tion in which a professed knowledge of some department of science or learning is used by Its practical application to the affairs of others, either in advising, guiding, or teaching them, or in serving their interests or welfare in the practice of an art founded on it. Formerly, theology, law, and medicine were specific ally known as the professions; but as the applications of science and learning are extended to other departments of affairs, other vocations also receive the name. The word implies professed attainments in special knowledge as dis tinguished from mere skill. A practical dealing with affairs as distinguished from mere study or investigation; and an application of such knowledge to uses for others as a vocation, as distinguished from its pursuit for its own purposes." There are professors of chemistry in all the chief colleges of the country. It is a science the knowledge of which is to be acquired only after patient study and application. The chemist who places his knowledge acquired from a study of the science to the use of others as he may be employed by them, and as a vocation for the purpose of his own maintenance, must certainly be regarded as one engaged in the practice of a profession which is generally recognized in this country. The question presented to us assumes that the 267] individual is *a chemist, and that he has come to this country for the purpose of pursuing his vocation as a chemist on a sugar plantation in Louisiana. It may be assumed that the branch of chemistry which he will practice will be that which relates to and is connected with the proper manufacture of sugar from the sugar cane, or possibly from sorghum or beets. He is none the less a -chemist, and none the less occupied in the practice of his profession because he thus limits himself to that particular branch, which is to be applied in the course of the scientific manufacture of sugar any more than a lawyer would cease to practice his profession by limiting himself to any particular branch thereof or a doctor by confining his practice to some specialty which he particularly favored and was eminent in. course differ, to some extent, in their qualities from each other, and each will require different treatment, depending upon the result of the analysis and the directions of the chemist founded thereon. There can be, therefore, no regular or formal rule or method adopted for all cases. It becomes necessary to examine each *sample and decide after such examina- [268 tion what treatment is necessary for that particular lot thus examined. Learning in the science, skill in its practice, experience in results, are all factors going to make up the competent chemist in this particular branch. The fact that the individual in question, by this contract, had agreed to sell his time, labor, and skill to one employer, and in one prescribed branch of the science, does not in the least militate against his being a profes sional chemist, nor does it operate as a bar to the claim that while so employed he is nevertheless practicing a recognized profession. It is not necessary that he should offer his serv ices to the public at large nor that he should hold himself ready to apply his scientific knowledge and skill to the business of all persons who applied for them before he would be entitled to claim that he belonged to and was actually practicing a recognized profession. As well might it be said that the law. yer who enters into the service of a corporation and limits his practice to cases in which the corporation is interested thereby ceases to belong to the profession. The chemist may confine his services to one employer so long as the services which he performs are of a profes sional nature. It is not the fact that the chemist keeps his services open for employ ment by the public generally which is the criterion by which to determine whether or not he still belongs to or is practicing a recognized profession. So long as he is engaged in the practical application of his knowledge of the science, as a vocation, it is not important whether he holds himself out as ready to make that application in behalf of all persons who desire it, or that he contracts to do it for some particular employer and at some named place. We have no doubt that the individual named comes within one of the exceptions named in the statute. The question certified to this court by the circuit court of appeals for the sixth circuit should be answered in the negative. V. BATES COUNTY, Impleaded in Behalf of It is not stated what the particular duties of a chemist on a sugar plantation are, but it is quite plain, even to one not engaged in the business, that there would be a necessity for the services of one skilled in the science of chemistry in order to enable a manufacturer to make the most out of his materials and produce a commodity up to the proper standard and of a marketable nature. All sugar cane, for ex- JAMES C. EDWARDS, Piff. in Err., [269 ample, is not alike in quality or in the propor tions of the ingredients which enter into its -composition, and in the course of manufacture these differences must be discovered and determined, and the material must be treated accordingly so that the finished product shall be a commodity which is up to the standard set with reference to the particular grade of sugar which it is claimed to be. In order to determine this difference and to reach this standard, analysis of the different samples of the cane at some period of the process of manufacture ought to and must be made, and these analyses it is the province of a chemist to make. Upon their results depend the future treatment of the article. The samples analyzed will of (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 269-273.) Jurisdiction of circuit court as to amount. The amount of a matured interest coupon which itself bears interest and constitutes a cause of action separate from that on the bond to which the coupon is attached can be added to the amount NOTE. As to amount necessary to give jurisdic tion in circuit court cases prior to act of 1875; amount necessary since act of 1875; amount in dispute,—see note to Schunk v. Moline, M. & S. Co. 37: 256. $1,000 bonds. The plaintiff filed a reply to the plea to the jurisdiction and the issue thereby raised was heard upon an agreed statement of facts and certain documentary evidence unnecessary to be specifically stated. In the agreed statement of facts it was ad Submitted April 29, 1896. Decided May 18, mitted that the funding bonds in question had 1896. N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri to review a judgment dismissing for want of jurisdiction a suit brought by James C. Edwards, plaintiff, against Bates County, impleaded, etc., to recover the principal of county bonds and the amount of interest coupons on said bonds with interest on the bonds and on the coupons. Reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings. See same case below, 55 Fed. Rep. 436. Statement by Mr. Justice White: On October 5, 1891, plaintiff in error filed his petition to recover from the defendant an aggregate alleged indebtedness, consisting of the following items: (1) The principal of two bonds for $1,000 each, issued by the defendant on January 18, 1871, with interest from the date of maturity of the bonds, January 18, 1886: (2) the amount of interest coupons on said bonds, due and payable on the 18th day of January, in the years 1873 to 1886, both inclusive, with interest from the maturity of each coupon; and, (3) the principal of seven funded bonds of said county, each for the sum of $100, dated October 1, 1885, and payable October 1, 1905. The petition alleged that due notice had been given by the county, pursuant to an option reserved by it, that it would redeem said lastnamed bonds at a place named on the 1st of July, 1891, and that on that date and at the place designated said bonds had been duly presented and payment thereof demanded and refused. A plea to the jurisdiction was filed on behalf of the defendant, based upon the claim that the matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, did not exceed the sum or value of $2,000. It was alleged, among other things, that each of the funded bonds provided on its face that the said county of Bates, for and on behalf of the township of Mount Pleasant, reserved the right at its option to redeem the bonds at any time after five years from the first 270]day of October, 1885, in accordance with the conditions printed on the back, which conditions, among other things, provided for the giving of notice, by advertisement, of the intention to redeem, and further provided that "if any bond be not presented as required in such notice, or within thirty days after the date therein fixed, interest thereon shall cease from said date, but said bond, with interest accrued to said date, shall be payable upon presentment at the office of the treasurer of Bates county at any time thereafter." It was further alleged that the funding bonds in question had not been presented for payment, and that the purpose of including them in the suit at bar was merely in aid of an attempt to confer jurisdiction upon the court over the claim of plaintiff upon the two never been presented for payment at the place designated by the contract for the redemption of the same, though said county had on deposit at the depository named in the advertised notice of intention to redeem, on said first day of July, 1891, and for more than thirty days thereafter, sufficient funds to pay said bonds, which funds had been deposited for such special purpose, and that the county of Bates had in the hands of its county treasurer money sufficient belonging to said township to pay said bonds at any and all times after said thirty days from said first day of July, 1891, if they had been presented for payment by the holder thereof. The trial court sustained the plea, and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction. 55 Fed. Rep. 436. The case was then brought to this court by writ of error. Mr. T. K. Skinker for plaintiff in error. No counsel for defendant in error. *Mr. Justice White delivered the [271 opinion of the court: We are solely concerned in this case in determining whether or not the circuit court possessed jurisdiction over the claim asserted in the petition. Act of March 3, 1891, chap. 517, § 5. From the facts heretofore detailed, the following questions arise: First. Should the circuit court have taken into consideration, for the purpose of ascertaining the adequacy of the jurisdictional amount, the claim of plaintiff upon the interest coupons attached to the two $1,000 bonds? Second. Did the court rightly hold that the amount of the claim upon the funding bonds was not an item "in dispute" between the parties, and therefore not proper to be taken into account in determining whether the court possessed jurisdiction? As to the first point. By the act of Congress of March 3, 1887, as amended August 13, 1888(25 Stat. at L. 434), original jurisdiction was conferred upon circuit courts of the United States, "concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of dif ferent states in which the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $2,000." It is contended that an indebtedness for the face amount of coupons is an indebtedness for "interest" within the meaning of the statute. The nature of a coupon was thus defined in Aurora v. West, 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 82 [19: 42]. where this court said (p. 105 [50]): "Coupons are written contracts for the payment of a definite sum of money, on a given day, and being drawn and executed in a form and mode for the very purpose that they may be separated from the bonds, it is held that they are negotiable, and that a suit may be maintained on them without the necessity | manded with directions to set aside the order of producing the bonds to which they were dismissing the action for want of jurisdiction, attached." and for further proceedings in conformity to law. 272]*Each matured coupon upon a negotiable bond is a separable promise, distinct from the promises to pay the bond or other coupons, and gives rise to a separate cause of action. Nesbitt v. Riverside Independent Dist. 144 U. S. 610 [36: 562]. In that case this court said Xp. 619 5656 GRIFFITH DAVIES and ISABELLA DAVIES, (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 273-280.) of law. "Each matured coupon is a separable promise. and gives rise to a separate cause of action. It may be detached from the bond and sold by itself. Indeed, the title to several matured coupons of the same bond may be in as many dif- Impairing obligation of contract-due process ferent persons, and upon each a distinct and separate action be maintained. So, while the prom-1. ises of the bond and of the coupons in the first instance are upon the same paper, and the coupons are for interest due upon the bond, yet the promise to pay the coupon is as distinct from that to pay the bond, as though the two promises were placed in different instruments, upon different paper." 2. Judicial decisions or acts of state tribunals or officers under statutes which were in force at the time a contract was made are not within the constitutional prohibition against state laws which impair the obligation of the contract. Want of due process of law in proceedings of a probate court is not sufficiently alleged to show a Federal question by the allegation that the court acted entirely without jurisdiction. [No. 260.] cided May 18, 1896. APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Washington dismissing a suit for want of jurisdiction, brought by Frank Hanford, plaintiff, against Griffith Davies et al., to obtain a decree that the defendants have no title to the land in question, and that the title of the plaintiff is good, and to enjoin defendants from asserting any title thereto, and to declare invalid an administrator's deed. There was also a motion to dismiss. Affirmed. See same case below, 51 Fed. Rep. 258. Not only may a suit be maintained upon an unpaid coupon in advance of the maturity of the principal debt, but the holder of a coupon is entitled to recover interest thereon from its Argued and Submitted April 29, 30, 1896. Dematurity. Amy v. Dubuque, 98 U. S. 470, 473 (25: 228, 230]. The logical effect of these rulings is that when the interest evidenced by a coupon has become due and payable the demand based upon the promise contained in such coupon is no longer a mere incident of the principal indebtedness represented by the bond, but becomes really a principal obligation. Clearly, such would be the nature of the claim of one who, as owner of the coupoos and not of the bonds, brought his action to enforce payment of the indebtedness evidenced by the coupons. So, also, before maturity of the bonds, their holder could still have sued upon the matured coupons as an independent indebtedness, and not as a mere accessory to a demand for a recovery of the face of the bonds. No good reason, therefore, exists for creating a distinction between such cases and the case at bar in which there is coupled with the demand to recover upon the coupons a demand for judgment upon the bonds. The confusion of thought, to which we alluded, in the case of Brown v. Webster, 156 U. S. 328 [39: 440], is also involved in the deci273]sion below, that is, the failure to *distinguish between a principal and accessory demand. The claim made by the plaintiff on the coupons was in no just sense accessory to any other demand, but was in itself principal and primary. In ascertaining, therefore, the jurisdictional sum in dispute, the sum of the coupons should have been treated as an independent, principal demand, and not as interest; and in holding otherwise the lower court erred to the prejudice of the plaintiff in error. As the face of the bonds amounted to the sum of $2,000, the addition of the demand based upon the coupons brought the sum in dispute within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether the controversy as to the funding bonds did not involve a real matter "in dispute" between the parties. Statement by Mr. Justice Harlan: *This cause was determined in the court [274 below upon a demurrer to the bill. The grounds of demurrer were: (1) That the bill did not set forth any case entitling the plaintiff to relief. (2) That the circuit court had no jurisdiction. It was adjudged that the bill did not state a case within the jurisdiction of the circuit court, and the question of jurisdiction alone has been certified. 51 Fed. Rep. 258. Taking the case to be as made by the bill, it is substantially as follows: On October 14, 1878, the territory of Washington, for a valuable consideration, executed to Thaddeus Hanford a deed conveying to him, his heirs and assigns, certain lands in what is now King county, state of Washington. The deed was duly recorded on November 25, 1878. It was executed by the territory in pursuance of a sale made by it of those lands as the property of one Lumley Franklin, for the nonpayment of taxes due from him. The deed contained what the bill describes as "the following contract and agreement" be of contracts, see note to Louisiana, Ranger, v. New NOTE.-That impairing remedy impairs obligation Orleans, 26: 132. As to what is due process of law, see note to PearThe judgment is reversed, and the cause is re-son v. Yewdall, 24: 436, tween the parties, namely: "Now, therefore, the said party of the first part by virtue of the statute in such case made and provided, for the consideration of the sum of money above mentioned paid to the county treasurer of said county, has granted, bargained, sold, and conveyed, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey, and confirm unto the said Thaddeus Hanford, his heirs and as signs, the said described real estate, together with all and singular the tenements and appurtenances thereto belonging or in any wise ap-ington, by its agent and organ, the probate pertaining, and the rents, issues, and profits thereof, as well in law as in equity, and the right, title, and interest of the said Lumley Franklin and all owners known or unknown, of, in, or to the above described premises." Thaddeus Hanford immediately entered into possession of the premises, paid the taxes thereon, and improved the same, remaining in possession until the 17th day of September, 1885. The statutes of Washington territory in force at the date of the above tax sale, as well as at the date of the execution of the above deed, prohibited the bringing of any suit or procceding for the recovery of land sold for taxes after 275] the expiration of three years from the recording of the tax deed of sale, except in cases where the tax had been paid or the land redeemed, or where such suit was brought by the purchaser at the tax sale. The statute also provided that the tax deed should be presumptive evidence of the regularity of all former proceedings. On September 17, 1885, Thaddeus Hanford being in possession executed to Frank Hanford a deed of the premises, conveying a title in fee. That deed was duly recorded on the 13th day of March, 1886. Frank Hanford purchased the premises in good faith for a valuable consideration and without notice of a claim by any other person than his grantor. In making his purchase he relied, the bill alleges, upon the "express contract entered into between the territory of Washington and the said Thaddeus Hanford, above set forth, by virtue of which said land was conveyed to said Thaddeus Hanford and title thereto confirmed in him by said territory and the laws thereof then existing." Immediately after his purchase the plaintiff entered into possession of and improved the premises, paying taxes, and also erecting a dwelling house in which the property of his agent and employee were kept. The bill then alleges: "That on the 26th day of July, 1887, the said territory of Washington, by W. Finley Hall, its agent, presented the petition of the said W. Finley Hall to the probate court of King county, alleging the death of said Lumley Franklin above named; that he left no property in Washington territory, except real estate; that there were no general creditors; that said Franklin was resident of Victoria, British Columbia, and that he died without the territory of Washington, and prayed that letters of administration be granted to said W. Finley Hall upon the estate of said Lumley Franklin, but said W. Finley Hall was not of kin to said Lumley Franklin, neither was he a creditor of said Franklin, nor did he act in presenting said petition at the request of any one of kin to said Lumley Franklin or at the request of any of the creditors of said Lumley Franklin. *That on the 8th day of Au-[276 gust said probate court assumed to appoint said. W. Finley Hall administrator of said estate, and on the 26th day of said month he filed his inventory showing that there were no debts against said estate, no personal assets, and that the said land constituted the sole assets of said. estate. That thereafter, to wit, on the 26th day of March, 1888, the said territory of Washcourt of King county, in violation of the contract above mentioned, entered into between said territory and Thaddeus Hanford, the grantor of your orator, ordered said land above described to be sold as the property of Lumley Franklin to pay a tax claimed by said territory from said Lumley Franklin, and thereafter, in pursuance of said order, made a pretended sale of said land and caused to be executed a deed purporting to convey the same to the defendant Griffith Davies, in violation of the contract above set forth between the said territory of Washington and the said Thaddeus Hanford and the obligation thereof, and in violation of U. S. Const. art. 1. § 10, and of U. S. Rev. Stat. §§ 1851, 1891. That in all of his actions the said W. Finley Hall acted as the agent and instrument of said territory of Washington, and in all of its proceedings the said probate court acted as the agent and organ of said territory for the purpose of collecting said tax claimed by said territory from said Lumley Franklin; that in all of its said proceedings the said probate court acted entirely without jurisdiction and without color of authority save as the agent and organ of said territory, and said probate court and said W. Finley Hall as the agents and organs of said territory were at the time of their said proceedings fully aware that said land had in good faith and for valuable consideration been sold by said territory to said Thaddeus Hanford as the property of said Lumley Franklin, for the nonpayment of taxes thereon by said Lumley Franklin, and that upon the faith of said sale and the deed executed in pursuance thereof your orator had purchased said land in good faith for valuable consideration and without notice of any claim on the part of said territory or [277 any person whomsoever from the said Thaddeus Hanford." The sections of the Revised Statutes above referred to are as follows: "Sec 1851. The legislative power of every territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." "Sec. 1891. The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not wholly inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the organized territories, and in every territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United States." The deed executed in pursuance of the sale ordered by the probate court was taken in the name of the defendant Griffith Davies, but it was in fact for the benefit of himself and his codefendants. The defendants purchased at the sale ordered by the probate court and received the deed made to Griffith Davies with actual and constructive notice of the plaintiff's title, and of all the facts and circumstances connected | Therefore, even if it be assumed that the plaintherewith. Nevertheless, it is alleged, with tiff had a contract with the territory, and even if the intent to create a cloud upon the plaintiff's it were *further assumed that the consti- [279 title and to force him to buy off their adverse tutional provision in question applied to the legclaim, they conspired together to make their islative enactments of a territory, the court besaid purchase, and in pursuance of that con- low was without jurisdiction, so far as it despiracy bought in the land and procured a deed pended upon the application of the clause of for it. Subsequently, February 25, 1881, they the Constitution protecting the obligation of forcibly entered upon and maintained forcible contracts against impairment by state laws. possession of the land until the 1st day of April, 1891, at which time the premises were vacated and are not now in the actual possession of any one, except so far as the abandonment of possession by the defendants restores the prior possession of the plaintiff. The bill alleges that the pretended deed of the defendants is of no validity in law or equity and is a cloud upon the title of the plaintiff, and that the defendants have no es tate, right, title, or interest in the lands or the possession thereof. But it is contended that the proceedings in the probate court did not constitute due process of law, and for that reason this suit is one arising under the Constitution of the United States. No such thought was intended to be expressed in the bill, and it is apparent that no such proposition was presented to the circuit court when it determined the question of jurisdiction. The suggestion of the want of due process of law in the proceedings in the probate court first distinctly appears in the assignment of errors filed in the court below long after the final decree was entered. The relief asked is a decree that the defend ant's have no title, interest, or estate in or It is true the bill alleges that the probate about the land or any part thereof, and that court in all of its proceedings acted "entirely the title of the plaintiff is good and valid; that without jurisdiction and without color of authe defendants and each of them be forever en-thority save as the agent and organ of said 278] joined from *asserting any title or claim dverse to the plaintiff; that said administrator's deed may be declared invalid and the record thereof of no effect; and that the plaintiff have such other and further relief as the equity of the case may require. Messrs. James B. Howe and George Donworth for appellant. Messrs. James Hamilton Lewis, J. A. Stratton, and L. C. Gilman for appellees. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court: As it appears from the bill that the plaintiffs and the defendants are all citizens of the state of Washington, the circuit court was without jurisdiction unless the suit was one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. The bill proceeds upon the ground that the orders of the probate court, resulting in the sale of the lands in controversy as the property of Lumley Franklin, and in the conveyance of 1888 to the defendant Davies, impaired the obligation of the alleged contract with the territory as evidenced by the deed of 1878 to Thaddeus Hanford. But it was not alleged in the bill that the proceedings in the probate court were had under any statute that was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, or which was enacted after the sale and conveyance of these lands by the territory to Thaddeus Hanford. The prohibition upon the passage of state laws impairing the obliga tion of contracts has reference only to the laws, that is, to the constitutional provisions or to the legislative enactments, of a state, and not to judicial decisions or the acts of state tribunals or officers under statutes in force at the time of the making of the contract, the obligation of which is alleged to have been impaired. Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Rock, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 177 [18: 3811; Lehigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388 [30: 1059]; Wood v. Brady, 150 U. S. 18 [37: 981]; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103 [40 L. ed. 91]. territory." But this allegation of want of jurisdiction in the probate court is too general and indefinite to show that its proceedings were wanting in due process of law. If the purpose was to present a case under the clause of the Constitution relating to due process of law, the grounds upon which the Federal court could take cognizance of a suit of that character between citizens of the same state should have been clearly and distinctly stated in the bill. It is well settled that, as the juris diction of a circuit court of the United States is limited in the sense that it has no other jurisdiction than that conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States, the presumption is that a cause is without its jurisdiction unless the contrary affirmatively appears; and that it is not sufficient that jurisdiction may be inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings, but the averments should be positive. Brown v. Keene, 33 U. S. 8 Pet. 112 [8: 885]: Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co. 109 U. S. 278, 283 [27: 932, 935], and authorities cited. These principles have been applied in cases where the jurisdiction of the circuit court was invoked upon the ground of diverse 280 citizenship. But they are equally applicable where its original jurisdiction of a suit between citizens of the same state is invoked upon the ground that the suit is one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. We are not required to say that it is essential to the maintenance of the jurisdiction of the circuit court of such a suit that the pleadings should refer, in words, to the particular clause of the Constitution relied on to sustain the claim or immunity in question, but only that the essential facts averred must show, not by inference or argumentatively, but clearly and distinctly, that the suit is one of which the circuit court is entitled to take cognizance. Ansbro v. United States, 159 U. S. 695 [40: 310]. Without expressing any opinion as to the effect of the proceedings in the probate court and the sale by the administrator Hall upon the rights acquired by the plaintiff under the tax sale at which Thaddeus Hanford pur |