Ser. II.as his external Actions: Which paffes Judg. ment upon himself and them; pronounces determinately fome Actions to be in themselves juft, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust: Which without being confulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns Him the doer of them accordingly: And which if not forcibly stopp'd, naturally and always of Course goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual Sentence, which fhall hereafter second and affirm its own. But this Part of the Office of Conscience is beyond my present Defign explicitely to confider. It is by this Faculty, natural to Man, that he is a moral Agent, that he is a Law to himself: By this Faculty, I fay, not to be confidered meerly as a Principle in his Heart, which is to have fome Influence as well as others; but confidered as a Faculty in Kind and in Nature fupream over all others, and which bears its own Authority of being fo. This Prerogative, this natural Supremacy of the Fa culty which furveys, approves, or difapproves the feveral Affections of our Mind, and Actions of our Lives, being that by which Men are a Law to themfelves, their Conformity

Conformity or Difobedience to which Law Ser. II. of our Nature renders their Actions in the highest and most proper Senfe natural or unnatural; it is fit it be further explained to you: And I hope it will be fo, if you will attend to the following Reflections.

Man may act according to that Principle or Inclination which for the present happens to be strongest, and yet act in a Way disproportionate to, and violate his real proper Nature. Suppose a brute Creature by any Bait to be allured into a Snare by which he is destroyed: He plainly followed the Bent of his Nature leading him to gratify his Appetite; there is an entire Correfpondence between his whole Nature and fuch an Action; fuch Action therefore is natural. But fuppose a Man, foreseeing the fame Danger of certain Ruin, fhould rush into it for the fake of a prefent Gratification: He in this Inftance would follow his strongest Defire, as did the brute Creature; but there would be as manifeft a Difproportion between the Nature of a Man and fuch an Action,as between the meaneftWork of Art, and the Skill of the greatest Master in that Art: Which Difproportion arifes not from confidering the Action fingly in itself, or

Ser. II. in its Confequences; but from Comparison of it with the Nature of the Agent. And fince fuch an Action is utterly difproportionate to the Nature of Man, it is in the ftricteft and moft proper Senfe unnatural, this Word expreffing that Difproportion. Therefore instead of the Words Difproportionate to his Nature, the Word Unnatural may now be put, this being more familiar to us: But let it be observed, that it ftands for the fame thing precisely. Now what is it which renders fuch a rafh Action unnatural? Is it that he went against the Principle of reafonable and cool Self-love, confidered meerly as a Part of his Nature? No; for if he had acted the contrary Way, he would equally have gone against a Principle or Part of his Nature, Passion or Appetite. But to deny a prefent Appetite, from Forefight that the Gratification of it would end in immediate Ruin or extream Mifery, is by no Means an unnatural Action: Whereas to contradict or go against cool Self-love for the fake of fuch Gratification, is fo in the Inftance before us. Such an Action then being unnatural, and its being fo not arifing from a Man's going against a Principle or Defire barely, nor in going against

that

that Principle or Defire which happens for Ser. II. the present to be strongeft; it neceffarily follows, that there must be fome other Difference or Diftinction to be made between these two Principles, Paffion and cool Selflove, than what I have yet taken Notice of: And this Difference not being a Difference in Strength or Degree, I call a Difference in Nature and in Kind. And fince in the Inftance ftill before us, if Paflion prevails over Self-love, the consequent A&tion is unnatural; but if Self-love prevails over Paffion, the Action is natural: It is manifeft that Self-love is in Humane Nature a fuperiour Principle to Paffion. This may be contradicted without violating that Nature, but the former cannot. So that if we will act conformably to the Oeconomy of Humane Nature, reasonable Self-love

must govern. Thus, without particular

Confideration of Confcience, we may have a clear Conception of the fuperiour Nature of one inward Principle to another, and fee that there really is this natural Superiority, quite diftinct from Degrees of Strength and Prevalency.

Let us now take a View of the Nature of Man, as confifting of various Appetites, Paffions,

D 4

Ser. II. Paffions, Affections, together with the Principle of Reflection or Conscience, leaving quite out all Confideration of the different Degrees of Strength in which either of them prevail. The former implies a direct fimple Tendency towards fuch and fuch Objects, without Diftinction of the Means by which they are to be obtained. Confequently from the former, Appetite or Paffion, there will be a Defire of particular Objects, in Cafes where they cannot be obtained without manifeft Injury to others. Reflection or Confcience comes in, and difapproves the Purfuit of them in these Circumftances; but the Defire remains. Which is to be obeyed, Appetite or Reflection? Cannot this Queftion be answered from the Oeconomy and Constitution of Humane Nature meerly, without faying which is ftrongeft? Or need this at all come into Confideration? Would not the Question be intelligibly and fully anfwered by faying, that the Principle of Reflection or Conscience being compared with the various Ap. petites, Paffions, and Affections in Men, the former is manifeftly fuperiour and chief, without regard to Strength? And how often foever the latter happens to prevail, it is

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