The battle of the two philosophies, by an inquirer [L.F.M. Phillipps. A study of J.S. Mill's An examination of sir William Hamilton's philosophy].Longmans, Green, and Company, 1866 - 88 pages |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 10
Page 13
... determining cause of most of his opinions ; " * and 3 . The doctrine that mind and matter , an ego and non- ego , are original data of consciousness ; which formed the basis , as he says , of Sir W. Hamilton's system of psychology ...
... determining cause of most of his opinions ; " * and 3 . The doctrine that mind and matter , an ego and non- ego , are original data of consciousness ; which formed the basis , as he says , of Sir W. Hamilton's system of psychology ...
Page 30
... determination of the true basis of knowledge . The next question then is , in what language is this dis- tinction to be expressed ? In the ordinary affairs of life we do not need the distinction , and , therefore , common language does ...
... determination of the true basis of knowledge . The next question then is , in what language is this dis- tinction to be expressed ? In the ordinary affairs of life we do not need the distinction , and , therefore , common language does ...
Page 34
... determining cause of most of his philosophical opinions - the doctrine of the freedom of the will . It is contained in the twenty - sixth chapter of his work , which certainly appears to us to be the ablest of all . The question is as ...
... determining cause of most of his philosophical opinions - the doctrine of the freedom of the will . It is contained in the twenty - sixth chapter of his work , which certainly appears to us to be the ablest of all . The question is as ...
Page 35
... determined by the strongest present moral motive ; but whether the motive force which determines it , is , or in any ... determining power not from his own will - force , but from his character.
... determined by the strongest present moral motive ; but whether the motive force which determines it , is , or in any ... determining power not from his own will - force , but from his character.
Page 37
... determined by our will , our will by our desires , our desires by our character and circumstances , then our actions are not under our own control ; and our character being determined for us , we are not morally responsible either for ...
... determined by our will , our will by our desires , our desires by our character and circumstances , then our actions are not under our own control ; and our character being determined for us , we are not morally responsible either for ...
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
à priori element à priori philosophy absolute acquired by experience actions actual sensations admit affirms analysis arguing argument ascertain assert assume battle character circumstances conceive conscious existence data of consciousness denies desire distinction distinguish doctrine evil expe fact of consciousness finite give ground Hamilton Hamilton's philosophy hypothesis idea imagine inconceivable inexplicable infer infinite space intuitive means merely metaphysical difficulty Mill's mind and matter moral cause morally responsible natural laws nature necessary beliefs necessitarian negation negative conception ness never non-ego non-self opinions ourselves permanent possibilities phenomena pion possess possibilities of sensation possibility of feeling possible sensations postulate present priori element priori philosophy prove punishment question reason refute rience right and wrong sense senseless thing series of feelings Sir William Hamilton tells theory of mind thing thinker thought tion transcendentalists true truth ultimate fact Universal Cause veracity of memory volition whilst wholly
Popular passages
Page 50 - The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion.
Page 75 - The true incomprehensibility perhaps is, that something which has ceased, or is not yet in existence, can still be, in a manner, present — that a series of feelings the infinitely greater part of which is past or future, can be gathered up, as it were, into a single present conception, accompanied by a belief of reality. I think by far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable fact, without any theory of how it takes place, and, when we are obliged to speak of it in terms which assume...
Page 75 - If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.
Page 51 - ... the sole end for which mankind are warranted individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection ; that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
Page 51 - These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise.
Page 28 - But reason itself must rest at last upon " authority ; for the original data of reason do not rest on " reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the " authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, " therefore, in rigid propriety, Beliefs or Trusts. Thus it " is that, in the last resort, we must, perforce, philosophi" cally admit that belief is the primary condition of reason, " and not reason the ultimate ground of belief.
Page 44 - I did will or nill anything, I was most sure that no other than myself did will and nill: and I all but saw that there was the cause of my sin.
Page 51 - The evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself, but on others ; and society, as the protector of all its members, must retaliate on him ; must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment, and must take care that it be sufficiently severe.
Page 68 - ... to us and to our fellow-creatures; the actual sensations are not. That which other people become aware of when and on the same grounds as I do, seems more real to me than that which they do not know of unless I tell them. The world of possible sensations succeeding one another according to laws is as much in other beings as it is in me; it has therefore an existence outside me; it is an external world.
Page 31 - Our belief in the veracity of memory is evidently ultimate; no reason can be given for it which does not presuppose the belief, and assume it to be well grounded.