weapons, in violation of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5472, is U.S. Rev. Stat. § 5472; United States v. Copa felony, on the prosecution of which the defend-persmith, 4 Fed. Rep. 198; United States v. ant is entitled to ten peremptory challenges, un-Wilson, Bald w. 78-93. der U. 8. Rev. Stat. § 819. [No. 294.] Robbery was a felony at common law. United States v. Browning, 1 Cranch, C. C. 330; 4 Cooley's Blackstone, 95-98; 2 Bishop, Argued and Submitted May 6, 1896. Decided Crim. Law, 1180; 3 Coke, Inst. 68; Whart. IN May 18, 1896. N ERROR to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama to review a judgment convicting Jeff Harrison of the offense of robbing a mail carrier, and putting his life in jeopardy by the use of dangerous weapons. Reversed, and cause remanded with a direction for a new trial. Messrs. Richard B. Kelly and John F. Methrin, for plaintiff in error: Appellant was entitled to ten peremptory challenges. He was indicted for an offense which was a felony at common law and for which Congress prescribed punishment designating the offense by its common-law name. appearing pursuant to it, is no ground. State v. Nor the failure of the Nerbovig, 33 Minn. 480. jury commissioners to sign and certify the jury list. Coker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 83. Where the statute prescribes the class of persons from which the jurors are to be selected, the failure on the part of the officers to draw the jurors from the class prescribed is a sufficient ground. State v. Jenkins, 32 Kan. 477. An objection that a juror is drawn from a particular panel is a challenge to the panel and not to his qualification. State v. Dale, 8 Or. 229. Where the states have statutory enactments as to what are good grounds for challenges to the panel, these grounds are then exclusive. Woodard v. State, 9 Tex. App. 412; Roundtree v. Gilroy, 57 Tex. 176. Am. Crim. Law, 4th ed. § 2; Roscoe, Crim. Ev. 91, 892; Bouvier, Law Dict. tit. Feloniously; Burrill, Law Dict. tit. Felony. Mr. J. M. Dickinson, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant in error: The statute does not call this offense a felony, but it, in respect of it, uses the words "rob, "robbery," and "robber." The word "rob" in the statute was used in its common-law sense. Whart. Crim. Law, § 1825, citing United States v. Wilson, Baldw. 78. At common-law "robbery" was a felony. 2 Stephen, Hist. Crim Law, 193; 3 Stephen, Hist. Crim. Law, 149; Whart. Crim. Law, § 22; Bishop, New Crim. Law, § 1180; 4 Bl. Com. 95; Russell, Crimes, 867. The withdrawal of a challenge to the array is a waiver of any irregularity in the drawing of the jury. Pierson v. People, 18 Hun, 239, 79 N. Y. 424, 35 Am. Rep. 524. The number of peremptory challenges to which an accused person or the prosecution or the parties to a civil action, is entitled, depends, generally, upon the statute relating to crimes. People v. Comstock, 55 Mich. 405. Whether persons tried together on one indictment must join in their challenges, or are entitled to sever, is a subject of much difference, the right to sever being generally allowed in criminal cases. Savage v. State, 18 Fla. 909; Wiggins v. State, 1 Lea, 738. And the peremptory challenges of one enure to the benefit of all. State v. Ford, 37 La. Ann. 448; State v. Durein, 29 Kan. 688, a case of misdemeanor; State v. Stoughton, 51 Vt. 362; Cruce v. State, 59 Ga. 83. In many jurisdictions the matter has been defined by statutes requiring that defendants jointly indicted shall join in their challenges. In others the statute gives the separate number to each de Where some of the petit jurors were absent and a jury was called from those who appeared, it was too late for the defendant to challenge the array because it was not made up from all who were summoned to appear. State v. Miller, 53 Iowa, 84. An irregularity in the drawing of the jurors which cannot affect the right of the prisoner is not ground for challenge to the array. Ferris v. Peo-fendant. A defendant charged in an indictment, ple, 35 N. Y. 125, 48 Barb. 17, 1 Abb. Pr. N. S. 193; Friery v. People, 2 Keyes, 424, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 215, 54 Barb. 319. Not good ground that the panel was certified by the deputy clerk. People v. Fuller, 2 Park, Crim. Rep. 16. Or on the ground that a certain class of persons were excluded in the selection of grand jurors. People v. Jewett, 3 Wend. 314. Good ground for challenge, that certain jurors had not been duly summoned. McCloskey v. People, 5 Park, Crim. Rep. 308. Mode of selecting and relieving jurors when liable to challenge to the array. Gardiner v. People, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. 155. It is no cause for challenge to the array that two sets of jurors were drawn at the same time from the jury box for two distinct courts, if they be kept entirely separate. Crane v. Dygert, 4 Wend. 675. Nor that the panel was drawn more than fourteen days before the sitting of the court. Crane v. Dygert, supra. A challenge to the array, if not made before the Jurors are sworn, is waived. New York v. Mason, 4 E. D. Smith, 142, 1 Abb. Pr. 344. The district attorney need not verify his answer to the challenge to the array. Gardiner v. People, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. 155. in separate counts, with separate misdemeanors of a kindred character, is not entitled to more challenges than under a single count. State v. Skinner, 34 Ark. 256; Smith v. State, 8 Lea, 386. Peremptory challenges are not usually allowed in a struck jury. Thomp. Trials, § 43. But in McDermott v. Hoffman, 70 Pa. 31, both challenges for cause and peremptory challenges were held permissible in a struck jury. Relationship to the ninth degree is good ground for challenge. State v. Walton, 74 Mo. 270; Hardy v. Sprowle. 32 Me. 310; Wirebach v. First Nat. Bank, 97 Pa. 543, 39 Am. Rep. 821; Moody v. Griffin, 65 Ga. 304. Jurors who would be incompetent because related to the parties are equally incompetent when related to counsel whose conditional fees entitle them by contract to a part of the recovery. Melson v. Dickson, 63 Ga. 682, 36 Am. Rep. 128. A property holder and resident of a municipality which is a party to the action in general, is not incompetent unless he has a direct pecuniary interest in the result. Omaha v. Cane, 15 Neb. 657; Russel v. Hamilton, 3 Ill. 56; Jefferson County v. Lewis, 20 Fla. 980; Phillips v. State, 29 Ga. 105; Kemper v. Louisville, 14 Bush, 87. A member of a religious denomination is not thereby precluded from sitting as a juror in a case 105 *Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered [141 the opinion of the court: In United States v. Coppersmith, 4 Fed. Rep. | leave to submit the case without argument to 198, in which it was held that under U. S. Rev. the judgment of the court. Stat. § 819, one charged with uttering and passing counterfeit coin was entitled to but three challenges, on the ground that this offense was not a felony within the terms of said section, Judge Hammond said that the defendant is entitled to ten challenges, "where Congress does not define an offense, but simply punishes it by its common-law name, and at commonlaw it is a felony This principle was followed in United States v. Daubner, 17 Fed. Rep. 793, in which it was held that the offenses described in U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5438, 4746, are not felonies, and that a defendant charged with them is only entitled to three peremptory challenges. Investigation has not disclosed any adjudica tion of this question, but in view of what is above set out we are constrained to the opinion that the trial judge erred, and therefore beg where a church organization of the same denomination, of which he is not a member, is a party. Barton v. Erickson, 14 Neb. 164; Burdine v. Grand Lodge, 1 Ala. Sel. Cas. 385. An employee of one of the parties to an action is incompetent to sit as a juror in the trial thereof. Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. v. Mask, 64 Miss. 738; Hubbard v. Rutledge, 57 Miss. 7; Gunter v. Graniteville Mfg. Co. 18 S. C. 262, 44 Am. Rep. 573; Central R. Co. v. Mitchell, 63 Ga. 173. A person who has sat as a juror in a former trial of the same case is thereby rendered incompetent. Dunn v. State, 7 Tex. App. 600; Jacobs v. State, 9 Tex. App. 278. But in the absence of a statute, prior service in a similar cause involving the same general considerations does not necessarily disqualify. Chariton Plow Co. v. Deusch, 16 Neb. 384. A grand juror of the panel who found a bill is not a competent juror to try the case. Greenwood v. State, 34 Tex. 334. It is not ground for rejecting a juror that he has an unfriendly feeling toward one of the attorneys engaged in the trial. Hutchinson v. State, 19 Neb. 262. A juror in a liquor case is incompetent if he says that he would allow less weight to the testimony of defendant than he would allow to it were be not engaged in that business. Stoots v. State, 108 Ind. 415. Contra, see Elliott v. State, 73 Ind. 10; Shields v. State, 95 Ind. 299. The expression or existence of prejudice against crime is no ground of challenge. State v. Burns, 85 Mo. 47. A juror cannot be asked, upon his voire dire, in a slander suit, whether he has any bias against such suits; as, if so, it does not disqualify him. Young v. Bridges, 34 La. Ann. 333. Prejudice against the defense of insanity is generally no ground for challenge. People v. Carpenter, 38 Hun, 490, 102 N. Y. 238; Butler v. State, 97 Ind. 378. In an action on a policy of insurance upon the life of one who committed suicide, a juror having said that he should consider the fact that a man had committed suicide to be some evidence of insanity, was held not to be a ground of challenge. Hagadorn v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 22 Hun, 249. Persons with conscientious scruples against the death penalty are incompetent jurors in capital cases. People v. Majors, 65 Cal. 138, 52 Am. Rep. 295; State v. Hing, 16 Nev. 307; Kennedy v. State, 19 Tex. App. 618. As stated by counsel for the United States, plaintiff in error was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life under an indictment for robbing a mail carrier of the United States of a registered mail package, which charged that in effecting such robbery he put in jeopardy the life of the carrier by the use of dangerous weapons; and was based on the following section of the Revised Statutes: "Sec. 5472. Any person who shall rob any carrier, agent, or other person intrusted with the mail, of such mail, or any part thereof, shall be punishable by imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years and not more than ten years; and if convicted a second time of a like offense, or if, in effecting such rob | convict a murderer to be hanged is incompetent. But a juror is not incompetent because he is a witness in the case. Bell. State, 44 Ala. 393. The expression of an opinion does not disqualify unless it appears that the statement was founded upon what purports to be evidence that has been or will be introduced on the trial, or upon conversation with witnesses. Johnson v. State, 11 Lea, 47; Guetig v. State, 66 Ind. 94, 32 Am. Rep. 99; Pender v. People, 18 Hun, 560; Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430; Ulrich v. People, 39 Mich. 245; State v. Wilson, 85 Mo. 134; State v. Reed, 89 Mo. 168; State v. Hayden, 51 Vt. 296; State v. Meyer, 58 Vt. 457; 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 355. If the crime charged be punishable with death, and the juror entertains such conscientious opin1ons as would preclude his finding the defendant guilty, he shall neither be permitted nor compelled to serve as a juror. People v. Carolin, 115 N. Y. 658; People v. Damon, 13 Wend. 351; People v. Ryan, 2 Wheel. Crim. Cas. 47; Walter v. People, 32 N. Y. 147, Affirming 6 Park. Crim. Rep. 15; People v. Jones, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 112; People v. Thomas, 8 Alb. L. J. 210; Gordon v. People, 33 N. Y. 511, 512; O'Brien v. People, 36 N. Y. 276, 3 Abb. Pr. N. S. 371, atfirming 48 Barb. 274; Lowenberg v. People, 5 Park. Crim. Rep. 425; People v. Wilson, 3 Park. Crim. Rep. 199; 1 Thomp. Trials, 8 74 et seq. That a juror's father had married the defendant's brother's widow is no ground of principal challenge. Cain v. Ingham, 7 Cow. 478; Eggleston v. Smithby, 17 Johns. 133. Upon a challenge of the district attorney to a juror, the latter said, on his examination, that he would not convict on circumstantial evidence. Held, that the challenge was properly sustained. People v. Ah Chung, 54 Cal. 402. One who is exempted from jury duty may waive his privilege and legally act as a juror. United States v. Lee, 4 Mackey, 498, 54 Am. Rep. 293; Green A juror who will not, on circumstantial evidence, v. State, 59 Md. 123, 43 Am. Rep. 542. bery the first time, the robber shall wound the person having custody of the mail, or put his life in jeopardy by the use of dangerous weapons, such offender shall be punishable by imprisonment at hard labor for the term of his natural life." interstate passengers and the United States mail over an interstate highway established by authority of Congress, to delay the transportation of such passengers and mails by turning aside from the direct interstate route, and running to a station 3 miles away from a point on that route and back again to the same point, because such station is the county-seat, for the interstate travel to and from which the railroad company furnishes other and ample accommodation, is an unconstitutional interference with and obstruction of interstate commerce and of the passage of the mails. In the course of impaneling the jury.plaintiff in error challenged three persons peremptorily, and afterwards challenged one Harris peremptorily, but the court held he was entitled to only three peremptory challenges, which he had exhausted, and overruled the challenge, to which action of the court an exception was duly taken. Harris was then sworn on the jury and sat as a member thereof on the trial. Argued April 14, 15, 1896. Decided May 18, Four other persons were likewise separately challenged peremptorily, the challenges overruled, exceptions taken, and they served on the jury. If plaintiff in error was entitled to ten peremptory challenges, five persons unlawfully took part as jurors in his conviction. U. S. Rev. Stat. § 819, provides: "When the offense charged is treason or a capital offense, the defendant shall be entitled to twenty and the United States to five peremptory challenges. On the trial of any other felony, the defendant shall be entitled to ten and the United States to three peremptory chal142] lenges; and in all other cases, civil and criminal, each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges; and in all cases where there are several defendants or several plaintiffs, the parties on each side shall be deemed a single party for the purpose of all challenges under this section. All challenges, whether to the array or panel, or to individual jurors for cause or favor, shall be tried by the court without the aid of triers." Counsel concedes that at common law "robbery" was a felony, and that the word "rob" in the statute was used in its common-law sense, and therefore admits that the errors assigned in respect of the action of the court in overruling these challenges are well taken. We concur in this view. Other rulings of the court are questioned in the brief of plaintiff in error, but it is quite improbable that they will occur on another trial and we need not pass upon them. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded with a direction to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. [No. 217.] 1896. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois to review a judgment of that court affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court of Alexander County, Illinois, granting a writ of mandamus in an action by the People of the State of Illinois, ex rel. W. N. Butler, against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, defendant, commanding the defendant to cause its south-bound fast mail train and all other passenger trains coming into Cairo to run to its passenger station at the intersection of Ohio Levee and Second streets in Cairo to receive and let off passengers. Reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings. See same case below, 143 Ill. 434, 19 L. R. A. 119. Statement by Mr. Justice Gray: This was a petition for a writ of mandamus, based upon Ill. Rev. Stat. 1889, chap. 114, § 88, which is as follows: "Every railroad corporation shall cause its passenger trains to stop upon its arrival at each station advertised by such corporation as a place for receiving and discharging passengers upon and from such trains, a sufficient length of time to receive and let off such passengers with safety: Provided, all regular passenger trains shall stop a sufficient length of time at the railroad station of county-seats to receive and let off passengers with safety." The petition was filed April 17, 1891, in the circuit court for Alexander county in the state of Illinois, by the county attorney in behalf of the state, alleging that the Illinois Central Railroad Company ran its south bound fast mail train through the city of Cairo, 2 miles ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COM- north of its station in that city, and over a PANY, Pl. in Err., V. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ex rel. W. N. BUTLER. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 142-154.) bridge across the Ohio river connecting its road with other roads south of that river, without stopping at its station in Cairo; and praying for a writ of mandamus to compel it to cause all its passenger trains, coming into Cairo, to be brought down to that station and Obstruction of interstate commerce and of the there stop a sufficient length of time to receive mails. and let off passengers with safety. The defendant contended that the statute did not require its fast mail train to be run to and stopped at its station in Cairo, and that the statute was contrary to the Constitution of the *United States, as interfering with in [144 terstate commerce, and with the carrying of the United States mails. By the act of Congress of September 20, 1850, chap. 61, entitled "An Act Granting the Right of Way and Making a Grant of Land to the 107 States of Illinois, Mississippi, and Alabama, in | the statute of Illinois of February 17, 1851, Aid of the Construction of a Railroad from that act of Congress was expressly "accepted, Chicago to Mobile," the right of way through and the conditions expressed in said act are the public lands, with the right to take earth, hereby agreed to and made obligatory upon stones, and timber necessary for the construc- the state of Illinois." Ill. Gen. Laws 1851, p. tion of the road, was "granted to the state of 192. Illinois for the construction of a railroad from By the statute of Illinois of February 2, the southern terminus of the Illinois & Michi-1855, "all railroad companies incorporated or gan Canal to a point at or near the junction of organized under, or which may be incorporated the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, with a branch or organized under, the authority of the laws of of the same to Chicago, on Lake Michigan, this state, shall have power to make such conand another via the town of Galena, in said tracts and arrangements with each other, and state to Dubuque, in the state of Iowa;" and a with railroad corporations of other states, for copy of the survey of the road and branches, leasing or running their roads, or any part made under direction of the legislature, was thereof; and also to contract for and hold, in required to be forwarded to the proper land fee simple or otherwise, lands or buildings in office, and to the general land office in the this or other states for depot purposes; and also city of Washington. By §§ 2-4 alternate to purchase and hold such personal property, sections of land on each side of the road were as shall be necessary and convenient for carrygranted to the state of Illinois, "subject to the ing into effect the object of this act;" and "shall disposal of the legislature thereof, for the pur- have the right of connecting with each other, poses aforesaid, and no other; and the said rail- and with the railroads of other *states, [146 road and branches shall be and remain a public on such terms as shall be mutually agreed upon highway, for the use of the government of the by the companies interested in such connecUnited States, free from toll or other charge tion." And by the statute of Illinois of Febupon the transportation of any property or ruary 25, 1867, "railroads terminating or to troops of the United States." By & 6 "the terminate at any point on any line of continuUnited States mail shall at all times be trans- ous railroad thoroughfare, where there now is ported on the said railroad, under the direc- or shall be a railroad bridge for crossing of tion of the Postoffice Department, at such price passengers and freight in cars over the same as the Congress may by law direct." And by as part of such thoroughfare, shall make con§7 "in order to aid in the continuation of said venient connections of such railroads, by rail, Central Railroad from the mouth of the Ohio with the rail of such bridge; and such bridge river to the city of Mobile," similar grants of shall permit and cause such connections of the "rights, privileges, and liabilities," and of rail of the same with the rail of such railroads, so lands, were made "to the states of Alabama that by reason of such railroads and bridge there and Mississippi respectively, for the purpose of shall be uninterrupted communication over aiding in the construction of a railroad from such railroads and bridge as public thoroughsaid city of Mobile to a point near the mouth fares; but by such connections no corporate of the Ŏhio river." 9 Stat. at L. 466. rights shall be impaired.” 2 Starr & C.¡Stat. pp. 1921, 1922. The legislature of Illinois, by the statute of February 10, 1851, incorporated the Illinois Central Railroad Company, and empowered it "to survey, locate, construct, complete, alter, 145]*maintain, and operate a railroad, with one or more tracks, from the southern terminus of the Illinois & Michigan Canal to a point at the city of Cairo, with a branch of the same to the city of Chicago, on Lake Michigan, and also a branch via the city of Galena to a point on the Mississippi river opposite the town of Dubuque, in the state of Iowa;" and by § 15, for that purpose only, ceded and granted to that corporation the right of way and lands granted to the state by the act of Congress, of September 20, 1850; and required "the main trunk thereof, or central line, to run from the city of Cairo to the southern termination of the Illinois & Michigan Canal," "and nowhere departing more than 17 miles from a straight line between" those two points; and required the corporation to mortgage said right of way and lands to the state of Illinois to secure the application of the proceeds of those lands to the constructing, completing, equipping, and furnishing said road and branches, in accordance with the terms of this act and said act of Congress;" and by § 19 declared "said road and branches to be free for the use of the United States, and to be employed by the Postoffice Department, as provided in said act of Congress." Ill. Priv. Laws 1851, pp. 61, 66, 68, 71. And by § 3 of By the act of Congress of June 15, 1866, chap. 124, entitled “An Act to Facilitate Commercial, Postal, and Military Communication among the Several States," and having this preamble, "Whereas the Constitution of the United States confers upon Congress, in express terms, the power to regulate commerce among the several states, to establish_postroads, and to raise and support armies: Therefore" it is enacted "that every railroad company in the United States, whose road is operated by steam, its successors and assigns, be and is hereby authorized to carry upon and over its road, boats, bridges, and ferries, all passengers, troops, government supplies, mails. freight, and property on their way from any state to another state, and to receive compensation therefor, and to connect with roads of other states so as to form continuous lines for the transportation_of the same to the place of its destination: Provided, that this act shall not affect any stipulation between the government of the United States and any railroad company for transportation or fares without compensation, nor impair or change the conditions imposed by the terms of any act granting lands to any such company to aid in the construction of its road; nor shall it be construed to authorize any railroad company to build any new road, or connection with any other road, without authority from the state in which *said [147 railroad or connection may be proposed;" and "that Congress may at any time alter, amend, | avoid obstructing navigation, required the ap or repeal this act." 14 Stat. at L. 66. By the act of Congress of December 17, 1872, chap. 4, amended by the supplementary act of February 14, 1883, chap. 44, "any person or corporation, having lawful authority therefor may hereafter erect bridges across the Ohio river, for railroad or other uses, upon compliance with the provisions and requirements of this act," among which are that they shall be built of a certain height above low-water mark, and at places and according to plans approved by the Secretary of War; and any bridge constructed under and according to this act is declared to be a lawful structure, to be recognized and known as a post route, and for the transmission over which of the mails, the troops, and the munitions of war of the United States, no higher charge is to be made than the rate per mile over the railroads or public highways leading to it, and across which the United States are to have the right of way for postal telegraph purposes. 17 Stat. at L. 398; 22 Stat. at L. 414. The city of Cairo is situated upon the point of land at the junction of the Mississippi and the Ohio rivers, and is surrounded by high levees to protect it from the river floods; and since 1859 has been a county-seat. In 1855, the defendant completed the location and building of its road, and laid and since maintained its track to the bank of the Ohio river, then tak ing a sharp turn westward, and passing, in the city of Cairo, for the distance of 2 miles along the Ohio levee embankment, to a place, less than half a mile from the junction of the waters of the two rivers, and at the intersection of Second and Ohio Levee streets, where its only passenger station in Cairo was established; and until a few months before the filing of the petition ran all its passenger trains to and from that station, and made it the southern terminus of its railroad. By the statute of Kentucky of March 29, 1886, chap. 446, the Chicago, St. Louis, & New Orleans Railroad Company and the Illinois Central Railroad Company were authorized "jointly, or either of them separately, to build, erect, construct, and forever maintain, use, 148] and operate a railroad bridge *over and across the Ohio river from the Kentucky shore, in Ballard county, opposite the city of Cairo, to any point in the city of Cairo, Illinois," conformably to the conditions and limitations of the acts of Congress of 1872 and 1883, above cited. Pursuant to that statute, the Chicago, St. Louis, & New Orleans Railroad Company, into which various railroad corporations had been consolidated by statutes of the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky, and whose line extended from New Orleans to the Ohio river, built a bridge across the Ohio river to low-water mark on the Illinois side, to which the jurisdiction of the state of Kentucky extended. Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479 [34: 329]. The north end of this bridge was at that part of Cairo about 2 miles north of the defendant's station in that city; and the peculiar conformation of the land and water made it impracticable to put it nearer to the junction of the two rivers. The height at which the bridge had to be built, in order to proaches on both banks to be graded. The approach on the Illinois side was built by the defendant, upon its own land, at the grade of 35 feet to a mile, and beginning 14 miles off, at Bridge Junction, beyond the corporate limits of Cairo. After this bridge was built, and the defendant's road was thereby connected with the Chicago, St. Louis, & New Orleans Railroad, the defendant put on a daily fast mail train, to run from Chicago to New Orleans, carrying passengers, as well as the United States mail, not going to or stopping at its station in Cairo, but connecting, at a point some 9 miles out on the main line, with a short train from that station. Trains passing over the through route from Chicago to New Orleans, and stopping at Cairo, are obliged to leave the main line at Bridge Junction, and to run down 34 miles to the Cairo station, and back to the same point on the main line. Six regular passenger trains were so run daily, giving adequate accommodations for passengers to or from Cairo. The defendant offered to prove that the schedule of *running time of the fast mail train[149 had been fixed by the Postoffice Department of the United States, and could not be changed by the defendant. The court excluded the evidence, "for the reason that it is not competent for the defendant to enter into the contract with the government of the United States, whereby it renders itself incapable of complying with the laws of Illinois;" and allowed an exception to this ruling. The court granted a writ of mandamus, commanding the defendant to cause its south bound fast mail train, and all its other passenger trains coming into Cairo, to be run or brought down to its passenger station at the intersection of Ohio Levee and Second streets, and there to be stopped a sufficient length of time to receive and let off passengers with safety. The defendant appealed to the supreme court of the state, which affirmed the judgment; and held that the statute of Illinois concerning the stopping of trains obliged the defendant to cause its fast mail train to be taken into its station at Cairo, and to be stopped there long enough to receive and let off passengers with safety; and that the statute so construed, was not an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce, or with the carrying of the United States mails. 143 Ill. 434, 19 L. R. A. 119. The defendant sued out this writ of error. Messrs. James Fentress and William H. Green for plaintiff in error. Messrs. John M. Lansden and Angus Leek for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court: The line of railroad communication crossing the Ohio river at Cairo, and of which the Illinois Central Railroad forms part, has been established by Congress as a national highway for the accommodation of interstate commerce and of the mails of the United States, and as such has been recognized and promoted by the |