fact all that he has received for several years, though his actual share of profits was much in excess of that, the surplus being carried to his credit on the partnership books. Elections, Count The Supreme Court of Nebraska has lately had occasion to pass upon a complicated state of affairs, in the contested election case of Hendee v. Hayden, 60 N. W. Kep. 1034. In one precinct the "spoiled ballots," of which several had been cast at the election, had been, irregularly and contrary to the provisions of the election laws, but without any fraudulent intent, strung upon the same string as the ballots cast, but at one end thereof, and in a separate bundle, with the string looped and tied around it, making a knet which divided the spoiled from the other ballots. On the trial of the case, the votes cast in that precinct were brought into court, and the package in which they were enclosed and sealed was opened, and the ballots recounted; but during the recount these spoiled ballots were counted with the ones cast at the election, and so mixed with them as to be indistinguishable from them. On this state of facts the Supreme Court held, (1) That the recount, under such circumstances, did not establish the result of the election as between the contesting parties, and that by the intermingling of the "spoiled" ballots with the others, they were rendered incompetent as evidence of the result of the election; (2) That as the will and choice of the voters expressed at the election, in the absence of fraud or illegality, should be ascertained, if any authentic or satisfactory testimony existed by which the result might be proved, the returns made by the county clerk being prima facic evidence of the facts therein set forth, were competent, and should have been considered by the court; (3) That it was not competent, under the circumstances above detailed, to apportion the “spoiled "ballots between the contesting parties, and to deduct from the vote of each a share of the spoiled ballots, proportioned according to the whole number of votes cast for him. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Miles v. Andrews, 38 N. Evidence, E. Rep. 644, has ruled, that when it is admitted that plaintiff and defendant conversed by telephone at a certain Conversations time, a witness who heard one side of the converby Telephone sation may testify to it, though he could not hear the replies, and did not know of his own knowledge with whom the conversation was held; though, perhaps, his testimony is entitled to but little weight. It is proper to admit statements made by telephone, when the witness to whom the statements were made testifies that he knew and recognized the voice of his interlocutor: Stepp v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. Rep. 349; S. C., 20 S. W. Rep. 753. And it has even been held that conversations by telephone are admissible as evidence, though they were carried on through the medium of an operator at an intermediate station, the parties being unable to hear each other: Oskamp v. Gadsden, (Neb.), 52 N. W. Rep. 718. The Supreme Court of Missouri has lately held, in State v. Evans, 28 S. W. Rep. 8, that though the declarations of a Dying deceased person are inadmissible when first uttered, Declarations yet if he subsequently reaffirms them, under a consciousness of the fact that he is dying, they are admissible as dying declarations; and that when the deceased states that he is shot to death, his declarations made at the time are admissible, though he also asks that a physician be sent for, as such a wish, under the circumstances, shows merely a desire to be relieved from pain. Declarations made when not in expectation of death are admissible, when subsequently reaffirmed by deceased when conscious of the approach of death, if re-read or repeated to him, and then assented to by him: Million v. Comm., (Ky.), 25 S. W. Rep. 1059; Reg. v. Steele, 12 Cox C. C. 168; and are admissible, if so reaffirmed, even though not repeated or re-read: Johnson v. State, (Ala.), 16 So. Rep. 99; Pro. v. Crews, (Cal.), 36 Pac. Rep. 367. Sending for a physician will not negative the expectation of death, if that fact is shown by the declarations: R. v. Howell, Den. C. C. 1; McQueen v. State, (Ala.), 15 So. Rep. 824; contra, Matherly v. Comm., (Ky.), 19 S. W. Rep. 977. According to the Court of Appeals of Colorado, a letter, duly addressed, stamped and mailed, with a return card attached thereto, which has not been returned to Receipt of Letter the sender, is conclusively presumed to have been received, in the absence of rebutting evidence: Sherwin v. Natl. Cash Register Co., 38 Pac. Rep. 393. This is in conformity with the general rule on the subject, that proof of mailing a properly stamped and addressed letter is prima facie evidence of its receipt by the addressee: Young v. Clapp, 147 Ill. 176; S. C., 35 N. F. Rep. 372; affirming 32 N. E. Rep. 187; McFarland v. U. S. Mut. Acc. Assn. of City of N. Y., (Mo.), 27 S. W. Rep. 436, and, if not denied, will be conclusive: Home Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Marple, 1 Ind. App. 411; and will overcome the merely negative testimony of the addressee that he did not receive it: In re Wiltse, 25 N. Y. Suppl. 733 S. C., 5 Misc. Rep. 105. This presumption may, however, be rebutted: Whitmore v. Ins. Co., 148 Pa. 405; S. C., 30 W. N. C. 277; 23 Atl. Rep. 1131; and, if denied, becomes a question for the jury; but a verdict for the plaintiff generally implies a finding that the defendant received the letter in question: Jensen v. McCorkell, 154 Pa. 323; S. C., 32 W. N. C. 355; 26 Atl. Rep. 366. Proof by the secretary of a corporation that a letter was folded and enclosed in a sealed envelope, and put in a basket in the office, in which letters were usually put for mailing, coupled with the fact that it was not found among the papers of the corporation, is evidence to go to the jury on the score of mailing, though the porter whose duty it was to mail the letters put in that basket did not recollect mailing such a letter: Hastings v. Brooklyn L. 1. Co., 138 N. Y. 473; S. C., 34 N. E. Rep. 289; affirming 17 N. Y. Suppl. 333. But the date of a letter affords no basis for calculating the time of its receipt, nor proof of the time of mailing, nor that it was ever mailed: Uhlman v. Arnholt & Schaefer Brewing Co., 53 Fed. Rep. 485. The Supreme Court of New York, Fifth Department, at general term, has affirmed the opinion of the special term, in Peo. v. Hannan, 30 N. Y. Suppl. 370, holding Extradition that under the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, which provides for the extradition of persons, "charged with the crime of murder, or assault with intent to commit murder," a person extradited on a charge of 'assault with intent to conimit murder" cannot be convicted of an assault with intent to do great bodily harm; See 1 Ax. L. REG. & REV. (N. S). 814; 28 Am. L. Rev. 568. Fraud. Resulting Trust The Supreme Court of Michigan, in Thompson v. Marley, 60 N. W. Rep. 976, has held, that when a father, who had been fraudulently induced to execute an absolute deed of his land to one of his children, by representations that that child would hold it in trust for the other children, subsequently executed another deed to that child for the same land, no fraud being used, such child took the land free from any trust in favor of the other children, since, as the fraud used in the procurement of the first deed merely created a resulting trust in favor of the father, the express trust being void as not being in writing, the second deed carried the father's equitable interest. Insurance, The Supreme Court of Wyoming has very justly decided, that when a policy of accident insurance requires an action thereon to be brought within one year from the date of the happening of the alleged injury, the limitation begins to run at the date of the death of the insured, and not at the time at which the cause of action accrues: McFarland v. Ry. Off. & Empl. Acc. Assn. of Indianapolis, 38 Pac. Rep. 347. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has improved on this, and asserts that when an accident policy provided that, in case of death or injury, notice of and Proofs claim should be given to the secretary of the company immediately after the accident, and positive proof of death should be furnished six months thereafter, as a condition precedent; and the insured, a tugboat engineer, disappeared November 9, 1892, and his body was found in the Notice of Death water near the tugboat April 19, 1893, and notice of death was furnished May 26, 1893, and proof thereof July 12, 1893; it showed a reasonable compliance with the terms of the policy: Kentzler v. Am. Mut. Acc. Assn., 60 N. W. Rep. 1002. Fire. In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois, when an insurance company, by its adjuster, on being requested to rebuild a house destroyed by fire, unconditionally Rebuilding, refused to do so, and stated that it would pay the Waiver amount of loss when the same was determined by arbitration, the company elected to pay the loss, and waived its right to rebuild: Platt v. Etna Ins. Co., 38 N. F. Rep. 580. Interstate The Supreme Court of North Carolina has lately held, in In re Sultan, 20 S. E. Rep. 375, that a resident of North Carolina, who, while in Pennsylvania, procured by false representations a shipment of goods from that place to his residence, and then returned thither, and there received the goods, and was indicted in Pennsylvania for the false representations, is a "fugitive" from justice, and may be surrendered on requisition. This is a correct application to the rule, that a fugitive from justice, within the meaning of the rendition act, is any one, who, having committed the offence with which he is charged in one state, is found in another at the time when it is sought to enforce his criminal liability, irrespective of his motive in leaving the jurisdiction : In re Cook, 49 Fed. Rep. 833; In re White, 55 Fed. Rep. 54; Roberts v. Reilley, 116 U. S. 80; S. C., 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291. And it does not matter that he has merely gone to the place of his domicile: Kingsbury's Case, 106 Mass. 223. Practice In the same case, it was also held, that when a warrant of extradition is granted by the governor, the courts will not, on habeas corpus, inquire into the motive and purpose of the extradition proceedings, to ascertain whether the object thereof is to punish crime, or collect a debt. The Supreme Court of Nebraska has laid down the following |