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found there. And thus we see, that foreigners, by living all their lives under another government, and enjoying the privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, even in conscience, to submit to its administration, as far forth as any denison ; yet do not thereby come to be subjects or members of that common-wealth. Nothing can make any man so, but his actually entering into it by positive engagement, and express promise and compact. This is that, which I think, concerning the beginning of political societies, and that confent which makes any one a member of
CH A P. IX.
so free, as has been said ; if he be abfolute lord of his own person and pofsessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and controul of
any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others : for all being kings as
much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers : and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.
$. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into common-wealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting,
First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them, for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures ; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of ftudy of it, are not apt to allow of it as a Jaw binding to them in the application of it. to their particular cases.
§. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences ac
cording to the established law : for every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cafes ; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remifs in other men's.
§. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended, will feldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injustice ; such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who at
g. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the Itate of nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to, by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of their property. It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of punishing, to be
The other power a man has in the state
exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it amongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of the governments and societies themselves.
§. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers.
The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself, and others within the permission of the law of nature : by which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one : community, make up one fociety, distinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other ; no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and by positive agree ments combine into smaller and divided of nature, is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up, when he joins in a private, if I may lo call it, or particular politic society, and incorporates into any common-wealth, separate from the rest of mankind.
§. 129. The first power, viz. of doing whatfoever be thought for the preservation of himfelf, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of that fociety shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of
§. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing be wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executive power of the society, as the law thereof shall require : for being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require ; which is not only necessary, but just, since the other members of the society do the like.
§. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require ; yet it being X 3