being as the fathers of them, watching over them for their good, the government was almost all prerogative. A few eftablished laws ferved the turn, and the difcretion and care of the ruler fupplied the reft. But when mistake or flattery prevailed with weak princes to make ufe of this power for private ends of their own, and not for the public good, the people were fain by exprefs laws to get prerogative determined in thofe points wherein they found disadvantage from it: and thus declared limitations of prerogative were by the people found neceffary in cafes which they and their anceftors had left, in the utmoft latitude, to the wisdom of those princes who made no other but a right use of it, that is, for the good of their people.

§. 163. And therefore they have a very wrong notion of government, who say, that the people have incroached upon the prerogative, when they have got any part of it to be defined by pofitive laws: for in fo doing they have not pulled from the prince any thing that of right belonged to him, but only declared, that that power which they indefinitely left in his or his ancestors hands, to be exercised for their good, was not a thing which they intended him when he used it otherwife: for the end of government being the good of the community, whatfoever alterations are made in it, tending to that end, cannot be an incroachment upon any body, fince no body in

government can have a right tending to any other end and thofe only are incroachments which prejudice or hinder the public good. Those who fay otherwise, fpeak as if the prince had a distinct and separate intereft from the good of the community, and was not made for it; the root and fource from which fpring almost all those evils and disorders which happen in kingly governments. And indeed, if that be fo, the people under his government are not a fociety of rational creatures, entered into a community for their mutual good; they are not fuch as have fet rulers over themselves, to guard, and promote that good; but are to be looked on as an herd of inferior creatures under the dominion of a mafter, who keeps them and works them for his own pleasure or profit. If men were fo void of reason, and brutish, as to enter into fociety upon fuch terms, prerogative might indeed be, what fome men would have it, an arbitrary power to do things hurtful to the people.

§. 164. But fince a rational creature cannot be fuppofed, when free, to put himself into fubjection to another, for his own harm; (though, where he finds a good and wise ruler, he may not perhaps think it either neceffary or useful to fet precife bounds to his power in all things) prerogative can be nothing but the people's permitting their rulers to do feveral things, of their own free choice, where Z 4

the

the law was filent, and fometimes too against the direct letter of the law, for the public good; and their acquiefcing in it when fo done: for as a good prince, who is mindful of the truft put into his hands, and careful of the good of his people, cannot have too much prerogative, that is, power to do good; fo a weak and ill prince, who would claim that power which his predeceffors exercised without the direction of the law, as a prerogative belonging to him by right of his office, which he may exercife at his pleafure, to make or promote an intereft diftinct from that of the public, gives the people an occafion to claim their right, and limit that power, which, whilft it was exercifed for their good, they were content fhould be tacitly allowed.

§. 165. And therefore he that will look into the biftory of England, will find, that prerogative was always largest in the hands of our wifest and beft princes; because the people, obferving the whole tendency of their actions to be the public good, contefted not what was done without law to that end: or, if any human frailty or mistake (for princes are but men, made as others) appeared in fome fmall declinations from that end; yet 'twas visible, the main of their conduct tended to nothing but the care of the public. The people therefore, finding reafon to be fatisfied with thefe princes, whenever they acted without, or contrary to the letter of the law, acquiefced in

what

what they did, and, without the least complaint, let them inlarge their prerogative as they pleased, judging rightly, that they did nothing herein to the prejudice of their laws, fince they acted conformable to the foundation and end of all laws, the public good.

§. 166. Such god-like princes indeed had fome title to arbitrary power by that argument, that would prove abfolute monarchy the best government, as that which God himself governs the universe by; because such kings partake of his wisdom and goodness. Upon this is founded that faying, That the reigns of good princes have been always moft dangerous to the liberties of their people: for when their fucceffors, managing the government with different thoughts, would draw the actions of thofe good rulers into precedent, and make them the ftandard of their prerogative, as if what had been done only for the good of the people was a right in them to do, for the harm of the people, if they fo pleafed; it has often occafioned conteft, and fometimes public diforders, before the people could recover their original right, and get that to be declared not to be prerogative, which truly was never fo; fince it is impoffible that any body in the fociety should ever have a right to do the people harm; though it be very poffible, and reasonable, that the people fhould not go about to fet any bounds to the prerogative of those kings,

or

or rulers, who themfelves tranfgreffed not the bounds of the public good: for prerogative is nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule.

§. 167. The power of calling parliaments in England, as to precife time, place, and duration, is certainly a prerogative of the king, but fill with this truft, that it fhall be made ufe of for the good of the nation, as the exigencies of the times, and variety of occafions, fhall require for it being impoffible to foresee which should always be the fittest place for them to affemble in, and what the best season; the choice of these was left with the executive power, as might be most fubfervient to the public good, and best suit the ends of parliaments.

§. 168. The old question will be asked in this matter of prerogative, But who shall be: judge when this power is made a right use of? I anfwer: between an executive power in being, with fuch a prerogative, and a legiflative that depends upon his will for their convening, there can be no judge on earth; as there can be none between the legislative and the people, fhould either the executive, or the legislative, when they have got the power in their hands, defign, or go aboutto enflave or destroy them. The people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cafes. where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to heaven: for the rulers, in fuch attempts,