Serm. Liableness to Abuse, or by its fuppofed DiXIII. ftance from or Nearness to Error.

It may

be fufficient to have mentioned this in general, without taking Notice of the particular Extravagancies, which have been vented under the Pretence or Endeavour of explaining the Love of God; or how manifeftly we are got into the contrary Extream, under the Notion of a reasonable Religion; so very reasonable, as to have nothing to do with the Heart and Affections, if these Words fignify any thing but the Faculty by which we difcern Speculative Truth.

By the Love of God, I would understand all those Regards, all those Affections of Mind, which are due immediately to him from fuch a Creature as Man, and which As this does not

reft in him as their End.

include fervile Fear; fo neither will any other Regards, how reasonable foever, which respect any thing out of or befides the Perfection of the divine Nature, come into Confideration here. But all Fear is not excluded, because his Displeasure is itself the natural proper Object of Fear. Reverence, Ambition of his Love and Approbation, Delight in the Hope or Consciousness of it, come likewife into this Definition of the

Love of God; because he is the natural Serm. Object of all thofe Affections or Movements XIII. of Mind, as really as he is the Object of the Affection, which is in the ftrictcft Sense called Love; and all of them equally reft in him, as their End. And they may all be understood to be implied in these Words of our Saviour, without putting any Force upon them; for he is speaking of the Love of God and our Neighbour, as containing the whole of Piety and Virtue.

It is plain that the Nature of Man is fo conftituted, as to feel certain Affections upon the Sight or Contemplation of certain Objects. Now the very Notion of Affection implies refting in its Object as an End. And the particular Affection to good Characters, Reverence and moral Love of them, is natural to all those who have any Degree of real Goodness in themselves. This will be illuftrated by the Description of a perfect Character in a Creature; and by confidering the Manner, in which a good Man in his Prefence would be affected towards fuch a Character. He would of Courfe feel the Affections of Love, Reverence, Defire of his Approbation, Delight in the Hope or Consciousness of it. And furely all this is S applica

Serm. applicable, and may be brought up to that XIII. Being, who is infinitely more than an ade

quate Object of all thofe Affections; whom we are commanded to Love with all our Heart, with all our Soul, and with all our Mind. And of thefe Regards towards Al mighty God, fome are more particularly fuitable to and becoming fo imperfect a Crea ture as Man, in this mortal State we are paffing through; and fome of them, and perhaps other Exercises of the Mind, will be the Employment and Happiness of good Men in a State of Perfection.

And it is

This is a general View of what the fol lowing Difcourfe will contain. manifeft the Subject is a real one: There is nothing in it enthufiaftical or unreasona ble. And if it be indeed at all a Subject, it is one of the utmost Importance.

As Mankind have a Faculty by which they difcern fpeculative Truth; fo we have va rious Affections towards external Objects. Understanding and Temper, Reason and Affection, are as diftinct Ideas, as Reason and Hunger; and one would think could no more be confounded. It is by Reason that we get the Ideas of feveral Objects of our Affections: But in thefe Cafes Reason and Affection

Affection are no more the fame, than Sight Serm. of a particular Object, and the Pleasure or XIII. Uneafinefs confequent thereupon, are the

fame. Now as Reafon tends to and refts in the Discernment of Truth, the Object of it; fo the very Nature of Affection confifts in tending towards, and refting in, its Object as an End. We do indeed often in common Language fay, that things are loved, defired, esteemed, not for themselves, but for fomewhat further, fomewhat out of and beyond them: Yet, in thefe Cafes, whoever will attend will fee, that these Things are not in Reality the Objects of the Af fections, i. e. are not loved, defired, efteemed, but the fomewhat further and beyond them. If we have no Affections which reft in what are called their Objects, then what is called Affection, Love, Defire, Hope, in Humane Nature, is only an uneafiness in being at Reft; an unquiet Disposition to Action, Progress, Pursuit, without End or Meaning. But if there be any fuch thing as Delight in the Company of one Perfon, rather than of another; whether in the Way of Friendship, or Mirth and Entertainment, it is all one, if it be without refpect to Fortune, Honour, or increafing our Stores

Serm. of Knowledge, or anything beyond the pre XIII. fent time; here is an Inftance of an Affec

tion abfolutely refting in its Object as it End, and being gratified, in the fame Way a the Appetite of Hunger is fatisfied with Food Yet nothing is more common than to hear i asked, What Advantage a Man hath in fuch a Course, fuppofe of Study, particula Friendships, or in any other; nothing, I fay, is more common than to hear such a Que stion put in a Way which supposes no Gain, Advantage or Intereft, but as a Means to fomewhat further: And if fo, then there is no fuch thing at all as real Intereft, Gain or Advantage. This is the fame Abfurdity with refpect to Life, as an infinite Series of Effects without a Cause is in Speculation. The Gain, Advantage or Interest consists in the Delight itself, arising from such a Facul ties having its Object: Neither is there any fuch thing as Happiness or Enjoyment, but what arifes from hence. The Pleasures of Hope and of Reflection are not Exceptions: The former being only this Happiness anticipated; the latter, the fame Happiness enjoyed over again after its Time. And even the general Expectation of future Happiness

can