Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century PhilosophyRichard Gaskin Routledge, 2013 M04 15 - 272 pages This book is a systematic and historical exploration of the philosophical significance of grammar. In the first half of the twentieth century, and in particular in the writings of Frege, Husserl, Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein, there was sustained philosophical reflection on the nature of grammar, and on the relevance of grammar to metaphysics, logic and science. |
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Results 1-5 of 33
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... reference (Bedeutung) and from the realm of ideas (Vorstellungen) – must be ... sense: its constituents are then appropriately conceived as senses, rather ... sense, and reference, with a Russellian approach to propositions (and facts) ...
... reference (Bedeutung) and from the realm of ideas (Vorstellungen) – must be ... sense: its constituents are then appropriately conceived as senses, rather ... sense, and reference, with a Russellian approach to propositions (and facts) ...
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... sense into the realm of reference, or an incorporation of the realm of reference into the realm of sense, and McDowell makes it clear that it is the latter incorporation he has in mind: Given the identity between what one thinks (when ...
... sense into the realm of reference, or an incorporation of the realm of reference into the realm of sense, and McDowell makes it clear that it is the latter incorporation he has in mind: Given the identity between what one thinks (when ...
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... reference, 9 we can say that in creating a world of senses, the demiurge eo ipso created a world of objects. To have ... sense. Now in the context of a distinction between sense and reference for names and predicates, this feature of the ...
... reference, 9 we can say that in creating a world of senses, the demiurge eo ipso created a world of objects. To have ... sense. Now in the context of a distinction between sense and reference for names and predicates, this feature of the ...
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... reference as well as at the level of 12 sense. In the example I have just given we have to do with a quite general truth about proper names, the fact that, as Gareth Evans put it, 'the single main requirement for understanding a use of ...
... reference as well as at the level of 12 sense. In the example I have just given we have to do with a quite general truth about proper names, the fact that, as Gareth Evans put it, 'the single main requirement for understanding a use of ...
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... reference relation: for a name to have sense, in this sense of 'sense', is just for it – that very name – to have a referent. For in having a referent the name necessarily has reference – where this latter word has its full force as a ...
... reference relation: for a name to have sense, in this sense of 'sense', is just for it – that very name – to have a referent. For in having a referent the name necessarily has reference – where this latter word has its full force as a ...
Contents
Frege and the grammar of truth | |
Husserls tactics of meaning | |
Logical form general sentences and Russells path to On Denoting | |
Grammar ontology and truth in Russell and Bradley | |
A few more remarks on logical form | |
Logical syntax in the Tractatus | |
Wittgenstein on grammar meaning and essence | |
Nonsense and necessity in Wittgensteins mature philosophy | |
Carnaps logical syntax | |
Heidegger and the grammar of being | |
Index | |
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Common terms and phrases
accept acquainted analysis analytic analytic philosophy argued argument arithmetical atomic sentences Begriffsschrift Bertrand Russell Bradley Cambridge Candlish Carnap Carnapian intension categorial grammar claim complex concept-word conceptual content constituents corresponding declarative sentence definite descriptions denoting concepts denoting phrases distinction Dummett entities essence example fact factual content false formal Frege Fregean Geach given Gödel’s grammatical form grammatical subject green Heidegger hence Husserl Hylton intersubstitutability language system level of reference linguistic logical form logical subject logical syntax meaning meaningful Meinong metaphysics Moorean Russell negation nonsense notion noun phrase objects ostensive definitions Oxford Philosophy predicate proper names propositional functions quantifier phrases question reality reject relation rules Russell holds Russell’s Russellian propositions semantic sense sense and reference singular term Socrates speak surface form symbol syntactic theory of denoting theory of descriptions Theory of Types things thought Tractatus transparency thesis true truth truth-value understanding University Press verb Wittgenstein words