Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century PhilosophyRichard Gaskin Routledge, 2013 M04 15 - 272 pages This book is a systematic and historical exploration of the philosophical significance of grammar. In the first half of the twentieth century, and in particular in the writings of Frege, Husserl, Russell, Carnap and Wittgenstein, there was sustained philosophical reflection on the nature of grammar, and on the relevance of grammar to metaphysics, logic and science. |
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... entities indicated by words' (1903: 47), which Russell calls 'terms'. There we are told: Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term.... A man, a moment, a ...
... entities indicated by words' (1903: 47), which Russell calls 'terms'. There we are told: Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term.... A man, a moment, a ...
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... entities in the world, centrally objects and properties (i.e. saturated universals such as wisdom) or concepts (i.e. the unsaturated entities which are Frege's own preferred candidate for the referents of predicates), 4 they present ...
... entities in the world, centrally objects and properties (i.e. saturated universals such as wisdom) or concepts (i.e. the unsaturated entities which are Frege's own preferred candidate for the referents of predicates), 4 they present ...
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... entities, are incorporated into the realm of sense. The right way to understand this characterization is presumably the following. Facts are composed – in the first instance, one might say – of senses, and then, derivatively – since ...
... entities, are incorporated into the realm of sense. The right way to understand this characterization is presumably the following. Facts are composed – in the first instance, one might say – of senses, and then, derivatively – since ...
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... entities, such as Russellian propositions, which objects and properties combine to make up. Propositions cannot, once a distinction between sense and reference is on the table, be located exclusively on the sense side of the sense ...
... entities, such as Russellian propositions, which objects and properties combine to make up. Propositions cannot, once a distinction between sense and reference is on the table, be located exclusively on the sense side of the sense ...
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... entities at the level of reference (in the simplest case, of an object and a monadic property). Frege's preferred candidate for what a sentence refers to is too crude to do justice to this important principle, for sentences with the ...
... entities at the level of reference (in the simplest case, of an object and a monadic property). Frege's preferred candidate for what a sentence refers to is too crude to do justice to this important principle, for sentences with the ...
Contents
Frege and the grammar of truth | |
Husserls tactics of meaning | |
Logical form general sentences and Russells path to On Denoting | |
Grammar ontology and truth in Russell and Bradley | |
A few more remarks on logical form | |
Logical syntax in the Tractatus | |
Wittgenstein on grammar meaning and essence | |
Nonsense and necessity in Wittgensteins mature philosophy | |
Carnaps logical syntax | |
Heidegger and the grammar of being | |
Index | |
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Common terms and phrases
accept acquainted analysis analytic analytic philosophy argued argument arithmetical atomic sentences Begriffsschrift Bertrand Russell Bradley Cambridge Candlish Carnap Carnapian intension categorial grammar claim complex concept-word conceptual content constituents corresponding declarative sentence definite descriptions denoting concepts denoting phrases distinction Dummett entities essence example fact factual content false formal Frege Fregean Geach given Gödel’s grammatical form grammatical subject green Heidegger hence Husserl Hylton intersubstitutability language system level of reference linguistic logical form logical subject logical syntax meaning meaningful Meinong metaphysics Moorean Russell negation nonsense notion noun phrase objects ostensive definitions Oxford Philosophy predicate proper names propositional functions quantifier phrases question reality reject relation rules Russell holds Russell’s Russellian propositions semantic sense sense and reference singular term Socrates speak surface form symbol syntactic theory of denoting theory of descriptions Theory of Types things thought Tractatus transparency thesis true truth truth-value understanding University Press verb Wittgenstein words