The battle of the two philosophies, by an inquirer [L.F.M. Phillipps. A study of J.S. Mill's An examination of sir William Hamilton's philosophy].Longmans, Green, and Company, 1866 - 88 pages |
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Page 28
... ultimate ground of belief . The ultimate facts of consciousness are given less in the form of cognitions , than of beliefs . Consciousness in its last analysis , in other words our primary expe- rience , is a faith . We do not in ...
... ultimate ground of belief . The ultimate facts of consciousness are given less in the form of cognitions , than of beliefs . Consciousness in its last analysis , in other words our primary expe- rience , is a faith . We do not in ...
Page 29
... ultimate facts which cannot be referred to anything higher . He often speaks of knowledge as resting ultimately on belief , and of ultimate principles as not known , but believed by a * Note , page 125 . necessity of our nature . The ...
... ultimate facts which cannot be referred to anything higher . He often speaks of knowledge as resting ultimately on belief , and of ultimate principles as not known , but believed by a * Note , page 125 . necessity of our nature . The ...
Page 30
... ultimate belief not a belief , but knowledge - to obliterate a distinction he himself admits is a real one , and , therefore , one which cannot be obliterated . Now a little further on , we not only find Mr. Mill asserting that we have ...
... ultimate belief not a belief , but knowledge - to obliterate a distinction he himself admits is a real one , and , therefore , one which cannot be obliterated . Now a little further on , we not only find Mr. Mill asserting that we have ...
Page 31
... ultimate " and not 66 our belief in . " And unless he himself distinguishes between this ultimate belief , and the belief of common language , derived from pro- bability when certain knowledge cannot be had - the absurdity with which he ...
... ultimate " and not 66 our belief in . " And unless he himself distinguishes between this ultimate belief , and the belief of common language , derived from pro- bability when certain knowledge cannot be had - the absurdity with which he ...
Page 54
... ultimate fact , for it admits of being resolved into the more general fact of our belief in the veracity of all our intuitions , and can be included and announced in that . This work of reduction formed indeed a main part of his work as ...
... ultimate fact , for it admits of being resolved into the more general fact of our belief in the veracity of all our intuitions , and can be included and announced in that . This work of reduction formed indeed a main part of his work as ...
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Common terms and phrases
à priori element à priori philosophy absolute acquired by experience actions actual sensations admit affirms analysis arguing argument ascertain assert assume battle character circumstances conceive conscious existence data of consciousness denies desire distinction distinguish doctrine evil expe fact of consciousness finite give ground Hamilton Hamilton's philosophy hypothesis idea imagine inconceivable inexplicable infer infinite space intuitive means merely metaphysical difficulty Mill's mind and matter moral cause morally responsible natural laws nature necessary beliefs necessitarian negation negative conception ness never non-ego non-self opinions ourselves permanent possibilities phenomena pion possess possibilities of sensation possibility of feeling possible sensations postulate present priori element priori philosophy prove punishment question reason refute rience right and wrong sense senseless thing series of feelings Sir William Hamilton tells theory of mind thing thinker thought tion transcendentalists true truth ultimate fact Universal Cause veracity of memory volition whilst wholly
Popular passages
Page 50 - The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion.
Page 75 - The true incomprehensibility perhaps is, that something which has ceased, or is not yet in existence, can still be, in a manner, present — that a series of feelings the infinitely greater part of which is past or future, can be gathered up, as it were, into a single present conception, accompanied by a belief of reality. I think by far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable fact, without any theory of how it takes place, and, when we are obliged to speak of it in terms which assume...
Page 75 - If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.
Page 51 - ... the sole end for which mankind are warranted individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection ; that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
Page 51 - These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise.
Page 28 - But reason itself must rest at last upon " authority ; for the original data of reason do not rest on " reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the " authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, " therefore, in rigid propriety, Beliefs or Trusts. Thus it " is that, in the last resort, we must, perforce, philosophi" cally admit that belief is the primary condition of reason, " and not reason the ultimate ground of belief.
Page 44 - I did will or nill anything, I was most sure that no other than myself did will and nill: and I all but saw that there was the cause of my sin.
Page 51 - The evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself, but on others ; and society, as the protector of all its members, must retaliate on him ; must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment, and must take care that it be sufficiently severe.
Page 68 - ... to us and to our fellow-creatures; the actual sensations are not. That which other people become aware of when and on the same grounds as I do, seems more real to me than that which they do not know of unless I tell them. The world of possible sensations succeeding one another according to laws is as much in other beings as it is in me; it has therefore an existence outside me; it is an external world.
Page 31 - Our belief in the veracity of memory is evidently ultimate; no reason can be given for it which does not presuppose the belief, and assume it to be well grounded.