tector and as their father, it is more than probable that the people, attributing his disgrace to his popularity, would have risen everywhere in his favour, as they did in the month of July following, and would have equally forced his majesty to recall him, and to grant the double representation of the Tiers Etat. I shall even add, that in such circumstances it would have been very difficult for the king to have avoided being drawn in by the specious reasons which Mr. Necker employed to determine him. He represented to the king," that the attacks which the parliaments, supported by the nobility, had made on his authority, had almost annihilated it; that the conduct of the clergy, in the first Assembly of Notables, proved but too well that their sentiments and wishes corresponded with those of the nobility and magistracy; that it could no longer be concealed that all those different bodies uniting to demand the convocation of the States General, was less with a view to re-establish the royal authority than to render it quite impotent; that this would be the result of their deliberations, unless the two first orders were bereaved of that weight which the ancient form of convocation gave them in the assembly; that the only means of attaining this important end was to compose the order of the Tiers of a number of deputies equal to that of the two other orders united; that no law existed to regulate the number of deputies that each order ought to send; that there was not an in stance of the two convocations being uniform in this respect, and therefore the measure he proposed, so far from being irregular, was no more than the exercise of a right which the king always had possessed, of fixing the number of the deputies of every order; that the third order was greatly interested that the king should have it in his power to protect it from the oppressive enterprizes of the two others; and that a sense of gratitude for this mark of confidence, as well as a regard for its own interest, would undoubtedly engage the third order to strengthen his majesty's hands, and enable him to re-establish a solid and vigorous government, without which the monarchy was lost." Such were the arguments which Mr. Necker employed in support of the famous reference to the council, upon which the double representation to the Tiers Etat was granted; and unfortunately there was not one of the ministers at that time who was capable of firmly opposing this opinion, which the king adopted through the error or the weakness of his council. It is incessantly repeated, "that all might yet have been prevented, had the king placed himself at the head of his troops, and of his nobility," &c. &c. &c. Of his troops! Could it be believed that there then existed many regiments that could be depended on, after experiencing the defection of the French guards and the regiment of Flanders, in both of which corps more confidence had been placed than in any other? Besides, it was known that M. de Bouillé had written to the king, that of one hundred and twenty battalions of infantry, and eighty of cavalry, which he commanded, he could rely on five battalions only, and these were foreign troops. In addition to this, the officers of those regiments the least infected with the spirit of the revolution, all agreed, that the very idea of being attacked by the populace, armed with sticks and pikes, was more terrifying to the 8 soldiers soldiers than the army of an enemy ranged in order of battle. With regard to the nobility, although those of its members, who owed most to the court, had basely repaid its favours with revolting ingratitude, and although a great many others had adopted the principles of the revolution, there yet remained many brave and loyal Chevaliers of the old stamp, who would have sought the glory of saving the monarchy at the risk of their own lives. But they were not possessed of sufficient force to insure the success which their loyalty deserved. The king was of this opinion. Ought it to be imputed to him as a crime? Ought he to be reproached, because he would not expose the lives of his most valuable subjects, without a moral probability of success; he, who would never risk the life of the most obscure individual to secure his own? Nothing can be more just than what M. de Malesherbes said to me one day, in an interesting conversation which will be found in these Memoirs, "that this extreme sensibility, this tenderness of disposition, so amiable in private life, and in times of tranquillity, often becomes, in times of revolution, more fatal to a king, than even certain vices would have been." Thus it was that the errors of Lewis the Sixteenth may truly be said to have originated in a virtuous principle. As to his weaknesses, (for undoubtedly he was not exempted from these,) I do not endeavour to conceal them. In the course of these Memoirs, I more than once lament the indecision of that unfortunate prince; his repugnance to adopt the bold measures which might have saved him; his being deficient in that energy of character, that self-confidence which imposes on the multitude, who are ever ready to believe that he who commands with firmness and an air of authority, possesses the means of enforcing obedience.' This account of the almost universal alienation of the minds and the hearts of the French from the king would appear incredible, if it had not been confirmed by the events which immediately followed. Considering how general and how complete this change of public opinion must have been, we are surprised that it was so little observed. We know that several sayings of distinguished persons, and several passages in the works of eminent writers, have been quoted, to shew that it was observed, and that its consequences were predicted: but we also know that there is a wide difference between flights of imagination, flashes of eloquence, or sallies of ill-humour, and the prognostics of an acute and deeply reasoning mind. One of the notes in the works of Rousseau has been often cited to us, in which, in his usual oracular manner, he informs his reader that all the governments of Europe verged towards their end; and that he knew the cause, but would not disclose it. Hence it has been inferred that he was aware of the change of which we are speaking, and of its consequences: but he probably foresaw them only as much as Seneca foresaw the discovery of America, when he wrote Venient annis Secula seris, quibus Oceanus The fact is that each of the writers happened to foretell that which he did not foresee. Yet the portentous change, its causes and its effects, did not wholly escape the eyes of all its contemporaries as we have a striking instance in the writings of the Abbé de Mably.-Two of the most curious works, which those of our readers who interest themselves on the subject of the French revolution can peruse, are that author's Doutes proposées aux philosophes economistes sur l'ordre, naturel et essentiel, des Societés politiques, and his treatise Des droits et des devoirs du Citoyen; inserted in the xith vol. of the collection of his works. The latter of them is a supposed dialogue between the writer and Earl Stanhope; the father, we believe, of the present Earl. In both, the reader will find a complete code of revolutionary principles; and while in the last he will see plainly delineated the actual march of the revolution, so far as it has hitherto proceeded, from the former he will discern the length of way which it has still to move, before it will accomplish its career, After some miscellaneous facts and observations, our author comes to the ministry of the Archbishop of Sens. Of that prelate, and of his predecessor, Monsieur de Calonne, he thus expresses himself *: Monsieur de Brienne, archbishop of Sens, who had long ardently aspired to the ministry, had always been kept out, in spite of the high reputation of his talents, upon account of the bad opinion which the king entertained of his morals and principles. When it was proposed to his majesty to receive this unworthy prelate (at that time archbishop of Thoulouse) into the council, the pious prince answered with indignation, "The man does not believe in God." The prelate being apprized of the motives of his majesty's repugnance, which were but too well-founded, flattered himself that he should be able to obviate them. He endeavoured to give an impression of his conversion, by appearing entirely devoted to the cares of his diocese, and by practising, from time to time, some of those public acts of charity which are always cried up, with exaggeration, in the public papers. This edifying course of good works was interrupted by the death of the archbishop of Paris, M. de Brienne never once doubting but that his reputation was so perfectly well established, that he ** Compare M. Necker's observations on these points. See our brief account of his work in the last Appendix, p. 537-540. should should now be esteemed a worthy successor to one of the most virtu ous prelates in France. He accordingly offered himself as a candidate, and supported his pretensions by the well-known credit and intrigues of the Abbé de Vermont. But the king was of opinion, that a belief in the Supreme Being could still less be dispensed with in an archbishop of Paris, than in a secretary of state, and therefore preferred the virtues of M. de Juigné to the supposed talents of M. de Brienne. Indeed, it has but too evidently appeared since, that he possessed no other talent but that of doing mischief; and in fact, he did more, and in less time, than the most ignorant, or even the most perfidious minister that ever existed in France or any where else. • The convocation of the first assembly of Notables, in the year 1788, opened a new prospect to the ambitious hopes and intrigues of the archbishop of Thoulouse. He saw that in the present circumstances, the only chance he had of rising to the ministry depended upon his being able to form a party in the assembly, sufficiently powerful to overturn M. de Calonne, who was the minister in greatest credit, and author of a new system of administration, which was at that time laid before the assembly. The archbishop prepared his batteries accordingly. The proportional contributions to all taxes, and the alienation of honorary rights depending on benefices, were the principal measures which M. de Calonne proposed to this assembly, in which the clergy had great weight. This attack upon ecclesiastical property offered a favourable opportunity for the enemies of the minister to excite the most violent opposition against him and his schemes, not only in the assembly, but also at court and in the capital. He was so powerfully attacked in so many different ways, that his disgrace seemed inevitable. His fall was accompanied with that of the Chancellor, (Hue de Mirosmeuil,) who, after giving his approbation and support to the plans of M. de Calonne, had the weakness to abandon him, and join his adversaries. In this manner the king was drawn on by a combination of circumstances, and reduced to the unhappy necessity of forming a new council, and of abandoning the reins of government to the archbishop of Thoulouse *. This ambitious man was not contented with occupying the situation from which he had precipitated M. de Calonne; he never rested until he was named the principal minister, and had supreme influence in the departments of all the other ministers, who, some from fear, and others from incapacity, became all the passive instruments of his destructive genius. The greatest error the king could be guilty of was to dismiss M. de Calonne, before he had put an end to the assembly of Notables. It must be acknowledged, that this fatal determination, followed by the nomination of the archbishop of Sens to the ministry, was the immediate cause of the revolution. Upon this occasion, the queen entirely gave way to that prejudice which the ambition of the archbishop of Sens, and the hatred of the Baron de Breteuil, inspired * M. de Fourqueux was the immediate successor of M. de Calonne; but his ill health prevented his retaining his place longer than three weeks.' her ber with against M. de Calonne. Her majesty must have bitterly regretted that the ever employed her influence over the king's mind to ruin that minister. As I have as much reason to complain of him as to praise him, I might, without being suspected of prepossession, either write an eulogium or a criticism on his conduct, if the one and the other were not equally foreign to the object of these Memoirs. I shall only observe, therefore, that in spite of the vague and violent declamations echoed from all parts of the kingdom against this minister, he certainly did nothing to justify the hatred and malice with which he was persecuted. And it is but fair to state, in his vindication, that although the archbishop of Sens and Mr. Necker exhausted all their efforts, and assiduously examined all the papers relating to his administration, yet they never could find the smallest proof of those heavy charges which have been urged against him.' To M. Necker he dedicates a whole chapter, (No. VII.) of which we shall copy the concluding part: Thus miserably ended the ministerial career of that extraordinary man, whose faults have cost France so dear. I say his faults, and not his crimes; for though I cannot reproach myself with having felt, for a moment, the smallest prejudice in favour of Mr. Necker, I knew him well enough to be firmly persuaded that he never intended the ill he has done, or that he had the least notior, that his measures would produce it. I only blame his vanity and his extravagant presumption. He so completely, in his conscience, believed himself to be the ablest minister that ever existed, that he would have been mortified to have only been compared with Sully and Colbert. He did not hesitate to believe, that he combined, in a superior degree, all the great qualities of the greatest ministers, without any of their faults. Independent of his superiority over them in what regarded his administration, he thought that the confidence which the public had in his virtues and talents would enable him to embark in greater undertakings than any of his predecessors. When recalled to administration, that same presumption, that same confidence in his own superior genius, which had always distinguished him, made him believe that he alone was capable of effecting the restoration of France, by giving it a new constitution. He was thoroughly persuaded, that the best constitution for France would be that which should secure to a minister, like himself, the greatest share of influence in the government, and the firmest stability in his situation. He thought that the surest means of attaining that end, was to conciliate the favour and attachment of the majority of the States General. If they had been constituted according to the ancient forms, the majority would have rested in the united orders of the clergy and the nobility. Mr. Necker having no means of attaching to himself the members of these two orders, who, as they were not connected with him, and looked for no services at his hands, owed him no gratitude the measure he chose to adopt, therefore, was, that of loudly proclaiming himself the protector of the Tiers Etat. He was resolved to risk every thing, in order to give them the preponderance, not doubting but that, as that Order would owe to him all |