this decision is now submitted as a very useful antidote to the injurious effects of that.

Taxation,

Law

The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently decided that an act which, professing to impose a tax on inheritances, exempts from taxation the right to receive or succeed to Constitutional estates not exceeding $20,000, though taxing the whole right of receiving or succeeding to estates which exceed that sum in value, and taxes the right to receive or succeed to estates of a large value at a higher rate per cent. than the right of succession to estates of smaller value, is in conflict with § 2 of the bill of rights of the constitution of that state, which declares that "all political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit;" and is, therefore, wholly unconstitutional and void: State v. Ferris, 41 N. E. Rep. 579.

Trade

In Weinstock, Lubin & Co. v. Marks, 42 Pac. Rep. 142, the Supreme Court of California has held that a tradesman, by adopting the name "Mechanics Store" for his Names place of business, may acquire a property right therein as a trade-name, so that equity will enjoin another from using the name "Mechanical Store" in such a way as to induce persons to purchase goods from him under the belief that they are dealing with the former.

Mandatory

In this case a merchant had erected a building of peculiar architecture adjoining a similar building occupied by an old firm engaged in a like business, and with the purInjunction pose of deceiving the customers of the firm, adopted a similar name, and refrained from using any sign about the building to designate the proprietor. The court below decreed that he should maintain and place in a conspicuous part of his store, and also in a conspicuous place on the outside or front thereof, a sign showing the proprietorship of the store, in letters sufficiently large to be plainly observable by passers-by and customers entering therein; but it was held by the Supreme Court that this was holding the defendant to too strict a rule, and that all that should be required was

that the defendant, in the conduct of his business, should distinguish his place of business from that in which the plaintiff carried on its business, in some mode or form that should be a sufficient indication to the public that it was a different place of business from that of the plaintiff.

Waters,

The House of Lords has lately held, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, [1895] 1 Ch. 145, that the owner of land containing underground water, which perPercolation, colates by undefined channels and flows to the Interference land of a neighbor, has the right to divert or appropriate the percolating water within his own lands, by wells or drainage shafts, so as to deprive his neighbor of it; and his right is the same whether his motive be to bona fide improve his own land, or to maliciously injure his neighbor, or to induce his neighbor to buy him out: Mayor, &c., of Bradford v. Pickles, [1895] App. Cas, 587.

No one can be held liable for damages caused by sinking a well in his own ground, by which the percolating waters are diverted from his neighbor's wells or springs; but if he sinks a well to a plainly-defined underground water-course and diverts it, he is liable for all damages occasioned thereby: Willis v. City of Perry, (Iowa,) 60 N. W. Rep. 727; Castalia Trout Club v. Castalia Sporting Club, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. 194; Williams v. Ladew, 161 Pa. 283; S. C., 29 Atl. Rep. 34; Sullivan v. Northern Spy Min. Co., (Utah.) 40 Pac. Rep. 709.

Will. Charitable Gift.

According to a recent decision of the Court of Appeal of England, a gift for the encouragement of a mere sport, though it may be beneficial to the public, cannot be upheld as charitable; and therefore a bequest of a fund in trust to provide annually forever a cup to be given to the most successful yacht of the season, though it states that the object of the gift is to encourage the sport of yacht racing, is in violation of the rule against perpetuities, and void: In re Nottage, [1895] 2 Ch. 649.

Bequest for Encouragement of Sport

The one essential feature of a charitable gift is, that it should be for the benefit of the public, not for that of any number of

private individuals. It is not necessary that its benefits should be bestowed upon the public uniformly; it is sufficient if they are open to all who under the circumstances can avail themselves of them; c. g, a hospital is a charitable institution, because it exists for the benefit of the sick of the community, so far as its resources extend, and also tends to lighten the burden which the support of those sick persons whom it cares for would throw upon the community; but a beneficial society is not a charity, unless its aims are such as bring it within the last-mentioned criterion, for it exists for the benefit of its own members only. Applying this broad rule, a bequest to a society founded for the dissemination of knowledge generally: Beaumont v. Oliveira, 4 L. R. Ch. 309; for the maintenance of missions: Commissioners v. Pemsel, [1891] App. Cas. 531; for the erection of a chapel and the maintenance of a public park: In re Bartlett, (Mass.) 40 N. E. Rep. 899; for the relief of the poor and the support of a sabbath-school: Conklin v. Davis, 63 Conn. 377; S. C., 28 Atl. Rep. 537; for founding and maintaining an institution for the purpose of studying and curing the diseases of animals and birds useful to man, and providing for free lectures to be given to the public: University of London v. Yarrow, 1 DeG. & J. 72, affirming 23 Beav. 159: for the increase and encouragement of good servants: Lascombe v. Wintringham, 13 Beav. 87; for the establishment of a fund to be expended in prizes to marksmen: In re Stephens, W. N. [1892] 140; and to enable a corporation, organized for the purpose, to purchase land and erect residences thereon for the laboring classes, to be controlled "so as to improve the moral, physical and intellectual condition of the youth of this city," which residences were to be let to laborers for rent, and not gratuitously: Webster v. Wiggin, (R. I.) 31 Atl. Rep. 824, are charitable gifts. Such is also a gift to a library, organized as a private corporation, if not organized for pecuniary profit, and not conducted for that purpose, when all the moneys obtained by it are used to maintain the library and purchase books, and all are entitled to the use of the books in the library room, though books may be taken therefrom only by those who become subscribers for a

fixed time and pay a certain fee, or who pay a certain amount for each book without becoming subscribers: Phillips v. Harrow, (Iowa,) 61 N. W. Rep. 434: but a library maintained only for the benefit of the subscribers is not a charity, even though all who wish may become subscribers: Carne v. Long, 2 DeG., F. & J. 75; In re Dutton, 4 Exch. D. 54

A charity need not necessarily be for an indefinite number of persons; and though a beneficial society whose benefits are confined to its own members is not a charity, yet a gift to the permanent fund of such an organization of public employes is a charitable gift, because it is not only in ease of all of those employes who may choose to become members, but tends to benefit the community by preventing their families from becoming a public charge: In re Jeanes's Estate, 3 D. R. (Pa.) 314: S. C., 34 W. N. C. 190.

On the other hand, a gift for the purpose of establishing a museum for the purpose of preserving relics of famous men is not a charity: Thomson v. Shakespear, 1 DeG., F. & J. 399. Nor is one for the maintenance of certain animals, though, not being a perpetuity, it is a valid trust: In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552. And if a valid charitable gift is itself conditional on the happening of a future and uncertain event, it violates the rule against perpetuities, and is void: Alt v. Lord Stratheden, [1894] 3 Ch. 265.

Life Estate,
Insurance

Policies

In a recent case in the Chancery Division of England, before Judge KEKEWICH, part of a testator's estate consisted of policies on the life of another, subject to a mortgage to the life assurance office. By his will he bequeathed his personal estate to one person for life, with remainders over. After the testator's death his executor paid the premiums on the policies and the interest on the mortgage out of the income of the personal estate until the death of the assured, when the office paid to the executor the surplus of the policy moneys remaining after deducting the mortgage debt. On these facts, it was held that, as between the tenant for life and the remaindermen, the amount of income expended in paying the premiums and interest ought to be recouped to the tenant for life, with interest, out of the prop

erty preserved by the expenditures, viz.: the surplus policy moneys; and that the balance of that surplus must be apportioned between capital and income: In re Morley, [1895] 2 Ch. 738.

In calculating the proportions in which outstanding personal estate which falls in during the existence of a life estate, should be divided between capital and income, the proper method is to ascertain the sum which, put out at the legal rate of interest on the day of the testator's death, and accumulating at compound interest calculated at that date with yearly rests and deducting income tax, would, with the accumulations of interest, have produced, at the day of receipt, the amount actually received; and the sum so ascertained should be treated as capital, and the rest as income: In re Earl of Chesterfield's Trusts, 24 Ch. D. 643.