Serm. other: And these Persons may probably X. judge and determine what is perfectly just and proper, even in Things in which they themfelves are concerned, if these things have no Relation to their particular favourite Paffion or Purfuit. Hence arises that amazing Incongruity, and seeming Inconsistency of Character, from whence flight Observers take it for granted, that the Whole is hypocritical and false; not being able otherwise to reconcile the several Parts: Whereas in Truth there is real Honefty, fo far as it goes. There is fuch a thing as Men's being honeft to fuch a Degree, and in fuch Refpects, but no farther. And this, as it is true, so it is absolutely neceffary to be taken Notice of, and allowed them; fuch general and undistinguishing Censure of their whole Character, as de. figning and false, being one main thing which confirms them in their Self-deceit. They know that the whole Cenfure is not true; and fo take for granted that no Part of it is. But to go on with the Explanation of the thing itself: Vice in general confifts in having an unreasonable and too great Regard to ourselves, in Comparison of others. Robbery and Murder is never from the Love of Injuftice or Cruelty, but to gra

tify fome other Paffion, to gain fome fup- Serm. posed Advantage; and it is falfe Selfishness X. alone, whether cool or paffionate, which makes a Man refolutely pursue that End, be it ever fo much to the Injury of another. But whereas, in common and ordinary Wickednefs, this Partiality and Selfishness relates only, or chiefly, to the Temper and Paffions; in the Characters we are now confidering, it reaches to the Understanding, and influences the very Judgment *. And befides that ge.

neral

* That peculiar Regard for ourfelves, which frequently produces this Partiality of Judgment in our own Favour, may have a quite contrary Effect, and occafion the utmoft Diffidence and Diftruft of ourselves; were it only, as it may fet us upon a more frequent and ftrict Survey and Review of our own Character and Behaviour. This Search or Recollection itfelf implies fomewhat of Diffidence; and the Discoveries we make, what is brought to our View, may poffibly increase it. Good-will to another may either blind our Judgment, fo as to make us overlook his Faults; or it may put us upon exercifing that Judgment with greater ftrictness, to fee whether he be fo faultlefs and perfect as we wish him. If that peculiar Regard to ourselves leads us to examine our own Character with this greater Severity, in order really to improve and grow better, it is the moft commendable Turn of Mind poffible, and can fcarce be to Excefs. But if, as every Thing hath its Counterfeit, we are fo much employed about ourselves in order to Difguise what is amifs, and to make a better Appearance; or if our Attention to ourselves has chiefly this Effect; it is liable to run up into the greatest Weakness

and

3

X.

Serm. neral want of Diftruft and Diffidence concerning our own Character, there are, you fee, two things which may thus prejudice and darken the Understanding itself: That Over-fondness for ourselves, which we are all fo liable to; and also being under the Power of any particular Paffion or Appetite, or engaged in any particular Purfuit. And these, especially the last of the two, may be in fo great a Degree, as to influence our Judgment, even of other Perfons and their Behaviour. Thus a Man, whofe Temper is formed to Ambition or Covetousness, shall even approve of them fometimes in others.

This seems to be in a good Measure the Account of Self-partiality and Self-deceit, when traced up to its original. Whether it be, or be not thought fatisfactory, That there is fuch a thing is manifeft; and that it is the Occafion of great Part of the unreafonable Behaviour of Men towards each other: That by means of it they palliate their Vices and Follies to themselves; and that it prevents their applying to themselves those Reproofs and Inftructions, which they meet

with

and Excefs, and is like all other Exceffes its own Difappointment: For scarce any show themselves to Advantage, who are over follicitous of doing so.

X.

with either in Scripture or in moral and re- Serm. ligious Discourses, though exactly suitable to the State of their own Mind, and the Course of their Behaviour. There is one thing further to be added here, that the Temper we distinguish by Hardness of Heart with respect to others, joined with this Self-partiality, will carry a Man almoft any Lengths of Wickedness, in the Way of Oppreffion, hard Ufage of others, and even to plain Injustice ; without his having, from what appears, any real Sense at all of it. This indeed was not the Cafe of David; for he plainly gave Scope to the Affections of Compassion and Good-will, as well as to his Passions of another Kind.

As to the Occafions upon which this Selfdeceit chiefly comes in and influences the Behaviour of Men; It is to be observed, that as there are express determinate A&s of Wickedness, such as Murder, Adultery, Theft: So on the other hand, there are numberlefs Cafes in which the Vice and Wickedness cannot be exactly defined; but consists in a certain general Temper and Course of Action, or in the neglect of fome Duty, fuppofe Charity or any other, whofe Bounds and Degrees are not fixed. This is the very Province

of

Serm. of Self-deceit and Self-partiality: Here it X. governs without Check or Controul.

P

For

what Commandment is there broken? Is there a Tranfgreffion where there is no Law? a Vice which cannot be defined? Whoever will confider the whole Commerce of Humane Life, will fee that a great Part, perhaps the greatest Part, of the Intercourse amongst Mankind, cannot be reduced to fixed determinate Rules. Yet in thefe Cafes there is a Right and a Wrong: A merciful, a liberal, a kind and compaffionate Behaviour, which furely is our Duty; and an unmerciful, contracted Spirit, an hard and oppreffive Course of Behaviour, which is most certainly immoral and vitious. But who can define precifely, wherein that contracted Spirit and hard Ufage of others confift, as Murder and Theft may be defined? There is not a Word in our Language, which expreffeth more deteftable Wickedness than Oppreffion; yet the Nature of this Vice cannot be fo exactly stated, nor the Bounds of it fo determinately marked, as that we shall be able to say in all Instances, where rigid Right and Justice ends, and Oppreflion begins. In these Cases there is great Latitude to be left, for every one to determine for, and confequently to deceive

himself.