adequate explanation or examination, sometimes in a wild rush at the end of the session, in the midst of a confusion too great even for the clerks to record properly what is taking place. It is not strange that under such conditions the governor's veto comes in as the final umpire, — vetoing after adjournment the worst of the bills and dropping from appropriation bills those items that in his opinion are without justification. The growth of the governor's veto has kept step with the growing recognition of legislative incompetence.1

Assuming that statutory legislation will slowly develop in quality under the present demand for improved laws, there should come an insistence that legislation be based on thorough studies made through experts and framed so carefully that each particular piece of lawmaking may stand out as a model of legislative capacity. Legislators should take as much pride in the scientific accuracy and applicability of their laws as an Edison might in the improvement of his inventions. Surely no greater honor can come to a man than the privilege of formulating and fathering a law that voices the constructive trend of the times and benefits the state in which his life is spent!

1 Mr. Tom Finty of the Dallas News thus summarizes the work of the thirty-third (Texas) legislature:

"Many measures of considerable merit failed of passage; others were passed in imperfect form, either through lack of effort to perfect the same or by reason of amendments offered in ignorance or malice. The really big things, such as riddance of the statutes of useless laws, the removal therefrom of errors committed by former Legislatures and the adjustment of codes to meet changed conditions, were not even undertaken, except in one instance. Hundreds of bills were rushed through pell mell and without opportunity for anyone to understand them. It has developed that some of these were useless; others defective and still others harmful. How many bills were thus objectionable is not yet known if not many, then it must be that the Thirty-Third Legislature has a lucky star. The writer believes that in the circumstances the Legislature has done well, and that it deserves the epitaph inscribed for Mark Twain's cowboy: 'He done his durndest, angels could do no more.'

In respect to the statutory initiative and referendum it would seem advisable to have these powers reserved by constitution to the electorate. Yet the electorate should not take the place of the legislature in lawmaking and the initiative and referendum should be used merely as a last resort. Measures initiated should properly be worded by the state's drafting department, submitted to the legislature for action, and given a fair and careful consideration. An intelligent legislature would do so, but in case of no action, the secretary of state might be instructed to refer the bill to the electorate. Laws made by the electorate presumably should be altered or repealed only with its consent, yet this would introduce into legislation another kind of procedure in lawmaking; to constitutional provisions and legislative statutes would be added laws made by electorates. This is unfortunate but temporarily necessary. When legislatures again return to popular favor, the third sort will probably rarely be formulated. Even now such laws are relatively few in number,1 and the exceptions are mainly in those states, like Oregon and California, where bossism had long prevailed and a sort of house-cleaning had to be made. As needed readjustments are made, there will be less and less necessity for the use of the initiative and referendum in statutory legislation. It is to be hoped also that as scientific management and the efficiency movement make headway in business circles, applications of these principles will be made to government, so that one may confidently anticipate in the near future real improvements in legislative and administrative systems.

1 See, Equity, January, 1913, pp. 34-47.

CHAPTER XXII

THE EXECUTIVE, THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE

JUDICIARY

I. THE EXECUTIVE

ALTHOUGH for many years the state executive has been growing in popular favor and political importance, his power in administration is still weak by comparison with his power over legislation. The national theory of an executive, who is likewise head of the administration, has not on the whole found favor in the states. It may be that these are wiser in this than the national government, and that the burden of administration is too heavy a load to place on the shoulders of a conscientious governor. There is certainly need of centralizing administration under responsible head, but possibly that might best be accomplished by developing a premiership from among the heads. of administration, leaving to the governor general supervisory powers, including the right to suspend from office and to order investigations of suspected branches of administration.

Aside from a supervision over administration the governor has many other duties to perform. As the voice and personification of the personality of the state he has a large social function which in some states is a heavy drain on his nervous energy. As the head of the state militia his duties might become really onerous in case of riot or war. His serious task however arises from his connection with the

legislature. Through his message and veto he must keep in close touch with the needs of the state and with proposed or possible legislation, serving in a sense as the exponent of the popular will. For this reason it would be only a natural expansion of his power to allow him the privilege of introducing along with his message bills embodying his recommendations and those of heads of departments, with the understanding that a proper time would be set apart for the discussion of such bills and that the administrative heads would have the privilege of the floor during the discussions, so as to allow opportunity for question and explanation. A governor who wisely performed his legislative functions only, would surely have duties sufficient to task his energy and strength, without the additional burden of the responsibilities of administration; for necessarily he would also continue his social duties as head of the state, and presumably should exercise a general supervisory power over administration, so as to enable him to check corruption and inefficiency.

II. THE ADMINISTRATION

To those at all familiar with the workings of government it is clearly obvious that the administration of the state is sadly in need of reorganization. In every state exist scores of loosely coördinated, virtually independent departments, boards and commissions, each nominally supervised by the legislature, or governor, or both, but all largely neglected because of the many other duties and responsibilities devolving on these. The result is that each particular part of the administration seeks for itself the largest possible appropriation; conducts its business in a somewhat leisurely fashion, chiefly concerned lest it should unfortunately fail to use up its allotment;

and endeavors to "stand in" with the powers that be, so as to feel assured of a permanent tenure in office and a large appropriation. There are of course many conscientious officials who work hard and honestly for the state, but the system is against them since it puts a premium on timeserving and sycophancy. Few realize to what an extent boards and commissions control the most important interests in the state, such as corporations, charities, and health; or how numerous are the boards to which are entrusted subordinate functions, administrative, regulatory or semi-judicial in kind. Seldom is there any attempt to adjust these properly into the system so as to ensure their honesty, efficiency and economy. Many of these boards have long outlived their usefulness, are parasitic by nature, and should be abolished. The remaining boards should be unified and brought into definite relationships with the fundamental departments of government, and no new board should be created unless its powers, duties and duration are carefully defined, and its relation to some existing department made emphatic.

It is possible, as already suggested, that the responsibility for efficiency in administration might be placed on the governor, as the "willing horse," but it is plainly impossible for him to give proper care both to administration and legislation. Conceivably the lieutenant-governor might be removed from his sinecural position as presiding officer in the senate and made head of the administration, as a sort of "business manager" for the state, subject to the governor's supervisory powers, and having in administration an authority like that exercised by the president in his cabinet of administrative heads. Such responsibilities would certainly dignify this somewhat useless officer, and would afford him excellent training for a later promotion