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"felves, makes us regardless of our own Serm. "Intereft, and fubftitute that of another in XI. "its ftead. " Whether there be any peculiar Competition and Contrariety in this Cafe, fhall now be confidered. Self-love and Interestedness was ftated to confift in or be an Affection to ourselves, a Regard to our own private Good: It is therefore diftinct from Benevolence, which is an Affection to the Good of our Fellow-creatures. But that Benevolence is diftin&t from, that is, not the fame thing with Self-love, is no Reason for its being looked upon with any peculiar Sufpicion; because every Principle whatever, by means of which that Self-love is gratified, is diftinct from it: And all things which are diftinct from each other, are equally fo. A Man has an Affection or Averfion to another: That one of these tends to and is gratified by doing Good, that the other tends to and is gratified by doing Harm, does not in the least alter the Respect which either one or the other of these inward Feelings has to Self-love. We use the Word Property so as to exclude any other Persons having an Intereft in that of which we fay a particular Man has the Property. And we often use the Word P 2 Selfish

Serm. Selfish fo as to exclude all Regards to the XI. Good of others. And as it is taken for

granted in the former Cafe, that the external Good, in which we have a Property exclufive of all others, muft for this Reason have a nearer and greater Respect to private Intereft, than it would have if it were enjoyed in common with others; fo likewise it is taken for granted, that the Principle of an Action, which does not proceed from Regard to the Good of others, has a nearer and greater Refpect to Self-love, or is lefs diftant from it. But whoever will at all attend to the thing, will fee that these Confequences do not follow. For as the Enjoyment of the Air in which we breath is just as much our private Interest and Advan tage now, as it would be if none but ourfelves had the Benefit of it; fo Love of our Neighbour has juft the fame Refpect to, is no more distant from Self-love, than Hatred of our Neighbour, or than Love or Hatred of any thing else. Thus the Principles, from which Men rush upon certain Ruin for the Deftruction of an Enemy, and for the Prefervation of a Friend, have the fame Refpect to the private Affection, and are equally interested, or equally difinterefted:

And

And it is of no Avail, whether they are faid Serm. to be one or the other. Therefore to those XI. who are shocked to hear Virtue spoken of as difinterested, it may be allowed that it is indeed abfurd to fpeak thus of it; unless Hatred, several particular Inftances of Vice, and all the common Affections and Averfions in Mankind, are acknowledged to be difinterested too. Is there any less Inconfiftence, between theLove of inanimate Things, or ofCreatures meerly fenfitive,and Self-love; than between Self-love, and the Love of our Neighbour? Is Defire of and Delight in the Happiness of another any more a Diminution of Self-love, than Defire of and Delight in the Efteem of another? They are both equally Defire of and Delight in fomewhat external to ourselves; either both or neither are so. The Object of Self-love is expreffed in the Term, Self; and every Appetite of Senfe, and every particular Affection of the Heart, are equally interested or difinterested, because the Objects of them all are equally Self or fomewhat elfe. Whatever Ridicule therefore the mention of a difinterested Principle or Action may be fupposed to lie open to, muft, upon the Matter being thus ftated, relate to Ambition,

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Scrm. and every Appetite and particular AffectiXI. on, as much as to Benevolence. And indeed all the Ridicule, and all the grave Perplexity, of which this Subject hath had its full Share, is meerly from Words. The most intelligible Way of speaking of it seems to be this: That Self-love, and the Actions done in confequence of it, are interested; that particular Affections towards external Objects, and the Actions done in confequence of thofe Affections, are not fo. But every one is at Liberty to ufe Words as he pleases. All that is here infifted upon is, that Ambition, Revenge, Benevolence, all particular Paffions whatever, and the Actions they produce, are equally interested or difinterested.

But fince Self-love is not private Good, fince Interestedness is not Intereft; let us now fee whether Benevolence has not the fame Respect to, the fame Tendency toward promoting, private Good and Intereft, with the other particular Paffions; as it hath been already fhewn, that they have all in common the fame Refpect to Self-love and Interestedness. One Man's Affection is to Honour as his End; in order to obtain which, he thinks no Pains too great. Suppofe an

other

other with fuch a Singularity of Mind, as Serm.

to have the fame Affection to public

Good

as his End, which he endeavours with the fame Labour to obtain. In Cafe of Succefs, furely the Man of Benevolence hath as great Enjoyment as the Man of Ambition; they both equally having the End their Affections, in the fame Degree, tended to: But in Cafe of Disappointment, the benevolent Man has clearly the Advantage; fince Benevolence, confidered as a Principle of Virtue, is gratified by its own Consciousness, i. e. is in a Degree its own Reward.

And as to these two, or any other particular Paffions, confidered in a further View, as forming a general Temper, which more or less difpofes us for Enjoyment of all the common Bleffings of Life, diftinct from their own Gratification: Does the benevolent Man appear lefs cafy with himself, from his Love to his Neighbour? Does he less relifh his Being? Is there any peculiar Gloom feated on his Face? Is his Mind less open to Entertainment, to any particular Gratification Nothing is more manifeft, than that being in Good-humour, which is Benevolence whilft it lasts, is itself the Temper of Satisfaction and Enjoyment. P 4 Suppofe

XI.

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