Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century PhilosophyRichard Gaskin Routledge, 2013 M04 15 - 272 pages This book is a systematic and historical exploration of the philosophical significance of grammar. In the first half of the twentieth century, and in particular in the writings of Frege, Husserl, Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein, there was sustained philosophical reflection on the nature of grammar, and on the relevance of grammar to metaphysics, logic and science. |
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... Truth' (1999). Gary Ebbs is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He has published articles on metaphysics and the philosophy of language, including 'Can We Take Our Words at Face Value ...
... Truth' (1999). Gary Ebbs is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He has published articles on metaphysics and the philosophy of language, including 'Can We Take Our Words at Face Value ...
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... truth-values. Frege's argument for making truth-values the referents of declarative sentences is that under intersubstitution of co-referential parts of a sentence, while the thought introduced by the sentence may change, its truth-value ...
... truth-values. Frege's argument for making truth-values the referents of declarative sentences is that under intersubstitution of co-referential parts of a sentence, while the thought introduced by the sentence may change, its truth-value ...
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Richard Gaskin. ↓ sense of sentence (Gedanke) ↓ referent of sentence i.e. truth ... truth-values to be the referents of declarative sentences is inconclusive ... value may express distinct Russellian propositions. But there is a way of ...
Richard Gaskin. ↓ sense of sentence (Gedanke) ↓ referent of sentence i.e. truth ... truth-values to be the referents of declarative sentences is inconclusive ... value may express distinct Russellian propositions. But there is a way of ...
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... truth-value. Why should it be thought that the sheer availability of false as well as true propositions obtaining at the level of sense creates difficulties for the project of colonizing the referential level with propositional entities ...
... truth-value. Why should it be thought that the sheer availability of false as well as true propositions obtaining at the level of sense creates difficulties for the project of colonizing the referential level with propositional entities ...
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... truth-value of any contingent proposition must co-vary with hypothetical changes in the characteristics of things it concerns – so that a hypothetical change, for instance, in the location of my coffee cup may entail an alteration in ...
... truth-value of any contingent proposition must co-vary with hypothetical changes in the characteristics of things it concerns – so that a hypothetical change, for instance, in the location of my coffee cup may entail an alteration in ...
Contents
Frege and the grammar of truth | |
Husserls tactics of meaning | |
Logical form general sentences and Russells path to On Denoting | |
Grammar ontology and truth in Russell and Bradley | |
A few more remarks on logical form | |
Logical syntax in the Tractatus | |
Wittgenstein on grammar meaning and essence | |
Nonsense and necessity in Wittgensteins mature philosophy | |
Carnaps logical syntax | |
Heidegger and the grammar of being | |
Index | |
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Common terms and phrases
accept acquainted analysis analytic analytic philosophy argued argument arithmetical atomic sentences Begriffsschrift Bertrand Russell Bradley Cambridge Candlish Carnap Carnapian intension categorial grammar claim complex concept-word conceptual content constituents corresponding declarative sentence definite descriptions denoting concepts denoting phrases distinction Dummett entities essence example fact factual content false formal Frege Fregean Geach given Gödel’s grammatical form grammatical subject green Heidegger hence Husserl Hylton intersubstitutability language system level of reference linguistic logical form logical subject logical syntax meaning meaningful Meinong metaphysics Moorean Russell negation nonsense notion noun phrase objects ostensive definitions Oxford Philosophy predicate proper names propositional functions quantifier phrases question reality reject relation rules Russell holds Russell’s Russellian propositions semantic sense sense and reference singular term Socrates speak surface form symbol syntactic theory of denoting theory of descriptions Theory of Types things thought Tractatus transparency thesis true truth truth-value understanding University Press verb Wittgenstein words