The battle of the two philosophies, by an inquirer [L.F.M. Phillipps. A study of J.S. Mill's An examination of sir William Hamilton's philosophy].
Longmans, Green, and Company, 1866 - 88 pages
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able acquired actions actual admit affirms already analysis answer arguing argument ascertain assert associate assume attack attribute become belief cause certainly character circumstances complete conceive conception consciousness consider denies desire determined difficulty distinction distinguish doctrine effects effort element evil existence expectation experience explain fact finite follow force further give given greater ground Hamilton idea imagine important inexplicable infinite space intuitive involves knowledge leave less light living maintain matter means memory merely metaphysical Mill Mill's mind moral nature necessary negative never non-self notion object opinions original ourselves Page Pages permanent philosophy positive possess possible postulate present priori prove punishment question reason rest result seems sensations sense series of feelings Sir W suppose tells theory thing thought tion true truth ultimate unless volition whilst whole wholly wrong
Page 50 - The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion.
Page 75 - The true incomprehensibility perhaps is, that something which has ceased, or is not yet in existence, can still be, in a manner, present — that a series of feelings the infinitely greater part of which is past or future, can be gathered up, as it were, into a single present conception, accompanied by a belief of reality. I think by far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable fact, without any theory of how it takes place, and, when we are obliged to speak of it in terms which assume...
Page 75 - If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.
Page 51 - ... the sole end for which mankind are warranted individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection ; that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
Page 51 - These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise.
Page 28 - But reason itself must rest at last upon " authority ; for the original data of reason do not rest on " reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the " authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, " therefore, in rigid propriety, Beliefs or Trusts. Thus it " is that, in the last resort, we must, perforce, philosophi" cally admit that belief is the primary condition of reason, " and not reason the ultimate ground of belief.
Page 44 - I did will or nill anything, I was most sure that no other than myself did will and nill: and I all but saw that there was the cause of my sin.
Page 51 - The evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself, but on others ; and society, as the protector of all its members, must retaliate on him ; must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment, and must take care that it be sufficiently severe.
Page 68 - ... to us and to our fellow-creatures; the actual sensations are not. That which other people become aware of when and on the same grounds as I do, seems more real to me than that which they do not know of unless I tell them. The world of possible sensations succeeding one another according to laws is as much in other beings as it is in me; it has therefore an existence outside me; it is an external world.