Ser. III. by ancient Writers, that Tortures and Death

are not fo contrary to Humane Nature as Injuftice; by this to be fure is not meant, that the Averfion to the former in Mankind is lefs ftrong and prevalent than their Averfi

on to the latter: But that the former is only contrary to our Nature confidered in a partial View, and which takes in only the loweft Part of it, that which we have in common with the Brutes; whereas the latter is contrary to our Nature, confidered in a higher Senfe, as a Syftem and Conftitution, contrary to the whole Oeconomy of Man *. And from all these things put to

gether,

*Every Man in his phyfical Nature is one individual fingle Agent. He has likewise Properties and Principles, each of which may be confidered feparately, and without Regard to the Respects which they have to each other. Neither of these are the Nature we are taking a View of. But it is the inward Frame of Man confidered as a Syftem or Conftitution: Whose several Parts are united, not by a phyfical Principle of Individuation, but by the Refpects they have to each other; the chief of which is the Subjection which the Appetites, Paffions, and particular Affections have to the one fupream Principle of Reflection or Confcience. The Syftem or Constitution is formed by and confifts in these Refpects and this Subjection. Thus the Body is a System or Conftitution: So is a Tree: Solis every Machine. Confider all the feveral Parts of a Tree without the natural Respects they have to each other, and you have not at all the Idea of a Tree; but add these Respects, and this gives you the

gether, nothing can be more evident than Ser. III, that, exclufive of Revelation, Mankind cannot be confidered as a Creature left by his Maker to act at random, and live at large up to the Extent of his natural Power, as Paffion, Humour, Wilfulness, happen to carry him; which is the Condition brute Creatures

Idea. The Body may be impaired by Sickness, a Tree may decay, a Machine be out of Order, and yet the System and Conftitution of them not totally diffolved. There is plainly fomewhat which answers to all this in the moral Conftitution of Man. Whoever will confider his own Nature, will fee that the feveral Appetites, Paffions, and particular Affections, have different Respects amongst themselves. They are Restraints upon, and are in a Proportion to each other. This Proportion is just and perfect, when all thofe under Principles are perfectly coincident with Confcience; when Paffion and Appetite leads us to 'exactly the fame Course with Reflection and Judgment. The least Excess or Defect, the leaft Alteration of the due Proportions amongst themfelves, or of their Co-incidence with Confcience, though not proceeding into Action, is fome Degree of Disorder in the moral Conftitution. But Perfection, though plainly intelligible and fuppofeable, was never attained by any Man. If the higher Principle of Reflection maintains its Place, and as much as it can corrects that Disorder, and hinders it from breaking out into Action, this is all that can be expected in fuch a Creature as Man. And though the Appetites and Paffions have not their exact due Proportion to each other; though they often ftrive for Mastery with Judg ment or Reflection; yet, fince the Superiority of this Principle to all others is the chief Respect which forms the Conftitution, fo far as this Superiority is maintained, the Character, the Man, is good, worthy, virtuous.

Ser. III. Creatures are in: But that from his Make, Conftitution, or Nature, he is in the strict

eft and most proper Senfe a Law to himfelf. He hath the Rule of Right within: What is wanting is only that he honestly attend to it.

The Inquiries which have been made by Men of Leifure after fome general Rule, the Conformity to, or Difagreement from which, fhould denominate our Actions Good or Evil, are in many Refpects of great Service: Yet let any plain honest Man, before he engages in any Course of Action, ask himself, Is this I am going about Right, or is it Wrong? Is it Good, or is it Evil? I do not in the leaft doubt but this Question would be answered agreeably to Truth and Virtue, by almost any fair Man in almost aCircumftance. Neither do there appear any Cafes which look like Exceptions to this, but those of Superftition and Partiality to ourselves. Superftition may perhaps be fomewhat of an Exception; but Partiality to ourselves is not, this being itself Dishonesty. For Man to judge that to be the equitable, the moderate, the right Part for him to act, which he would fee to be hard, unjuft, oppressive in another, this is plain

ny

Vice, and can proceed only from great Un- Ser. III. fairness of Mind.

But allowing that Mankind hath the Rule of Right within himself, yet it may be asked, What Obligations are we under to attend to and follow it? I anfwer; It has been proved that Man by his Nature is a Law to himself, without the particular diftinct Confideration of the pofitive Sanctions of that Law, the Rewards and Punishments which from the Light of Reason we have ground to believe are annext to it. The Question then carries its own Answer along with it. Your Obligation to obey this Law, is its being the Law of your Nature. That your Confcience approves of and attefts to fuch a Course of Action, is itself alone an Obligation. Conscience does not only offer itself to fhew us the Way we should walk in, but it likewife carries its own Authority with it, that it is our natural Guide, the Guide affigned us by the Author of our Nature: It therefore belongs to our Condition of Being, it is our Duty, to walk in that Path and follow this Guide, without looking about to fee whether we may not poffibly forfake them with Impunity. However, let us hear what is to be said against E obeying

Ser. III. obeying this Law of our Nature. And the Sum is no more than this. "Why should "we be concerned about any thing out of "and beyond ourfelves? If we do find with" in ourselves Regards to others, and Re"ftraints of we know not how many dif"ferent Kinds, yet thefe being Embarass"ments, and hindering us from going the "nearest Way to our own Good, why "should we not endeavour to fupprefs and

get over them?". Thus People go on with Words, which when applied to Humane Nature, and the Condition in which it is placed in this World, have really no Meaning. For does not all this kind of Talk go upon Suppofition, that our Happiness in this World confifts in somewhat quite diftinct from Regards to others; and that it is the Priviledge of Vice to be with. out Restraint or Confinement? Whereas on the contrary the Enjoyments, in a Manner all the common Enjoyments of Life, even the Pleasures of Vice, depend upon these Regards of one Kind or another to our Fellow-Creatures. Throw off all Regards to others, and we should be quite indifferent to Infamy and to Honour; there could be no fuch thing at all as Ambition; and fcarce