus leaving out everything relating to returns of fees, was passed by both Houses, vetoed by the President, and passed over the veto. 52d Congress, 1st sess. H. R. Bill 9612, Report No. 1969; 24 Congr. Rec. 649, 1508, 1582, 1656, 1661, 2287, 2381, 2433, 2523, 2524; Act of March 3, 1893, chap. 220 (27 Stat. at L. 745). On *The judiciary committee of the House[517 of Representatives, on the same day on which they reported that bill, also reported a bill, having the like approval, entitled A Bill to Amend Section 828 of the Revised Statutes of the United States Relating to Clerk's Fees," and purporting to amend that section by adding, at the end thereof, these words: "For filing declaration of intention to become a citizen by an alien, $1; for final papers and all services connected therewith, $2." This bill, after being passed by the House, was referred to the committee on the judiciary of the Senate, and no further proceedings thereon appear to have been had. 52d Congress, 1st sess. H. R. Bill 9613, Report No. 1970; 24 Congr. Rec. 650, 684. In the next Congress a bill embodying the provisions of those two bills was reported by the committee on the judiciary of the House of representatives, passed by the House, referrea to the committee on the judiciary of the Senate, and not afterwards heard of. 53d Congress, 1st sess. H. R. Bill 3963, Report No. 111; 25 Congr. Rec. 2608, 2657, 2663, 2710. Congress not having legislated upon the subject since the decision of this court in United States v. Hill, 120 U. S. 169 [30: 627], and no special usage or sound reason being shown for not applying a uniform rule in all the courts established by authority of Congress in the states and in the territories, the supreme court of the territory of Utah rightly held, in accordance with that decision, that the appellee was not obliged to return to the United States, as part of the emoluments of his office, sums received for his services in naturalization proceedings. But the erroneous ruling of that court upon the other branch of the case requires its judgment to be reversed, and the case remanded (pursuant to the act of July 16, 1894, chap. 138, § 17 (28 Stat. at L. 111) to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Utah for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. MILTON A. WHEATON. (See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 518–526.) Power of circuit court of appeals-when merits of case cannot be reconsidered-writ of certiorari. 1. Under the act of March 3, 1891, an appeal to the circuit court of appeals from an interlocutory order or decree of the circuit court, granting an Statement by Mr. Justice Gray: In each of these cases, the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of California, upon a bill in equity for the infringement of a patent for an invention, an answer denying the validity and the infringement of the patent, a general replication and a hearing, entered an interlocutory decree, adjudging that the patent was valid and had been infringed, granting an injunction, and referring the case to a master to take an account of profits and damages. From that decree, in each case, the defendant appealed to the circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit. In the first case, the defendant, at the time of taking the appeal, filed in the circuit court an assignment of errors, alleging error in holding that the patent was valid, and that it had been infringed. The plaintiff moved the circuit court of appeals to dismiss the appeal, so far as it involved any question except whether an injunction should be awarded. But that court denied the motion; and, upon a hearing, examined the questions of validity and infringement, decided them in favor of the defendant, and entered a decree reversing the decree of the circuit court. 15 U. S. App. 217, 577. On petition of the plaintiff, this court, on January 28, 1895, granted a writ of certiorari to the circuit court of appeals. In the second case, the circuit court of ap injunction and ordering an account, in a patent peals affirmed the decree of the circuit court, 29 case, may be from the whole order or decree, and U. S. App. 409; but, *upon a rehearing, [519 upon such appeal the circuit court of appeals decided that there had been no infringement,. has authority to consider and decide the case upon its merits, and thereupon to render or di- reversed its own decree and that of the circuit rect a final decree dismissing the suit. court, and remanded the case with instructions 2. The merits of the case, having been once de- to dismiss the bill; and afterwards denied a petermined by the circuit court of appeals in re-tition for a rehearing, and a motion to certify versing an interlocutory decree of the circuit questions of law to this court. 44 U. S. App. court granting an injunction in a patent case, 118, 425. The circuit court, upon receiving and remanding it with instructions to dismiss the the mandate of the circuit court of appeals, bill, are not open to reconsideration at a later and without hearing the plaintiffs, entered a stage of the same case, either in that court or in final decree dismissing the bill. An appeal 8. The discretionary power of issuing a writ of from this decree was taken by the plaintiff to certiorari will not be exercised by this court to the circuit court of appeals, and upon the dereview a decision of the circuit court of appeals fendant's motion and without any hearing on in dismissing an appeal from the circuit court, the merits, was dismissed by that court. The where the only difference that could result would plaintiff, on November 9, 1896, presented to be an affirmance instead of a dismissal, and this court a petition for a writ of certiorari; would not affect the essential rights of the par- and the court thereupon granted a rule to show cause why the writ should not issue to bring up the decree of the circuit court of appeals, the court below. ties. [Nos. 200, 639.] Argued January 19, 1897. Decided February "so that it may be determined whether, upon 15, 1897. an appeal upon an interlocutory decree granting a temporary injunction in a patent case, PETITIONS for writs of certiorari to the the circuit court of appeals can render or di Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in suits in equity for the infringement of a patent, to review a decree in the first case reversing the decree of the circuit court and in the second case to review a decree dismissing an appeal. Writ of certiorari dismissed in the first case; and in the second case writ of certiorari denied. See same cases below, 15 U. S. App. 217, 577, 29 U. S. App. 409, 44 U. S. App. 118, 425. NOTE. As to what is "final decree," or judgment of state or other court from which appeal lies, see note to Gibbons v. Ogden, 5: 302. As to certiorari in United States courts, see note to Clark v. Hackett, 17:69. rect a final decree on the merits." That question was now, by leave of the court, orally argued in both cases, the parties in the first case stipulating in writing that, if the decision of this court upon that question should be in favor of the jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals, the case should be dis missed by the appellees. Messrs. Calderon Carlisle and William Mr. Milton A. Wheaton, in proper person, for himself. Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court: Aldrich. Richmond ▼. Atwood (September, 1892) 5 U. S. App. 151. The act of March 3, 1891, chap. 517, estab- This view has since prevailed, not only in lishing circuit courts of appeals, after providing the first circuit: Marden v. Campbell Printing in 5 for appeals from the circuit courts and Press & Mfg. Co. (May, 1895) 33 U. S. App. 520 district courts directly to this court in *cer-123; Wright & C. Wire Cloth Co. v. Clinton Wire tain classes of cases, and in § 6 for appeals from Cloth Co. (May, 1895) 33 U. S. App. 188, 206, final decisions of those courts to the circuit | 236; but also in the second circuit: Florida court of appeals in all other cases, including Const. Co. v. Young (December, 1892) 11 U. S. cases arising under the patent laws, further provides, in § 7, that "where, upon a hearing in equity in a district court, or in an existing circuit court, an injunction shall be granted or continued by an interlocutory order or decree, in a cause in which an appeal from a final de cree may be taken under the provisions of this act to the circuit court of appeals, an appeal may be taken from such interlocutory order or decree granting or continuing such injunction to the circuit court of appeals: Provided, that the appeal must be taken within thirty days from the entry of such order or decree, and it shall take precedence in the appellate court; and the proceedings in other respects in the court below shall not be stayed, unless other-1893) 18 U. S. App. 245; Electric Mfg. Co. v. wise ordered by that court, during the pendency of such appeal." 26 Stat. at L. 828. The questions presented by each of these cases are whether, in a suit in equity for the infringement of a patent, an appeal to the circuit court of appeals from an interlocutory order or decree of the circuit court, granting an injunction, and referring the case to a master to take an account of damages and profits, may be from the whole order or decree, or must be restricted to that part of it which grants the injunction; and whether the circuit court of appeals, upon such an appeal, may consider and decide the merits of the case, and, if it decides them in the defendant's favor, may order the bill to be dismissed. Upon these questions there has been some diversity of opinion among the circuit courts of appeals of the different circuits. But those courts have now generally concurred in taking the broader view of the appeal itself, and of the power of the appellate court. In the earliest of such appeals, the cases were examined on the merits, and, upon a reversal of the order or decree appealed from, the authority to direct the bill to be dismissed was assumed, without question, in the circuit courts of appeals for the fifth circuit: Dudley E. Jones Co. v. Munger Improv. Cotton Mach. 521 Mfg. Co. *(December, 1891) 2 U. S. App. 55; for the first circuit; Richmond v. Atwood February, (1892) 5 U. S. App. 1; and for the second circuit: American Paper Pail & B. Co. v. National Folding Box & P. Co. (July, 1892) 1 U. S. App. 283. The cases in the fifth and first circuits were afterwards reconsidered upon petitions for rehearing. In the fifth circuit, the decree was modified so as only to direct the injunction to be dissolved. Dudley E. Jones Co. v. Munger Improv. Cotton Mach. Mfg. Co. (May, 1892) 2 U. S. App. 188. But in the first circuit, the power of the circuit court of appeals, upon such an appeal, to consider the merits of the case, and to order the bill to be dismissed, was maintained, after thorough discussion of the subject on principle and authority, in an opinion delivered by Judge App. 683, 685; Bidwell Cycle Co. v. Featherstone (August, 1893) 14 U. S. App. 632, 655; Curtis v. Overman Wheel Co. (December, 1893) 20 U. 8. App. 146; Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. New York Air Brake Co. (October, 1894) 26 U. S. App. 248, 358; Kilmer Mfg. Co. v. Griswold (April, 1895) 35 U. S. App. 246; in the third circuit: Union Switch & Signal Co. v. Johnson R. Signal Co. (May, 1894) 17 U. S. App. 609, 611, 620; Erie Rubber Co. v. American Dunlop Tire Co. (July, 1895) 28 U. S. App. 470, 513, 522; in the seventh circuit: Temple Pump Co. v. Goss Pump & Rubber Bucket Mfg. Co. (October, 1893) 18 U. S. App. 229; Northwestern Stove Repair Co. v. Beckwith (October, Edison Electric Light Co. (May, 1894) 18 U. S. App. 637, 643; Card v. Colby (November, 1894) 24 U. S. App. 460, 480, 486; Standard Elevator Co. v. Crane Elevator Co. (October, 1896) 46 U. S. App. ; in the eighth circuit: Lockwood v. Wickes (June, 1896) 40 U. S. App. 136, overruling same case (December, 1895) 36 U.S. App. 321; and in the ninth circuit: Consolidated Piedmont Cable Co. v. Pacific Cable R. Co. (July, 1893) 15 U. S. App. 216; *Butte City (522 Street R. Co. v. Pacific Cable R. Co. (February, 1894) 15 U. S. App. 341; Vulcan Iron Works v. Smith (May, 1894) 15 U. S. App. 577; Wheaton v. Norton (January, 1895) 29 U. S. App. 409, and (October, 1895) 44 U. S. App. 118, 170. But In the fourth circuit the question does not appear to have arisen in a patent case. where, upon a bill in equity to restrain a supervisor of registration from interfering with the right to vote at the election of delegates to a convention to revise the Constitution of the state of South Carolina, the circuit court of the United States for the district of South Carolina had, by successive orders, granted and continued a temporary injunction, the circuit court of appeals, upon appeal from these orders, entered a decree not only reversing the orders, but directing the bill to be dismissed; the Chief Justice saying: "Although the appeal is from interlocutory orders, yet, as we entertain no doubt that such a bill cannot be maintained, we are constrained, in reversing these orders, to remand the cause with a direction to dismiss the bill." Green v. Mills (1895) 25 U. S. App. 383, 398 [30 L. R. A. 90]. appeal from that decree was dismissed by this court, without touching this question. 159 U. S. 651 [40: 293]. An In the sixth circuit, on the other hand, in a case in which the circuit court bad entered an interlocutory decree sustaining the validity of the patent, adjudging that there was an infringement, ordering an account of damages and profits, and granting an injunction, and had allowed an appeal from so much only of that decree as granted the injunction, and de SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. OCT. TERM, nied an appeal from the rest of the decree, the | rad, 47 U. S. 6 How. 201, 205 [12: 404, 406]: Lo circuit court of appeals, in an opinion delivered Guen v. Gouverneur, 1 Johns. Cas. 436, 498, by Mr. Justice Jackson (then circuit judge) 499, 507-509 [1 Am. Dec. 121]; Bush v. Liowith the concurrence of Judge Taft and Judge ingston, 2 Cai. 66, 86 [2 Am. Dec. 316]; NewHammond, held that the appeal had been ark & N. Y. R. Co. v. Newark, 23 N. J. Eq. properly restricted by the circuit court, and 515. that the circuit court of appeals had no authority, upon this appeal, to hear and fully determine the merits of the case, but that those remained, notwithstanding the appeal, within the jurisdiction and control of the circuit court. That decision was made before the second decision in Richmond v. Atwood, 5 U. S. App. 151, 523]abovecited, *had been reported, and without reference to the practice of courts of chancery elsewhere. And it was said in the opinion: "It would doubtless have been well if, in the creation of this court, the 7th section of the act had permitted or authorized an appeal from interlocutory decrees sustaining the validity of patents and adjudging their infringement, so as to obviate in many cases the taking of expensive accounts, and the delays incident thereto." Columbus Watch Co. v. Robbins (October, 1892) 6 U. S. App. 275, 281. A certificate thereupon made by the circuit court of appeals, for the purpose of obtaining the instructions of this court, was dismissed by this court, with Mr. Justice Jackson's concurrence, because no question of law was distinctly certified, and because the circuit court of appeals had decided the case before granting the certificate. 148 U. S. 266 [37: 445]. That decision was long treated as settling the practice in that circuit on appeals from such interlocutory decrees, and as permitting the questions of validity and infringement to be considered only so far as they affected the granting or refusal of an injunction. Blount v. So ciété Anonyme (November, 1892) 6 U. S. App. 335; Columbus Watch Co. v. Robbins (October, 1894) 22 U. S. App. 601, 634; Duplex Press Co. v. Campbell Press Co. (July, 1895) 37 U. S. App. 250; Thompson v. Nelson (November, 1895) 37 U. S. App. 478; Goshen Co. v. Bissell Co. (December, 1895, and February, 1896) 37 U. S. App. 555, 689. But, at last, the circuit court of appeals of the sixth circuit, in an able and elaborate opinion delivered by Judge Lurton, with the concurrence of Judge Taft and Judge Hammond, being a majority of the court which had made the decision in Columbus Watch Co. v. Robbins, 6 U. S. App. 275, above cited, expressly overruled that decision, and brought the practice in that circuit into harmony with the practice prevailing in other circuits. Bissell Co. v. Goshen Co. (March, 1896) 43 U. S. App. 47; Dueber Co. v. Robbins (May, 1896) 43 U. S. App. 391. By the practice in equity, as administered in the court of chancery and the House of Lords in 524 England, and in the *courts of chancery and courts of error in the states of New York and New Jersey, appeals lay from interlocutory, as well as from final, orders or decrees; and upon an appeal from an interlocutory order or decree the appellate court had the power of examining the merits of the case, and upon deciding them in favor of the defendant, dismissing the bill, and thus saving to both parties the needless expense of a further prosecution of the suit. Palmer, House of Lords Practice, 1; 2 Daniell, Ch. Pr.(1st ed.) 1491, 1492; Forgay v. Con812 States, from the beginning until the passage of But under the judicial system of the United the act of 1891, establishing circuit courts of appeals, appeals from the circuit courts of the United States in equity or in admiralty, like writs of error at common law, would lie only after final judgment or decree; and an order or decree in a patent cause, whether upon preliminary application or upon final hearing, granting an injunction and referring the cause to a master for an account of profits and damages, was interlocutory only, and not final, and therefore not reviewable on appeal before the final decree in the cause. 24, 1789, chap. 20. SS 13, 22 (1 Stat. at L. 81, 84); act of March 3, 1803, chap. 40 (2 Stat. at Act of September. L. 244); U. S. Rev. Stat. § 691, 692, 699, 701; Forgay v. Conrad, supra; Barnard v. Gibson, 47 U. S. 7 How. 650 [12: 857]; Humiston v. Stainthrop, 69 U. S. 2 Wall. 106 [17: 905]; Keystone Manganese & I. Co. v. Martin, 132 U. S. 91 [33: 275]; McGourkey v. Toledo & 0. C. R. Co. 146 U. S. 536, 545 [36: 1079, 1083]; American Const. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co. 148 U. S. 372, 378, 379 [37: 486, 489]. The provision of § 7 of the act of 1891, that cuit court "an injunction shall be granted or where "upon a hearing in equity" in a circontinued by an interlocutory order or decree,' in a cause in which an appeal from a final decree might be taken to the circuit court of appeals, "an appeal may be taken from such interlocutory order or decree granting or continuing such injunction" to that court, authorizes, according to its grammatical construc- [525 tion and actual meaning, an appeal to be taken from the whole of such interlocutory order or decree, and not from that part of it only which grants or continues an injunction. The manifest intent of this provision, read courts of the United States, contrasted with in the light of the previous practice in the the practice in courts of equity of the highest authority elsewhere, appears to this court to have been, not only to permit the defendant to obtain immediate relief from an injunction, the continuance of which throughout the progress of the cause might seriously affect his interests, but also to save both parties from the expense of further litigation, should the appellate court be of opinion that the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction because his bill had no equity to support it. cause, of which it has acquired jurisdiction by therefore, the circuit court of appeals, upon |