can afford Satisfaction, only as it is a prefent Serm. Object to the Principle of Self-love. XIII.

It was doubtless intended, that Life fhould be very much a Pursuit to the Grofs of Man 1 kind: But this is carried fo much further than is reasonable, that what gives immediate Satisfaction, i. e. our prefent Intereft, is fcarce confidered as our Intercft at all. It is Inventions which have only a remote Tendency towards Enjoyment, perhaps but a remote Tendency towards gaining the Means only of Enjoyment, which are chiefly spoken of as ufeful to the World. And though this way of thinking were just with respect to the imperfect State we are now in, where we know fo little of Satisfaction without Saticty; yet it must be guarded againft, when we are confidering the Happiness of a State of Perfection; which Happiness being Enjoyment and not Hope, muft neceffarily confift in this, that our Affections have their Objects, and reft in those Objects as an End, i. e. be fatisfied with them. This will further appcar in the Sequel of this Difcourfe.

Of the feveral Affections, or inward Sen. fations, which particular Objects excite in Man, there are some, the having of which implics the Love of them, when they are $ 3 reflect

Serm. reflected upon. This cannot be said of all XIII. our Affections, Principles, and Motives of

Action. It were ridiculous to affert, that a Man upon Reflection hath the fame Kind of Approbation of the Appetite of Hunger, or the Paffion of Fear, as he hath of Good-will to his Fellow-creatures. To be a just, a good, a righteous Man, plainly carries with it a peculiar Affection to, or Love of Justice, Goodness, Righteoufnefs, when these Principles are the Objects of Contemplation. Now if a Man approves of, or hath an Affection to, any Principle in and for itself; incidental things allowed for, it will be the fame whether he views it in his own Mind or in another; in himself, or in his Neighbour. This is the Account of our Approbation of, our moral Love and Affection to good Characters; which cannot but be in thofe who have any Degrees of real Goodness in themselves, and who difcern and take Notice of the fame Principle in others.

From Observation of what paffeth within ourselves, our own Actions, and the Be. haviour of others, the Mind may carry on its Reflections as far as it pleafes; much beyond what we experience in ourselves, or difcern in our Fellow-creatures. It may go

on

on, and confider Goodness as become an uni- Serm. form continued Principle of Action, as con- XIII. ducted by Reason, and forming aTemper and Character abfolutely good and perfect, which is in a higher Senfe excellent, and proportionably the Object of Love and Approbation.

Let us then suppose a Creature perfect according to his created Nature: Let his Form be Humane, and his Capacities no more than equal to thofe of the Chief of Men: Goodnefs fhall be his proper Character; with Wisdom to direct it, and Power within fome certain determined Sphere of Action to exert it. But Goodness must be the fimple actuating Principle within him; this being the moral Quality which is amiable, or the immediate Object of Love as distinct from other Affections of Approbation. Here then is a finite Object for our Mind to tend towards, to exercise itself upon : A Creature, perfect according to his Capacity, fixt, fteady, equally unmoved by weak Pity or more weak Fury and Refentment; forming the jufteft Scheme of Conduct; going on undisturbed in the Execution of it, through the feveral Methods of Severity and Reward, towards his End, namely, the general Happiness of all with whom he hath to do, as

Serm. in itself right and valuable. This Character, XIII. though uniform in itself, in its Principle, yet exerting itself in different Ways, or confidered in different Views, may by its appearing Variety move different Affections. Thus, the Severity of Juftice would not affect us in the fame Way, as an Act of Mercy: The adventitious Qualities of Wisdom and Power may be confidered in themselves: And even the Strength of Mind, which this immoveable Goodness fuppofes, may likewise be viewed as an Object of Contemplation, diftinct from the Goodness itself. Superiour Excellence of any Kind, as well as fuperior Wisdom and Power, is the Object of Awe and Reverence to all Creatures, whatever their moral Character be: But fo far as Creatures of the lowest Rank were good, so far the View of this Character, as fimply good, must appear amiable to them, be the Object of, or beget Love. Further, fuppofe we were confcious, that this fuperior Person so far approved of us, that we had nothing fervilely to fear from him; that he was really our Friend, and kind and good to us in particular, as he had occafionally Intercourse with us: We must be other Creatures than we are, or we could not but feel the fame

Kind of Satisfaction and Enjoyment (what- Serm. ever would be the Degree of it) from this XIII. higher Acquaintance, as we feel from common Friendships; the Intercourse being real, and the Perfons equally prefent,in both Cases. We fhould have a more ardent Defire to be approved by his better Judgment, and a higher Satisfaction in that Approbation, than any thing of this Sort which could be felt in refpect to common Perfons, or be wrought in us by their Prefence. Let us now raise the Character, and fuppofe this Creature, for we are ftill going on with the Suppofition of a Creature, our proper Guardian and Governour; that we were in a Progrefs of Being towards fomewhat further, and that his Scheme of Government was too vaft for our Capacities to comprehend; remembring ftill that he is perfectly Good. Wisdom, Power, Goodness, accidentally viewed any where, would inspire Reverence, Awe, Love: And as thefe Affections would be raised in higher or lower Degrees, in Proportion as we had occafionally more or lefs Intercourfe with the Creature endued with those Qualitics; fo this further Confideration and Knowledge, that he was our proper Guardian and Governor, would much more bring

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