upon whom the Revenge is taken. Now, if Serm. we confider Mankind, according to that IX. fine Allufion of St. Paul, as one Body, and every one Members one of another; it must be allowed that Refentment is, with Refpect to Society, a painful Remedy. Thus then the very Notion or Idea of this Paflion, as a Remedy or Prevention of Evil, and as in itself a painful Means, plainly fhews that it ought never to be made ufe of, but only in order to produce fome greater Good.

It is to be observed, that this Argument is not founded upon an Allufion or Simile; but that it is drawn from the very Nature of the Paffion itself, and the End for which it was given us. We are obliged to make ufe of Words taken from fenfible things, to explain what is the most remote from them And every one fees, from whence the Words Prevention and Remedy are taken. But if you please, let these Words be dropped; the thing itself, I fuppofe, may be exprefs'd' without them.

That Mankind is a Community, that we all ftand in a Relation to each other, that there is a publick Intereft of Society which cach Particular is obliged to promote, is the Sum of Morals. Confider then the Pafli

Serm. on of Refentment, as given to this one BoIX. dy, as given to Society. Nothing can be

more manifeft, than that Refentment is to be confidered as a fecondary Paffion, placed in us upon Suppofition, upon Account of, and with Regard to Injury; not, to be fure, to promote and further it, but to render it, and the Inconveniences and Miseries arifing from it, lefs and fewer than they would be without this Paffion. It is as manifeft, that the Indulgence of it is, with Regard to Society, a painful Means of obtaining these Ends. Confidered in itself, it is very undefirable, and what Society must very much wish to be without. It is in every Instance absolutely an Evil in itself; because it implies producing Mifery: And confequently muft never be indulged or gratified for itself, by any one who confiders Mankind as a Community or Family, and himself as a Member of it.

Let us now take this in another View. Every natural Appetite, Paffion and Affection, may be gratified in particular Instances, without being fubfervient to the particular chief End, for which these several Principles were respectively implanted in our Nature. And, if neither this End, nor any

other

other moral Obligation be contradicted, Serm.' fuch Gratification is innocent. Thus, I IX. suppose, there are Cafes in which each of these Principles, this one of Resentment excepted, may innocently be gratified, without being fubfervient to what is the main End of it: That is, though it does not conduce to, yet it may be gratified without contradicting that End, or any other Obligation. But the Gratification of Resentment, if it be not conducive to the End for which it was given us, muft neceffarily contradict, not only the general Obligation to Benevolence, but likewife that particular End itself. The End, for which it was given, is to prevent or remedy Injury; i. e. the Mifery occafioned by Injury; i. e. Mifery itself: And the Gratification of it confifts in producing Misery; i. e. in contra. dicting the End, for which it was implanted in our Nature.

This whole Reasoning is built upon the Difference there is between this Pafsion and all others. No other Principle, or Paffion, aims at the Mifery of our Fellow-crea tures, as its End. But Malice and Revenge meditates Evil itfelf; and to do Mischief, to be the Author of Mifery, is the very Thing M 2 which

Serm. which gratifies the Paffion: This is what it IX. directly tends towards, as its proper Defign. Other Vices eventually do Mifchief: This alone aims at it as an End.

As to any thing which can be urged in Juftification of Revenge, from the Effects which the Indulgence of it were before mentioned to have upon the Affairs of the World, it cannot be to the Purpose; becaufe, though it be a remarkable Instance of the Wisdom of Providence to bring Good out of Evil, yet Vice is Vice to him who is guilty of it. "But fuppofe these good " Effects are forefeen :" That is, Suppofe Reason in a particular Cafe leads a Man the fame Way as Paffion? Why then, to be fure, he fhould follow his Reason, in this as well as in all other Cafes. So that, turn the Matter which way ever you will, no more can be allowed to this Passion, than what hath been already †.

As to that Love of our Enemies, which is commanded, this fuppofes the general Obligation to Benevolence or Good-will towards Mankind; and this being fuppofed, that Precept is no more than to forgive In

juries ;

Serm. VIII. p. 152. + Serm. VIII. p. 151.

juries; that is, to keep clear of thofe Abuses Serm. before mentioned: Because that we have IX. the habitual Temper of Benevolence, is taken for granted.

Resentment is not inconfiftent with Goodwill: For we often fee both together in very high Degrees; not only in Parents towards their Children, but in Cafes of Friendship and Dependance, where there is no natural Relation. These contrary Paffions, though they may leffen, do not neceffarily destroy each other. We may therefore love our Enemy, and yet have Refentment against him for his injurious Behaviour towards us: But when this Refentment intirely destroys our natural Benevolence towards him, it is exceffive, and becomes Malice or Revenge : The Command, to prevent its having this Effect, i. e. to forgive Injuries, is the fame as to love our Enemies; because that Love is always fuppofed, unless destroyed by Refentment.

But though Mankind is the natural Object of Benevolence, yet may it not be lef fened upon Vice, i. e. Injury? Allowed: But if every Degree of Vice or Injury must destroy that Benevolence, then no Man is