SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

both in England and in this country, that torts | short distance from the dock, he must have OCT. TERM, originating within the waters of a foreign known that a diver had been engaged in the power may be the subject of a suit in a do- work of raising the sunken dredge, although mestic court. The authorities upon this sub- he testifies that he could not say that he saw ject are fully reviewed in an exhaustive opin- the diver at work, and did not remember being ion by the late Judge Emmons in the case of informed that the dredge was broken into The Avon, Brown, Adm. 170, wherein juris pieces, which were scattered about in several diction was taken of a collision occurring places in the slip. He could hardly have failed upon the Welland canal in Canada. To the to observe that no vessel had been moored on same effect are Smith v. Condry, 42 U. S. 1 that side of the slip since the dredge sank. How. 28 [11:35]: The Ticonderoga, Swab. Adm. He denies that he had seen any of the buoys 215; The Griefswald, Swab. Adm. 430; The which had been placed to mark the position of Diana, Lush. Adm. 539; The Courier, Lush. the sunken dredge, and says *that he took[287 Adm. 451; The Halley, L. R. 2 Adm. & Eccl. it for granted that the railroad company, having 3, L. R. 2 P. C. 193; The Mali Ivo, L. R. 2 had a diver at work on the sunken dredge for Adm. & Eccl. 356; The M. Moxham, L. R. 1 several days, knew whether this berth was safe Prob. Div. 43, 107. for a safe berth, and supposed that the wreck or not; that he relied upon their knowledge was on the north side of the slip where he saw the dredge sink. It appears, however, that operations for raising the wreck had been progressing for about three weeks prior to the arrival of the Stroma.

Indeed, large numbers of collisions arise upon the Canadian side of the St. Clair, De troit, and St. Lawrence rivers, which would not be cognizable in our courts, if the general proposition claimed by the appellant were true, since by the treaty between this country and Great Britain the boundary line is located in or near the center of the river.

Had both parties to the libel been foreigners, it might have been within the discretion of the court to decline jurisdiction of the case, though the better opinion is that, even under those circumstances, the court will take cognizance of torts to which both parties are foreigners: at least in the absence of a protest from a foreign consul. The Maggie Hammond v. Moreland ("The Maggie Hammond"), 76_U. S. 9 Wall. 435 [19:772]: The Belgenland v. Jensen, 114 U. S. 286]355 [29: 152]; *The Courier, Lush. Adm. 541; The Havana, 1 Sprague, 402; The Invincible, 2 Gall. 29; The Johann Friederick, 1 W. Rob. Adm. 35; The Charkieh, L. R. 4 Adm. & Eccl. 120; The Vivar, L. R. 2 Prob. Div. 29; The Anne Johanne, 2 Stuart, Vice Adm. 521; Thomassen v. Whitwell, 9 Ben. 113; Chubb v. Hamburg-American Packet Co. 39 Fed. Rep.

431.

3. Was there any negligence on the part of the respondent, or, to state was there any negligence with respect to the more accurately, libellant, or of which it was entitled to complain?

The owners of the Stroms were represented at Colon by one Andrews, who was acting as the agent for William Warriner, the regular agent of the West India & Pacific Steamship Company, and the consignee at Colon of the Stroma. Learning that the steamer was about to arrive, Andrews wrote to Mr. Abello, the harbor master of the port and the freight agent of the Panama Company, asking him that a berth be assigned to the Stroma, which was expected to arrive in a day or two. reply, Mr. Abello came to him in person, and, In as Abello says, told him the West Indian, also expected, could go to No. 1 wharf, but that he had no berth for the Stroma. Mr. Andrews suggested to him that the seaward end of the north side of No. 2 wharf might be a suitable place, and Abello assented to his putting her there. Andrews admits that he had seen the dredge sink in the slip, but claims that "at the time it sunk it was lying close to No. 1 wharf, to which it had been moored," the distance between the two wharves being about 150 feet. As his office was opposite Abello's, and but a 1006

As she

The steamer arrived at about 8 o'clock in boat sent out by the agent of the company to the morning of December 31, was met by a direct her to the dock, and was ordered by the man in charge to go to pier No. 2, and find a berth on the north side of the wharf. As the steamer approached, the company's flag was displayed from the corner of the wharf, indicating the position she should take. neared the wharf, Andrews spoke to the officer in charge, reminding him of the dredge being there, pointing him in the direction, and then called out to the captain "hug in close to the wharf, and you will clear the wreck." The testimony of the supercargo of the Stroma was that, as the steamer swung along parallel with the pier, Andrews called out to the captain "to be very careful in backing up the dock and not permit the stern of the ship to swing out into the dock, as there was a sunken run foul of;" and that similar instructions dredge somewhere up the dock that it might the railroad company, who was standing on were given by Mr. Commager, an employee of the dock awaiting her arrival.

mager himself, who swears that, when he
This testimony is corroborated by Com-
Andrews of the danger, saying: "I suppose
went down to meet the steamer, he reminded
you have not forgotten about that dredge,'
pointing out its position, and that Andrews
did not answer him, but spoke to some officer
of the boat, calling out and reminding him of
the dredge being there. This testimony is
also corroborated by that of the witness
Muller, also an employee of the railroad com-
mager. It would appear that at this time the
pany, who heard the conversation with Com-
buoys which had been placed to mark the
position of the wreck were still visible-at
*least four witnesses swore to that effect, [288
and there was practically nothing to contradict
them. But as they do not seem to have been
at all conspicuous we do not think that negli-
gence can
observing them.
be imputed to anyone for not

agent, to provide a berth for the Stroma and
Had the respondent undertaken, through its
see that she was properly moored, it would
probably have been responsible for this acci-

|

in equity seeking such dissolution and asking
that defendants be enjoined from continuing in
a like combination, and from further conspiring,
agreeing, combining, or acting together to main-
tain rates of freight, does not prevent this court.
from taking cognizance of an appeal and deciding
the case on its merits, where the judgment of
this court is sought upon the legality of their
agreement and defendants claim it to be legal
and necessary, and on dissolving such association
entered into and acted upon another similar
agreement.

2 Where parties have entered into an illegal agree-
ment and are acting under it, and there is no ade-
quate remedy at law, and the jurisdiction of the
court has attached by the filing of a bill to restrain
such or any like action under a similar agreement,
and a trial has been had and judgment entered, the
appellate jurisdiction of this court is not ousted
by a simple dissolution of the association, ef-
fected subsequently to the entry of judgment in
the suit.

3. A stipulation between the parties, while not controlling as to the amount in controversy on

nishes rules of interpretation in law as well as in public and social transactions; exceptions and qualifications; accustomed sense and usage,-see note to Millard v. Lawrence, 14: 925.

As to when "may" means "must" or "shall;" when a power for public purposes is conferred, a duty arises to execute that power,-see note to Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, 7: 47.

Illegal contracts; monopolies; restraint of trade; trade combinations; corporate trusts and combinations; stockholding corporations.

Whatever tends to injustice or oppression, restraint of liberty, commerce, and natural or legal right; whatever tends to the obstruction of justice, or to the violation of a statute; and whatever is against good morals, when made the object of a contract.-is against public policy, and therefore void, and not susceptible of enforcement. 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 880, citing Smith v. Arnold, 106 Mass. 289; Durgin v. Dyer, 68 Me. 143; Burkholder v. Beetem, 65 Pa. 496; Pierce v. Evans, 61 Pa. 415; Bank of United States v. Owens, 27 U. S. 2 Pet. 527 (7: 508); Bishop v. Palmer, 146 Mass. 469, 474.

A contract may be illegal though fair on its face. Riley v. Jordan, 122 Mass. 231.

The object of a contract may be against public policy so as to render it void, though the contracting parties may have had no criminal or unlawful animus. Saratoga County Bank v. King, 44 N. Y. 87.

Though a party imposed upon may have relief against a wrong-intending party, yet the object of the contract, if against public policy, cannot be achieved. Quirk v. Thomas, 6 Mich. 76; Suit v. Woodhall, 113 Mass. 391; Wright v. Crabbs, 78 Ind. 487; Harrington v. United States ("The Distilled Spirits") 78 U. S. 11 Wall. 356 (20: 167); Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U. S. 12 Wall. 342 (20: 439).

A contract void against public policy because inhibited by statute does not become valid by reason of the subsequent repeal of the statute. It can neither be cured by a later statute nor by a supplemental agreement made after the repeal, by which the promise first given without lawful consideration is sought to be renewed. Banchor v. Mansel, 47 Me. 58; Robinson v. Barrows, 48 Me. 186; Webber v. Howe, 38 Mich. 150, 24 Am. Rep. 590; Ludlow v. Hardy, 38 Mich. 690; Anding v. Levy, 57 Miss. 51, 34 Am. Rep. 435; Decell v. Lewenthal, 57 Miss. 331, 34 Am. Rep. 449; Gilliland v. Phillips, 1 S. C. 152; King v. Winants, 71 N. C. 469, 17 Am. Rep. 11, and 73 N. C. 563; Wilson v. Bozeman, 48 Ala. 71; Cate v. Blair, 6 Coldw. 639; Pierce v. Kibbee, 51 Vt. 559;

|

appeal, may be regarded in a particular case with other facts appearing in the record as sufficient proof of the amount in controversy to sustain the jurisdiction of this court.

The amount involved on an appeal exceeds $1,000 where the bill seeks a dissolution of an association of common carriers for the regulation of rates, when those rates exceed $1,000 per day, and the carriers claim that such an association or something similar thereto is necessary to the prosperity, if not the life, of each company.

5. A contract between competing railroads relating to traffic rates for the transportation of articles of commerce between the states, the direct effect of which is to produce a restraint of trade or commerce, is within the provision of the act of Congress of July 2, 1890, declaring that every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, is illegal.

6. Competing and nonconnecting railroads are not authorized by the commerce act to make an

Everingham v. Meighan, 55 Wis. 354; Petrel Guano
Co. v. Jarnette, 25 Fed. Rep. 675.

An agreement in general or total restraint of trade is void, although it may be founded on a legal and valuable consideration. An agreement not to carry on a certain business anywhere is invalid, whether it be by parol or speciality, or whether it be for a limited or unlimited time. Story, Cont. $650; Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 190; Homer v. Ashford, 3 Bing. 323: Pierce v. Fuiler, 8 Mass. 223, 5 Am. Dec. 102; Nobles v. Bates, 7 Cow. 307: Morris v. Colman, 18 Ves. Jr. 437; Hinde v. Gray, 1 Man. & G. 195; Alger v. Thacher, 19 Pick. 51, 31 Am. Dec. 119; Chappell v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 159, Dunlop v. Gregory, 10 N. Y. 244, 61 Am. Dec. 746; Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 El. & Bl. 47; Rousillon v. Rousillon, L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 351; Dean v. Emerson, 102 Mass. 480; Ross v. Sadgbeer, 21 Wend. 166.

Contracts in partial restraint of trade, limited as to time and territory, founded on a reasonable consideration confined to particular persons, are valid. Rannie v. Irvine, 7 Man. & G. 976; Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157; Hartley v. Cummings, 5 C. B. 247; Bunn v. Guy, 4 East. 190; Pierce v. Woodward. 6 Pick. 206; Perkins v. Lyman, 9 Mass. 522; Hayward v. Young, 2 Chit. 407; Mallan v. May, 11 Mees. & W. 653; Wickens v. Evans, 3 Younge & J. 318; Lawrence v. Kidder, 10 Barb. 641; Arnot v. Pittston & E. Coal Co. 68 N. Y. 558, 23 Am. Rep. 190; Dean v. Emerson, 102 Mass. 480; Richardson v. Peacock, 33 N. J. Eq. 597; Guerand v. Dandelet, 32 Md. 561, 3 Am. Rep. 164; Warfield v. Booth, 33 Md. 63; Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St. 519.

All combinations between merchants,speculators. or any class of men to elevate or depress the market are injurious to the public interest and in restraint of trade. When such a purpose is apparent in a contract, it strikes the agreement with nullity. Fairbank v. Leary, 40 Wis. 637; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & M. R. Co. 72 Ill. 360; Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346, 22 Am. Rep. 171; Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666.

When several corporations combine to do certain business, under the general management of a committee, which, representing all the corporations, is to have charge of the property, machinery, etc., of all; and when the profits thus earned are to be divided between the parties to the combination,-they thus constitute a partnership of corporations, not a mere "traffic arrangement." Such contract of partnership is ultra vires and void, unless duly authorized by statute. Mallory v. Hanaur Oil Works, 86 Tenn. 598; Grain Elevator Co. v. Memphis & C. R. Co. 85 Tenn. 703; Thomas v. West Jersey R. Co. 101 166 U. S

agreement of maintenance of rates and the curbing of competition.

7. Debates in Congress are not appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the language of a statute passed by that body.

8. All combinations in restraint of trade or commerce are prohibited by the act of Congress of July 2, 1890, whether they are in the form of trusts or in any other form whatever.

9. The above-mentioned act of July 2, 1890, covers and was intended to cover common carriers by railroad.

10. The words "unlawful restraints and monopolies," in the title of the act of Congress of July 2, 1890, do not show that the purpose of the act was to include only contracts which were unlawful at common law, but refer to and include those restraints and monopolies which are made unlawful in the body of the act.

11. The term "contract in restraint of trade," as used in the act of Congress of July 2, 1890, does not refer only to contracts which were invalid at common law, but includes every contract in re

U. S. 71 (25: 950); Whittenton Mills v. Upton, 10
Gray, 582, 71 Am. Dec. 681.

A corporation can exercise no other powers than such as are specifically granted, or such as are necessary for carrying into effect the powers granted. Vandall v. South San Francisco Dock Co. 40 Cal. 83; Tuomas v. West Jersey R. Co. 101 U. S. 71 (25: 950); Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Oregonian R. Co. 130 U. S. 1 (32: 837); Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co. 139 U. S. 24 (35: 55); Morawetz, Priv. Corp. § 316.

A contract between corporations organized to distribute and furnish water to consumers in a county and city, one of which owns a supply of water and a pipe line ending at the city limits, and the other a distributing plant within the city, for co-operation in supplying water to the city and providing a method of determining the price of water, is not in violation of public policy as a monopoly for its sale, as the California Constitution reserves to municipal corporations the power of regulating water rates. San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego Flume Co. 108 Cal. 549, 29 L. R. A. 839.

straint of trade, and is not limited to that kind of a contract which is in unreasonable restraint of trade.

12. It is a matter of common knowledge that agreements as to rates have been continually made of late years between railroad companies, and that complaints of each company in regard to the violation of such agreements by its rivals have been frequent and persistent.

13. The right of a railroad company to charge reasonable rates does not include the right to enter into a combination with competing roads to maintain reasonable rates.

14. The public policy of the government is to be found in its statutes, and when they have not directly spoken, then in the decisions of the courts and the constant practice of the government officials; but when the law-making power speaks on a particular subject over which it has constitutional power to legislate, public policy in such a case is what the statute enacts.

An agreement between corporations engaged in the manufacture of cotton-seed oil, to select a committee composed of representatives from each corporation, and to turn over to this committee the properties and machinery of each company, to be managed and operated for a specified term by the committee, for the common benefit, the profits and losses to be shared in agreed proportions, is not a mere "traffic arrangement," but a contract of partnership which is ultra vires and consequently void so far as it is unexecuted, even though it be authorized by both shareholders and directors. Mallory v. Hanaur Oil Works, 86 Tenn. 598.

A contract between an individual and three manufacturers under several patents, forming a combination of the parties with a view to regulate competition between the parties to it in the sale of the particular commodity which they severally make, is a contract for a lawful purpose, where it does not refer to an article of prime necessity, to a staple of commerce, or to a merchandise to be bought or sold on the market. Central Shade Roller Co. v. Cushman, 143 Mass. 353.

An agreement between several commercial firms, by which they bound themselves for the term of three months not to sell any India cotton bagging,

A patentee may secure and protect his monopoly in any lawful way, by suit against infringers, by purchase of conflicting devices, by compromise or arrangements with competitors when infringe-except with the consent of a majority of their ments may be doubtful, and may contract with a rival to secure it in the monopoly of the manufacture which the patent affects. Bonsack Mach. Co. v. Smith, 70 Fed. Rep. 383, 73 Pat. Off. Gaz. 963.

number, was held unlawful in India Bagging Asso. v. Kock, 14 La. Ann. 164. Other cases that may be properly cited in connection with this as being in support of the general principle therein applied, Although there may be no direct constitutional although the particular facts involved in them are provisions against a monopoly, yet the whole theory different, are Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346, 22 of a free government is opposed to such grants, Am. Rep. 171; Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 and it does not require even the aid which may Ohio St. 666; Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 434, 49 Am. be derived from the Bill of Rights the 1st section of | Dec. 282; Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co. 68 which declares "that no man or set of men is en- Pa. 173; Arnot v. Pittston & E. Coal Co. 68 N. Y. titled to the exclusive public emoluments or privi-558, 23 Am. Rep. 190. leges from the community," to render them void. 4 Bac. Abr. 764. tit. Monopoly: 4 Bl. Com. 160; 3 Coke. Inst. 181; Butchers' Benevolent Asso. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. (*Slaughter House Cases") 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 102 (21: 417).

A manufacturing corporation which instead of manufacturing its product and disposing of it to the public on what might be fair competitive prices, becomes a party to a combination in part at least designed to create a monopoly and exact from the public prices which could not be otherwise obtained, is liable to have its charter vacated and annulled for such subversion of the object for which it was created. People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co. 54 Hun, 354, 5 L. R. A. 886.

A contract by which a railroad company agreed that an elevator company should, in consideration of the erection of an elevator, have the handling of all through grain brought by the railroad company to Dubuque, and receive a fixed price therefor, is not repugnant to the commercial power of Congress nor to public policy. Dubuque & S. C. R. Co. v. Richmond, 86 U. S. 19 Wall. 584 (22: 173).

Any agreement between large dealers, meant to control the market and obtain exorbitant prices, is an unlawful conspiracy against trade and void. Arnot v. Pittston & E. Coal Co. 68 N. Y. 558, 23 Am. Rep. 190; Craft v. McConougby, 79 Ill. 346, 22 Am. Rep. 171; Fairbanks v. Leary, 40 Wis. 637; Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666, 672; Collins v. Locke, L. R. 4 App. Cas. 674; Western U. Teleg.

tofore decided by the courts to have been the public policy of the country on the subject. 16. An agreement between railroad companies "for the purpose of mutual protection by establishing and maintaining reasonable rates, rules,

interstate commerce may be provided by Con-
gress as more efficient than any other civil rem-
edy.
[No. 67.]

and regulations on all freight traffic, both through Argued December 8, 9, 1896. Decided March 22,

and local," is by its necessary effect an agreement to restrain trade or commerce within the meaning of the act of Congress of July 2, 1890, no mat

ter what the intent was on the part of those who

signed it.

17. Retroactive effect is not given to a statute by applying the statute to a continuation, after

making combinations in restraint of trade illegal,

its passage, of a pre-existing contract.

18. The United States is authorized by 4 of the act of July 2, 1890, to bring an action for the dissolution of an unlawful combination of carriers in violation of such act, and for an injunction against continuing such a combination.

19. A remedy by injunction for the protection of

Co. v. Chicago & P. R. Co. 86 Ill. 246, 29 Am. Rep. 28; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. American U. Teleg. Co. 65 Ga. 160, 38 Am. Rep. 781; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & M. R. Co. 72 Ill. 360.

All contracts entered into in violation of the Illinois act of June 11, 1891, denouncing trusts and combinations in restraint of trade, are absolutely void. American Strawboard Co. v. Peoria Strawboard Co. 65 Ill. App. 502.

A combination between independent manufacturers engaged in making and selling under different patents and in various forms an extensively used article, by which a corporation is formed to which the legal title to the several patents is assigned, while the assignors are vested with the exclusive right to manufacture and sell under their own patents, but must sell at uniform prices and upon the same terms without respect to cost or merits of their respective articles, and are strictly forbidden to manufacture or sell any other style or kind,-is illegal as against sound public policy, although it involves patents and patented articles only. National Harrow Co. v. Hench, 76 Fed. Rep. 667, 76 Pat. Off. Gaz. 2011.

The uniting of corporations into a particular consolidation or partnership, not authorized by their charters or effected under statutes in reference to consolidation of corporations, is ultra vires and warrants the forfeiture of their corporate existence.

Such combinations have frequently been condemned by courts as unlawful and against public policy. Craft v. McConougby, 79 Ill. 346, 22 Am. Rep. 171; Alger v. Thacher, 19 Pick. 51, 31 Am. Dec. 119; Hannah v. Fife, 27 Mich. 172; Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio, 349, 47 Am. Dec. 258; Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 434, 49 Am. Dec. 282; Hoffman v. Brooks, 11 Cin. L. Bull. 258; Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 672; Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co. 68 Pa. 186.

1897.

PPEAL from a decree of the United States

A Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirming a decree of the Circuit Court

of the United States for the District of Kansas,
First Division, dismissing a suit in equity
brought by the United States as complainant
against the Trans-Missouri Freight Association
et al., for the purpose of having an agreement
between the defendant railroad companies for -
mutual protection by establishing and main-
taining reasonable rates, rules, and regulations
on all freight traffic set aside and declared ille-
gal and void, and to have the association dis-

thrift, and enterprise, and is opposed to monopolies and combinations, bcause unfriendly to such thrift and enterprise; and it declares all combinations whose object is to destroy or impede free competition in business as utterly void. Bennett, J., in Anderson v. Jett, 89 Ky. 375, 6 L. R. A. 390.

A trust in the form of a stockholding corporation has also been held illegal, and the American decisions are nearly unanimous to the effect that in the absence of express legislative permission a corporation cannot purchase and hold stock in other corporations. People, Peabody, v. Chicago Gas Trust Co. 130 Ill. 268, 8 L. R. A. 497; Valley R. Co. v. Lake Erie Iron Co. 46 Ohio St. 44, 1 L. R. A. 412; Central R. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 31 N. J. Eq. 475; Franklin Co. v. Lewiston Sav. Inst. 68 Me. 43, 28 Am. Rep. 9; Central R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582; Franklin Bank v. Commercial Bank, 36 Ohio St. 354, 38 Am. Rep. 594; Millbank v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. 64 How. Pr. 20; Talmage v. Pell, 7 N. Y. 328; Mechanics' & W. Mut. Sav. Bank v. Meriden Agency Co. 24 Conn. 159; Berry v. Yates, 24 Barb. 200; Sumner v. Marcy, 3 Woodb. & M. 105; Hazelhurst v. Savannah, G. & N. A. R. Co. 43 Ga. 13; State, Memphis, v. Butler, 86 Tenn. 614; Buckeye Marble & F. Co. v. Harvey, 92 Tenn. 115, 18 L. R. A. 252; Pierson v. McCurdy, 33 Hun, 520; New Orleans, F. & H. S. S. Co. v. Ocean Dry Dock Co. 28 La. Ann. 173, 26 Am. Rep. 90.

The following articles have been held to be of such general importance that an attempt to control their production is illegal: Coal, Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co. 68 Pa. 173; Arnot v. Pittston & E. Coal Co. 68 N. Y. 558, 23 Am. Rep. 190. Gas, Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co. 130 U.S. 408 (32: 984); People, Peabody, v. Chicago Gas Trust Co. 130 Ill. 268, 8 L. R. A. 497; Chicago Gaslight & C. Co. v. People's Gaslight & C. Co. 121 111. 530. Matches, Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 622, 6 L. R. A. 457. Lumber, Santa Clara Valley Mill & L. Co. v. Hayes, 78 Cal. 387. Cotton bagging, India Bagging Asso. v.! Kock, 14 La. Ann. 164. Butter, Chapin v. Brown, 83 Iowa, 156, 12 L. R. A. 428. Grain, Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346, 22 Am. Rep. 171. Salt, Clancey v. Onondaga Fine Salt Mfg. Co. 62 Barb. 395. The organization of a corporation for the pur- Alcohol, State v. Nebraska Distilling Co. 29 Neb. pose of controlling the manufacture and trade in 700. Candles, Emery v. Ohio Candle Co. 47 Ohio St. matches, by getting all manufacturers of matches Milk, Chicago Milk Shippers' Asso. v. Ford, 4 to enter into a combination, giving it the whole conNat. Corp. Rep. 300. Preserves, American Preservtrol of the business, and by buying out all others ers' Trust v. Taylor Mfg. Co. 46 Fed. Rep. 152, Cloth, who might be competitors, is an unlawful Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 El. & Bl. 47. Grain bags, enterprise, being an attempt to create a mo-Pacific Factor Co. v. Adler, 90 Cal. 110. Harrows› nopoly. Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632, 6 L. R. Strait v. National Harrow Co. 18 N. Y. Supp. 224. A. 457.

The possibility that other business enterprises in the same pursuit may be set on foot to counteract the effect of a combination to control the market in a commodity, will not relieve such combination from illegality. People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co. 54 Hun, 354, 5 L. R. A. 386.

Public policy encourages fair dealing, honest

320.