CHAP. X. A Brief Account of the War of the Toquis Vilumilla and Curignancu; Spanish Governors to the Year 1787. THE Araucanians had for some time been very much dissatisfied with the peace. They perceived that it gave the Spaniards an opportunity of forming new establishments in their country. They also endured very impatiently the insolence of those who were designated by the title of Captains of the Friends, and who having been introduced under pretence of guarding the mis sionaries, arrogated to themselves a species of authority over the natives, who, stimulated by resentment for these grievances, determined, in 1722, to create a Toqui, and have recourse to arms. The choice fell upon Vilumilla, a man of low rank, but one who had acquired a high reputation for his judgment, courage, and extensive views, His object was no less than the expulsion of the Spaniards from the whole of Chili. To succeed in this arduous enterprise, it was necessary to obtain the support of all the Chilians, from the confines of Peru to the Bio-bio. Vast as was 1723 the plan, it appeared to him not to be difficult of execution. Having killed in a skirmish three or four Spaniards, and among them one of the pretended Captains of Friends, he dispatched, according to custom, a messenger with one of their fingers, to the Chilians in the Spanish provinces, inviting them to take arms at a signal to be given by kindling fires upon the tops of the highest mountains. On the 9th of March, 1723, the day appointed for the open declaration of hostilities, fires were accordingly kindled upon the mountains of Copiapo, Coquimbo, Quillota, Rancagua, Maúle, and Itata. Owing to the smallness of their numbers, or their apprehension of the issue of the war, the natives, however, made no movement. Vilumilla was, however, by no means discouraged on seeing his projects evaporate in smoke. As soon as he had declared war, he set out immediately at the head of his troops to attack the Spanish settlements. But before commencing his march, he was careful to give information to the missionaries, and request them to quit the country, in order to avoid being ill-treated by his detached parties. The capture of the fort of Tucapel was the first fruit of this expedition. The garrison of Arauco, fearing the same fate, abandoned the place. Having destroyed these fortresses, he directed his march against that of Puren, which he expected to possess himself of without resistance. But Urrea, the commanding officer, opposed him so vigorously that he was compelled to besiege it. In a short time the garrison was reduced to great extremities from hunger and thirst, as the aqueduct which supplied them with water had been destroyed by the enemy, and the commander, having made a sortie in order to procure supplies, was slain, together with the soldiers accompanying him. In this critical state of affairs, the governor, Don Gabriel Cano, who had succeeded Concha, arrived with an army of five thousand men. Vilumilla, expecting immediately to come to action, posted himself behind a torrent, and drew up his troops in order of battle: but Cano, though repeatedly provoked by the enemy, thought it more advisable to abandon the place, and retire with the garrison. The war afterwards became reduced to skirmishes of but little importance, which were finally terminated by the celebrated peace of Negrete, a place situated at the confluence of the rivers Bio-bio and Lara, where the treaty of Quillan was reconfirmed, and the odious title of Captain of Friends wholly abolished. Cano, after a mild and harmonious government of fifteen years, died in the city of St. Jago. He was succeeded by his nephew, Don Manuel Salamanca, who was appointed by the viceroy of Peru, and whose whole conduct was conformable to the humane maxims of his uncle. Don Joseph Don Antonio Guill Gonzaga attempted under 1 ticable. Many counsels were held to devise the most suitable means of carrying this scheme into execution, which the wishes of the governor made him consider as very easy. The Araucanians were informed of all these proceedings by their spies, and apprehensive of the danger to which such an innovation might expose their liberties, they met secretly to deliberate upon the measures they should take to elude the designs of their neighbours without having recourse to arms, when the following resolutions were adopted by the national council: In the first place, to delay as long as possible the business, by equivocal replies and delusive promises. Secondly, When pressed to commence building, to require from the Spaniards tools and other necessary aid. Thirdly, To have recourse to arms whenever they found themselves obliged to begin the work, but to conduct it in such a manner, that only the provinces that were compelled to build should declare war, the others remaining neutral in order to be able to mediate a peace. Fourthly, To come to a general rupture whenever they found that the mediation of the latter would not be accepted. Fifthly, To allow the missionaries to depart without injury, as they had nothing to accuse them with but of being Spaniards. Sixthly, To make choice imme-, diately of a Toqui, who should have in charge to attend to the execution of the above-mentioned |