A Table of the Colours (or Appearances) of Good and Evil; and their Degrees, as Places of Persuasion, and Dissuasion, and their several Fallaxes, and the Elenchs of them. 1. Cui cæteræ partes vel sectæ secundas unanimiter deferunt, cum singulæ principatum sibi vindicent, melior reliquis videtur. Nam primas quæque ex zelo videtur sumere; secundas autem ex vero et merito tribuere. Since all parties, or sects, challenge the pre-eminence of the first place to themselves; that, to which all the rest with one consent give the second place, seems to be better than the others. For every one seems to take the first place out of zeal to itself, but to give the second where it is really due. O Cicero went about to prove the sect of Academics, which suspended all asseveration, for to be the best. For, saith he, ask a Stoic which philosophy is true, he will prefer his own: then ask him, which approacheth next the truth, he will confess, the Academics. So deal with the Epicure, that will scant endure the Stoic to be in sight of him; so soon as he hath placed himself, he will place the Academics next him.1 So, if a prince took divers competitors to a place, and examined them severally, whom next themselves they would chiefly commend; it were like the ablest man should have the most second votes. The fallax of this colour happeneth oft in respect of envy; for men are accustomed, after themselves, and their own fashion, to incline to them which are softest, and are least in their way, in despite and derogation of them, that hold them hardest to it. So that this colour of meliority and pre-eminence is a sign of enervation and weakness. 1 Cic. Acad. apud Augustin. c. Acad. iii. 7. い 2. Cujus excellentia, vel exsuperantia melior; id toto genere melius. That kind is altogether best, whose excellence or preeminence is best. APPERTAINING to this are the forms: Let us not wander in generalities. Let us compare particular with particular, &c. This appearance, though it seem of strength, rather logical than rhetorical, yet is very oft a fallax. Sometimes because some things are in kind very casual, which if they escape, prove excellent, so that the kind is inferior, because it is so subject to peril; but that, which is excellent, being proved, is superior. As the blossom of March, and the blossom of May, whereof the French verse goeth: Bourgeon de Mars, enfant de Paris, So that the blossom of May is generally better than the blossom of March; and yet the best blossom of March is better than the best blossom of May. Sometimes, because the nature of some kinds is to be more equal, and more indifferent, and not to have very distant degrees, as hath been noted in the warmer climates, the people are generally more wise, but in the northern climate the wits of chief are greater. So in many armies, if the matter should be tryed by duel between two champions, the victory should go on the one side; and yet, if it be tried by the gross, it would go of the other side. For excellencies go as it were by chance, but kinds go by a more certain nature, as by discipline in war. Lastly, many kinds have much refuse, which countervail that which they have excellent; and therefore generally metal is more precious than stone, and yet a diamond is more precious than gold. 3. Quod ad veritatem refertur, majus est, quam quod ad opinionem. Modus autem et probatio ejus, quod ad opinionem pertinet, hæc est: Quod quis, si clam putaret fore, facturus non esset. That which hath relation to truth is greater than that which refers to opinion. But the measure and tryal of that, which belongs to opinion, is this: That which a man would not do, if he thought it would not be known. S the Epicures say to the Stoics felicity placed in virtue; that it is like the felicity of a player, who, if he were left of his auditory, and their applause, would straight be out of heart and countenance; and therefore they call virtue, bonum theatrale. But of riches the poet saith, Populus me sibilat, at mihi plaudo :* And of pleasure, Grata sub imo Gaudia corde premens, vultu simulante Pudorem. The fallax of this colour is somewhat subtil, though the answer to the example be ready: For virtue is not chosen propter auram popularem, for the applause of people; but contrariwise, maximè omnium teipsum reverere, so as a virtuous man will be virtuous in solitudine, and not only in theatro, though percase it will be more strong by glory and fame, as an heat which is doubled by reflection. But that denieth the supposition, it doth not reprehend the fallax, whereof the reprehension is, allow that virtue (such as is joined with labour and conflict) would not be chosen, but for fame and opinion; yet it followeth not, that the chief motive of the election should not be real, and for itself; for fame may be only causa impulsiva, and not causa constituens, or efficiens. As if there were two horses, and the one would do better without the spur than the other: but again, the other with the spur would far exceed the doing of the former, giving him the spur also; yet the latter will be judged to be the better horse: and the form, as to say Tush, the life of this horse is but in the spur, will not serve as to a wise judgment: for, since the ordinary instrument of horsemanship is the spur, and that it is no matter of impediment nor burthen, the horse is not to be accounted the less of, which will not do well without the spur, but the other is to be reckoned rather a delicacy than a virtue: so glory and honour are the spurs to virtue: and, although virtue would languish without them, yet since they be always at hand to attend virtue, virtue is not to be said the less, chosen for itself, because it needed the spur of fame and reputation. And therefore that position, Nota ejus rei, quod propter opinionem, et non propter veritatem 2 Hor. Sat. I. i. 66. eligitur, hæc est; quod quis, si clam putaret fore, facturus non esset. 4. Quod rem integram servat, bonum: quod sine receptu est malum. Nam se recipere non posse, impotentiæ genus est: potentia autem bonum. That, which keeps a matter safe and entire, is good: but what is destitute, and unprovided of a retreat, is bad. For, whereas all ability of acting is good, not to be able to withdraw ones self, is a kind of impotency. H TEREOF Æsop framed the fable of the two frogs, that consulted together in the time of drought (when many plashes that they had repaired to were dry,) what was to be done: and the one propounded to go down into a deep well, because it was like the water would not fail there; but the other answered, yea, but if it do fail, how shall we get up again? And the reason is, that human actions are so uncertain, and subject to perils, as that seemeth the best course which hath the most passages out of it. Appertaining to this persuasion, the forms are, you shall engage your self; on the other side, tantum, quantum voles, sumes ex fortuna, you shall keep the matter in your own hands. The reprehension of it is, that proceeding and resolving in all actions is necessary. For, as he saith well, not to resolve, is to resolve; and many times it breeds as many necessities, and engageth as far as in some other sort, as to resolve. So it is but the covetous man's disease translated into power; for the covetous man will enjoy nothing, because he will have his full store, and possibility to enjoy the more; so by this reason, a man should execute nothing, because he should be still indifferent, and at liberty to execute any thing. Besides necessity and this same jacta est alea, hath many times an advantage; because it awaketh the powers of the mind, and strengthneth endeavour, Cæteris pares, necessitate certè superiores istis. 42 5. Quod ex pluribus constat et divisibilibus, est majus quam quod ex paucioribus, et magis unum: nam omnia per partes considerata majora videntur; quare et pluralitas partium magnitudinem præ se fert. Fortius autem operatur pluralitas partium, si ordo absit: nam inducit similitudinem infiniti, et impedit comprehensionem. That, which consists of more parts, and those divisible, is greater, and more one, than what is made up of fewer; for all things, when they are looked upon piece-meal, seem greater; whence also a plurality of parts make shew of a bulk considerable, which a plurality of parts effects more strongly, if they be in no certain order; for it then resembles an infinity, and hinders the comprehending of them. TH HIS colour seemeth palpable, for it is not plurality of parts, without majority of parts, that maketh the total greater; yet, nevertheless, it often carries the mind away; yea, it deceiveth the sense; as it seemeth to the eye a shorter distance of way, if it be all dead and continued, than if it have trees, or buildings, or any other marks whereby the eye may divide it. So when a great monied man hath divided his chests, and coins, and bags, he seemeth to himself richer than he was. And therefore the way to amplify anything is to break it, and to make an anatomy of it in several parts, and to examine it according to several circumstances. And this maketh the greater shew, if it be done without order, for confusion maketh things muster more. And besides, what is set down by order and division, doth demonstrate, that nothing is left out or omitted but all is there: whereas, if it be without order, both the mind comprehendeth less that which is set down, and besides it leaveth a suspicion, as if more might be said than is expressed. This colour deceiveth, if the mind of him that is to be persuaded, do of itself overconceive or prejudge of the greatness of any thing; for then the breaking of it will make it seem less, because it makes it to appear more according to the truth. And therefore, if a man be in sickness or pain, the time will seem longer without a clock, or hourglass, than with it: for the mind doth value every moment; and then the hour doth rather sum up the moments than divide the day. So in a dead plain the way seemeth the longer, because the eye hath precon |