Of these two, Delight in the Profperity Ser. V. of others and Compaffion for their Diftreffes,

the

For does not every Body by Compaffion mean, an Affection the Object of which is Another in Distress? Instead of this, but defigning to have it mistaken for this, they speak of an Affection or Paffion, the Object of which is our felves, or Danger to ourselves. Hobbs defines Pity, Imagination, or Fiction of future Calamity to ourselves, proceeding from the Senfe (he means Sight or Knowledge) of another Man's Calamity. Thus Fear and Compaffion are the fame Idea, and a fearful and a compaffionate Man the fame Character. Further, Compaffion and Mercy are often feen without any thing of that Weakness, the Idea of which the Word Pity fometimes raises to our Thoughts. Now to thofe who give any Scope to their Affections, there is no Perception or inward Feeling more univerfal than this; that one who, without that Weaknefs, has been merciful and compaffionate throughout the Course of his Behaviour, fhould himself be treated with Kindness, if he happens to fall into Circumftances of Diftrefs. Is Fear then or Cowardice so great a Recommendation to the Favour of the Bulk of Mankind? Or is it not plain, that meer Fearlessnefs (and therefore not the contrary) is one of the most popular Qualifications? This fhews that it is contrary to the common Sense of Mankind, to fuppofe Compaffion to be the fame as Fear.

Nothing would more expofe fuch Accounts as thefe of the Affections which are favourable and friendly to our Fellow-creatures, than to fubftitute the Definitions which this Author, and others who follow his Steps, give of fuch Affections, inftead of the Words by which they are commonly expreffed. Hobbs, after having laid down that Pity or Compaffion is only Fear for ourselves, goes on to explain the Reason, why we pity our Friends in Diftress more than others. Now fubftitute the Definition inftead of Word Piry in this Place, and the Inquiry will be, why we fear our Friends,

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Ser. V. the laft is felt much more generally than the former. Though Men do not univer

fally

Friends, c. which Words (fince he really does not mean why we are afraid of them) make no Question or Sentence at all. So that common Language, the Words to Compaffionate, to Pity, cannot be accommodated to his Account of Compaflion. The very joining of the Words to Pity our Friends, is a direct Contradiction to his Definition of Pity: Because those Words fo joined, neceffarily exprefs that our Friends are the Objects of the Paffion; whereas his Definition of it afferts, that ourselves, or Danger to ourselves are the only Objects of it. He might indeed have avoided this Abfurdity, by plainly faying what he is going to Account for; namely, why the Sight of the Innocent, or of our Friends in Diftrefs, raifes greater Fear for ourselves than the Sight of other Perfons in Diftrefs. But had he put the thing thus plainly, the Fact itself would have been doubted; that the Sight of our Friends in Diftrefs raifes in us greater Fear, for ourselves, than the Sight of others in Distress. And in the next Place it would immediately have occurred to every one, that the Fact now mentioned, which at leaft is doubtful, whether true or falfe, was not the fame with this Fact, which no-body ever doubted, that the Sight of our Friends in Diftrefs raifes in us greater Compaion than the Sight of others in Diftrefs: Every one, I fay, would have seen that these are not the fame, but two different Inquiries; and confequently, that Fear and Compaffion are not the fame. Suppofe a Person to be in real Danger, and by fome Means or other to have forgot it; any trifling Accident, any Sound might alarm him, recall the Danger to his Remembrance, and renew his Fear: But it is almoft too grofly ridiculous (though it is to show an Abfurdity) to speak of that Sound or Accident as an Object of Compaffion; and yet according to Mr. Hobbs, our greateft Friend in Distress is no more to us, no more the Object of Compaffion or of any Affection in our Heart. Neither the one or the other raises any Emotion

fally rejoyce with all whom they fee re- Ser. V. joyce, yet accidental Obstacles removed,

they

Emotion in our Mind, but only the Thoughts of our liableness to Calamity, and the Fear of it; and both equally do this. It is fit fuch fort of Accounts of Humane Nature should be shown to be what they really are, because there is raised upon them a general Scheme which undermines the whole Foundation of common Juftice and Honefty. Hobbs of Hum. Nat. c. 9. §. 10.

There are often three diftinct Perceptions or inward Feelings upon Sight of Persons in Diftrefs: Real Sorrow and Concern for the Mifery of our Fellow-creatures; fome Degree of Satisfaction from a Consciousness of our Freedom from that Mifery; and as the Mind paffes on from one thing to another, it is not unnatural from fuch an Occafion to reflect upon our own Liableness to the fame or other Calamities. The two laft frequently accompany the first, but it is the first only which is properly Compaffion, of which the Diftreffed are the Objects, and which directly carries us with Calmnefs and Thought to their Affiftance. Any one of these, from various and complicated Reasons, may in particular Cafes prevail over the other two; and there are, I suppose, Inftances where the bare Sight of Diftrefs, without our feeling any Compaffion for it, may be the Occafion of either or both of the two latter. One might add, that if there be really any fuch thing as the Fiction or Imagination of Danger to ourselves from Sight of the Miseries of others, which Hobbs speaks of, and which he has abfurdly miftaken for the whole of Compaffion; if there be any thing of this Sort common to Mankind, diftinct from the Reflection of Reason, it would be a moft remarkable Inftance of what was furtheft from his Thonghts, namely, of a mutual Sympathy between each Particular of the Species, a Fellowfeeling common to Mankind. It would not indeed be an Example of our fubftituting others for ourselves, but it would be an Example of our fubftituting ourselves for others. And as it would not be an Inftance of Benevolence, fo neither would

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Ser. V. they naturally compaffionate all in fome Degree whom they fee in Distress, so far

as they have any real Perception or Sense of that Diftrefs: Infomuch that Words expreffing this latter, Pity, Compassion, frequently occur; whereas we have fcarce any fingle one by which the former is diftinctly express'd. Congratulation indeed anfwers Condoleance; but both thefe Words are intended to fignify certain Forms of Civility, rather than any inward Senfation or Feeling. This Difference or Inequality is fo remarkable, that we plainly confider Compaffion as itfelf an original, diftinct, particular Affection in Humane Nature; whereas to rejoyce in the Good of others, is only a Consequence of the general Affection of Love and Good-will to them. The Reason and Account of which Matter is this. When a Man has obtained any particular Advantage or Felicity, his End is gained, and he does not in that particular want the Affiftance of another; there was therefore no need of a diftinct Affection to

wards

would it be any Inftance of Self-love; for this Phantom of Danger to ourselves naturally rifing to View upon Sight of the Diftreffes of others, would be no more an Inftance of Love to ourselves, than the Pain of Hunger is.

wards that Felicity of another already ob- Ser. V. tained, neither would fuch Affection directly carry him on to do Good to that Perfon: Whereas Men in Diftrefs want Assistance, and Compaffion leads us directly to aflift them. The Object of the former is the prefent Felicity of another; the Object of the latter is the present Mifery of another: It is easy to fee that the latter wants a particular Affection, and that the former does not. And upon Suppofition of a distinct Affection in both Cafes, the one must rest in the Exercise of itself, having nothing further to gain; the other does not reft in itself, but carries us on to affift the Distressed.

But fuppofing thefe Affections natural to the Mind, particularly the laft; Has not each Man Troubles enough of his own? Muft he indulge an Affection which appropriates to himself those of others? Which leads him to contract the leaft defirable of all Friendships, Friendships with the Unfortunate? Muft we invert the known Rule of Prudence, and choose to affociate ourselves with the Diftreffed? Or allowing that we ought, as it is in our Power, to relieve Them; yet is it not better to do this from Reason and Duty? Does not Paffion and Affection of every Kind perpetually mislead us? Nay, is not Paffion and

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Affection